ALEXANDER HAMILTON 



• And in regions far, 
Such lieroes bring ye forth 
As those from whom we came ; 
And plant our name 
Under that star 
Not kno\vu unto our North.' 

To the Virginian Voyage. 

—Drayton. 






'X 





ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

An Essay on American Union 



BY 



FREDEEICK SCOTT OLIVER 



I 



NEW EDITION 
WITH FRONTISPIECE AND A MAP 



New York: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
London: ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO. LTD. 

1907 






i IViAY 18 13-12 



Ellntar-l, : T. and A. Co».«,„, Pri„i„, ,„ „„ „,jj„y _\ 



TO 

THE MEMORY OF 

CHARLES WELLINGTON FURSE 

WHOSE FRIENDSHIP ENCOURAGED ME 
TO UNDERTAKE THIS WORK. 



PREFACE 

I WISH to acknowledge the debt I owe to various friends 
who have done me the honour to read the proofs of this 
essay. I have not ceased to marvel at their kindness and 
their patience. Their advice has helped me at many points, 
and, although their frankness has occasionally been some- 
Avhat disconcerting, it has been mingled with encourage- 
ment. As a result I have completed a task which less 
biased critics may well consider to have been presump- 
tuously undertaken. 

In particular I have to thank Miss Mary Stubbert for her 
valuable assistance ; but at the same time it is necessary to 
make it clear that she is not to be held responsible for the 
opinions I have ventured to express on men and events. 
I am well aware that in several instances she is in dis- 
agreement with my conclusions. I wish also to thank Mr. 
William Wallace, who has read and corrected all the proofs 
for the press, and has compiled the chronological table 
which will be found on pages 490-4, 

The references need a few words of explanation. The 
Works of Alexander Hamilton, in twelve volumes, edited 
by Senator H. C. Lodge (2nd Federal Edition, 1904), and The 
History of the Republic of the United States of America, 
as traced in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton and of 
his Co-temporaries, in seven volumes, by his son John C. 

vU 



viii ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

Hamilton (1857), are mentioned in the footnotes for the 
sake of brevity as Works and History respectively. The 
Life which is quoted is The Life of Alexander Hamilton, 
in one volume, also by his son (1834). There are several 
modern lives and studies of Alexander Hamilton — by Mr. 
John T. Morse, jr., in two volumes (1882) ; by Senator H. C. 
Lodge (1886, 'American Statesmen' series); by Dr. W. G. 
Sumner (1890, ' Makers of America' series); Hamilton and 
his Contemporaries, by Mr. C. J. Riethmtiller (1864); Alex- 
ander Hamilton : a Historical Study (1877), and The Life 
and Epoch of Alexander Hamilton (1879), by Mr. G. Shea. 
A comprehensive bibliography of the period will be found 
in the Car)ihridge Modern History, vol. vii. pp. 780-810. 

The History by John C. Hamilton is open to all the 
objections that may be alleged against a life written by a 
son. It is the work of a vehement partisan. Nothing that 
Alexander Hamilton did is wrong, and all the deeds of his 
opponents are as black as ink. But, notwithstanding, it is 
a book of great value. Of the subject as a man it does not 
afford a single glimpse ; but it abounds in evidence with 
regard to his career. It is full of quotations from the 
letters of friends and enemies, and the abstracts of debates 
are illuminating. Dr. Sumner's volume, on the other hand, 
has a considerable interest because it is written from the point 
of view of the American free-trader, and although the author 
generously acknowledges the great qualities of Hamilton, 
he boldly challenges his economic conclusions. Mr. Rieth- 
mtlller's book was written during the War of Secession. It 
is full of sympathy, but arrives at a strange conclusion. 
Hamilton, in his opinion, would have acquiesced in the dis- 
memberment of the Union. 



PREFACE ix 

It must be frankly admitted that no adequate life of 
Hamilton has yet been written. His achievements have 
been chronicled, praised and condemned; but in the case 
of such a character it is impossible to rest content with an 
account of his public deeds. Hamilton awaits a true inter- 
preter, and it is hardly necessary to say that the present 
volume does not aim at supplying the deficiency. 

The only vivid account of ' the man ' with which I am 
acquainted is to be found in the historical romance by 
Mrs. Atherton, entitled The Conqueror. If the writer of 
a dusty, historical essay may speak without impertinence 
of the merits of such a work, I should venture to express 
my admiration for the insight of the authoress. Her pre- 
sentment of Hamilton, in my humble judgment, is not 
merely a masterly work of art, but a most serious and 
truthful portrait. 

Mrs. Atherton has led us to expect that one day she will 
give us an authentic life of her hero. I could have wished 
that she had accomplished her task before I had engaged 
on mine. At any rate I venture to express the hope, which 
many others must entertain, that her promise will not 
remain for long unfulfilled. 

F. S. O. 

Checkendon Court, Oxfordshire, 
22nd January 1906. 



CONTENTS 



INTRODUCTION, 



PAOB 

3 



BOOK I 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES (A.D. 1757-1783) 



I. Boyhood, .... 


11 


II. The Quarrel with Great Britain, 


19 


III. Early Writings, 


27 


rv. The Beginning of the War, . 


33 


V. The Course of the War, 


44 


VI. The End of the War, . 


56 


VII. The Military Secretary, 


68 


BOOK II 





THE UNION OF THE STATES (A.D, 1780-1788) 

I. Political Writings during the War, . 
II. Congress and the Conduct of the War, 

III. Centrifugal Force and its Consequences, 

IV. Disorder and Anarchy, 
V. The Power of a Vision, 

VI. The Convention of Philadelphia, 
VII. The Federalist, 



83 
96 
111 
123 
138 
147 
165 



xu 



ALEXANDER HAMILTON 



BOOK III 

THE FEDERALISTS (A.D. 1789-1791) 

CHAP. 

I. President Washington, 

II. The Threefold Policy, 

III. Hamilton's Difficulties, 

IV. Secretary of the Treasury, 
V. The Public Credit, . 

VI. Commerce and the Union, 
VII. The Stewardship of the Estate, 



BOOK IV 

THE DEMOCRATS (A.D. 1791-1794) 

I. Thomas Jefferson, 
II. The Origin and Growth of Parties, 

III. Charges of Corruption, 

IV. Foreign Dangers, 

V. The French Revolution and the Declaration of 
Neutrality, . 

VI. The Treaty with Great Britain, 

VII. The Foundations of Foreign Policy 



BOOK V 

THE POLITICIANS (A.D. 1795-1804) 

I. The End of an Epoch, 
II. James Monroe, 

III. John Adams, . 

IV. The Victory of Jefferson, 
V. Aaron Burr, . 

VI. Duel and Death, 
VII. The Failure of the Democrats, 



CONTENTS 



xiu 



BOOK VI 



CONCLUSION 

CHAP. 

I. Some General Remarks, 
II. Whig or Tory t 

III. Union and its Difficulties, 

IV. Nationality and Empire, 

V. Commerce under Two Aspects, 

VI. Sovereignty, . 
VII. The Duties of Empire, 

Appendix I., . 

Appendix II. : Chronological Table, 

Index, 



PAGE 

441 
448 
454 
461 
466 
473 
479 

489 
490 
495 



INTEODUCTION 



But he the wwJce-men what they may be, let us speake of the 
Worhe; that is ; the true greatnesse of kingdoms and estates ; 
and the meanes thereof. — Bagon. 



ALEXANDER HAMILTON 



INTRODUCTION 

Englishmen for the most part are not learned in American 
history. Possibly at the bottom of their neglect lies an 
opinion that the study would prove more profitable than 
entertaining, richer in useful lessons and estimable characters 
than in stirring events and figures of a romantic interest. 
It is necessary to admit that the whole narrative has fallen 
under the suspicion of being somewhat akin to a moral tale, 
in which persons of Radical and Tory proclivities play the 
parts respectively of Sandford and Merton, in order that, in 
the end, democracy and business methods may be glorified 
in the eyes of men. 

The wars of Independence and Secession are the only 
events with which, as a rule, an Englishman pretends to an 
acquaintance, and when he has stated it as his opinion that 
the former was a wise resistance to an intolerable oppres- 
sion, and the latter a humane and heroic enterprise to put 
an end to slavery, he has usually come to the end of his 
conversation. It is not the purpose of this essay to ques- 
tion either of these judgments, but to consider a struggle 
entirely different in its character, which had its origin in 
the war with Britain and its sequel in the war between 
North and South. 

When peace was signed in 1783 the States had indeed 
secured their independence, but union seemed even more 
remote and difficult of attainment than nine years earlier 



4 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

when tlie war began. Tlie United States are to-day so firm a 
political fact that it is not unusual to overlook the critical 
and dangerous period during which they were disunited. We 
are apt to imagine that the war was waged against an 
enemy as compact as ourselves, not against thirteen jealous 
allies whose only serviceable bonds of union were an aspira- 
tion towards independence and a common enemy. 

Another view of the matter has been put forward upon 
high authority. We have been told that, in the passionate 
heat of victory, a unanimous and patriotic impulse, working 
in half-molten metal, wrought and fashioned a noble con- 
stitution. This statement is dramatic, but untrue. No 
travesty of the facts could indeed be more complete. The 
metal was stone-cold, full of cracks and flaws and fissures, 
when the Convention of Philadelphia, six years later, welded 
it together. After more than four months of angry debate, 
the Union was in the end confirmed, but only by a narrow 
majority, and amid indignant protests. Upon its first 
announcement, it had many more enemies than friends 
throughout the continent. For every state claimed a 
separate sovereignty, and was reluctant to part with any 
shred or its authority. Only after a long and difficult 
assault were they persuaded that there would be a greater 
benefit in the surrender. 

When the Constitution was at last acknowledged there 
remained a still more arduous undertaking ; for it was 
necessary to set Government to work, to defend it against 
the open and covert attacks of the party of disintegration, 
and to devise a policy which should have sufficient strength 
and dignity, and hold upon the hearts of men to support the 
fabric of the Union. 

In dramatic quality the history of the war is inferior to 
the course of events after the war had ended. The whole 
situation becomes more tense. The clash of personal 



INTRODUCTION 6 

forces is fiercer, the action swifter ; motives, principles and 
tendencies are easier to comprehend. War is always a 
confusion, filled with irrelevant and distracting excitement. 
The hero, indeed, is visible, but his subordinates are a part 
of the spectacle, not actors in a drama. Private character is 
smothered by discipline or overwhelmed in a single patriotic 
purpose. On the signing of peace men begin to regain their 
humanity. Their tongues are loosened. Ideas and counter 
ideas spring up as soon as the frost-bound repression is 
relaxed. The interest shifts from the opposition of masses 
to the visions and beliefs, the rivalries and hatreds, of indi- 
vidual men. 

In the Revolution, Alexander Hamilton played no promi- 
nent part. He was a boy at college when discontent drew to 
a head, and at the date of the skirmish of Lexington was 
only eighteen years of age. In the War of Independence his 
share was subordinate, though it was brilliant and effective. 
But when the war had ended, he became the master spirit of 
America. 

In the great rebellion Washington was the master spirit. 
In the great struggle to prevent the breaking of the Union, 
Lincoln was the master spirit. In his fitness for the par- 
ticular crisis Hamilton was the equal of these men, and it 
would be hard to find higher praise. In character he was 
their equal ; in force of will ; in efficiency ; in practical 
wisdom ; in courage and in virtue. But in a certain sense 
his greatness surpasses theirs, for it is more universal and 
touches the interest of the whole world in a wider circle. He 
was great in action which is for the moment, and in thought 
which is for all time; and he was great, not merely as a 
minister of state, but as a man of letters. In constancy it is 
customary to compare him with the younger Pitt, who was 
his contemporary. In political foresight and penetration it 



6 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

is no extravagance to place him by the side of Burke. He 
shares with Fox his astounding genius for friendship. 

The end of the eighteenth century was a fertile period. 
Great men abounded in it. Talleyrand had known them 
all, and had contended with most of them. He was himself 
one of the greatest; certainly one of the coolest observers. He 
cherished few illusions, and it has never been said of him, even 
by his bitterest enemy, that he suffered his judgment to be 
duped by his affections. In statecraft he had a wide horizon, 
and his experience enabled him to make just comparisons. 
He mentions Hamilton with the greatest of his contem- 
poraries, even with Napoleon, and mentions him with them 
m order to place him above them. Hamilton's portrait hung 
in his study till he died, and on it was an inscription in his 
own hand, ' that he had loved Hamilton and that Hamilton 
had loved him.' 

To subjects of King Edward the history of the Union of 
the States should be of profound interest at the present 
time. Under many aspects the problems in America at 
the end of the eighteenth century and in the British 
Empire at the beginning of the twentieth bear a startling 
likeness to each other. In the memoirs of the chief actors 
we find a frequent echo of our own phrases. The attitudes 
of men, according to their various temperaments, are the 
same. There are the same enthusiasms and the same 
suspicions ; the same vehement desires, indignant against 
all the race of sceptics ; the same pleas of insuperable 
obstacles and the imprudence of a rash initiative. A 
slightly formal and old-fashioned speech enhances rather 
than conceals the likeness, as the portrait of an ancestor in 
prim cap or flowing periwig startles the beholder by its 
resemblance to some familiar youthful face. 

This romantic influence is not without its danger, and i& 



INTRODUCTION 7 

apt to work in our minds with an excessive vivacity, luring 
us too readily to the conclusion that history is about to 
repeat itself. It is well to remember that when the gods 
arrange the pieces upon their broad chessboard in situations 
which surprise us by their similarity to the order of some 
previous game, it is commonly with the whimsical intention 
of solving the problem in an altogether different manner. 
Viewed with less excitement, the things themselves lose not 
a little of their likeness, and important differences appear. 
We are therefore well advised if we are wary and do not 
assume too much. 

To say, at the present crisis, that the study of American 
history may prove useful and suggestive, is so obvious a 
reflection that it can only be excused by the almost uni- 
versal omission to undertake the labour; but to conclude 
that the Union of the States is a precedent governing our 
own case would be idle talk. For it is the business of the 
British people to-day, as it has been for four centuries past, 
not to follow precedents, but to make them. If it were 
possible to find among the lives of the nations any parallel 
to the British Empire, it might be different; but no parallel 
exists in any records for so diverse and marvellous a growth. 

One of the chief merits of the Americans when they 
framed their constitution was their earnest determination 
to consider the facts of their own case before all else, and 
their firm refusal to be led blindfold either by history or 
logic ; and these, perhaps, are the only rules which can be 
recommended absolutely for every quandary, the only 
examples which it is safe to follow to the letter. Our 
eternal warning should be the Chinese tailor who copies 
a coat even to its patches. When we begin to grope and 
rummage for precedents, our decadence cannot be long 
delayed. The situation must be viewed by each race and 
generation boldly through its own eyes, not timorously 



8 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

with a forefinger in tlie guide-book of history. For though 
we turn over pages never so industriously to discover how 
foreigners or our own kinsmen have acted in circumstances 
somewhat alike, we shall never arrive at any ready-made 
solution of our difficulty. 

Nor, on the other hand, is it the highest wisdom to 
entertain an undue reverence for our own institutions, for 
though these are an elastic garment, there may come a time 
when they will no longer serve. It is a vain hope that by 
cheerfully ignoring danger we shall avoid it. It is rash to 
assume that a constitution must always grow, and that 
it can never be made; or that, by spiriting and conjuring 
over the respectable antiquity of the Privy Council, we shall 
be able to convert the loose confederation of our Empire 
into a firm union. 



BOOK I 

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 

A.D. 1757-1783 



Character is of a stellar and wndiminishaUe greatness. What others 
effect hy talents w hy eloquence, this man accomplishes by some mag- 
netism. ' Half his strength he put not forth.' His victories are by 
demonstration of superiority, and not by crossing of bayonets. He 
conquers, because his arrival alters the face of affairs. ' lole I how 
did you know that Hercules was a God ? ' ' Because,' answered lole, 
' I was content the moment my eyes fell on him. JVhen I beheld 
' Theseus, I desired that I might see him offer battle, or at least guide 
* his horses in the chariot race ; but Hercules did not wait for a contest ; 
' he conquered whether he stood, or walked, or sat, or whatever thing he 
' did.' Man ordinarily a pendant to events, only half attached, and 
that awkwardly, to the world he lives in, in these examples appears to 
share the life of things, and to be an exp-ession of the same laws which 
control the tides and the sun, numbers and quantities. — Emekson. 



BOOK I 

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 

CHAPTER I 

Boyhood 

The childhood of Alexander Hamilton ended when he A.D. 1757 
was eleven years of age. For four years he was a store- 
keeper's clerk at St. Croix, in the Leeward Islands; for 
three he was a college student at New York; for six he 
was a soldier in the War of Independence. After these 
experiences, at the age of twenty-five, he was admitted to 
the bar. His professional career covered a period of twenty- 
two years ; but during five of these he was Secretary of the 
Treasury in General Washington's cabinet, and withdrew 
entirely from practice during the term of his ofiice. He 
was killed in a duel at the age of forty-seven, when his 
fame as a lawyer stood at its highest. 

These are the main divisions of his life; but the bare 
catalogue gives an incomplete idea of his activity. While 
he was a student he wrote and spoke so as to produce a 
considerable influence upon the whole State of New York. 
While he was a soldier he was also an organiser, a diplo- 
matist and a writer of despatches that have a world-wide 
celebrity. From the time he left the army and joined the 
bar until he became head of the most arduous department 
of government, his energies were more deeply engaged in 

promoting the Union of the States than in the practice of 

11 



12 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1757 the law. From the date of his retirement from the cabinet 
until his death he was at the same time leader of the bar 
and the acknowledged chief of a powerful political party. 
He was a boy for eleven years only. Perhaps it would be 
truer to say of him that he was a boy throughout the 
whole of his marvellous career. 

For youth was the distinguishing note of his career. 
His triumph was the triumph of youth : his failure the 
failure of youth. His personal charm and exuberant con- 
fidence did not follow the normal course, mellowing in 
middle life into a genial tolerance, a quieter wisdom, a less 
vehement but more masterful efficiency. The change was 
in a contrary direction. He beheld mankind hobbling and 
hurrying after impossible compromises, striving timidly to 
keep the peace among their ideas by smiling with an equal 
favour upon the most irreconcilable and deadly enemies. 
It is true that under this disappointment his courage never 
flagged. His efforts were as heroic at the end as at the 
beginning. But his heart was filled with a fierce impatience 
and an anger which broke away at times from his control. 
Like a boy who has dreamed a dream, but cannot prevail 
with men to accept it in all its glorious symmetry, he came 
to despair of the consequences to a world containing so much 
obstruction and so many fools. 

It is a rare occurrence under popular government for a 
young statesman to hold the predominant power, for the 
policy of a nation to be moulded by the thoughts of a fresh 
and eager mind, and executed by the vigour of a spirit not 
yet tamed to an immoderate reverence for obstacles. For 
where the people hold the ultimate control, a patient 
dexterity, with which no man was ever born, has in the long 
game of politics an undue advantage. Youth, with a wise 
instinct, abstains as a rule from conspicuous activity in 
serious matters until it has acquired the craft which is the 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 13 

necessary complement of its force, and when it bursts at A.D. 1757 
last upon the admiration of its fellow-citizens, has entered 
into the shadowless and dusty realm of middle age. 

This unfortunate exclusion of youth is to be lamented, 
for age is too considerate of rubbish. Like a housewife in 
her lumber-room, it shrinks from the wise sacrifice of useless 
possessions, pleading ever that at some future day they may 
recover a portion of their former value. The destructiveness 
and extravagance of youth are in many cases the best 
economy and the wisest defence of a nation. The perfect 
government would maintain the balance of youth and age, 
of confidence and experience, no less carefully than the 
balance of poor and rich, of force and breeding, of honesty 
and honour. The embargo on youth impoverishes the 
quality of statesmanship ; but how to remedy the evil is a 
problem which still seeks an answer. All that is most 
excellent in popular government, the wide interest in public 
affairs, the sense of duty, the pursuit of a worthy ambition, 
tend to swell the ranks of old age ; while each fresh com- 
plexity of the conditions and growth of the great machine 
entrenches the veterans more firmly in their advantage. 

Hamilton was not merely a good soldier, a great lawyer, 
a statesman of rare and exceptional splendour, but also a 
figure of deep romantic interest. Such an endowment is 
uncommon, especially in Anglo-Saxon communities, where a 
wise absorption in a single activity is approved by public 
opinion, and any variety of talents is viewed askance. But 
the explanation of his character is not to be found in the 
dramatic temperament. Had he been a better actor he 
must assuredly have been a more successful politician. He 
was as heedless of all matters of style and deportment as of 
his popularity, or even of his life. Ever intent on objects, 
he followed them in and out through the crowd of rapidly 
changing events, caring infinitely less for the opinion people 



14 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1757 formed upon his personal merits than for the ultimate 
success of his pursuit. Few men, filling so large a space in 
history, have been less concerned with their own particular 
appearance or fame in the pageant of affairs. He became a 
soldier upon a generous impulse, a lawyer for a living, a 
statesman because it was the strongest passion of his nature 
to promote union, order and progress. The circumstances 
of his birth and of his death, his private adventures and 
the publicity that political malice has caused them to 
assume, cannot by any ingenuity be traced to a disposition 
for the picturesque. 

To pretend that he had no joy in battle, no exultation in 
victory, would be absurd, for his nature was frank and 
vehement. He was never detached and seldom reticent. 
To endure human folly in patient and hopeful expectation 
of the inevitable reaction was contrary to his character. He 
had no hatred of limelight nor horror of applause, but both 
with him were secondary matters. Throughout his whole 
life the paramount motive was to get things done, not to 
make himself a great fame by doing things. So unusual an 
ambition has caused him to be suspected of an inordinate 
subtlety. To the common politician whose main sincerity 
is his determination to ride into popular notice on the back 
of a grievance or a fit of hysterics, such an attitude is 
wholly incredible. He cannot fathom the depths of a 
spirit that loves union, and order, and progress for their 
own sakes, and seeks power, not as an end in itself, but as 
a means to the accomplishment of a vision. And yet, to 
the candid reader of Hamilton's life and writings, nothing 
is clearer at every turn than that he came to enact his high 
and notable part in public affairs chiefly because it seemed 
to be the only way open to him of getting the work done 
which he considered essential for the salvation of his 
adopted country. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 15 

Alexander Hamilton was born a British subject in the A.D. 1757 
island of Nevis, in the Leeward Group, on the 11th of January 
1757. On both sides he was of gentle descent.^ His father 
was one James Hamilton, a younger son of Hamilton of 
Grange, in Lanarkshire ; his mother, Rachel ^ Faucette, the 
daughter of a Huguenot emigrant. Rachel Faucette had 
been previously married to a Dane, but finding her life 
insupportable had left him.^ Gossip asserts that, divorce 
having proved to be impracticable, she took the law into 
her own hands and accepted James Hamilton as her second 
husband, but without the blessing of the Church. While 
we cannot accept Alexander Hamilton's illegitimacy * to be 
a matter of certainty, there can be no doubt that it was 
believed in by his contemporaries, and was made the subject 
of sneering references in the correspondence of his political 
enemies.^ His father was a merchant; an amiable man, 
but feckless and unfortunate, so that almost from infancy 
the boy owed his support to relatives of his mother. 

In the small and leisured society of a sugar island the 
circumstances of a family can hardly have been a close 
secret from its neighbours. Even if no stain attached to 
Hamilton's birth, his poverty and dependence were obvious 
to all men. He was a boy of strange precocity and a 
remarkable intelligence, sensitive, affectionate and deeply 
attached to his mother — a brilliant and beautiful woman 
who died while he was still a child. In temper he was 
fiery and passionate, but delicate in frame and puny of 
stature. With such a constitution of mind and body, and 
in such circumstances of poverty and dependence, it needed 
something greater than an ordinary hero to emerge unhurt. 

The most remarkable fact about his boyhood is the 

^ Appendix i. ^ The Christian name is given by Mrs. Atherton. 

' History, i. pp. 40-43. ^ Lodge's Hamilton, Appendix, pp. 285-297. 
' Sumner's Hamilton, p. 1. 



16 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1769 early development of his character. Before he was sixteen 
^'^' ^^ he had served an apprenticeship to practical affairs in 
the warehouse, or store, of Nicholas Cruger, a substantial 
merchant of St. Croix, by whom he was sent to other 
islands on important business, and left in complete control 
of the staff, correspondence and undertaking, during the 
prolonged absence of his master in the Northern colonies. 
There is a letter ^ of this period to the firm's agent in 
New York in reference to the cargo and return cargo of 
the sloop Thunderbolt, which shows more than a mere 
facility in business forms and phrases. What most impresses 
us in the document is the careful foresight and arrange- 
ments of which it forms the record. It is the letter of 
one who feels his responsibihties, but is not overburdened 
by their weight. 

Another letter of an even earlier date has a wider celebrity, 
but in spite of its precocity of language is of less value as 
illuminating his character. It is addressed to his school- 
fellow Stevens.2 " To confess my weakness, Ned, my 
' ambition is prevalent, so that I contemn the grovelling 
' condition of a clerk or the like, to which "my fortune, etc., 

* condemns me, and would willingly risk my life, though 
' not my character, to exalt my station. I am confident, 
' Ned, that my youth excludes me from any hopes of 
' immediate preferment ; nor do I desire it ; but I mean 
' to preface the way for futurity. I 'm no philosopher, you 
' see, and may justly be said to build castles in the air ; my 
' folly makes me ashamed, and I beg you '11 conceal it ; yet, 
' Neddy, we have seen such schemes successful when the 
' projector is constant. I shall conclude saying, I wish there 

* was a war." 

Here indeed is the accustomed language of the infant 
prodigy. Both words and sentiments are striking, but they 
1 Works, ix. pp. 38-39. ^ Ibid. ix. pp. 37-38. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 17 

are the convention of youthful genius. They reflect a glin a.d. i769 
of the dramatic from the great light of subsequent events ; ^^ 

but are really less remarkable than the quiet, executive 
letter on freight and accounts, staves, hogsheads, mules, 
and the armament which is desirable in view of the ' Guarda 
Costas which are said to swarm upon the coast.' 

We may believe him to have been sincere in his contempt 
for ' the grovelling condition of a clerk,' but he soon had 
reason to bless the results of his service. For a boy loving 
books and conscious of an extraordinary facility in the use 
of language, there is a constant danger that his intelligence 
may be brought under the domination of words. At the 
most impressionable period of his life Hamilton learned the 
hard lesson that the finest phrases, though they may tem- 
porarily sway the dispositions of men, will never alter a 
single fact of their existence ; that the most fluent explana- 
tion will never wipe out the ill results of a bad bargain, 
a want of foresight or a misplaced confidence. Through- 
out the whole of his writings we are conscious of this 
quality — that he was ever striving to express in language 
which admitted of no misunderstanding, ideas which he had 
already brought to the test of things. It is a rare quality 
in any man, but more than usually rare in lawyers and 
politicians, never to allow words a part in completing the 
fabric of an imperfect thought. The experience gained 
in Nicholas Cruger's store was of great value in itself; 
but the habit which it imposed upon his mind of going 
always to the facts was immeasurably beyond all other 
benefits. 

With so much knowledge of his temperament and 
circumstances it is natural to picture an austere youth : 
courageous certainly, but somewhat bitter and sardonic, 
narrow in his sympathies, chary of his confidence. But 
early responsibility failed to give him even a grave face. 

B 



18 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1772 The imaginary portrait is wholly at fault. The real picture 
* shows a boy of a gay and affectionate disposition, bubbling 
over with hope, naively exulting in the consciousness of his 
powers, winning friends wherever he goes and keeping them 
without an effort or a calculation, merely by the charm and 
sincerity of his spirit. 

His 'grovelling' clerkship ended and he became a student, 
as the result of a hurricane.^ Shortly after midsummer 
1772 the Leeward Islands were devastated by a tempest 
of remarkable violence. Hamilton wrote a description 
which was published anonymously in the adjacent island 
of St. Kitts. The principal personages were impressed by 
its vigorous merits, and the authorship was soon discovered. 
It was felt that a boy of so great talent deserved to have a 
chance given him in the world. His proud relatives were 
not hard to persuade. Their kindness supplied the funds 
necessary for a college education, and, armed with intro- 
ductions from his friend Dr. Knox, a Presbyterian minister 
he set out for New York a few weeks later. The vessel 
caught fire on the voyage, but the flames being got under 
she landed her passengers in safety at Boston Harbour 
sometime in the month of October. 

Hamilton appears to have directed his course of studies 
without the aid of any guardian. His first step was to 
enter himself at a grammar school where he remained 
for a year. He then presented himself to the head of 
Princeton College and underwent a private examination. 
We may presume it was entirely satisfactory, seeing that 
he thereupon proposed to the principal, and the principal 
gravely recommended to the trustees, that he should not be 
fettered by the usual regulations as to years, but should 
be allowed to pass through the curriculum as rapidly as his 
progress justified.^ The trustees not being amenable he 

^ Life, pp. 6 and 7. ' Ibid. p. 9. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 19 

entered at King's College (Columbia), which was ready to A.D. 1773 
take him upon his own terms. Here he remained for two " ^^ 
years, working with an extraordinary swiftness and in- 
dustry, but finding time notwithstanding for college debates, 
political pamphlets, the writing of verses and for general 
society. He appears also to have given much of his time 
and thought to religion, and, by the testimony of his friend 
Robert Troup, was an earnest believer in the doctrines of 
Christianity. 

The plan of his education was therefore a curious inver- 
sion. After a training in affairs he submitted himself to an 
academic course, and the unusual order of events had at 
least this advantage, that he knew with greater clearness 
than most students what he wished to learn, and why he 
wished to learn it. 



CHAPTER II 

The Quarrel with Great Britain 

In the autumn of 1773, within a few months of Hamilton's 
enrolment as a student at King's College, Boston Harbour 
was black with tea. He visited friends in that town in the 
following spring, and returned to New York a convert to 
the policy of resistance.^ 

The true importance of Hamilton is not in the events 
which led to the great rebellion, but in those which flowed 
from it. It would therefore be out of place to enter upon 
an elaborate discussion of the causes of the war; but in 
attempting even the briefest summary of the situation, we 
are met at once by the difficulty which arises when popular 
opinion has accepted and embalmed an explanation which is 
not in accordance with the facts. 

» Life, p. 25. 



20 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1773 ' The Revolution,' it has been said, ' was merely an episode 
^T. 16 jj^ British history, but it is the American epic.' The early 
chroniclers of the Republic abounded in pious panegyric. 
They chanted pseans, and pointed morals, and delivered 
philippics against tyranny and oppression without check 
or contradiction; for in England the minds of men were 
turned away from a distasteful subject to matters of more 
immediate and absorbing interest. A war which has failed 
is a dreary topic, and in the events which crowded upon 
Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, achievements 
of a contrasting glory were not far to seek. 

In these propitious circumstances, the crude theory that 
right lay wholly upon one side, and wrong upon the other, 
was boldly put forward. So careless were our ancestors in 
the matter, that the growth of this heroic legend has had a 
free course until, in popular discussions upon both sides of 
the Atlantic, it is now usually assumed to be outside the 
region of criticism. The world is required to believe that 
in 1776 the majority of Americans were good men, and the 
majority of Britons bad ones; that the former were liberal 
and intelligent, the latter dull and furious ; that the leaders 
in the one case were disinterested patriots, in the other the 
corrupt sycophants of a tyrannical madman, and that, in 
Washington's vigorous words, all loyalists and Tories were 
merely ' abominable pests of society.' This opinion in time 
came to be accepted, like a quack medicine, mainly because 
it was well advertised. The plain man was captivated by 
the simplicity of a statement which his intelligence could 
grasp almost without an effort. Fluent moralists among us, 
writing with no more serious motive than to celebrate the 
triumph of their own party principles, found the explanation 
admirably suited to their purpose, and gave their solemn 
blessing and approval to the myth which our kinsmen had 
invented, as Romans before them had devised the legend of 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 21 

Romulus, Remus and the she-wolf to adorn the illustrious a.d. 1773 
foundation of the city. ^'^- ^^ 

The balance of legal right was almost as plainly in 
favour of the British contentions as the balance of common- 
sense was against them. The Supreme Courts of Appeal in 
this country and the States, sitting in banc for a new trial 
of the issues involved, would probably be forced to decide, 
as a matter of law, that upon most of the essential points 
our ancestors were technically in the right. On the other 
hand, a jury of men of the world would almost as certainly 
conclude that imprudence rarely steered a more perilous 
course or followed it in a spirit less likely to escape ship- 
wreck. It is difficult to believe that legal right really 
mattered a great deal to any one. The fundamental, para- 
mount, determining cause of the war with Britain was the 
need of getting free from restraint, and this need was 
realised rather by a kind of instinct than by any reasoning. 
It drew its main force much more from a vague fear of 
what might happen in the future than from any material 
damage or political injury that had actually occurred. 

As things then stood, the simplest and most obvious way 
of dealing with the difficulty seemed to the one side to be 
coercion, to the other side revolt. On the one hand there 
was a new country, vigorous and remote, possessing enormous 
resources of which it was at least dimly conscious, eager, 
hopeful and impatient in pursuit of its destiny; on the 
other an old, dignified, slow-moving, sceptical people, lack- 
ing certainly in sympathy, but lacking most of all in 
knowledge of any circumstances but its own. By the 
constitution, imperial sovereignty was in the hands of the 
second, and the real danger of the situation lay in the 
mixture of sense of duty, selfish interest and ignorance 
which the British cabinet brought into its attempt to rule 
over an imoetuous subject at such a distance in time and 



22 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1773 miles. But, granting so much, we may dismiss without 
'^'^" ^^ ceremony all the bogeys with corked eyebrows which the 
patriotism of early American historians has constructed. 
The evil was hindrance, not tyranny; vexatious, but not 
ill-meant, delays ; a tendency to strangle colonial ambitions 
and to impede action by processes and references, cere- 
monies and forms, by disparaging criticisms and buckets 
of elder-brotherly cold water. But a settled policy, even 
serious isolated acts, of tyranny, as tyranny has generally 
been understood, never did happen and never could have 
happened. 

It is impossible to conduct successfully the infinitely less 
complex affairs of an ordinary business from a centre 
separated by great distances from its branches, unless the 
manager be given so free a hand that he becomes in fact 
the predominant partner within his own sphere. The British 
king and people failed to realise this essential limitation of 
their sovereignty. It was no wonder, for no country in the 
world had ever realised it before them. The essence of the 
difficulty was never clearly stated by either side, so little 
was it grasped by reason, so much was it a matter of mere 
instinct. Americans felt that a free hand was a necessity, and 
that under existing circumstances they would never obtain 
it. It seemed to them that they were not understood, which 
was true, and that they could never hope to be understood, 
which was probable ; for it was impossible at that date to 
foresee ocean greyhounds and Marconi installations, and a 
system of news — truthful, rapid and cheap — which at the 
present time seems not beyond reasonable hope. When it is 
a question of preserving or accomplishing a political union, 
it is time, not distance, that is the great obstacle. The swift 
interchange of thought and the simultaneous impulses which 
spring therefrom are even greater forces for binding nations 
together than are safety and speed of travel to and fro. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 23 

The two nations, therefore, came in the end to a A.D. 1773 
desperate struggle, the one side for its independence, the '^'^' ^^ 
other for its dignity, and being for the most part of the 
Anglo-Saxon stock, they brought up their batteries and 
engaged in a solemn and interminable argument on the 
principles of constitutional law. Beyond sharpening the 
wits of the disputants and improving the education of their 
readers, this long-range duel of claims and counter-claims 
served no important purpose and has needlessly obscured 
the issue for future generations. In great events it is 
always well to look for the idea, and the idea in this case 
was neither legal right nor private rights, was not even 
freedom, but only independence. 

The American loyalists or Tories suffered greater evils and 
showed a finer judgment than either Parliament or Congress ; 
but as loyalty, like treachery, bears a certain relation to the 
issue of any struggle, the virtues of these men have rarely 
received a fit acknowledgment. They failed in their 
endeavour. The great Washington denounced them in the 
harsh terms which have been already quoted. The epic 
required that they should be painted black. Consequently 
they have been set down for the most part as sordid 
schemers, and for the rest as unreasoning fanatics moved by 
a spirit of impossible loyalty. But the motive of the Ameri- 
cans who stood out against their fellow-colonists was neither 
a private advantage nor a sentimental attachment. Their 
aim was the security of an inheritance, and they judged any 
attempt to sever or divide it to be the greatest of all political 
crimes. The Empire had been built up with painful effort, and, 
in their opinion, a people that was worthy of it would have 
endured, in order to maintain it, much greater sufferings 
than had ever been inflicted by British statesmen. Oppres- 
sion and injustice were evils which time would surely abate. 
The Tories had a settled belief in their countrymen on both 



24 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1773 sides of the ocean, and foresaw what is obviously the truth, 
^'^' ^^ that when the temper of the disputants should have cooled, 
the wrongs and grievances would gradually disappear. Thej 
were people of the old school, who considered patience to be 
the final test of national greatness. They had a sound 
instinct of statesmanship, a memory of the slow movement 
and ultimate triumph of England under the Tudors ; and 
they were content, as their ancestors had been content, who 
lived, and fought, and grumbled under the two Henrys and 
Elizabeth, to endure obstruction and delay, regarding these 
things even with a measure of gratitude as a precaution 
inaposed by Providence in order that the mortar might have 
time to set. They abhorred the idea of a jerry-built nation. 
The desire of their hearts was a British North America; the 
chief of their fears was a foreign conquest, settlement, or 
intrusion. 

Foreign interference, as their terrors painted it, has been 
successfully withstood, but it must be remembered that 
within a few years of the foundation of the new republic the 
attempt was made and reached the height of a serious 
danger. The great majority of the citizens were ready to 
welcome it. The leaders of the popular party even invited 
it, and it was prevented only by the efforts of Washington, 
Hamilton and a few others who were covered with oppro- 
brium as their reward. But if in one form the disaster of 
foreign influence has been avoided, almost by a miracle, it 
is worth considering whether in another the fears of the 
loyalists have not been to some extent realised. A cosmo- 
politan America, though they did not foresee the possibility, 
would certainly have been distasteful to their principles. 
They did not desire a huge immigration of strange people, 
and would hardly have accepted the mere predominance of 
the English tongue throughout the union as a proof that 
their aim of a British North America had been realised. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 25 
The central idea of these Tories was the preservation at A.D. 1773 



all costs of an existing union, and their failure to achieve it 
was due no less to the raw impatience of their fellow-colonists, 
than to the blundering management of the British Cabinet, 
which always pushed things to extremes at the wrong 
moment. Between these headstrong opponents there was 
no possibility of accommodation. Every act of either party, 
after disagreement first arose, appeared to the other in lurid 
colours. The Canadian War had left a legacy of ill-feeling 
and distrust. The British considered, with some reason, that 
the colonials had often shirked their fair share of danger 
and hardship ; that their governments had been niggardly, 
cheese-paring and ungenerous in the matter of supplies; that 
they had created difficulties and sought a profit at a time of 
national crisis. They argued further that the taking of 
Quebec and the total expulsion of the French from the 
north and west of the continent were of much greater benefit 
and moment to Americans than to Englishmen. The 
colonies had been preserved from the imminent danger of a 
French envelopment, their borders had been placed in a 
position of comparative security from the instigated raids 
of ferocious savages, mainly by British arms and treasure. 
As a consequence, the indignant Briton viewed the American 
as a creature of the blackest ingratitude, canting about his 
rights, like a fraudulent bankrupt, in order to escape the 
payment of his just debts. 

The colonial opinion of the mother country was equally 
unflattering, and probably equally just. The colonists 
despised the home Government for its lack of foresight, 
knowledge of conditions and estimate of difficulties. The 
British officer, who is apt upon occasions to be wanting in 
tact, had not brought any exceptional qualities of efficiency 
i»r resource to reduce the balance of his social imperfec- 
tions. In consequence, the colonial picture of his patronising 



^T. 16 



26 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1773 kinsman represented him as a swaggering bully, bloated 
-^T. 16 yfii]^ a fatuous and misplaced self-confidence, who misunder- 
stood everything and everybody, and by reason of his 
natural endowment of stupidity, was destined in the nature 
of things to continue to misunderstand until the end of 
time. 

The old country was wounded in its feelings, the new 
country in its pride, and both doubtless with much reason ; 
but if all the evil that each thought of the other had been 
true, it was still entirely unimportant. There are moments 
in the happiest history of the best husbands and the most 
perfect wives when the estimate is equally black; but 
circumstances being favourable, charity, laughter and a 
true sense of proportion enter in to set the matter right. 
But in this unfortunate union the circumstances were 
unfavourable, and time only widened the cleavage. The 
difficulty was that Britain would not consent to a partner- 
ship, which was the only solution, but insisted upon a 
dependency. The American colonists therefore hardened 
their hearts and would accept nothing short of indepen- 
dence. 

Raw feelings alone will never make a great revolution. 
They are but light and trivial breezes. Blowing with the 
current they would hardly have raised a ripple, but blowing 
against it they covered the surface with a thousand white 
and angry waves, which overwhelmed all the light craft of 
conciliation and drowned every peacemaker, lay and official. 
Lord Rockingham, with Burke to find him brains, was as 
helpless as Lord North. Every act, word and proposal of 
every negotiation was suspect by the other side. Little 
things not worth a second thought, the small blunders of 
obscure officials, old wives' grievances, and the absurd and 
unintended wrongs done by pompous men, elevated them- 
selves into national questions, and became the food and 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 27 
nourishment of disputants upon constitutional and legal A.D. 1773 

• 1 , ^T. 16 

right. 

We may dismiss the theory of malign intriguers who 
perverted the judgment and poisoned the affections of the 
American people. The misrepresentations of Samuel Adams, 
the craftiness of Franklin, the heroics of Henry, and the 
phrases of Jefferson, were no more the cause of the rebellion 
than the obstinacy of George the Third, the pedantry of 
Grenville, the flippancy of Townshend, the indecency of 
Wedderburn, or the easy, good-natured facing-both-ways 
of Lord North. We have been inclined to dwell too much 
upon the defects of individual men and to attribute too 
great a power to minor influences, which, although they 
exasperated the combatants, could never have caused the 
combat and in many instances were merely the external 
phenomena of a great struggle. 



CHAPTER HI 

Early Writings 

By his own account Hamilton started as a loyalist, and was 
converted to the popular side by his visit to Boston.^ His 
sympathies were always aristocratic, and he was born with 
a reverence for tradition ; but his strongest instinct was for 
the orderly achievement of a practical end. He was ever 
quick to make up his mind, and having come to a decision, 
to take all the steps needful for attaining the objects of his 
policy. 

In the month of July (1774) following his matriculation, 
a great meeting was held * in the fields ' with the purpose 
of influencing the vote of New York in the election of 

1 Life, p. 26. 



28 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1774 delegates to the first Continental Congress. It was a 
^' popular convocation, and had the advantage of a political 
martyr as its president.^ The speeches were hearty enough, 
but, as might have been expected, ignored the most essential 
points of the argument. Hamilton, instigated thereto by his 
friends, mounted upon the platform, and supplied the 
deficiencies. He was a young-looking boy of seventeen, and 
began with hesitation ; but being desperately in earnest, 
and having a natural gift of expression, he held his 
audience, gaining confidence as he proceeded. " His mind 
' warmed with the theme, his energies were recovered; 
' and, after a discussion clear, cogent, and novel, of the 
' great principles involved in the controversy, he depicted 
' in glowing colours the long-continued and long-endured 
' oppressions of the mother country ; he insisted on the 
' duty of resistance, pointed to the means and certainty of 
' success, and described the waves of rebellion sparkling 
* with fire, and washing back on the shores of England the 
' wrecks of her power, her wealth, and her glory." ^ 

This incident has a great celebrity, and we can well 
believe it all. But here again we are face to face with the 
infant prodigy, the same who wrote in his twelfth year to 
Ned Stevens that ' his ambition was prevalent.' Our 
astonishment is less that he should have made such a gifted 
speech, than that having made it he was ever heard of again. 

Of a different character altogether from this incident are 
his pamphlets, which were printed in quick succession 
between the end of the same year and the midsummer 
following. Before Christmas he had undertaken the defence 
of the first Continental Congress against the attack of Dr. 
Seabury, a clergyman (afterwards a bishop) who wrote 
under the signature of a ' West Chester farmer.' Hamilton's 

' Captain Alexander M'Dougal, imprisoned 1770 for seditious libel. 
a Life, pp. 22-23. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 29 

Full Vindication^ provoked a reply, and in February there A.D. 1775 
came a rejoinder, The Farmer Refuted} He continued to ^^ 

write upon similar themes in Holt's Journal, and in June 
he published another pamphlet under the title of Remarks 
upon the Quebec Bill.^ 

These works, although enjoying a considerable fame (they 
were generally attributed to the experienced pen of Mr. Jay),* 
are not of great importance either as history or literature. 
But they speak a different language from the infant prodigy, 
and bear a nearer family resemblance to the letter that dealt 
with staves and hogsheads and Guarda Costas. There is, of 
course, a considerable number of words expended upon the 
texts of slavery and tyranny. The future bishop is well 
bethumped. The premises are not reasoned but accepted, 
as we should expect in the case of a boy of eighteen ; 
but nevertheless, rhetorical exaggeration and turgid general- 
ities play but a small part. In the first pamphlet the most 
telling argument is a sober and practical analysis directed 
to disprove the assertion that Britain had but little, the 
colonies everything, to lose by such a stoppage of trade as 
was advocated by Congress. It concludes with a vigorous 
epistle to the farmers of the New York colony, somewhat in 
the manner of the Drapier Letters; as simple and direct, 
almost as hearty in its intolerance, but a few degrees more 
just in its foundation. 

In the second pamphlet Hamilton pursued his victim 
with an ardour whetted on applause. It abounds in bad 
law, bad history and bad philosophy, but is more than 
redeemed by an exuberance of common-sense. The cen- 
tral argument admits the allegiance due by the American 
colonists to a common sovereign, but repudiates the authority 
-Df the British Parliament. A democracy attempting to rule 

* Works, i. p. 4. ^ Ibid. i. p. 55. 

« Ibid. i. p. 181. * Life, p. 37. 



30 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1775 over another democracy lie holds to be a worse tyrant than 
• any autocrat.^ He deals with the pretensions of the home 
Government in the first place on the theory of the British 
constitution, and having established their absurdity by this 
examination, he next overwhelms them by an appeal to the 
Natural Rights of Man. Satisfied with his victory in this 
empty game of battledore and shuttlecock, he proceeds to a 
technical argument drawn from the charters of the colonies, 
and concludes triumphantly by denying the rights of Britain 
to tax her colonists or to legislate for them. He justifies, 
however, upon the ground of an implied concession, her 
claim to regulate their trade for the advantage of the 
empire, and even for her own particular advantage as a 
return for the protection afforded by her navy. 

The alternative to a slavish submission is civil war, 
and accordingly to sustain the confidence of his country- 
men in such a struggle he describes in a hopeful spirit 
the boundless resources of the colonies, their indepen- 
dence of external commerce, their fitness for the peculiar 
warfare that is likely to be pursued, and paints in the 
gloomiest colours the difficulties and embarrassments against 
which their oppressors will be forced to contend. No hope 
remains in patience and loyalty, in petitions and remon- 
strances, but only in arms. The discipline of Britain will 
in the end prove powerless against the patriotism of 
America, and a favourable neutrality, if not an active 
interference, on the part of France and Holland, will sustain 
them in their struggle for freedom. "I earnestly lament 
' the unnatural quarrel between the parent state and the 
' colonies, and most ardently wish for a speedy reconciliation 
* — a perpetual and mutually beneficial union " ; and he 
protests that he is ' a warm advocate for limited monarchy, 
and an unfeigned wellwisher to the present Royal Family.' ^ 

1 Works, i. p. 81. » Ihid. i. p. 176. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 31 

This pamphlet was published early in February. In the a.d. 1775 
third week of April the British troops were routed as they ^' 
withdrew from Lexington, and before the middle of May 
the strong posts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point had fallen 
into the hands of rebel raiders under Allen and Benedict 
Arnold. In June the American militia was defeated 
at Bunker Hill after a gallant resistance, and George 
Washington was appointed by the Second Congress to the 
oflfice of commander-in-chief Henceforth for many years to 
come the written word was to exercise less influence than the 
loaded musket. The Remarks on the Quebec Bill, a short 
and acrimonious document, whose chief object appears to 
have been to excite religious prejudice against the British 
Government for their toleration, or, as Hamilton preferred 
to allege, their establishment of Roman Catholicism in 
Canada, marks the ending of his youthful fertility. It was 
published in the same month that saw the battle of Bunker 
Hill. 

The pamphlets ceased, and by degrees the speeches ceased 
also. Hamilton joined a volunteer corps called the Hearts 
of Oak, drilled early in the morning, and wore a uniform of 
green, with brown leather facings, and the appropriate motto, 
Freedom or Death. He turned from constitutional law to 
the study of strategy and tactics, and had the honour, with 
his comrades in arms, to draw the first fire of his Britannic 
Majesty in the colony of New York while engaged in re- 
moving the guns from the harbour battery. The chronicler, 
searching for evidence to support his favourite idea of the 
infant prodigy, has recorded that when H.M.S. Asia, lying 
at anchor, let off a broadside at her godsons of the Hearts 
of Oak, " Hamilton, who was aiding in the removal of the 
' cannon, exhibited the greatest unconcern, although one of 
' his companions was killed by his side." ^ We may believe 

1 Life, p. 48. 



32 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1775 it or not as we choose, but such cA^ents are at any rate un- 
Mv. 18 favourable to the composition of pamphlets. 

We hear of him again on three occasions during these 
months, playing a part which is noteworthy and highly 
characteristic. For all his love of freedom, his hatred of 
lawlessness was the stronger passion. Both indeed had 
their origin in his detestation of injustice and oppression. 
His fame stood high with the revolutionary party, whose 
enthusiasm had christened him 'the oracle';^ but he did 
not hesitate to risk his popularity by withstanding the 
violence of the mob against private individuals suspected of 
Tory proclivities. There is an element of comedy in the 
student of King's delivering a lengthy harangue from the 
College steps in order to give his principal the opportunity 
of escape to a British ship of war; while, from an upper 
window, this worthy gentleman, mistaking the object of the 
address, besought the people who had come to tar and 
feather him not to listen to his defender because he was 
'crazy.' With less success he attempted to prevent the 
destruction of Rivington's press.- 

It is not without importance that upon the appearance 
of the first pamphlet Hamilton was approached by the 
loyahst party with flattering offers of employment if he 
would transfer his services to the other side. Such proposals 
must have been attractive not only on account of his youth 
and poverty, but for the further reason that so many of his 
sympathies were bound up with the ideas of monarchy and 
a settled constitution. His prompt rejection of the offer 
is all the more remarkable, when we remember that it has 
been the ignorant habit of Democrat historians to write of 
him as if he had been a pure adventurer, and that even 
in recent times apologies for his career and appreciations of 
his character, with equal ignorance and less excuse, have 
1 Li/e, p. 37. 2 jiid, pp. 48, 49. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 33 

tacitly assumed the justice of the charge. Only in the most A.D. 1775 
romantic sense can Hamilton be termed an adventurer : '^'^' ^^ 
only because he was a young man from a strange land 
seeking adventures ; never because he sold his sword, A 
character less mercenary, and less concerned in any personal 
advancement, save as a means of rendering better service 
to the state, has never played a part upon the public stage. 
To the Dugald Dalgettys of history he bore no resemblance 
save in his courage ; and if we are iu search of an analogy 
we shall find it rather among the knights of the Bound 
Table than among the soldiers of fortune. 

We cannot deplore the interruption of his pamphleteering ; 
but, on the contrary, and in spite of the merits of his work 
in this direction, must judge it to have been most fortunate. 
Such extraordinary facility, such dangerous precocity, 
needed the sternest antidotes. In the moulding of Hamil- 
ton's great character, the counting-house of Nicholas Cruger 
and the campaigns of Washington were the severest and the 
best influences, for both called upon him in harsh tones to 
be certain that his words corresponded with some fact, and 
were not merely words. The questioning of such experiences 
will take no denial ; and the man who, possessing high gifts 
of thought and eloquence, finds himself forced by circum- 
stances to endure their relentless catechism, may hope to 
enjoy his reward by escaping for ever from the bondage of 
phrases. 



CHAPTER IV 

The Beginning of the War 

The War of Independence covered a ;;:eriod little short of 
nine years, if we reckon it to have begun at the skirmish of 





34 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1775 Lexington 1 and to have ended when General Washington 
^'^- ^^ bade farewell to his officers at Fraunces' Tavern.^ During the 
whole of this time there was a military organisation and an 
army in being. The issue indeed was decided at Yorktown ' 
more than two years earlier. After that event Britain gave 
up the hope of regaining her colonies and undertook no 
further enterprises. 

The maxim which insists upon strategy as a deciding 
factor in a long and dreary struggle never found a more 
conspicuous illustration. With bad strategy victories 
brought no profit, while with good, defeats were matters of 
but little moment. Strategy may be defined as a wise alliance 
with circumstances which, in case of success, will follow up 
the pursuit, and in case of failure will screen the retreat. 
The strong sense of Washington was incapable of distraction 
from this consideration either under adversity, of which he 
had a wide experience, or in good fortune, which occasionally 
rewarded his devotion. 

It has been assumed that in the case of the colonists 
strategy was an easy matter ; that it was obvious, and from 
the besfinninsf had determined the course of their efforts and 
the ultimate issue of the war. The Americans had a 
base of operations in every village, an army in the whole 
population. Before a British advance the waves parted, 
as the Red Sea before the army of Pharaoh, only to 
engulf and overwhelm them. Our own countrymen, on the 
other hand, had but one base — the sea. Yet when we con- 
sider the matter, the contest was not so unequal as our 
apologists have alleged. A population of some two and 
a half millions sprinkled upon a coastline of twelve hundred 
miles as the crow flies, or, if we count the great bays and 
indentations and the extent of navigable rivers, more than 
twice as much again, must in the end fall a victim to any 

1 19Lh Axnii 1775. ^ ^^^ December 17S3. ^ jg^h October 1781. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 35 

great power holding command of the sea. Nothing appears A.D. 1775 
more certain than that, had our ancestors maintained their '^'"' ^^ 
maritime supremacy, the rebeUion must have perished of 
sheer exhaustion. 

At the critical moment, when the resources of Congress 
were at their last extremity, naval superiority upon the 
coasts of North America passed into other hands. What 
it is also easy to forget is that Britain, as happens from 
time to time, was at war with the world. France and 
Spain and Holland were at open war with her. The 
Baltic States — Russia, Denmark and Sweden — had allied 
themselves in an armed neutrality. At all points through- 
out our dispersed empire we were outnumbered and on 
the defensive. "The Marquis de Lafayette," Washington 
wrote in July 1780, " will be pleased to communicate 
' the following general ideas to Count de Rochambeau and 

* the Chevalier de Ternay as the sentiments of the under- 

* written : — In any operation, and under all circumstances, a 
' decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a funda- 
' mental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of 
' success must ultimately depend." ^ On land the great 
captain had done his utmost. Circumstances of hill and 
river, swamp and forest, farm and desert, had been bound in 
alliance to his victorious arms ; but for the supreme victory 
there was need of a general strategy in which the blue 
ocean played a part. Failing that confederate, the only choice 
for his wearied veterans and a devastated people was submis- 
sion to the British Parliament, or some great trek into the 
prairies of the West. It is not the least of the glories of 
an imperishable fame that one who was so hot and eager a 
soldier should have grasped thus coolly and considerately 
the essential, unalterable condition of final success. 

^ Sparks's Washington, vii. p. 509. 



36 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A. D. 1775 At the beginning of the war (1775) the King's army 
'^'^- ^^ under General Gage held Boston, in Massachusetts. The 
distinguishing note of this period was a fear on the part of 
. the British to strike hard while conditions were still favour- 
able to their arms. This fear arose from an ill-grounded 
hope that the mere display of military strength in a defensive 
attitude might be sufficient to overawe and suppress the 
rebellion without recourse to sterner measures which would, 
it was thought, add to the difficulties already existing the 
further obstacle of bitter memories. 

The centre of disaffection was in the northern states of 
New England, and the object of King George's Government 
was to overawe the rebels by pressure on the heart. General 
Washington received from Congress his commission as 
commander-in-chief shortly before midsummer. In July he 
settled down to the siege of Boston. His army, though full of 
spirit, lacked both organisation and discipline. When he had 
to some extent remedied these defects, it was discovered that 
there was no gunpowder. His opponent, on the other hand, 
commanded a body of troops, as well-trained and courageous 
as Europe could produce. He was superior in numbers and 
well supplied with ammunition. He was not a brilliant 
man, but had he merely consulted the drill-book and moved 
his pieces in a mechanical fashion, he must have destroyed 
the beleaguering army of militiamen. 

Dulness in a general officer is in itself a serious obstacle ; 
but when one of that quality is bound by the careless 
pedantry of instructions, his unfortunate army becomes 
mere food for bullets. The idea of reconciliation was in 
the air. The tone of despatches from one of the most 
incompetent ministers for war that ever sat in a British 
cabinet filled the slow mind of Gage with a fear of winning 
a bloody but decisive battle. From the beginning it was 
an ill-conducted war. Mediocrity appointed mediocrity; 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 37 

lectured it to be dilatory ; dwelt with a kind of drunken A.D. 1775 
wisdom upon the advantage of building golden bridges ; ^'^* ^^ 
paralysed it with a fear to strike ; failed to send it reinforce- 
ments ; from time to time forgot even that it existed ; and 
only under the cold douche of disaster roused itself to deal 
out solemn blame. So during the whole of that summer, 
autumn and winter General Gage sat in Boston, growing 
more and more uncomfortable, doing nothing, and allowing 
Washington to drill his men, find gunpowder, and hem 
him in. 

As the days began to shorten, an American expedition 
under Montgomery departed up the Hudson by the lakes 
George and Champlain to invade Canada. Early in 
November St. John surrendered to him after a siege of 
fifty days, and before the middle of the month Montreal 
was also taken. In September a second column under 
Arnold set out through the woods of Maine, and after 
incredible hardships arrived before the Heights of 
Abraham. Carleton, with a thousand men, held Quebec 
for the King. 

Contrary to colonial expectations, the country did not 
rise at their coming in any enthusiasm for freedom. 
Possibly there was some lurking suspicion that King Stork 
would prove a worse tyrant than King Log. Hamilton's 
eloquent pamphlet against the establishment of Papacy and 
the applause which greeted it may well have disturbed 
Canadian minds. The invaders received but scant help. 
Their two columns joined forces before Quebec, but on the 
last day of the year Carleton drove back the assault. Mont- 
gomery, a gallant and noble figure, was killed in the 
attempt; and Arnold, no less brave, was forced to retreat 
with great loss and hardship, having gained nothing by the 
attempt. 

Meanwhile, Washington was engaged in a great struggle 



38 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.T). 1775 to make his army effective. Patriotism was prevalent, but 
^" ^^ by no means universal. Corruption, stock-jobbing, and 
an eagerness to make a profit out of army supplies were 
matters which stirred his indignation even in the early 
days of the contest. Congress was inclined to argue, 
and to make long speeches, and to invoke general prin- 
ciples of considerable grandeur but no practical utility. 
It was invested with high duties but meagre powers. All 
affairs, military and diplomatic, were in its hands ; but as 
funds, without which duties have little chance of getting 
themselves performed, depended entirely upon the voluntary 
contributions of the various States, Congress lacked the right 
to enforce its will, and had to rely upon moral influence 
for its supplies. 

In spite of the danger that menaced them, the states, 
from memory of British oppression, were deeply con- 
cerned with a pedantic idea of liberty, and never abandoned 
an unreasonable suspicion of a strong central govern- 
ment. Their jealous refusal to delegate power or to part 
with any of their individual rights, even to a congress elected 
by their own citizens, was the cause of more disasters 
to their arms and more embarrassment to their leaders 
than all the assaults of the enemy. Their prejudice against 
a regular army was ineradicable. They sought to preserve 
the superiority of the civil power over the military by a 
system of short enlistments that regarded four months as 
the proper term of service, and a year as justifiable only in 
circumstances of extreme emergency. To make the task 
of the commander-in-chief quite beyond the wit of man. 
Congress, in its anxiety to conform to this general idea of 
political liberty, decreed that a want of discipline should 
not be punished without the consent of the state to which 
the delinquent had the honour to belong. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 39 

The Second Year of the war (1776), despite the failure of A.D. 1776 
the Canadian invasion, opened gloomily for the British. Their ^"^^ ^^ 
stolid occupation of Boston had entirely failed to win over 
colonial opinion, or to daunt the rebellious spirit of the New 
England states. Sir William Howe had succeeded General 
Gage. Easy, indolent and good-humoured, he was entirely 
lacking in the quality of swift decision. Like his elder 
brother, the distinguished admiral, he was a friend of 
Benjamin Franklin's. He had much sympathy with the 
colonial grievance, and was appointed partly on his merits 
as a soldier, partly with a vague idea of conciliation. It is 
always dangerous to attempt a combination of these func- 
tions while victory hangs in the balance. 

Early in March Washington, having organised and in- 
creased his army, occupied Dorchester Heights and com- 
manded the British position. A fortnight later Sir William, 
finding his lines untenable, embarked the troops and sailed 
to Halifax, where, until June, he waited for reinforcements 
which had been promised but never came. Washington, 
foreseeing that the next move of the British must be against 
New York, marched southwards, arriving in that city towards 
the middle of April. 

The British general, holding the absolute command of the 
sea, determined, as had been foreseen, to occupy New York 
and to make it the base of operations for his main army. 
Between Boston and New York, as strategical positions, no 
hesitation was possible ; for the latter city, commanding 
the mouth of the navigable waterway of the Hudson, was 
immensely superior. Moreover, it was to a large extent a 
friendly city, full of rich and respectable Tories. But 
although from a purely military point of view the exchange 
was profitable, the loss of Boston was in the political 
aspect a damaging blow to British prestige. It filled 
the raw colonial troops with confidence in themselves 



40 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1776 and in their leader, and relaxed that pressure upon the 
■ heart of the rebellion which had been rightly judged of high 
importance by the King's Government. 

For the moment Britain was at peace with the rest of the 
world, and providing she could have kept the flames under 
and conserved her authority among the colonists, there 
was no immediate menace of foreign attack. Holding an 
absolute command of the sea, it seems as if her right strategy 
would have been to strain every nerve for the provision of 
enough troops to seize and hold the great towns along the 
coast — Boston in the north, Charleston in the south, New 
York commanding the mouth of the Hudson, Philadelphia 
the estuary of the Delaware ; from these strong positions upon 
a common base, the sea, to have pressed and strangled the 
revolution by a grinding occupation, to have discouraged its 
forces by frequent expeditions, and to have worn down resist- 
ance by sheer exhaustion of funds. When we remember 
how nearly the revolt came to failure from lack of money on 
more than one occasion, and even when in a military view 
affairs wore a fortunate appearance for the colonists, we can 
hardly resist the conclusion that had the war been directed 
at its beginning in the grand manner of Pitt instead of by 
the diffidence of Lord North, if the advantage of sea-power 
and of the long purse had been fully realised and used 
with intelligence and without mercy, neither the genius of 
Washington nor the devotion of his troops could have 
secured independence for the allied states. 

But no nerves were strained. Energy and intelligence 
did not exist. Sir William Howe, disappointed of reinforce- 
ments and paralysed by dilatory instructions, sailed towards 
midsummer for New York and established himself at Sandy 
Hook and Staten Island. On the 4th of July an eloquent 
document, drafted by one Thomas Jefferson of Virginia — a 
ready penman but a shrinking antagonist — was issued to 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 41 

the world. The Declaration of Independence was a useful A.D. 1776 
assertion, for it had a dramatic quality which stirred men's ^'^' 
hearts. 

A few days later Admiral Lord Howe arrived with an 
addition to the fleet and reinforcements for the army, bring- 
ing powers to offer pardon and amnesty, which unfortunately 
the evacuation of Boston and the enthusiasm excited by 
the famous Declaration had shorn of all hopes of success. 
The failure of an expedition against Charleston brought the 
forces who had been engaged in it back from the south. 
Sir William Howe accordingly found himself in command 
of some twenty-five thousand men with a fleet in support 
excellent in itself and admirably officered. Against him 
were thirty thousand American levies. 

Washington held New York. A part of his army, five 
thousand strong, was in August entrenched at Brooklyn, in 
Long Island, separated from the city by a sea channel 
a mile in width. On the 27th the British general attacked 
and inflicted a severe defeat upon his opponents, who 
lost two thousand men. But, fearing great bloodshed and 
a crowning victory, he failed to storm the trenches. His 
delay allowed, or tempted, Washington to bring up more 
troops, making his effective total nine thousand combatants. 
It was a mistaken policy, which with a swifter antagonist 
must have resulted in ruin. But Sir William, though a 
sound man, was leisurely, and by the time he had matured 
his plans, the prompt action of the American general had 
rendered them fruitless. The obvious measure was to make 
use of the fleet and cut the nine thousand off from the 
mainland. While Sir William was considering this excellent 
method Washington realised his danger. A fog fell oppor- 
tunely, as in some Homeric contest, and under the protec- 
tion of the gods the colonial troops withdrew in good order, 
and unmolested, across the dividing arm of the sea. It was 



42 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1776 a masterly performance, and atoned for the bad judgment 
which had incurred the risk. 

Washington realised that New York could no longer be 
held. On military grounds he desired to burn it, but 
political considerations rendered this course impracticable. 
About the middle of September Admiral Howe forced his way 
up the Hudson, threatening to cut off the American army 
who found themselves obliged to evacuate the city and to 
retreat up the east bank of the river. But General Howe was 
dilatory and made no effective pursuit. A month went by, 
during which the colonial army dwindled to twelve thousand 
men. In the middle of October the fleet forced its way still 
further, past forts and obstructions, causing Washington to 
retreat to White Plains, where he took up a strong position. 
Sir William, without undue haste, attacked him towards the 
end of the month and drove him, but in good order, out 
of his entrenchments. Again there was delay, and after- 
wards a spell of unpropitious weather which induced the 
British commander to withdraw. A few days later he 
successfully attacked the American forts on both sides of 
the river, capturing two thousand men and a large store of 
munitions. Under this heavy blow Washington withdrew 
to the west bank of the river, and, during November, with 
a rapidly shrinking army, was pursued by Cornwallis south- 
wards across New Jersey; but always without disorder or 
defeat. In the early days of December he arrived at 
Princeton with barely three thousand ragged men, and the 
British troops at his heels. Finding his position impossible, 
he crossed the Delaware river, destroying behind him aU the 
boats for many miles along its course. The population 
wavered, and many of them came in seeking the royal pardon. 
Congress was helpless, though still loquacious. Considering 
Philadelphia, where they sat, to be in serious danger of 
capture, they departed to Baltimore. Their fears, however, 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 43 

were groundless, for to a commander like Sir William A.D. 1776 
Howe the difficulties of transport through an unfriendly ^'^' ^^ 
country, in the depth of winter, presented too great an 
obstacle. 

It was the fate of the British general to nourish himself 
upon text-book probabilities and the phrases of war. He 
appears to have concluded, upon the best possible grounds, 
that the American army had dissolved. Accordingly, with- 
drawing a great portion of his troops to comfortable winter 
quarters in New York, he left a long, straggling line of 
posts parallel to the Delaware. 

Washington may have harboured illusions contrary to 
the teaching of the Pundits, but he had the great gift of 
turning them into realities. With small thanks to Congress 
he brought his ragged and bootless army up to the strength 
of six thousand men, and planned an elaborate attack at 
different points upon the extended British line. But he 
reckoned without his generals, and to a certain extent 
without natural obstacles. Gates, Ewing, Griffin, Putnam, 
Cadwalader, some for good reasons and others for bad, 
all failed him, and he went with his lonely column 
across the Delaware on a bitter night. With less than 
twenty-five hundred men he marched, after the arduous 
crossing, nine miles through darkness, with a sleet-storm 
driving in his face. As he approached the village of 
Trenton, held by Hessians, word reached him that the arms 
of his right flank were wet. He sent them word 'to use 
the bayonet, for the town must be taken.' At Christmas 
daybreak he stormed, took two thousand prisoners, and re- 
turned whence he came. 

The alarm reached New York, and Cornwallis, the ever- 
vigorous, sallied out to inflict punishment. Leaving three 
regiments at Princeton he pushed on against the enemy, 
who had again crossed to the east bank of the river. 



44 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1776 But Washington, evading the rush, slipped past him, and 
■ ^^ cut to pieces the three regiments left behind at Princeton. 
Upon this unlooked-for event Sir William judged it wiser 
to leave the line of the Delaware and concentrate his 
main army for the winter in New York. The colonists, 
dispirited by the autumn reverses, were now filled with new 
courage, and the task of withdrawing the British posts was 
none too easy. 

It was a gallant campaign, and from the political stand- 
point something even greater. In the severest weather, 
with starved and ill-clad troops, absurdly inferior in num- 
bers, and depressed by the memory of many months of 
defeat, Washington twice within a few days succeeded by the 
force of his great will in concentrating his small column in 
superior strength and destroying his enemy unawares. The 
mobiUty of footsore men in wintry weather is a contingency 
that text-books dealing with average conditions are justified 
in ignoring. But as Britons we must concede that there is 
a contrast not wholly in our favour between Sir William 
Howe, comfortably eating his Christmas dinner by a warm 
fire in New York city, and this calm American, undeluded 
and undismayed, deaf equally to false hopes and to despair, 
who, realising that the thing most necessary to his country 
at the moment was victory, lifted his weary militia through 
the snow and won it. 



CHAPTER V 

The Course of the War 

In January (1777), at the beginning of the Third Year of the 
war, Washington took his troops into winter quarters at 
Morristown, keeping close watch upon New York, where 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 45 

all the Britisli regiments lay huddled together, after their a.d. 1777 
evacuation of New Jersey. '^'^' '^^ 

By March his five thousand men had again dwindled to 
three thousand under the hardships of famine and an ill- 
equipped camp. Congress did little to support his arms 
beyond passing resolutions that victories ought to occur. It 
intermeddled, making unfit military appointments, and giving 
commissions to foreigners flown with European tactics and 
personal complacency.^ Boots and stockings, food and great- 
coats, even muskets and gunpowder, were sadly wanting. 

In May, having collected seven thousand men with much 
difficulty, and mainly by his personal exertions, Washington 
broke up his cantonments. Sir William Howe's plan of 
campaign was re-formed partly upon his own experience and 
partly by help of the valuable suggestions which packet 
boats brought him from the War Office. His main army 
was to take Philadelphia for its objective, and he formed the 
intention of marching upon that city through New Jersey. 

From Canada an expedition under General Burgoyne (a 
gifted and fashionable soldier with a reputation for wit, who 
had passed over the head of Carleton, in spite of the merit 
which attached to that officer's defence of Quebec) was to 
force its way south by Lake Champlain and the Hudson river. 
A junction was to be made with Sir Henry Clinton, who, 
according to the arrangement, was to sally out from New 
York. The objective of this combination was the isolation 
of the disaffected New England states. This part of the 
plan was arranged between Burgoyne and Lord George Ger- 
maine, the Secretary of State for War, and was not even 
communicated to the British commander-in-chief until he 
was committed to his southern movement. 

Two figures in this war occupy a unique position : 
Washington, because it has never been possible to praise 

^ Hamilton to Duer, History, i. p. 431. 



46 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1777 tim beyond his merits ; Germaine, for the reason that 
^T. 20 j^Q blame has ever done justice to his incompetency. A 
nation can only expect humiliation when, regardless of 
its interest and its honour, it entrusts its War Office 
to a soldier of battered reputation, incapable of transact- 
ing the simplest business with industry and despatch. If 
a layman may presume to offer an opinion upon such high 
matters, it would be that the Canadian expedition was 
singularly futile in its design, and was based upon a mis- 
apprehension of books rather than upon any understanding 
of the facts. For Burgoyne's column was, as the saying is, 
' in the air.' It was obliged to carry its supplies, and could 
never have hoped to hold any lines of communication. 
When it had passed on its way, except for a certain devasta- 
tion, it might as well never have been there. It is only 
dream-strategy which attempts to cut off a province by 
drawing a line which is immediately rubbed out behind the 
pencil. 

The Hudson river was a diflferent matter. There was a 
possibility of holding that waterway, and thereby making a 
division that it would have been difficult for the colonists 
to obliterate. But to such an end, concentration of the 
whole British army was necessary. For this purpose Bur- 
goyne was wanted at New York, not at Ticonderoga ; and 
Sir William Howe, having regard to the smallness of his 
total force, had no business to be thinking of Philadelphia. 
But the strategy was arranged from home. That in itself 
was an evil of the first magnitude; but having been so 
arranged, it was essential that it should have been firmly 
imposed upon the generals who were to carry out the 
campaign. This was omitted, although Germaine appears 
at one time to have realised the necessity of clear orders and 
afterwards to have forgotten. A letter directing the British 
commander-in-chief to operate upon the Hudson so as to 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 47 

support Burgoyne was actually written ; but the Secre- a.d. 1777 
tary for War refused to sign it because no copy had been ^t- 20 
taken, and being committed to a holiday in Kent, he would 
not wait until this omission had been rectified. The letter 
was never sent, and Sir William Howe, who, with many 
merits, lacked a swift intelligence, was left to guess at the 
meaning of a plan made by other people. 

In the third week of July, General Howe, judging 
it impracticable to march south upon Philadelphia with 
Washington hovering upon his right flank, put his troops 
into transports and rounded Cape May into the estuary 
of the Delaware. But finding himself confronted with 
forts and other difficulties, he put about and sailed away 
to the south, round the Capes of Delaware, up the long 
Chesapeake Bay to the Head of Elk, where he finally 
disembarked. His expedition had occupied more than a 
month, and it was now near the end of August. As the 
result of much seafaring the indefatigable traveller was 
nearly as far from Philadelphia as when he started, and the 
army of Washington was hovering on his left flank instead of 
on his right. He was separated from his base at New York 
by a hundred and forty miles or thereabouts of hostile 
country (measuring as the crow flies); or, if it were a 
question of returning as he came, by some four hundred and 
fifty miles of sea. Washington on the easy interior lines 
had moved his army south to Germantown with the idea of 
defending Philadelphia. 

On the 11th of September the British army in superior 
numbers defeated Washington at the Forks of the Brandy- 
wine and opened the Avay north to Philadelphia, which 
they occupied towards the end of the month, after fighting 
another, but smaller, engagement, in which they were also 
victorious. 

Sir William then divided his army. One portion held 



48 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1777 Germantown, while the other attempted to reduce the 
Ml. 20 jj^merican forts which surrounded the mouth of the Dela- 
ware. Washington, undismayed by his ill-luck, brought up 
his army, now diminished to eight thousand men, to the 
attack of Germantown. It is probable that with seasoned 
troops and favourable weather he would have been successful. 
Fortune favoured him to begin with, but a mist fell (not 
opportunely, as at Brooklyn) which confused and misled 
his officers. A panic ensued, and he suffered a severe 
defeat. What is remarkable about the performance is the 
tenacity it displays. With a raw army he had suffered 
two defeats and lost the city which it had been his object 
to cover; but a little more than a fortnight later he had 
inspired sufficient spirit in his men to attack his victorious 
enemy in its lines. Beaten once more, he withdrew un- 
dismayed to prepare for further operations. Partly, no 
doubt, it was the personal qualities of the man, but partly 
also the wise alliance with circumstances which the British 
had disdained, but which Washington had priced at its true 
value. In spite of victories Sir William Howe was ever 
unable to pursue. 

Burgoyne had moved from Canada shortly after mid- 
summer with three thousand regular troops and five 
hundred Indians, and had recaptured Ticonderoga with 
stores and guns during the first week of July. 

But Clinton at New York had found himself too weak 
to venture within striking distance to support the expedi- 
tion, which was slowly struggling south through swamps 
and forests with a heavy train of artillery, baggage, and 
supplies ; harassed by a multitude of invisible foes in camp 
and upon the march. 

In the middle of October all Washington's anxieties for 
the safety of the New England states were brought to an 
end by the surrender of Burgoyne with between three and 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 49 

four thousand men to a force five times his number at A.D. 1777 
Saratoga, thirty miles to the north of Albany, and about a * ^*^ 
hundred and eighty from New York. 

The full consequences of the surrender at Saratoga can 
hardly have been clear at once even to the sagacious mind 
of the American commander-in-chief It was one of those 
small battles which are remarkable in history for having 
changed the whole face of a situation. It secured the 
northern states from any serious attack; raised the con- 
fidence of the American army, Government, and citizens ; 
depressed in equal proportion the spirits of their enemj^; 
dislocated his plan of campaign, and endangered the posi- 
tion of his main army at Philadelphia by releasing large 
reinforcements. These were the obvious results, but also 
the least important. 

Up to this time Britain had not only held com- 
mand of the sea, but had enjoyed complete immunity. 
She could carry her troops to and fro along the coasts where 
and when she liked. A few frigates were sufficient pro- 
tection against American privateers. The immediate effect 
of Saratoga was to menace this invaluable security. The 
ultimate etlect was to destroy her naval superiority in those 
waters, and by this means to bring the war to a disastrous 
ending. An alliance with a great sea power was, from 
the point of view of the states, the most important object 
of diplomacy, and Saratoga is a memorable battle chiefly 
because it was the direct cause of such an alliance. 

The neutrality of France had no tinge of benevolence for 
Britain. The ministers of Louis xvi. were watchful and 
jealous. The loss of Canada and the triumphant adminis- 
tration of Pitt were memories which still rankled. Under a 
thin veil of private adventure France had sought from the 
beginning to furnish the rebellious colonists with the sinews 
of war. She had regarded with a favourable eye the enlist- 

D 



60 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1777 ment of her subjects as volunteers. But the prestige of her 
^'^- ^^ ancient rival was as yet unshaken. France was willing to 
comfort the enemies of the King of England, but her policy 
stopped short of open war. For this step more was requisite 
than the Bourbon alliance. The revolutionary states must 
first give some signal proof of their superiority. In the 
surrender of Saratoga she found a justification for bolder 
measures. Britain thenceforth was no longer engaged in 
a purely domestic warfare with her rebellious children, but 
had to defend herself also against two great European 
powers — France and Spain. 

Towards the end of November, Sir William Howe had 
taken the forts upon the Delaware, and his supporting fleet 
had safe access to the estuary. In the beginning of De- 
cember he made preparations for a forward movement 
against the American army, but nothing came of it, and 
Washington retired unmolested into winter quarters at 
Valley Forge. 

If the results of a campaign could be measured by 
the comfort of the adversaries when it has ended, or 
even if it bore any fixed relation to the number of victories 
won in the field, the British general would have had 
good reason for complacency. But the hard order of facts 
ignores these minor considerations. It was probably clear 
even to Sir William Howe, amiable, courteous, liberal, but a 
frank hater of all arduous affairs, that the starved and shiver- 
ing regiments in the hills fifteen miles away were the real 
victors, although he lay pleasantly at Philadelphia with his 
fleet anchored in the Delaware under silenced forts. 

A.D. 1778 At the beginning of May (1778), in the Fourth Year of the 
war, the French alliance became known and was eagerly 
welcomed in America. A fortnight earlier, Admiral d'Estaing 
had set sail with twelve ships of the line, his total force both 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 51 

in numbers and weight of armament being greatly superior A.D. 1778 
to the fleet serving under Lord Howe. But his voyage was ^^' ^^ 
performed with all the deliberation that had marked British 
enterprises on land. He had no luck with the elements, nor 
much skill. It took him twelve weeks to arrive. 

Meanwhile it had been arranged that the Howes, upon 
their own request, were to be relieved. They heartily dis- 
liked the job, and the}' disliked even more the ministry 
under which they had the honour to serve. Sir William 
was superseded by Sir Henry Clinton before the middle of 
May. The stout old admiral should shortly have followed his 
brother home, but as he was on the point of handing over his 
command, news reached him of d'Estaing and his superior 
fleet. In such circumstances he let his resignation wait over. 

Also in the month of May (though for all the efibct that came 
of it 'tis hardly worth mentioning) commissioners arrived, 
appointed under the Conciliatory Bills — Lord Carlisle, Eden, 
and Johnstone — to offer concessions and accommodations. 
But as the Americans, bound by the terms of their alliance 
with France, demanded the recognition of their indepen- 
dence, or the withdrawal of King George's troops as a 
preliminary to all negotiations, nothing but some delay was 
the result — delay hurtful to Britain, having regard to 
d'Estaing, who was approaching with his superior fleet. 

A few days before midsummer, Clinton evacuated 
Philadelphia, and started to march northward, through New 
Jersey, to his base at New York — none too early, for d'Estaing 
was already much overdue. Lord Howe, in his cool, 
workmanlike manner, unperturbed by the British Govern- 
ment's neglect to reinforce him, or even to send him word 
of the sailing of the French admiral (such oversights he 
appears to have taken with resignation, as he did gales, 
shoals, and tides, and the other natural hazards and condi- 
tions of his service), got on board his transports all the 



52 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1778 stores and supplies and sailed for New York, arriving there 
^T. 21 y^ithout misadventure. 

Clinton was less fortunate. He had been compelled to 
return north with his army by land, for the reason that his 
ships afforded barely sufficient accommodation for the large 
numbers of loyalist refugees whom it was considered unsafe 
to leave to the tender mercies of Congress. His force num- 
bered ten thousand. Against him were thirteen thousand 
colonials, who hung upon his left flank and threatened to 
envelop his rear. 

On June 28 Washington sent orders to General Lee, who 
commanded the advanced division, to attack the British at 
Monmouth Court-house. But Lee was a thoroughly in- 
competent soldier, and evidence has come to light in recent 
years which raises the suspicion that he was also a traitor.'' 
He hesitated, expressed grave doubts and found delay wiser 
than action. Cornwallis, realising the danger, pushed forward 
his baggage, and came to the aid of the rearguard. Being 
met by no attack, he proceeded with his usual prompt valour 
to deHver one. Lee thereupon ordered a general retreat. 

It was a day of excessive heat, when the astonished 
Washington, riding forward at the head of his main army, 
encountered a string of fugitives. They were ignorant 
of any reason for their flight except that it was by order. 
With the aid of his staff, the rout was checked and the 
battle re-formed. Cornwallis was driven back, the lost 
ground recovered, and the exhausted troops bivouacked 
on the field. The British had lost a rearguard action, but the 
Americans had lost the opportunity of a crowning victory. 
By the following morning Cornwallis had withdrawn, and 
Clinton's army was safe, if not from effective pursuit, at 
least from annihilation. 

A grateful tradition has so recklessly transformed the 

^ Fiske's Ame7~ica7i Revolution, i. pp. 300-306. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 53 

character of Washington that he has become a kind of A.D. 1778 
mechanical monster stuffed with incredible copy-book 
headings, strangely unlike the altogether human and 
passionate hero that he was in fact. At Monmouth Court- 
house on that blazing, winking, dusty afternoon, the com- 
mander-in-chief received the report of his subordinate. 
A blast of pale anger, a terrific eloquence of unprintable 
scorn, and General Lee vanished from all part and promi- 
nence in the war. After a feeble recovery of the spirits, 
a few months of inglorious notoriety, some bursts of impu- 
dence and muttering discontent, he faded utterly out of 
the knowledge of men. 

Sir Henry Clinton's retreat had cost him fifteen hundred 
men by the time he reached the southern shore opposite 
Staten Island. Here he put his army on board Lord Howe's 
transports, which having disembarked their passengers in 
safety had now returned across the bay to his assistance. 
By the end of the first week in July he was safe in New 
York, but only in the nick of time. 

The British admiral, unlike his adversary, had been 
fortunate as well as skilful. Having secured the army, 
he prepared to encounter d'Estaing, who commanded a 
fleet of double his numbers and more than double his 
armament. The episode of which this gallant and good- 
tempered gentleman was the hero is one of the few in the 
history of the American War to which the British nation 
can look back with unmingled satisfaction. He disposed 
his small fleet in so masterly a fashion across the entrance 
to New York harbour that d'Estaing judged him, after a 
careful reconnaissance, to be unassailable, and towards the 
end of July moved to Rhode Island, a hundred and fifty miles 
to the north, where a colonial force under General Sullivan 
was endeavouring to drive the British out of Newport.^ 

^ Mahan, Types of Naval Officers, pp. 276-284. 



54 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1778 But on the 9th of August, to the bewilderment of the 
'^'^' allies, the British fleet appeared off the entrance to Narra- 
gansett Bay. Lord Howe had received reinforcements, which 
brought his strength in numbers up to about two- thirds of 
the French. The adverse balance, in his opinion, might be 
redressed by seamanship, and in this he rightly believed 
himself to hold an easy superiority. The British had lost 
command of the sea, and so long as he should lie at anchor 
in New York harbour, the allies had gained that inestimable 
advantage. The best he could hope for with so inferior a 
force was to produce a deadlock in which neither party held 
a clear predominance. 

His unforeseen arrival and daring menace drew the 
French admiral in pursuit. After two days during which 
Lord Howe skilfully manoeuvred in the open sea, a gale 
sprang up which separated the two fleets and inflicted so 
great damage upon d'Estaing that he considered it impera- 
tive to retire to Boston, fifty miles further north, to refit. 
Upon this General Sullivan was obliged to withdraw, which 
he did in high dudgeon, relieving his wounded feelings in 
indiscreet and bitter criticism of his faint-hearted ally. 
Colonial opinion echoed these hot opinions, so that it 
needed all the cool tactfulness of Washington to prevent 
the prophecy of Chatham coming true, and the ' unnatural ' 
alliance which had been welcomed with such fervid en- 
thusiasm from falling hopelessly to pieces. 

D'Estaing sailed for the West Indies early in November, 
and his departure gave back the command of the sea to 
Lord Howe's successor. Under favour of this condition 
the British pressed an attack in the southern states, cap- 
turing and holding the town and harbour of Savannah. 

The Fifth Year of the war (1779) lacked the excitement of 
great events. The want of French co-operation until the 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 55 

late autumn produced a deadlock. In the chief seat of a.d, 1779 
the war, the state of New York, Washington did not feel ^t. 22 
himself strong enough to attack the British lines, while 
Clinton was too weak to push his army into the open and 
risk a pitched battle in a hostile country. 

For the first time since the beginning of the war, winter 
had passed without famine or excessive privation among 
the colonial troops. But Congress had less credit for this 
result than the increased authority of the commander-in- 
chief and the disastrous experience of previous years, which 
even the state governments who held the purse-strings 
were driven to respect. 

Congress was in fact as bankrupt as ever of executive 
powers, and still more bankrupt in the matter of capable 
men. For the need of officers had drawn many away, while 
foreign missions had found more congenial employment for 
others. The finances of the country were in a most 
melancholy state of exhaustion ; while profit-making and 
corruption took a heavy toll upon the meagre funds. 
* Speculation and peculation,' in Washington's phrase, were 
deadlier enemies than the fleets and armies of King George. 
In such circumstances a campaign of passive resistance, 
upon which Washington had determined, placed a severe 
strain upon the spirits of his dwindling army. 

In the spring the British operations were confined to a 
series of raids which have raised the usual cloud of charges 
and countercharges of barbarity which are incidental to the 
nature of such a plan of campaign. Where the devastation 
of homesteads is the deliberate policy of a commander, the 
argument of expediency will not wipe out bitter memories, 
whether the general be British or American — Clinton in 
New Jersey or Sherman in Georgia. 

In June the British showed an inclination to extend 
their posts along the Hudson. Forts were captured 



56 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1779 and recaptured, occupied and demolished, but no events 
happened which gave a decided advantage to either side. 
Washington turned a deaf ear to all heroic advice, and 
steadily pursued his weary strategy of squeezing Clinton 
back into his lines as often as he showed a disposition 
to move out of them. He turned an equally deaf ear 
to the cries of Congress for a more ferocious retaliation 
in the matter of the raids. He knew his own business 
and the nature of war. Considering he was but a plain 
country gentleman and a soldier, he also understood with 
marvellous insight those orators and journalists, drunk with 
the rumours of outrage and atrocity, ignorant of warfare 
and by temperament averse from it. He rated the value of 
their counsel at a price that was unflattering, and the 
opinion of the army supported him in his clemency. 

As was but natural, there were strong murmurs against 
the French. For ten months the alliance had lain dormant. 
The sea-power of Britain was as absolute as it had been in 
the early years of the war. On the 1st of September, 
however, d'Estaing reappeared off Savannah, which was 
still in British hands. In co-operation Avith the Ameri- 
can besiegers he delivered an attack which was repulsed. 
During October he sailed away with the greater part of 
his ships for France, so that even the menace of a superior 
hostile fleet in the West Indies was withdrawn, and Britain 
resumed her command of the sea. 



CHAPTER VI 

The End of the War 

In the early days of the Sixth Year of the war (1780) the 
outlook of the American States seemed as hopeless as in the 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 57 

black autumn of 76. Men suffered less, or at any rate felt a.d. 17S0 
their sufferings with a duller ache, but no excitement would ^^- ^^ 
have been so dangerous as the weariness that was hanging on 
their shoulders. It seemed to them as if, in spite of all their 
valour and devotion, in spite of the capacity of their leader 
and the success of his strategy, in spite even of their superior 
numbers, more earnest spirit, and the advantage of a well- 
known and friendly country, they were after all about to be 
crushed by the sheer weight of an enemy who, possessing 
boundless resources, would neither budge nor yield. Their 
treasury was as dry as a summer sandbank, and foreign 
loans were hard to come by. 

Congress was sometimes hysterical, often absurd, and 
always impotent. It passed resolutions, gave much advice 
to the commander-in-chief, and sat for ever whistling for 
a wind. The state governments were filled with jealousy, 
spleen and suspicions, by no means groundless, one of 
another. They were incapable equally of effective co-opera- 
tion and of delegation of their petty sovereignties to the 
hands of a federal power. The Army, under ill treatment 
and neglect, was dwindling, and had even become mutinous. 
The people had comforted their sad hearts with a splendid 
alliance, but the nuptials were barely concluded when, like 
the citizen's fashionable wife, the partner proved gadding 
and unprofitable. The British enemy remained in stolid 
occupation of the chief commercial city ; and in this com- 
manding position, which enabled them always to menace 
injury, and often to inflict it, they remained unassailable so 
long as they held command of the sea. In the early weeks 
of the year the royalist army in the south, reinforced by 
sympathisers among the American citizens, and led by Sir 
Henry Clinton himself, was vigorously pushing on the siege 
of Charleston with good prospects of success. 

The feeling of discouragement was not only excusable as a 



58 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1780 weakness of human nature, but was grounded in tlie very 
^'^•^^ facts of the situation. Had the British government been 
willing to risk some bold stroke of magnanimity, had it acted 
with more astuteness and greater energy, or had there arisen 
some statesman of the mettle of the elder Pitt, suddenly 
awakening the slumbering spirit of patriotism among the 
people, we feel that, even at the eleventh hour, our ances- 
tors might still have turned the tables on their adver- 
saries and prevented the disruption of the empire. The 
faults of King George the Third have been conceded with a 
liberal hand, and are written large in every schoolbook of 
history. It is but due, however, to his memory to recognise 
that, although the beginnings of the quarrel may have been 
owing in great measure to his defects of judgment and of 
temper, he stood alone among his ministers, and all but 
alone among his subjects, in the possession of that spirit 
and pride of duty that made the strength of Washington 
and his ragged army. 

In April Lafayette returned from France bringing news 
of a French fleet and army to sail without delay. Washing- 
ton thereupon turned his mind to plans for a joint attack 
upon New York, and to the alternative scheme for a com- 
bination against the enemy in the south. But on May 12 
Charleston, hitherto deemed impregnable, was stormed and 
captured by Clinton, an achievement which deserves high 
praise for its skill and daring. His losses were but two 
hundred and fifty men, and with this small sacrifice he 
secured the town and harbour, and took six thousand 
prisoners and four hundred guns. Having secured his 
conquest, he left Cornwallis in command in the south, 
which now lay open to invasion, and returned to New 
York. Washington held grimly to the Hudson river, and 
awaited the coming of the French forces. 

Towards the middle of July an army of five thousand 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 59 

men under Rochambeau, and a small fleet with seven ships A.D. 1780 
of the line under de Ternay, arrived once more off Rhode 
Island, bringing intelligence of a larger fleet that was to 
follow. Their arrival was welcome ; but the orders of the 
French Government that no important enterprises were to 
be undertaken until the promised reinforcements should 
appear produced much heartburning. Weeks went by, and 
then word came that the second fleet lay in Brest Harbour 
blocked by a British admiral. 

Under this disappointment the heads even of good 
soldiers and citizens began to swim, and the mouths of men 
were full of contradictory reasons for resting from the 
struggle. Some drew attention to the empty treasury ; 
others to the fact that the French had now come; others, 
again, demonstrated convincingly that the British were worn 
out, and as good as beaten already. August saw the army 
on the verge of dissolution. But Washington, as ever, was 
calm, industrious and determined ; writing with suppressed 
passion to Congress ; inspiriting his troops ; reasoning with 
men by letter and speech, and succeeding somehow in 
keeping things together. 

September was a black month for the Americans. Corn- 
wallis in the south with two thousand men utterly de- 
feated their army, over three thousand strong, at Camden, 
under Gates, the conqueror of Burgoyne. Washington 
returning from a meeting with Rochambeau learned of 
the treachery and flight of General Arnold commanding 
at West Point. Meanwhile the army watching New York 
starved and became more mutinous. Admiral Rodney 
with a portion of his fleet visited the city, but un- 
fortunately he did not see his duty in the same light 
as it had appeared to Lord Howe. The French were 
left undisturbed at Newport, and he sailed back to the 
West Indies. 



60 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1781 When the Seventh Year of the war (1781) opened, Greene, 
^"^^ ^'* the best of Washington's generals, took command against 
Cornwallis in the south. He had succeeded Gates, whose 
vanity and incompetence were at length manifest even to 
Congress despite his flattery and intrigues. A column 
under Arnold, now in the British service, ravaged Virginia. 
Washington's hands were full of disciplinary matters. 
There was a mutiny of the Pennsylvania regiments, due 
to the misery of their conditions, and when that was settled, 
another broke out among their comrades of New Jersey. 
Some hanging was necessary, from which the commander- 
in-chief did not shrink. 

Greene, opposed to the main army under Cornwallis, made 
a successful retreat, drawing the British two hundred miles 
from their base, but leaving both the Carolinas at their 
mercy. On March 15, Greene with four thousand five 
hundred men judged himself to be in sufficient strength to 
turn and risk a battle with his redoubtable antagonist, who 
had less than half his numbers. But he was heavily defeated 
at Guilford Court-house ; though, like many of the British 
victories, this one also was barren of good results for the 
conquerors. Cornwallis found himself obliged to retreat to 
Wilmington, and the Americans re-entered South Carolina. 
Again at Hobkirk Hill on April 25 Greene was beaten by 
a small force of nine hundred men under Lord Rawdon, but 
being too weak to pursue, the British troops were forced 
to retire on Charleston. 

At the end of March de Grasse sailed from Brest with an 
overwhelming fleet of twenty-six ships of the line and a 
large convoy, arriving at Martinique in the last days of 
April.1 

Cornwallis at Wilmington debated whether he should 
rejoin Eawdon at Charleston or push on to Arnold in the 

^ Mahan, 2'he Influence of Sea Power in History, chap. x. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 61 

north. At the end of April he determined on the latter a.d. i781 
course, and the fate of the war was decided. ^'^- ^^ 

On May 20 Cornwallis met Arnold at Petersburg, when 
their united armies amounted to five thousand men. Takinsf 
command, he sent Arnold back to New York. Clinton when 
he heard of this movement condemned it, and with good 
reason. The position of an army resting on the Chesapeake 
depended for its safety on command of the sea, and this upon 
his information was unlikely to be retained for many weeks 
longer. 

Washington, having full knowledge of the intentions of de 
Grasse, discussed with Rochambeau the alternatives — a 
combined attack upon Clinton's army in New York, or upon 
that of Cornwallis in the south. Having decided upon the 
latter course, the allies determined to alarm Clinton by the 
feint of an attack, which succeeded so well that he applied 
to Cornwallis for reinforcements. 

Towards the middle of August a frigate brought word that 
de Grasse might shortly be expected in the Chesapeake. 
Washington wrote immediately in reply that he would join 
him with as many troops as could be spared from the 
investment of the main army of the British. 

In Virginia, Lafayette with light troops had for some time 
been watching and harassing Cornwallis, who had gradually 
withdrawn to the coast, and was established with his prin- 
cipal force at Yorktown, on the south shore of the estuary 
of the York river. 

On the 21st of August Washington began to move his 
army southwards. On the 23rd and 24th he crossed from 
the east to the west bank of the Hudson river. On the 
27th de Barras, the French admiral at Newport, sailed with 
his fleet of eight ships of the line, and eighteen transports 
carrying troops and a siege-train, to join de Grasse in the 
south. 



62 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1781 Rodney in the West Indies, at the news of the French 
■^'^* ^"^ departure from these waters, had detached Hood with four- 
teen ships to follow them.^ Making a quicker passage, the 
British arrived in Chesapeake Bay three days before the 
enemy, and finding no trace of him sailed on to New York. 
Admiral Graves at that station had five ships of the line, 
and was Hood's senior officer. He took command of the 
united fleet, and having word of de Barras's departure from 
Newport, weighed anchor on the 31st in the hopes of 
delivering a crushing blow. But the French had good luck 
in their sluggishness, and Graves went past without sighting 
them. When he arrived in Chesapeake Bay he found only 
the fleet of de Grasse, which outnumbered him by five ships 
of the line. He engaged gallantly, but without discretion, 
and allowed de Grasse to manoeuvre him gradually out of 
the bay, declining action for five consecutive days. Mean- 
while de Barras arrived with his contingent, and Graves, 
hopelessly outnumbered, withdrew to New York. It was a 
good scheme on the part of the British, and miscarried 
partly through ill-fortune, but mainly through a lack 
of wits. 

September opened hopefully for the allies. On the 2nd 
Washington, having taken every ingenious precaution to 
conceal his departure, reached Philadelphia with his army. 
About the same time Clinton appears to have first realised 
that he was seriously bent on a southern movement. In 
the south Greene engaged Colonel Stewart at Eutaw Springs, 
and fought an indecisive battle, but the result was to force 
the British commander to fall back upon Charleston, thereby 
cutting off Cornwallis's retreat towards the south. On the 
22nd French transports carried Washington's army down 
the Chesapeake and up the James river to Williamsburg. 
On the 28th he marched on Yorktown. The meshes were 
1 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power in History, chap. x. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 63 

being drawn very tight round the best soldier who had a. d. 1781 
fought in America for King George. ^* 

The French fleet held the river mouth against escape or 
succour. To the south, the estuary of the James, four 
hundred miles of hostile country, and the army of Greene, 
cut off all hope of a retreat on Charleston. To the north the 
York river, over a mile broad, separated Cornwallis from his 
outpost at Gloucester. To transport his little army, number- 
ing somewhat more than seven thousand men, in open boats 
across such an obstacle, exposed during the process to attack 
from the fleet at anchor in the bay, having transported it 
in safety, to traverse Maryland and Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey to New York, four hundred miles away, with an 
elated enemy on his heels and lining every wood and river 
bank upon the march, was an opportunity so slender that 
only desperation could have thought of clutching at it. 
Across the peninsula to the west, cutting him off entirely 
from the mainland, lay the army of Washington, eighteen 
thousand strong — eleven thousand Americans and seven 
thousand Frenchmen — with a heavy and well-appointed 
siege-train. The allies were full of fresh hope and ardour, 
and their great leader was calmly confident of a crowning 
victory at last. Discouragement and disease among the 
British and their Hessian mercenaries increased the odds 
against Cornwallis. So matters stood on the 1st of October 
1781. 

On the 5 th the Americans opened their trenches. 
On the 14th two commanding redoubts were captured 
— the first by a light corps led by Colonel Alexander 
Hamilton with great judgment and gallantry, the second 
more deliberately by the French. The game was hopeless 
from the beginning, and now it was all but played out. 
Still the intrepid defender remained obdurate to all talk of 
a surrender. If he could not avert the inevitable, he could 



64 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1781 at all events add anotlier example of courage and resource 
^'^•'^^ to the great tradition of the British arms. His ammuni- 
tion was giving out, and many of his soldiers were sick. 
He made a night attack, spiked guns, destroyed some earth- 
works, but to no purpose. Then he formed an audacious 
scheme of escape to the north. One contingent crossed 
successfully to the northern shore ; but even the elements 
were against him. A gale sprang up in which no open 
boat, weighted to the gunwale with men and stores, could 
ever hope to live. 

So upon the 19th of October, there being no other course 
available, he surrendered. In a war which was the grave 
of most men's reputations who had in it any prominent 
part, military or civil, Cornwallis almost alone added to 
his fame. For not only was he a soldier of stainless 
courage, but he had a bold and steady judgment, and 
in his actions a promptness that was lacking in all the 
others. 

Yorktown was the end of the war. Charleston and 
Savannah were evacuated in the succeeding year, and 
only New York remained in possession of the King's 
troops. 



Washington was not less admirable in success than 
under defeat. He had no thought of taking his ease 
until not only victory, but the fruits of victory, had been 
secured. The general conviction that the war was over 
seemed to him to be fraught with dangerous possibilities. 
Negotiation must follow, supposing both parties to be 
inclined to peace. Having regard to the alliance with France 
and Spain, who as yet had tasted little of the sweets of 
conquest, had settled but few of their old accounts, and had 
enjoyed revenge only, as it were, vicariously, in the profit 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 65 

taken by a third party at the expense of their ancient foe, A.D. 1781 
it was probable that such negotiations would extend over a ^"^ 

long period. 

Washington was still too weak to turn Clinton out of 
New York without French aid, and the French had other 
more urgent uses for their ships and men. But it was a 
clear necessity that Clinton should be kept fast under lock 
and key, otherwise, when it came to a treaty, the British 
Government might have some solid advantage to throw 
into the scales. At all costs the colonial army must be kept 
in being, an effective force, capable not only of defence but 
of aggression. In this attempt it was necessary to reckon 
with Congress and the state governments, and the temper of 
the civil population and the army itself, who were, one and 
all, weary of the war, and only too much inclined to a 
complacent admiration of their past valour. At no period 
of his career had the commander-in-chief to encounter 
difficulties that were harder to contend with, and his credit 
stands as high in these irksome labours as it did at Princeton, 
Yalley Forge, or Yorktown. 



In March, in the Eighth Year of the war (1782), the A.D. 1782 
British House of Commons voted for the discontinuance of 
hostilities, and Lord George Germaine resigned. There is a 
touch of irony in the event ; for his retention of office would 
now no longer have been of any conspicuous injury to his 
country. 

In May Washington was imploring the states for men, 
and for money to pay the troops and to provide them with 
supplies.^ The question of arrears and pensions was very 
urgent. In October we find him writing to the Secretary 

^ Sparka's Washington, viii. pp. 284-88. 
E 



66 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1782 of War on these matters, pressing immediate consideration 

"^^■^^ of the just claims of his soldiers, "after having spent the 

' flower of their days, and many of them their patrimonies, 

' in establishing the freedom and independence of their 

* country." ^ 

But in Congress, and not only in Congress, but also in 
the people, there was an exaggerated standard of political 
morality founded upon stock phrases regarding the sub- 
ordination of the military to the civil power. In times of 
war this excessive virtue had yielded with a sigh to the 
importunate violence of events, but with the return of peace 
it sought to stifle the memory of its lapse under a prudish, 
circumspect, precise and jealous behaviour. The army was 
at last told in plain words that it placed too high an estimate 
both upon its importance and its claims. It was exhorted 
to practise the virtue of patience. By and by, when the 
civil power should decide in its wisdom that the time was 
ripe, something would probably be done. As a matter of 
grace, relief would then be doled out, of such a kind as 
prudent citizens, without losing sight of first principles, 
could allow to thoughtless fellows who had risked nothing 
but their fortunes and their reputations for the common 
good. Addressed in terms of so cool a gratitude, the army 
began to murmur mutinously, and to consider whether after 
all it was not master of the situation. There was talk of a 
dictator,^ which threw Washington into a rage and Hamilton 
into a fit of laughter. 

In the following year things became graver. There was 
open sedition, of which the heroic Gates was the secret 
instigator.^ The army, urged in anonymous broadsheets to 
use force for securing its well-earned provision of half-pay, 
gave an attentive ear. Gates in former years, with the aid 

1 Sparks's Washington, viii. p. 354. ^ History, ii. p. HI. 

3 Ibid. ii. pp. 393-94. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 67 

of Congress, had endeavoured to supplant Washington in A.D, 1782 
the chief command. He now turned upon his former ally, ^'^' ^^ 
and made it the object of his mean intrigues to destroy the 
affection of the army for its great leader by forcing him to 
act as the protector of Congress. 

There was only one man in America capable of quelling 
the mutinous spirit, and he, by the irony of fate, was in full 
sympathy with the grievance. His enemies counted safely 
that to Washington disorder and civil war would appear 
even greater evils than the suffering of his soldiers. They 
judged rightly that he would not hesitate in his course of 
action. A meeting of the discontented assembled upon an 
appointed day, and Gates was called on to preside. 
Washington attended with a set speech in writing in his 
pocket. " He, who had never been greeted but with affec- 
' tion, was received with cold and calm respect. It appeared 
' as though sedition had felt it necessary to commence her 
' secret work by engendering suspicions against the Father 
' of his country. He arose : he felt the estrangement — 
' he paused, and he doubted of the issue. As he uncovered 
' his venerated head, and was about to address them from 
' a written paper in his hand, his eye grew dim, and he 
' uttered this pathetic unpremeditated remark : ' Fellow 
' soldiers, you perceive I have not only grown grey, but 
' blind in your service.' " ^ He then proceeded to read his 
speech, which was an indignant condemnation of the con- 
spiracy ; but the phrase of his opening had been enough. 
"Awed by the majesty of his virtue, and touched with 
' his interest in their sufferings, every soldier's eye was 
' filled with a generous tear ; they reproved themselves 
' for having doubted him who had never deceived them : 
' they forgot their wrongs, in the love of their country 
* and of their chief." ^ 

1 History, ii. p. 391. 2 Ibid. p. 393. 



68 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1783 By the autumn of 1782 the allies of the states were in a 
^'^' "^ more accommodating humour for discussing terms of peace. 
In April, Rodney in the West Indies had broken the line 
of de Grasse. In September, Elliot at Gibraltar, after a 
three years' siege, had burned de Crillon's famous batteries 
to the water's edge. The preliminary articles of peace were 
signed on January the 20th, 1783, and the welcome news 
reached Washington in March. In November the British 
army left New York, and before Christmas Day the American 
commander-in-chief had bidden his officers good-bye and 
laid down his commission in Congress. 



CHAPTER VII 

The Military Secretary 

A.D, 1776 In March '76, a few days before Washington drove Sir 
^T. 19 wTiiiJam Howe out of Boston, Hamilton was appointed to 
the captaincy of the company of artillery which had been 
raised by New York state. In January of the same year 
he had celebrated his nineteenth birthday. Murmurs on 
the score of his youth were quieted by testimonials from 
the military instructors, and at the earliest opportunity by 
his conduct in the field. It is notable that he laboured at 
the science of his profession during the twelve months that 
intervened between his enrolment in the Hearts of Oak 
and the battle of Brooklyn, with the same zeal which he 
had previously given to philosophy and the classics. In 
drills and gun-practice he was equally industrious, and 
valued the smart appearance of his company to the extent 
of giving the larger portion of his allowance from the West 
Indies to their external embellishment.^ 

^ Life, p. 52. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 69 

In the famous passage from Brooklyn he brought up A.D. 1776 
the rear, comported himself in such a manner as to win ■ ^^ 
considerable credit, and lost his baggage and a gun. He 
attracted the favourable notice of Greene, the best general 
who served under Washington, and afterwards, during the 
retreat from New York, of the commander-in-chief him- 
self, who was impressed by his earthworks at Harlem, and 
engaged him in conversation.^ At White Plains he again 
won admiration for the coolness and courage with which 
he used his battery to check the British attack.^ In October, 
after the fall of the posts on the Hudson river, he volun- 
teered to retake Fort Washington, but the offer did not 
commend itself at headquarters.^ In the late autumn, when 
the American army was falling back through New Jersey, 
dwindling in numbers and hope, he again earned high praise 
by the bold and sagacious handling of his battery for the 
protection of the rearguard in its crossing of the Raritan.* 
By the end of the year he had won as great a fame 
for his soldierly qualities as a few months earlier for his 
pamphlets and speeches. A contemporary record is quoted 
by his biographer: — "I noticed a youth, a mere stripling, 
' small, slender, almost delicate in frame, marching beside 
' a piece of artillery with a cocked hat pulled down over 
' his eyes, apparently lost in thought, with his hand resting 
' on the cannon, and every now and then patting it as 
' he mused, as if it were a favourite horse or a pet play- 
' thing." 5 

On the 1st of March 1777 he was appointed aide-de-camp a.d. 1777 
to General Washington with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, ^^- ^^ 
and entered into close relations with that great man 
which lasted for the whole period of their joint lives. It 
is fair to assume that he owed this appointment as much 

1 Life, p. 56. 2 Ibid. p. 56. » jn^, p. 56. 

* Ibid. p. 57. ^ History, i. pp. 137-8. 



70 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1777 to his reputation witli the pen as to the handling 
^T. 20 q£ j^jg battery. The combination of quahties made him 
invaluable. Washington was overwhelmed with corre- 
spondence, and although he wrote well, it was with ex- 
treme difficulty and slowness, and innumerable corrections 
even in such details as grammar and spelling. A large 
proportion of his letters were political and diplomatic, 
rather than military in the strictest sense. A boy who 
was not only a ready and powerful writer, but who possessed 
in addition the instinct of a statesman and the spirit of 
a soldier, was an inestimable discovery. From the first 
he acted as secretary, sharing the duties of the post 
with one who became at once his devoted friend, ' the 
old secretary,' General Harrison. The affection of this 
colleague invented the nickname which has stuck — 'the 
little lion.' i 

From the first, also, he was employed to write important 
documents, and sent upon errands that required character 
and discretion. It is beyond question that the messages 
to Congress, and the correspondence with British generals, 
which impressed Europe with the dignity and power of the 
American leader, were mainly the work of Hamilton's mind. 
The official correspondence of Washington during this period 
had a wide audience and a great celebrity, and while we 
must acknowledge the credit due to his secretary in the 
vigour, the logical arrangement, the lucidity and the stateli- 
ness of these documents, we are no less bound to beware of 
the absurd explanation which has depicted the commander- 
in-chief as a kind of puppet. It is a favourite device of a 
certain class of commentators upon great men to attribute 
their excellences always to some one else, and Hamilton has 
not altogether escaped this indiscreet tribute, either during 
his life or subsequently. But certainly he never sought it, 

1 Life, p. 64. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 71 

nor gave the least colour to the legend. Washington was a.d. 1777 
not the readiest of writers, but he held his opinions in '^' 
a vice; and we may safely assume that if his vivacious 
secretary had happened upon any occasion to set forth 
his own views and not those of his chief, the despatch 
containing them would have been rewritten before it was 
signed. It is not unfair, however, nor is it any derogation 
from the splendid character of the commander-in-chief, to 
say that Hamilton began by writing to his instructions, 
and ended by divining, interpreting and anticipating his 
thoughts.^ In counsel no less than in action, the greatest 
of Washington's qualities was his instinct for the true 
relation of things. Reasoning and argument were only a 
degree less irksome to him than composition and penman- 
ship. It has been said of him by one who had acted as 
his secretary, that when some important document had to 
be acknowledged, he left his bewildered amanuensis to find 
not only the words, but even the answer itself. But to 
live on close terms with Washington was to be dominated 
by his opinions to such an extent that it would have been 
difficult to run counter to them. 

Of one of Hamilton's services we have very ample 
records. At the end of October, after the news had come 
of Burgoyne's surrender, he was despatched to General Gates 
for reinforcements. He was in his twenty-first year, and had 
been acting as military secretary for a period of only eight 
months. Gates was a vain, envious and foolish creature, but 
he was also a victorious general. He had reaped where others 
had sown, and was enjoying an immense fame and popularity 
in consequence. His success at Saratoga was contrasted by 
shallow and impatient people with the defeat at Brandywine 
and the fall of Philadelphia. There was a strong Gates party, 
composed of his own henchmen and the ill-wishers of the 

1 Pickering to Coleman, History, ii. , preface, p. vii. 



72 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1777 commander-in-chief. Gates, in the j&rst flush of conquest, 
had even permitted himself certain deliberate slights and 
discourtesies. Altogether it was a difficult embassy for a 
boy to accomplish with credit, and it may be taken as proof 
of the confidence which Washington reposed in Hamilton 
that he went armed with a letter, to use if there were 
need of it, clothing him with absolute power and leaving 
everything to his discretion. 

Gates, as might have been expected, demurred to parting 
with two out of his three brigades, and pretended danger 
from Sir Henry Clinton in New York as his justification. 
He would give one of the three, which Hamilton, mindful of 
the diplomacies, was about to accept with a wry face, when he 
discovered that it was less than half the strength of either of 
the others, and liable to still further diminution at an early 
date through the expiry of the term of enlistment. There- 
upon Hamilton had no option but to act upon his powers. 
His letter to Gates is a masterpiece of courtesy in the im- 
perative mood. The victorious general, surprised in sharp 
practice, gave up more than he need otherwise have done, 
and added a second brigade. 

With General Putnam, whom he met by the way, Hamil- 
ton dealt more cavalierly. Putnam was a better man than 
Gates, braver and more honest, but he had what in Scotland 
is called ' a bee in his bonnet.' With him high matters 
were a complete confusion, and the little things usually took 
precedence of the big. Like many brave veterans who 
are dimly conscious of their own lack of perspicacity, he 
was of a most touchy disposition. Orders given without 
any authority by a very youthful staff officer, command- 
ing him forthwith to detach troops to the south when 
he had been planning a baresark descent upon Clinton in 
New York, were a great deal more than he could stand with 
equanimity. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 73 

Hamilton returned a few days later, after his encounter A.D. 177S 
with General Gates, to find that his august commands to ^^-^l 
General Putnam had not been carried into execution. His 
indignation was only equalled by his determination to be 
obeyed. He was shivering with fever, but such was the 
force of his youthful spirit that from his sick-bed orders 
went forth to Putnam's puzzled subordinates to march south 
immediately, and neither the unwillingness of one, nor the 
ingenious pretext of another that his men were undergoing 
' an operation for the itch,' was able to stand against such 
persuasions. 

In the following year we find for the first time murmurs 
against the undue influence exercised by Hamilton upon 
the mind of Washington. The charge was maintained till 
the end of his days, and in later years became one of 
the chief cries of the Democratic party. The power which 
Hamilton exercised over the minds of his fellows and over 
events is undeniable; but throughout his life he was ever 
suspected of an even greater personal influence than he 
possessed. The superior brilliance of his personality dis- 
torted the true proportions of every word and action. If 
something noteworthy was done, men were certain that 
he had pulled the strings ; if something remarkable 
was said, that he had prompted. All admiration and 
odium were concentrated upon him, and it was con- 
ceived to be impossible for any colleague to retain his 
independence of will or judgment in such dangerous 
company. 

Hamilton's correspondence during the period of the war is 
full of interest, and bears evidence to a clear and soldierly 
view of the situation. But what has been preserved 
is only a fragment, and where we should most desire his 
commentary there is usually a gap. In the early months 
of the year he was engaged at Valley Forge with a com- 



74 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1779 mittee of Congress, drafting and redrafting their reports 
'^'^- ^^ upon the organisation and subsistence of the army. He 
kept up a regular but unofficial correspondence in his 
own name, but on his general's behalf, with the friendly 
party in Congress. At the battle of Monmouth he 
appeared once more as a soldier, protesting energetically 
against the tactics of Lee and rallying the retreating 
regiments. Afterwards he was sent to interview Admiral 
d'Estaing. 

In the following winter (79), while the army lay watching 
the British, a plan for kidnapping Sir Henry Clinton was 
hatched by some audacious spirits. " The British general 
' was then occupying a house near the Battery, in New York, 
' situate a few yards from the Hudson river. Intelligence, 
' through spies, had been obtained of the approaches to his 
' bedchamber. Light whale-boats, with muffled oars, were 
' to be placed under the command of Colonel Humphreys, 

* of Connecticut ; and the party, in full preparation, were 

* waiting anxiously the approach of night for the execution 

* of their purpose. . . . Colonel Hamilton, in the interval, 
' became informed of the intended enterprise. He observed 

* to General Washington ' that there could be little doubt 
' of its success ; but, sir,' said he, ' have you examined the 
' consequences of it ? ' The general inquired, ' In what 
' respect ? ' ' Why,' replied Hamilton, ' it has occurred to 
' me that we shall rather lose than gain by removing Sir 
' Henry Clinton from the command of the British army, 
' because we perfectly understand his character ; and, by 
' taking him off, we only make way for some other, perhaps 
' an abler officer, whose character and disposition we have 
' to learn.' The general acknowledged the force of the 
'objection, and abandoned the project."^ . . . There is 
an almost preternatural sagacity in such reasoning. The 

1 Life, pp. 218, 219. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 75 

scene appeals to tlie imagination so strongly that we A.D. 1780 
pray it may indeed have happened : — the solemn general, ^^ 

with the weight of American freedom on his broad 
shoulders, standing six feet two in his shoes and frown- 
ing over his big, thick nose which turned to so bright a 
scarlet in cold weather that intelligent strangers visiting 
in the camp suspected the sobriety of his habits ; the 
little secretary, stretching to his full height of some five 
feet six, delicate and dark-eyed, propounding with an 
awful and relentless gravity the logical defects of this 
exuberant plan — it is a situation filled with the spirit 
of eternal humour. For beyond doubt either of the two 
men would have given his ears to go, had his duty allowed 
it, in the light whale-boat with muffled oars to steal Sir 
Henry Clinton from his bed-chamber in that dark night 
of February. 

In December 1780 Hamilton was married to Miss Betsy 
Schuyler, a girl of great charm and a quick and humorous 
intelligence. Her father was that General Schuyler who 
had held the important command of the northern army 
until a few weeks before Saratoga, when Gates, by intrigues 
with Congress, contrived to supplant him and to reap the 
credit of his patient strategy. Despite his ill-treatment 
Schuyler continued to serve against Burgoyne as a volun- 
teer until the British surrender, when he showed the most 
considerate hospitality to his defeated enemies. He was 
a man of a noble and magnanimous nature, greatly trusted 
by Washington, and possessing much political influence, 
especially in his native state of New York, by reason of his 
character, his old family traditions of public spirit, and his 
wide possessions. To what extent this alliance added to 
Hamilton's resources is uncertain, for he was of a fierce 
independence with respect to money matters; but the 
marriage, which had the hearty approval of his wife's 



76 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1780 family, assured his position as an American citizen. It 
"^"^ was, in other respects also, a fortunate and happy union 
to the end. For in spite of certain scandals that were 
brought to light in later days through the industry 
of political malice, the confidence and affection exist- 
ing between the two was never shaken. The private 
shortcomings of Hamilton cannot be denied. He has 
himself admitted them gravely and with dignity, making 
neither reservation nor excuse; but as regards his loyalty 
there has never at any time existed even the shadow of 
a doubt. 

The circumstances of Hamilton's resignation of his staff 
appointment have been made the subject of much fine 
writing. It is clear that even so early as the spring of 
1780 he had grown somewhat impatient of his oflfice, and 
had sought without success an independent command in the 
south, at a time when the fortunes of the colonists were by 
no means brilliant, and there had been much hard fighting 
and many serious defeats. It must be remembered that 
he valued himself more highly as a soldier than in any 
other capacity. He believed, whether rightly or wrongly 
can never be decided, that war was his true profession, 
and that if the chance were given he could prove himself 
to be a great commander. His post on the staff was a 
strict and literal secretaryship, more civil indeed than 
military. It was indeed ' the grovelling condition of a 
clerk,' which his youthful genius had contemned with such 
vivacity. The very excellence of his work made promotion 
nearly impossible ; for Washington could find many capable 
men to lead columns, but what other to write letters to 
Congress ? 

The cause of the severance was simple enough, but, as 
the incident was dramatic, it has resulted that Hamilton 
has sometimes been accused of ingratitude to his bene- 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 77 

factor. This rupture, or quarrel, assuredly did not A.D. 1780 
produce the effect that such occurrences beget in the ^^" ^^ 
relations of common men ; for within a week or two of 
the event we find Washington inviting his ex-secretary 
to be present at a private conference with Rochambeau, 
and signing himself ' yours sincerely and affectionately.' ^ 
Indeed, there is not the slightest evidence of any slacken- 
ing in their mutual confidence either then or afterwards. 
The truth of the matter appears to lie in this — that a 
great man will not continue contentedly to be secretary to 
any one, not even to another great man many years his 
senior, at a time full of arduous enterprises and stirring 
events. It is a trying relationship, and must soon become 
intolerable to a vigorous and independent mind. Hamilton 
longed for a command in the field, and the work which in 
despondent moments he may have regarded as that of a 
conduit pipe became more and more distasteful to him. 
In the end he seized at an opportunity that let him escape 
into freedom. 

The evidence against him is his own letter. He had the 
defects of his qualities. Not to write upon any subject which 
interested him was an impossibility ; and he had the further 
Johnsonian failing that he made his minnows speak like 
whales. There is often a touch of the ' my-ambition- 
is-prevalent ' in his early letters, and when he wrote to his 
admiring father-in-law, General Schuyler, to explain why 
he had ceased to be a member of General Washington's 
'family,' his statement is more than usually pompous. 
The commander-in-chief had met him on the stairs and 
desired his immediate attendance. The Marquis de 
Lafayette had button-holed him as he was hastening to 
obey. Washington had exploded, as the best man will, at 
having been kept waiting; imagined it was ten minutes 

1 Life, p. 373. 



78 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1781 when in fact it was but two. The little secretary was 
^T. 24 -^-jy respectful under the tempest, but adamantine that 
the incident must end his service. As to the alleged 
delay — 'I am not conscious of it, sir; but since you 
have thought it, we part.' ^ Nor would any condescension 
move him one hairsbreadth. The good Washington went 
further than any but a great man would have gone to 
soothe the ruffled feelings ; but it was unavailing, not 
because feathers were ruffled, but because the bird longed 
for freedom. Doubtless each in his heart understood the 
other, and in spite of some display of temper loved him 
only the more. 

Hamilton resigned his position on the staff in February 
1781, and obtained command of a light corps late in the follow- 
ing summer. In October, when Cornwallis was surrounded 
at Yorktown, he found the chance that he had longed for. It 
was indeed too late in the day to dream of becoming a great 
general ; but the opportunity of proving himself a daring and 
capable officer was still open, and Hamilton seized it, or it 
might almost be said, snatched it out of the hands of 
another who had been appointed over his head. His assault 
upon the first redoubt at Yorktown did not determine the 
issue of the war ; did not even determine the surrender of 
Cornwallis. It was only one of those brilliant and particular 
actions of which military history has thousands on its 
record, and will continue, we may safely believe, to inscribe 
thousands more so long as there are wars in the world and 
brave men. But although from the general view of the 
campaign it may almost be ignored, it was an effective deed, 
and showed the highest qualities of swiftness, judgment, 
leadership and courage. It was valuable to Hamilton him- 
self because it confirmed his confidence, and to his descen- 
dants as one of those personal heirlooms that will never be 

1 Works, ix. pp. 232-37. 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 79 

forgotten even in a greater fame. The praise of Washington A.D, 1781 
was never hghtly earned. "Few cases," he wrote of the 
taking of the first redoubt, " have exhibited greater proofs 
* of intrepidity, coolness and firmness than were shown on 
' this occasion." ^ 

1 Life, p. 383. 



BOOK II 

THE UNION OF THE STATES 

A.D. 1780-1788. Mt. 23-31 



The greatness of an estate in hulk and territory doth fall under measure ; 
and the greatness of finances and revenue doth fall under computation. 
The population may appear by musters ; and the number and greatness 
of cities and towns by cards and maps. But yet there is not anything 
amongst civil affairs more subject to error, than the right valuation and 
true judgment concerning the power and foixes of an estate. The 
Kingdom of Heaven is compared, not to any kernel or nut, but to a 
grain of mustard seed; which is one of the least grains, but hath in it 
a property and spirit hastily to get up and spread. So there are states 
great in territory, and yet not apt to enlarge or command ; and some 
that have but a small dimension of stem, and yet apt to be the foundations 
of great monarchies. — Bacon. 



BOOK II 

THE UNION OF THE STATES 

CHAPTER I 

Political Writings during the War 

The second period of Hamilton's career began in the sixth A.D. 1780 
year of the war. As military secretary he had seen his 
commander-in-chief hampered and distressed, the army 
starved and disheartened. He discovered the cause in the 
impotence, faction and financial discredit of a Congress which 
affected to represent thirteen jealous and discordant states 
temporarily and imperfectly united by a common danger. 
Being what he was, a confidential staff-officer, he viewed the 
matter in the first instance from that standpoint. He was 
impressed by the bad effects of misgovernment upon military 
affairs. He realised that the federal assembly lacked the power, 
the intelligence and the will to support its generals with 
vigour and consistency. He was confronted with that order 
of difficulties which arises when a debating-club is dressed 
up in the lion's skin of authority; when a deliberative 
assembly, upon a dubious warrant, endeavours to perform 
the high executive functions of government. The routine of 
his office brought him into daily touch with a bustling and 
eloquent sham. A military secretary, whose concern is with 
an army and its supplies, may be forgiven for unfavourable 
opinions of a government that can neither recruit nor pro- 
vide. To discharge its proper share of the burdens of such 

8S 



84 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1778 a time it needed to be of good credit, and to this end it 
^'^' ^^ was essential that it should be honest, resourceful and 
businesslike. In Hamilton's opinion it was lacking in all 
these qualities. 

In the autumn following the battle of Monmouth (1778) 
he found time to undertake the flagellation of a certain 
legislator of Maryland, who had made a corner in flour. 
This gentleman was a member not merely of Congress, but 
of the very committee charged with provisioning the army 
and the French fleet. By Hamilton's account he would 
appear to have been a worthy pioneer of the most 
modern commercial developments. He played with his 
committee, postponing its decision, while his emissaries 
bought up all the available flour. Prices were thereupon 
doubled, and the speculation wore a smiling face, when by 
some means his sins were discovered. Over the signature 
Puhlius} which a few years later was to become immortal 
in a nobler controversy, Hamilton is forcible enough, but 
not in his happiest vein. The correspondence is a pompous 
exercise in the manner of Junius, interesting less for its 
intrinsic merits than for the simple fact which it records. 
Little, indeed, is left of the offender and his corner in 
flour ; but we feel that such sentences as " notwithstanding 
' our youth as a nation we begin to emulate the most veteran 
' and accomplished states in the art of corruption," ^ are a 
trifle too grandiose for the occasion that called them forth. 

Early in 1780 Robert Morris undertook the desperate 
finances of the Federal Government. He was a rich man 
and an able administrator, but he had to make bricks with- 
out straw. The great plan and the astute, particular re- 
source were equally within the field of his practical energy. 
He ruined his own fortune for the state, and a grateful 
country allowed him in later years to gain experience in a 

1 Works, i. p. 199. 2 n^i^, i. p. 202. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 85 

debtor's prison. Money was harder to raise at this time a.d. 1780 
than ever before. Supplies were more deficient, and the ^'^' ^^ 
army was mutinous. Hamilton, who held Morris in great 
and deserved respect, took the opportunity of his appoint- 
ment to present him with an anonymous memorandum on 
the financial situation. 

It is amazing to find a soldier of three-and-twenty, with 
his hands full of a laborious official correspondence, with no 
experience of business beyond what he had gained as a boy 
in a merchant's office, plunging into a detailed and forcible 
argument for the establishment of a national bank.^ " The 
present plan," he announces with modesty, " is the product 
' of some reading on the subjects of commerce and finance, 
' and of occasional reflections on our particular situation ; 
' but a want of leisure has prevented its being examined in 
' so many lights and digested so materially as its importance 
' requires." ^ There is indeed proof of considerable reading 
in this lengthy analysis, though how he can have found the 
time for it remains a mystery. But there is also something 
a great deal more valuable. It is an argument from experi- 
ence. It was but a small section of human affairs that 
formed the basis of his theories — Cruger's ledgers and 
the starvation of the federal army — but he viewed these 
scraps of reality in a light of such intense understanding 
that they were sufficient for the purpose in hand. There is 
eloquence in the letter, for it is a quality always present in 
his writings, even upon the driest themes, but the fabric is 
substantial and practical. The bank is realised down to its 
quills and ink-pots as vividly as in its grandest international 
operations. Mr. Law, he argues, was right in his main 
idea.^ For Law had grasped the necessity of interesting the 
moneyed classes to co-operate with Government, and his 
policy was a failure only because Law was himself dishonest. 

» Works, iii. p. 319. » Ibid. iii. p. 341. ^ jf^i^^ ^^i ^ ^32. 



86 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1781 In the following year Hamilton returned to his argument 
'''■ in a second letter to Morris,^ this time under his own name. 
A national bank still appeared to him to be the only way 
out of the diflSculty which had arisen owing to the lack 
of funds. He accordingly provided an elaborate plan, with 
articles of constitution. Britain, he argued, had failed 
to subdue the states by force of arms ; she was within an 
ace of winning by their financial exhaustion. He urged 
the advantages of a national debt, a blessing if not ex- 
cessive, and ' a powerful cement of our union.' The idea 
of an alliance with the moneyed classes, of taking hostages 
from them, was enforced once more. It remained to the 
end a fundamental article of his financial creed. Later on, 
in his own famous administration, he was able to realise it. 

Morris in answer was polite and appreciative. He in- 
formed his correspondent that a bank was about to be 
started, following the lines of Hamilton's project, but upon 
a more modest scale. That a soldier should have sought to 
intervene in these weary matters with so much zest and 
vehemence may well have excited wonder in the mind of 
the statesman. The modern reader marvels to find a 
military secretary discoursing in his leisure moments on 
national resources and foreign loans, on imposts and taxes 
and the balance of trade, propounding a plan for a national 
bank, elaborating it with an exuberant energy, a comprehen- 
siveness of vision, a directness and ease and force of expres- 
sion which disclosed the blessed quality of youth in every 
line and turn. There are occasions in Hamilton's career 
when we are puzzled whether to laugh or to cry out with 
admiration at the boyish confidence undaunted by the 
grimmest difficulties. There is a heroic quality even in his 
longest letters on taxation. Their passionate sincerity, their 
joyful audacity, bridge the gulf of years and create an 

1 Works, iii. p. 342. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 87 

intimacy such as we have felt with our heroes of romance — A.D. 1780 
with Quentin Durward and with d'Artagnan; a confusion 
of wonder with personal affection. For a true understanding 
of Hamilton's part in American history it is necessary to 
realise that he was loved by his contemporaries in this 
spirit. 

A more famous letter was written between the dates of 
the two that have been mentioned. In August 1780 there 
was a general despondency, not wholly financial. French 
aid had arrived at Newport, but the second fleet which was 
looked to for complete supremacy lay in Brest Harbour 
blocked by the tyrant of the seas. Americans, with an easy 
lethargy, afiected nevertheless to believe that Britain was 
finally exhausted. A few days later Gates was routed by 
Cornwallis at Camden. 

' The fundamental defect,' wrote Hamilton to Duane, ' is a 
want of power in Congress.' ^ Three causes contributed to 
this misfortune: in the people a jealous excess of the spirit 
of liberty; in Congress a diffidence of their own authority 
and a want of sufficient means at their disposal. The clear 
duty of Congress was to usurp powers in order to preserve 
the Republic ; but its courage stopped short of this solution. 
The confederation, as it stood, was fit neither for war nor 
peace. 

Men, mindful of the pretensions of a British Parliament, 
were jealous of sovereignty; but the real danger of the 
states lay in too little sovereignty and not in too much. 
The defects of the situation were plain to any one who 
was not blinded by phrases or misled by distrust. 

As funds were the basis of all civil authority, the central 
government must have the power to tax, which under the 
existing arrangement was denied to it. 

A deliberative body was unfit to rule, for a powerful 

1 Works, i. p. 213. 



88 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1780 executive must be few and not numerous ; active, not merely 
^" " loquacious. Congress, from a kind of vanity, was averse 
from delegation to individuals. The small powers it 
possessed were whittled down to an absurdity by delegation 
to boards ; and boards, as John Stuart Mill pointed out in 
later days, are screens. 

The fluctuating constitution of the army, the imperfection 
and inequality of its supplies, were consequences to be ex- 
pected from such conditions. " It is now a mob, rather 
' than an army ; without clothing, without pay, without 

* provision, without morals, without discipline. We begin 
' to hate the country for its neglect of us. The country 

* begin to hate us for our oppressions of them. Congress 

* have long been jealous of us. We have now lost all con- 

* fidence in them, and give the worst construction to all 
' they do. Held together by the slenderest ties, we are 

* ripening for a dissolution." ^ 

The remedies were hard to achieve, though easy to name. 
Congress must have greater powers, either by taking its 
courage in both hands and seizing them upon the plea of 
necessity, or by a convention of the states empowered to 
conclude a real confederation. Personal responsibility was 
an essential, and the only safety was to be found in the 
appointment of great officers of state, ministers for foreign 
affairs, for war, marine, finance, and trade. Recruits must 
be enlisted for the period of the war, or at the least for 
three years. Congress itself must have the duty of supply, 
and the means for exercising it. Officers who sacrificed 
their prospects for patriotism deserved consideration. The 
least they had a right to was half-pay for life. But the 
question of funds lay at the bottom of everything. A foreign 
loan, a federal revenue, a tax in kind, and a national bank 
were Hamilton's prescriptions ; and, as he added shrewdly, 

1 Works, i. p. 221. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 89 

they need not want for the first of these, since they could a.d. 1780 
coerce France with a threat of peace. ^" 

This letter to Duane is an important landmark. It shows 
that even at this early date Hamilton had fully and firmly 
grasped the essentials of the situation. In his cogent and 
unambiguous fashion he led his various arguments up to 
the final conclusion that the supreme need of the moment 
was the need of a nation. The artificial nature of the states, 
with their unreasonable sentiments, eternal jealousies and 
disastrous pretensions to separate sovereignty, was no doubt 
easier to understand and harder to excuse when viewed by 
one who was an American only by adoption, and had become 
a citizen of one of these rival communities almost by an 
accident. His foreign birth was therefore an advantage, 
since it enabled him to consider the problems and forces of 
the time in a spirit of detachment, without the heat of 
local prejudice and in their true proportions. 

Hamilton, it will be remembered, resigned his appointment A.D. 1781 
as military secretary in February 1781, and it was not until " 

August that he obtained a command and marched south 
against Cornwallis in Yorktown. During these seven months 
of leisure he had time to meditate more deeply upon the 
political situation. The fruits were The Gontinentalist} a 
series of six papers, of which four were written during this 
interval, and the remaining two in the spring and summer 
of the following year. It is an odd but magnificent way 
of spending a short leave, after five years of uninterrupted 
labour and hardship. For the great Washington was an 
exacting taskmaster, and his campaigns were not conducted 
with much regard for a generous diet, warm feet, or soft 
lying. 

In these letters, which contain the kernel of Hamilton's 
theory of statesmanship, he goes further back into causes 

1 Works, i. p. 243. 



90 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1781 in search of a cure for the national disorders. There is 
* no contradiction of his former ideas, but only a greater 
completeness. 

At the beginning of the war there was a lack of men 
experienced in government. The majority of this class 
adhered to the other side, and the influence of the small 
number who were available ' was too commonly borne down 
by the prevailing torrent of ignorance and prejudice.' 'An 
extreme jealousy of power is the attendant on all popular 
revolutions.' It was not marvellous, therefore, that both 
the people and the states were jealous of the authority of 
Congress; or that Congress, being subject to the epidemic 
timidity, was jealous of the army. With courageous iteration 
Hamilton returned to his old argument. The capital defect 
was a want of power in Congress. Unsupported by the 
confidence of its constituents, it had none to bestow upon its 
servants. There was a want of agreement as to the proper 
remedies ; but every man admitted that the confederation 
was unequal either to a 'vigorous prosecution of the war, 
or to the preservation of the union in peace,' The great 
danger of a popular government is ever its jealousy of 
power. " In a government framed for durable liberty, not 
' less regard must be paid to giving the magistrate a proper 
' degree of authority to make and execute the laws with 
' rigour, than to guard against encroachments upon the 
' rights of the community ; as too much power leads to 
' despotism, too little leads to anarchy, and both eventually 
' to the ruin of the people." ^ 

In the case of a single state the commonest danger is that 
the sovereign, whether a monarch or a republican council, 
will make himself too powerful for his subjects; but in 
federal governments which have to deal with the affairs 
of a group of states the peril is of an opposite character. 

1 Works, i. p. 246. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 91 

In sucli a case it usually happens that the members are A.D. 1781 
an overmatch for the common head, and that the central ^'^•-^ 
power is lacking in authority sufficient to secure the obedi- 
ence of the several parts of the confederacy. States sub- 
scribing to a league or union may have, or seem to have, 
at certain times an advantage in things contrary to the good 
of the whole, or a disadvantage in things conducive to the 
common weal. And under this aspect states are like private 
men who, when they have the power of disregarding the laws 
of their country, frequently find a sufficient reason for doing 
so in their own interest. But the danger that, upon a cool 
estimate, the members may discover a real or imaginary 
gain in disobedience to the titular sovereign, is not the 
end of the evil. Prejudice, vanity and passion have also 
to be taken into account. The ambitions of persons holding 
office in the several states foster ideas hostile to the con- 
federacy, in order to preserve their own consequence ; while 
the people tend also in the same direction, being more 
devoted in their attachment and obedience to their own 
particular government, which acts upon them directly, than 
towards the central power which can only touch them in- 
directly, and possesses no officers clothed in a calm assur- 
ance to enforce its laws. 

When the war came to an end all danger from foreign 
aggression would temporarily disappear. Relieved from this 
menace, centrifugal tendencies would then run riot. Societies 
whose true aim and only security against attack lay in a 
close political union "must either be firmly united under 
' one government, or there will infallibly exist emulations and 
* quarrels ; this is in human nature." ^ Even when Hamilton 
wrote, in the midst of war and of danger too serious for 
trifling, some of the states had evaded or refused compliance 
with the demands of Congress on points of the greatest 
» Works, i. p. 254. 



92 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1781 moment. Peace would bring tlie danger of disunion much 

Mt 24 

Iu^.. ^t jj2ore near. 

After the final defeat of British policy it ought to be the 
aim of American statesmanship to prevent and frustrate for 
all time European interference with the development of the 
states, and even with the destinies of the whole Northern 
Continent. It was only to be expected that the great 
powers would endeavour to obtain a foothold, and might 
therefore upon occasions have an interest in fostering in- 
ternal contentions, jealousies and schisms; in instigating 
competitions with regard to boundaries, rivalry in commerce 
and disputes wheresoever a plausible pretext could be dis- 
covered. Groups and minor confederacies would then begin 
to combine, and Europe would be allowed to come into 
American affairs as an ally of one or other of them. From 
such an opportunity it was of vital importance that she 
should be rigorously excluded. To a man viewing the 
thirteen states in a broad vision, as one nation, such a con- 
clusion was too obvious for any argument. To a man regard- 
ing the matter from the meaner standpoint of the interest 
of an individual state, the conclusion was no less clear if he 
would but project his mind a few years into the future. 

"Our whole system," he continues, "is in disorder; our 
' currency depreciated, till in many places it will hardly 
' obtain a circulation at all ; public credit at its lowest ebb ; 
' our army deficient in numbers, and unprovided with every- 
' thing." ^ And while government was thus unable to pay, 
clothe, or feed the troops, things were happening in the 
Southern States which should have caused Americans to 
blush. Cornwallis had won victory after victory, and was 
making steady progress, in spite of the fact that the whole 
British forces in the states were little more than fourteen 
thousand men. And yet the population of those states was 

1 Works, L p. 255. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 93 

greater than at the beginning of the war — more than two A.D. I78i 
millions and a quarter of white citizens. The quantity of 
specie had also increased. The country abounded in the 
necessaries of life and in warlike materials. There was no 
lack even of foreign commodities, and commerce in spite of 
everything was growing. A powerful ally co-operated by 
sea and land, and paid the whole cost of supporting her 
five thousand troops on American soil. 

In these circumstances but one of two things could afford 
an explanation of the disastrous situation — a general dis- 
affection on the part of the people, or mismanagement on 
the part of their rulers. The former alternative could not 
be entertained, for the reason that it was contrary to notori- 
ous facts. The prime necessity therefore was to strike at 
the root of the whole evil by a reform of government and 
by augmenting the powers of the confederation. 

The great defect of the constitution under another aspect, 
was that it had no property; no revenue, nor the means 
of obtaining it. Funds are the foundation of every- 
thing. 'Power without revenue, in political society, is a 
name.' 

At this point the series of letters was interrupted by 
Washington's sudden campaign in the south against Corn- 
wallis. After the fall of Yorktown in the autumn, Hamilton 
retired into civil life, and in the following April and July 
the argument was concluded in a different strain. From the 
necessities of government he passed to the possibilities of 
development ; from a criticism of the theory to a discussion 
of the practice of government. 

" The vesting Congress with the power of regulating trade 

* ought to have been a principal object of the confederation 
' for a variety of reasons. It is as necessary for the purposes 

* of commerce as of revenue. There are some who maintain 
' that trade will regulate itself, and is not to be benefited by 



94 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D, 1782 ' the encouragement or restraints of government. Such 

■ ^^ ' persons will imagine that there is no need of a common 

' directing power. This is one of those wild, speculative 

* paradoxes T/hich have grown into credit among us, contrary 

* to the uniform practice and sense of the most enlightened 

* nations." 1 There are laws which a government must observe 
in regulating commerce. Individuals may have objects in 
trade which it is the duty of a government to defeat. There 
may be prospects of national wealth which, since the capital 
of private persons is limited, only government help can 
inaugurate. The state will aim at a balance of the whole, 
favouring neither the cultivators of the land, nor the 
merchants, nor the manufacturers, nor the artisans and 
labourers. Under this aspect an excessive tariff would be 
as unstatesmanlike as no tariff at all. That trade can be 
trusted to regulate itself to the greatest advantage of the 
community is the prime paradox. All experience is against 
it, and proves that the influence of government is salutary if 
only government be Avise and honest. The government of 
Elizabeth fostered the trade of England. Colbert laid the 
foundations of prosperous trade in France. In the opinion of 
some, who grant these premises, the separate states and not 
the federal power were the proper regulators of commerce ; 
" but as they are parts of a whole, with a common interest in 

* trade, as in other things, there ought to be a common direc- 
' tion in that as in all other matters." ^ With regard to any 
plan devised by human ingenuity, it will always be possible 
to argue that it is for the advantage of one unit, or of one 
state, rather than of another ; but " unless we can overcome 
' this narrow disposition and learn to estimate measures by 

* their general tendencies, we shall never be a great or a 
' happy people, if we remain a people at all." ^ 

But supposing that the central power is prevented from 
» Works, i. p. 267. ^ jj^ia. i p. 271. * Ibid. i. p. 277. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 95 

undertaking, or should be unwilling to undertake, the A.D. 1782 
control of trade, what will happen ? There will be a lack ^'^- ^^ 
of revenue. There will be a risk of independence. The 
union will become precarious. The want of a wholesome 
concert and provident superintendence to advance the 
general prosperity will lead to a depression of the landed 
interest and of labour for the immediate advantage of 
the trading classes. Finally, the trading interest itself will 
fall a victim to bad policy. It is of the essence of states- 
manship that burthens should be distributed and benefits 
shared. No class should be oppressed, for the interests of 
all are interwoven. " Oppress trade, lands sink in value ; 
' make it flourish, their value rises. Encumber husbandry, 
' trade declines ; encourage agriculture, commerce revives." ^ 
"There is something," he concludes, " noble and magnificent 
' in the perspective of a great Federal Republic, closely linked 
' in the pursuit of a common interest, tranquil and prosperous 
' at home, respectable abroad ; but there is something pro- 
' portionably diminutive and contemptible in the prospect 
' of a number of petty states, with the appearance only of 
' union, jarring, jealous, and perverse, without any determined 
' direction, fluctuating and unhappy at home, weak and in- 
' significant by their dissensions in the eyes of other nations. 
' . . . Happy America if those to whom thou hast intrusted 
' the guardianship of thy infancy know how to provide 
' for thy future repose, but miserable and undone if their 
' negligence or ignorance permits the spirit of discord to 
' erect her banner on the ruins of thy tranquillity." ^ 

1 Works, i. p. 281. a Ibid. i. pp. 286. 287 



96 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 



1776-1783 
.Et. 19-26 



CHAPTER II 

Congress and the Conduct of the War 

A.D. The legend which was born out of the soaring fancy 
of the early chroniclers covers a much wider field than the 
mere origins of the rebellion. The influence of the epic 
can be traced no less plainly in the popular beliefs regarding 
the course of the war, than in the current estimates of the 
virtues of individuals and of the value of institutions. 
The image of the American Revolution which fills the mind 
of the average Englishman is smooth, definite and highly 
coloured, but it is a poor likeness of the event. In this 
picture the thirteen colonies are presented as one people, 
firmly bound together from the beginning by a confidence 
in one another, and a common sentiment of freedom far 
stronger than the forms and articles of any constitution. 
* The League of Friendship,' as it was named by hopeful 
enthusiasts, is conceived to have had no parallel save in the 
Golden Age. The prevailing pattern of man during this 
virtuous epoch is imagined to have been George Washington. 
Congress, no less than the army, was cast in that heroic 
mould. The nation itself rises before a picturesque imagina- 
tion like some vast audience in the Albert Hall, tier upon tier, 
a multitude of individuals, but a single type. Everywhere 
there appears the same austere patriotism and awful gravity, 
the same fortitude and the same simplicity. If any man were 
bold enough to suggest that comparison is possible between 
the British Parliament and the American Congress of that 
time, or that among the members of these two august assem- 
blies there was anything approaching an equality of virtue, 
wisdom, or courage, popular opinion, nourished upon the 



1776-1783 
^T. 19-26 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 97 

myth, would put aside the paradox without a smile, as a A.D. 
jest bordering too closely on profanity. 

The Englishman, who never shows to best advantage in 
the apologetic mood, has accepted everything which the 
American epic required for its completeness. He has 
bowed in humility before the frequent scorn of its moral 
judgments, has received without demur its shallow and 
eloquent generalisations, and, clothed in a white sheet, has 
joined, with a taper in his hand, in the discovery of scape- 
goats and the making of heroes. It is no part of our 
purpose to enter upon a defence of British policy; but 
if we are to entertain a true regard for the fame of 
Washington and Hamilton, the difficulties against which 
they had to contend must be firmly grasped. If these be 
covered over industriously with rose-leaves, we may arrive 
at a very flattering estimate of the virtues of the American 
colonists ; but in that case we shall be forced to undervalue 
the greatness of these two leaders, who both during and 
after the war had, according to the common history of 
mankind, their hardest difficulties to overcome from within 
and not from without. 

Instead of this picture of a perfect patriotism, it is wiser 
to accept the plain facts. The American Revolution, after 
the war began, owed but little to Congress, much certainly 
to the patriotic spirit of the people, but most of all to a 
few great men. The countrymen of Washington, engaged 
in a prolonged and painful struggle, where fortune varied 
and hearts grew sick with deferred hope, showed the same 
high qualities and the same ignoble faults that might have 
been looked for in men of that race. 

Throughout the whole period of the war, and for more 
than seven years afterwards (dating from the surrender at 
Yorktown), the states were not a nation, but merely a loose 
and jealous confederacy. It is indeed matter for amaze- 

G 



98 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. ment, not that the war should have run such a lon^ and 
776-1783 
Mr. 19-26 



1776 1783 painful course, but that under such conditions it was ever 



conducted to a successful conclusion. We must admire the 
binding force of the desire for independence by which the 
ill-founded structure was kept together, and marvel at the 
ineptitude of British diplomacy that could drive no wedges 
of disunion into a fabric riddled with such dangerous gaps. 

Until the outbreak of war none of the thirteen colonies 
had been, or had even claimed to be, a sovereign state. 
Sovereignty, for what it was worth, resided in King George, 
who exercised it upon the advice of his cabinet and through 
the agency of the different governors. Each state was in- 
dependent of its neighbours. None was in a position of 
superiority to another. There was no machinery of law or 
custom for joint action through any central power. Franklin, 
indeed, had dreamed of federation in years gone by. The 
representative Congress which assembled to concert 
measures with regard to the prosecution of the war with 
France had arrived at a plan of union largely under his 
influence. The royal governors were favourable to the 
proposal; but it was rejected without hesitation by the home 
Government, which feared to call into existence so powerful 
a subject, and by the colonial legislatures, whose jealousy of 
one another seemed to be ineradicable.^ 

With the assumption of independence sovereignty 
therefore went a-begging. No federal power existed, only 
a Congress of the States, assembled in a great emer- 
gency to take counsel together and to speak, if possible, 
with one voice. In political virtue, courage and sagacity, 
this first Congress was a body of a remarkable distinction ; 
but it was not a government, and it lacked both the 
authority and any precedent for creating one. The 
prevalent opinion was that sovereignty, havmg departed 

^ History, iii. p. 245. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 99 

out of King George tlie Third and the British Parliament, A.D. 
had entered into the individual legislatures of the thirteen ^^^'^^Iq 
states. A minority, it is true, held that by some mystical 
process sovereignty had passed into the hands of Congress ; 
but all serious attempts on the part of that assembly to 
exercise sovereign powers over the various states incurred 
at once the odium of the selfsame tyranny against which 
the revolution was directed. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania 
and the rest, were determined that they would no longer be 
subjects. Their aim in taking up arms was independence, 
and they were no more willing to part with this precious 
possession to their own Congress than to King George. 
At a later date, when it was proposed to create a revenue 
for support of the army out of a duty upon imports, a patriotic 
opposition demanded a plain answer to the question as to 
how this measure differed in principle from the Stamp Act 
which had set two continents by the ears. 

In spite, however, of this extreme jealousy, the severe 
pressure of circumstances brought it about that from the 
beginning many of the customary duties and functions of 
a sovereign were performed by Congress. There being, in 
fact, no alternative, it took upon itself to create an army, to 
build a fleet, to issue paper money, to raise loans, make 
alliances and assert the independence of the United States. 
But as Congress acted always upon sufferance, it lacked the 
confidence which is given by real authority, and as a natural 
result its procedure was feeble, irresolute and ineffectual. 
Shortly after the famous declaration of July 1776, ' articles 
of confederation and perpetual union' were submitted for 
consideration, but until March 1781 they remained without 
ratification. The delay was a matter of but little moment, 
seeing that this stately and sonorous document merely 
defined in more precise terms the impotence of govern- 
ment. 



100 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. Put in the shortest form, the evil lay in the want of 

^IJ^~}^tl power. ' Influence,' in the words of Washington, ' is not 
iET. 19-26 ^ ' . 

government.' Congress had no subjects. It was merely 
the council of an alliance. It could requisition supplies, 
and money and men ; but if a state chose to fill its ears 
with wax and pay no heed, the central authority was 
without any remedy but patience. Over the individual 
citizens of the states it had no jurisdiction whatsoever. 
With the various legislatures its relations were those of 
a diplomatist. When it sought to create an army it needed 
to ask leave, and to accomplish its end was forced to 
submit to terms not only ignominious but contrary to 
reason. When a state saw fit to furnish a regiment, it 
claimed and exercised the right to appoint its ofiicers. 
Military organisation under such conditions was clearly 
impossible. Efficiency would have been beyond hope had 
the commander-in-chief lacked the courage and personal 
force necessary for exceeding his functions. 

Congress issued paper money, and its value sank after 
a few months to two cents in the dollar. It made alliances 
which could and would have been disowned by any state 
had it discerned a private advantage in the disavowal. 
When Congress finally came to make peace, the terms 
which it had agreed to were ignored and repudiated. In the 
harlequinade of human affairs no pantaloon ever exercised 
less discipline and authority. 

The consequences of this want of power were certain. Men 
of capacity who desired to serve their country sought other 
opportunities, in the state legislatures, in diplomacy, or in 
the army. The ranks of Congress were recruited by medio- 
crities, most of them loquacious and many of them corrupt. 
It had the mysterious confidence of Chinese mandarins in 
the efficacy of ordinances and proclamations. It ordered 
victories and decreed an army of eighty thousand men ; but, 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 101 

notwithstanding, Washington had to make shift with ten A.D. 
thousand that he and not Congress had the labour and ^IJ^''}]^^ 

° . . ^T. 19-26 

credit of collecting. It meddled with appointments and 
promotions, and to every foreign " adventurer that came, 
' without even the shadow of credentials, gave the rank of 
* field officers." ^ It fumed over the question of supplies, 
leaving the army to perish of cold and hunger while it 
debated interminably and bungled its diplomacy with the 
states who were the real paymasters. Occasionally it had 
ideas. Officers, Samuel Adams argued, ought to be elected 
annually, so as to preserve the commonwealth from military 
despotism 2 — a view of the matter which, had it prevailed, 
might have ended the war at a much earlier date. His 
kinsman, John Adams, Chairman of the Board of War, 
discoursed on strategy and promulgated maxims. ' My 
toast is a short and violent war ' ; for he was utterly ' sick of 
Fabian systems.' George the Third, if he had happened to 
hear of these sayings, must have wished well to the Adams 
family. These rhetorical activities were their own reward. 
They found no shoes, blankets or victuals for the men who 
camped at Valley Forge and huddled round the fires at 
night, afraid to sleep lest they should never wake. Mad- 
dened by the ingratitude and ingenious persecution of con- 
gressmen, Arnold became a traitor ; ^ and Greene, who had a 
nature beyond treachery, Avas driven to resignation * by their 
consequential malice. In this buzz and hubbub of inferior 
minds Washington alone was able to endure, wearing down 
their folly and conceit by his resolute gravity. 

This Congress, to which the great and constant general 
was obliged to defer and appeal, was clothed with a mock 
dignity and that fickle and uncertain power which rests 
entirely upon moral influence. It was meddlesome and 

^ Hamilton to Duer, History, i. p. 431. ^ Cf. also Hidory, i. p. 420. 

3 History, ii. pp. 50-52. •» Ibid. ii. pp. 39-42, 



102 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. inefficient ; was much addicted to fault-finding, to the giving 
^I!^~}qI^ of foolish advice, and to intrigue against its own officers. It 
stinted supplies and delayed action. While it endeavoured 
with certain ill results to assert its own vain and foolish 
authority in the conduct of military affairs, it showed a 
corresponding backwardness and timidity in grappling with 
the national credit and curbing the recalcitrancy of the 
states. Enjoying the exercise of its minor functions with 
a peculiar zest, it shrank from placing them in jeopardy 
by any bold attempt to develop its implied powers on the 
plea of a national emergency. To consolidate its position 
and assume or usurp the high executive rights of govern- 
ment was an ambition wholly beyond its mean horizon; 
but in the torment and obstruction of its servants it was an 
adept, jealous of its privileges and observant of the letter 
of its commission. 

It is interesting, no doubt, to speculate upon the events 
which might have happened had the British Cabinet acted 
with more vigour, or had Washington been governed by less 
fortitude ; but it is, perhaps, still more interesting to consider 
what might have happened had Hamilton been a member 
of Congress instead of a soldier. When we consider his 
daring and masterful spirit, and remember how at a later 
date, with less assistance from the pressure of events, and 
in the teeth of interests which in the meanwhile had 
become more widely vested, of prejudices which had 
hardened into hatred, of traditions of independence which 
had grown from saplings into timber, he still succeeded in 
prevailing upon his fellow-countrymen to accept a real union, 
it is hard to believe that in the case we have imagined the 
signature of peace would have found the whole work of 
federation still waiting to be done. It appears more likely 
that he would have taken the metal at a red heat in 1777, 
than that he would have waited for eleven years longer until 



1776-1783 
^T. 19-26 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 103 

it had grown cool. That his attempt would have succeeded A.D 
is not beyond possibility, and had it succeeded it is con- 
ceivable that the constitution so created would have been a 
more powerful charter and more in accordance with his own 
political convictions than that which was subsequently 
approved at Philadelphia. 

The famous Conway Cabal (1777-1778) aimed at getting 
rid of Washington and replacing him by Gates ' the hero of 
Saratoga/ afterwards the hero of Camden, on which occa- 
sion he fled a hundred and eighty miles without looking 
back.i Because all Americans at the present time enter- 
tain an affectionate reverence for the memory of their first 
great leader, we are apt to assume that there must have 
been an even livelier passion of loyalty in the breasts of 
their ancestors who were his contemporaries. The reality 
was somewhat different. It is well to remember that for a 
time the opinion of a majority of Congress was in favour of 
driving Washington to resignation. 

In November 1777 that body was in the pride of its youth. 
If it was powerless to supply Washington with reinforce- 
ments, it was equal to the task of complaint against his 
failures and condemnation of his ' Fabian tactics ' ; if it 
showed no alacrity in checking frauds in the commissariat, 
it could still point a moral and deduce conclusions from the 
victory of Saratoga and the defeats of Brandywine and 
Germantown. It was inclined to a simple-minded worship of 
success, without analysis or consideration of circumstances. 

In the early spring thieves fell out, and the Conway 
Cabal came to an inglorious end. It had reckoned 
hopefully upon Washington's resignation, and had the 
commander-in-chief been merely the good man and high- 
spirited gentleman he was, and not something still greater 
over and above, the plan would have had the best chances 

^ Hamilton to Duane, History, ii. p. 124. 



1776-1783 
^T. 19-26 



104 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. of success. But, fortunately for his country, lie looked upon 
his own position in a spirit of extraordinary detachment. He 
regarded domestic intrigue, discontent and calumny as natural 
incidents in the war ; as things to be reckoned with, like floods, 
frosts and snowfalls, impersonally and without malice. As he 
had never sought power and honour, but merely accepted 
them when duty left no escape, he had no motive for resigna- 
tion ; for his duty was unchanged either by ingratitude or 
abuse. Under this attack his strength was weighted with 
another burden in that winter of suffering in the hills at 
Valley Forge, but he would have thought himself no less 
disgraced in laying down his commission before the clamours 
of Congress than in laying down his arms to a summons 
from Sir William Howe. 

To have a clear understanding, not merely of the cam- 
paigns of Washington, but of what followed after, when peace 
was signed, it is necessary that the character of the govern- 
ment, the nature and extent of its authority, should be 
firmly grasped. The war languished and dragged wearily 
along from the want of power in Congress and from the 
lack of virtue in congressmen. In reality the second was 
merely a consequence of the first ; for a position of promi- 
nence and publicity without powers commensurate to the 
ofiice has no attractions for effective citizens who take 
statecraft seriously and are content to endure speech only 
as a means to action. But to the consequential classes, 
prominence, publicity and speech have ever appeared ends 
admirable in themselves. Such men are easily content 
with those shreds of power which consist in the giving of 
advice, in the finding of fault, and in setting their servants 
by the ears. We must therefore admire the constancy 
of the patriotic minority who held to Congress through 
good and evil report, bearing with the din of clap-trap for 
the chance of being able now and again to serve their 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 105 



country by the defeat of an intrigue or the destruction of A.D. 
a folly. Men like Robert Morris have a right to share in ^^ ^g 26 
the fame of Washington. In a sense they have a double 
title to the gratitude of their countrymen, seeing that 
they not only withstood the mischief but endured the 
debate. 

Putting aside all consideration of persons, putting aside 
also such aspects of the conduct of government as the 
ingenious bad faith which marked its action after the 

o 

Saratoga capitulation, looking at the matter in the driest 
light, there can be no shadow of a doubt that the feeble 
constitution of Congress, with its attendant evils in the 
character of its members, was the cause of the long 
continuance of the war. Had Washington been supported 
with men and supplies, it is neither incredible nor even 
unlikely that the messengers bringing news of the surrender 
of Burgoyne, in October 1777, might have met halfway 
upon their journey riders from the south with word of 
the surrender of Howe at Philadelphia. The number of 
Washington's troops was at no time in proportion to 
the manhood of the country, nor were his supplies of 
food, clothing and pay ever commensurate with its wealth. 
Neither in men nor money was there a true measure taken 
of the spirit of its citizens. These difficulties dogged 
Washington to the end. In every year after 1775 there 
was a possibility of ending the war by a crowning victory 
had he commanded an army worthy in numbers and equip- 
ment of the resources of the United States. 

It has been calculated by a thoughtful American his- 
torian,^ that in the war between North and South, ninety 
years later, the federal troops towards the end of the 
struggle were in the proportion of one in every five of 
the men capable of bearing arms ; more than a million 

^ The Critical Period of American History, by John Fiske, pp. 101-3. 



106 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. soldiers were in tlie field for the defence of the union. 

1776-1783 jj^ ^YiG War of Independence the numbers never reached 

^T. 19-26 , . , . .p -, .,. . , IT 

so high a ratio even if the militia, who appeared and 

disappeared very much at their own pleasure, is included 
in the sum. Accordingly it has been maintained by 
certain writers, that in the war against Britain there was a 
weaker spirit of patriotism than in the War of Secession. 
In both cases there was a man of immense character acting 
disinterestedly to attain success. Lincoln and Washington 
may be held to cancel one another in the equation. The 
real difference is that in the one case there was govern- 
ment, and in the other there was not. 

For if Congress could not bring into the field in such a 
cause men who were wilUng to serve, and if it could not 
provide for its soldiers, whom the country was well able to 
support, it was clearly an institution too contemptible to be 
described as a government. Allowing to natural conditions 
and the inertness of Britain their full force, the success of 
the colonists in the fight for independence was due to no 
political institutions, but only to the binding force of a 
common aim and the unmatched qualities of one great 
man. At the end of the war government was still to seek. 
The binding force of a common aim was then for the time 
being relaxed, for it had split into a thousand centrifugal 
forces of local jealousy and minor interests. But at least 
the one great man remained as before, and by good 
fortune another great man emerged in the nick of time to 
his assistance. 

Neither Washington nor Hamilton was under any illusion 
with regard to the immediate consequences of peace. They 
foresaw dangers ahead of them more grave in character than 
those which had already been surmounted. They knew 
that the future of their country hung upon a firm union, 
and that a firm union was impossible without a strong 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 107 

government. The existing government was a make-believe. A.D. 
It had been maintained in an appearance of authority only 1776-1783 
by the determination of the people, and by an excessive con- 
sideration, a conscious and patriotic hypocrisy, on the part 
of their leaders. It had no inward strength, but Hke a 
sinking patient depended upon stimulants and doses for the 
preservation of its feeble vitality. 

As Hamilton had foretold, the ending of the war let loose 
at once all the forces of disunion. Men ringing their joy-bells 
as King George's fleet of transports shook out their white 
sails in New York harbour forgot that independence, being 
won, had still to be secured ; or, if they did not actually forget, 
indulged themselves in an easy confidence, longing for a brief 
respite from all high endeavour. To Hamilton such indiffer- 
ence seemed as dangerous as the lethargy of the traveller 
who sinks exhausted in a snowdrift. He believed that all 
effective co-operation had ceased when Washington dis- 
banded his army in the autumn of 1783; that the union 
was then dissolved as a reality, and preserved in Congress 
only as a tradition. The states were thirteen independent 
sovereigns, whose jealousies left open the doors of the house 
to foreign intrigue. Unless the people could be brought 
to realise the gravity of their predicament, the natural 
consequence of the War of Independence would be another 
civil war. 

During the spring of the year 1783 much correspondence 
had passed between Hamilton and the commander-in-chief 
upon this matter. Their minds were clear both as to the 
malady and the means to a cure. " Unless Congress have 
' powers competent to all general purposes," Washington 
wrote, " the distresses we have encountered, the expense we 
* have incurred, and the blood we have spilt, will avail us 
' nothing." ^ " It now only remains," Hamilton replied, " to 

^ Sparks's Washington, viii. p. 391. 



108 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1783 ' make solid establishments within, to perpetuate our Union, 
'^' ' to prevent our being a ball in the hands of European 
' powers, bandied against each other at their pleasure : in fine, 
' to make our independence truly a blessing. This, it is 
' to be lamented, will be an arduous work ; for to borrow a 
' figure from mechanics, the centrifugal is much stronger 
' than the centripetal force in these states — the seeds of 
' disunion much more numerous than those of union. I 
' will add that your Excellency's exertions are as essential 
' to accomplish this end as they have been to establish 
' independence." ^ 

Washington's circular letter to the governors of the states 
at the close of the war breathed the same prayer for "four 

* things which I humbly conceive are essential to the well- 
' being, I may even venture to say, to the existence of the 

* United States as an independent power : — First, an indis- 
' soluble union of the states under one federal head ; second, 
' a sacred regard to public justice; third, the adoption of a 
' proper peace establishment ; and fourth, the prevalence of 
' that pacific and friendly disposition among the people of the 
' United States which will induce them to forget their local 
' prejudices and policies; to make those mutual concessions 

* which are requisite to the general prosperity ; and, in some 
' instances, to sacrifice their individual advantages to the 

* interest of the community." ^ In his farewell address to 
his soldiers he entreated them to go forth as missionaries 
among their fellow-citizens, preaching the gospel of union 
and a strong government.^ 

It is not beyond the truth to say that Hamilton alone 
fully understood the heart of Washington upon this issue ; 
that he alone fully realised the grandeur of the policy of 
union. For between the aims of these two men and the 

1 Works, ix. p. 327. ^ Sparks's Washington, viii. pp. 442-3. 

• Ibid. viii. p. 495. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 109 

aims of the rest of the national party there was something A.D. 1783 
more than a difference of degree. The majority supported '^'^' ^^ 
the constitutional movement out of fear, these two from 
hope. Washington's fame is still, in some respects, far 
below his true deserts. We are apt to imagine him a 
man of cold courage and unimaginative wisdom. He was, 
in truth, under certain aspects neither cold nor unimagina- 
tive. His vision of the future was glowing and exuberant. 
The fancy of the veteran who had borne the brunt and 
discouragement of a wasting war was as fresh and san- 
guine as that of a boy who has never known a check. 
Alive no less to the value of the inheritance than to the 
dangers which threatened it, his chief concern was not a 
temporary triumph, but an ultimate security. Like Hamil- 
ton, he fixed his eyes upon a future far beyond his own 
span of life, and the welding of the thirteen states was to 
make the foundations of an Empire. 

From the declaration of peace there is a change in the 
relations of the two men. Their correspondence is still 
grave and formal; sometimes affectionate, never familiar. 
On the part of the elder there is an extraordinary 
generosity, a loyalty which never fails; on that of the 
younger a respectful consideration which has no tinge of 
the histrionic. In a sense, the leadership passes into the 
hands of Hamilton. It is his thought which ever presses 
forward, binding and constructing and preparing the way. 
He is the interpreter of the federal idea, and his main 
support is Washington's instinct which approves, Washing- 
ton's character which upholds him at every crisis of the 
struggle. Without diminishing his dignity or self-respect, 
without any abdication or surrender of his personal con- 
victions, Washington places the whole force of his great 
influence at the disposal of Hamilton, recognising in him a 
genius for statecraft, and without a grudge or afterthought 



110 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1783 for his own glory. Such alliances are rare, but out of their 
^'^' ^^ conjunction great events are apt to be begotten. 

Hamilton was justified in all his predictions. The centri- 
fugal forces, escaping from their cave, made such a tempest 
of disorder as may well have taken even the prophet himself 
by surprise. Washington, in his wise optimism, held un- 
moved to the belief that ' everything would come right at last,' 
and compared the riot and extravagance of the states after 
the peace to that of ' a young heir come a little prematurely 
to a large inheritance,' ^ who by and by, under the pressure 
of circumstances, will return to his natural good sense, and 
successfully rebuild his dilapidated fortune. As things went 
from bad to worse he grew graver, but never despondent. 
What perhaps weighed upon him most heavily was not 
so much any doubt of the result, as the peril of his most 
cherished desire. He wished to live the rest of his days as a 
country gentleman, mending and enjoying his estate. He 
loved his wide plantations, green forests and majestic river. 
The struggle with Nature for an antagonist delighted his 
great heart by its arduous intensity, its compatibility with 
silence, its freedom from the restlessness of camps and 
cities and the affairs of men. But gradually it became clear 
that no union could ever be attained without him; and 
when it was at length attained, that no man but he could 
properly start it on its course ; and afterwards, that no man 
but he could continue it with safety. So in the end there 
remained barely three years for a reward to one who cared 
less than most men for the prizes of ambition, and loved to 
watch the seasons in his country home more than to lead 
victorious armies or to be a ruler over a great nation. 

1 Sparks's Washington, ix. p. 11. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 111 



1782-1783 
^T. 25-26 



CHAPTER III 

Centrifugal Force and its Consequences 

The first trouble was the army, as has already been stated A.D. 
in a previous chapter.^ Unpaid and unpensioned, it spoke 
openly of rebellion. Washington was urged to make himself 
king, not only by men who had claims and grievances, but 
by others who, while they loved order, considered this 
remedy to be the only means of obtaining an honest 
acknowledgment and liquidation of the various liabilities 
which had been contracted during the war.^ 

Soldiers in peace-time are at a disadvantage. They are 
rarely masters of effective speech. Their words lack the 
cunning of restraint. Their sincerity and their conscious- 
ness of injustice render them impatient of parties. Occa- 
sionally they are useful to the politician, but he discards the 
alliance immediately it becomes a question of recompense. 
Moreover, their misfortunes tend to bring them upon the 
rates. Their grievance being that the country has dealt 
with them ungenerously, the taxpayers of whom the country 
is composed are placed in what they would themselves de- 
scribe as 'a delicate position' — the delicacy consisting in 
the fact that they cannot indulge their emotions without 
putting their hands deeper into their pockets. Consequently, 
in a democracy, though the wrongs of an army frequently 
call forth much sentiment, they rarely obtain substantial 
redress.^ A pension-list for political purposes is the utmost 
that a reasonable mind will entertain. 

Congressmen were very slow to respond. They continued 

1 Book I. Chap. vi. pp. 65-67. ^ Fiske's Critical Period, pp. 106-8. 

' Cf. action of Massachusetts, History, ii. pp. 494-5. 



112 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. to draw their own salaries with a most punctual fidelity ; 

1782-1783 j^^|- ^YiQ claims of the army were a controversial matter 
iET. 25-26 ^ / , 

which they professed to have scruples agamst settlmg 

offhand. It would be easier, they alleged with some 

truth, and more dignified, to discuss the question at leisure 

when the army was disbanded.^ When mutinous murmurs 

reached their ears they looked askance at Washington, 

and made speeches upon the text, ' No Cromwells.' In 

plain words, they had no power, and what was even more, 

they had no goodwill. The debating caste was jealous of 

the warrior caste ; feared it, and aflfected, not altogether 

insincerely, to regard the calling of arms with a kind of 

moral reprobation. Soldiers were under certain conditions 

a painful necessity, but, like a panther used for hunting, 

should bo clapped in chains as speedily as possible after the 

quarry had been killed. Hamilton, writing to Washington 

from Philadelphia in the spring of 1783, describes the 

attitude of his fellow-congressmen without flattery : " But 

' while I urge the army to moderation, I advise your 

' Excellency to take the direction of their discontents, and 

' endeavour to confine them within the bounds of duty, I 

' cannot, as an honest man, conceal from you that I am 

' afraid their distrusts have too much foundation. Repub- 

' lican jealousy has in it a principle of hostility to an army, 

' whatever be their merits, whatever be their claims to 

' the gratitude of the community. It acknowledges their 

' services with unwillingness, and rewards them with reluct- 

* ance, I see this temper, though smothered with great care, 

' involuntarily breaking out upon too many occasions. I often 

' feel a mortification, which it would be impolitic to express, 

' that sets my passions at variance with my reason. Too 

' many, I perceive, if they could do it with safety or colour, 

' would be glad to elude the just pretensions of the army."^ 

1 History, ii. p. 496. ^ \Yorks, ix. p. 330. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 113 

The dangers of a military rebellion were avoided in the ^^^^ 
manner which has been already described. For success the ^^ 25-26 
movement needed a Cromwell; and there was only one 
Cromwell possible, who not only declined to serve, but by 
adroit and courageous management defeated the hopes of 
the revolutionary party. Hot as was Washington's indigna- 
tion, much as he loved the army, his patriotism was too 
wide and well balanced to let loose the havoc of civil war, 
even though short of this remedy there was no hope of an 
adequate provision. It was said with truth that the defeated 
Government of King George dealt with the exiled and 
fugitive loyalists with a far greater liberality than the 
United States bestowed upon their victorious but im- 
poverished army. 

After the taking of Yorktown, Hamilton returned to Albany, 
and remained the guest of his father-in-law until the spring. 
General Schuyler offered pecuniary assistance, and there was 
some talk of a public appointment, but both were refused. 
Hamilton's determination was fixed to go to the bar. He 
resigned his commission in the army on the ground that he 
had obtained his command in the autumn only with great 
difficulty and after repeated applications. He was unwilling, 
now that the issue admitted of no uncertainty, to 'obtrude' 
his claims upon the commander-in-chief. At the same time 
he gave up his rights in the matters of half-pay and com- 
pensation. In the May following (1782) he accepted for the 
period of a few months the office of receiver of the continental 
taxes for New York state, but resigned it in winter, when 
he was chosen to be a member of Congress. 

In 1782, after a few months of study, Hamilton was 
admitted to the bar. The age of twenty-five, which was 
his age at that date, is to-day the usual time of life for 
young men to enter upon this arduous profession. There 
is an odd contrast, however, between the typical student of 

H 



114 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. Lincoln's Inn or the Temple, and this strange, smiling, 
1782-1783 vj <j 

Mt~25-2Q boyish figure, with the fine lace ruffles, who had already 

played the part and borne the responsibilities of a man in 
the affairs of a great war, who had dealt with statesmen in 
high matters of politics, and conducted with tact and firm- 
ness the diplomacy between the commanders of America 
and France. 

When we read of his sudden success as an advocate, we 
are inclined to look for the reason in the smallness of the 
arena and the dearth of great practitioners. To a certain 
extent both explanations are correct. The population of 
New York state in 1782 numbered only about a hundred 
and seventy thousand persons, New York city some thirty 
thousand. The former leaders of the bar, for the most part 
loyalists or Tories, had been swept entirely out of the field. 

But granting that the arena was small, it was not so with 
the issues which the conclusion of peace had brought up for 
consideration. Few courts of justice have ever been called 
upon to settle principles of higher moment to the state. 
Hamilton followed the Ciceronian tradition, mixing and inter- 
weaving law with politics. Through his advocacy in private 
causes he sought to affect, and to a large degree succeeded 
in affecting, public opinion outside the court-house. 

The treaty of peace with Britain, like other docu- 
ments of the kind, contained provisions of give and take. 
After signature by the commissioners in Paris, it was rati- 
fied with due consideration by the Continental Congress. 
The advantages which it secured were not merely of a 
sentimental nature, but material. It was justly regarded 
by enlightened citizens of the States as a triumph of 
diplomacy. The credit of Britain in the bargain was more 
of the heart than of the head. She was willing to concede 
substantial and important benefits in order to secure the 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 115 

lives and property of those colonists who had clung to the A.D. 1783 
old tradition and had sustained her arms. Looking at '^' 
the matter in a cool light, she blundered into sacrifices 
that were altogether needless even with this aim in view. 
Her discredit was a lack of knowledge, of foresight and 
of interest. The game was played, and she had lost. 
North America, in the eyes of her statesmen, was a 
strip of eastern seaboard ; the great lakes were but dimly 
understood ; the continent beyond the Mississippi was 
ignored. She gave much more than she needed to have 
given, both in east and west, to attain her honourable end ; 
and what was more immediately distressing, she received 
little or no value in return for her liberal concessions. 

" The uti possidetis, each party to hold what it possesses," 
Hamilton writes in the first letter from Phocion, "is the 
' point from which nations set out in framing a treaty of 

* peace. If one side gives up a part of its acquisitions, the 
' other side renders an equivalent in some other way. What 
' is the equivalent given to Great Britain for all the important 
' concessions she has made? She has surrendered the capital 
' of this state (New York) and its large dependencies. She 
' is to surrender our immensely valuable posts on the 
' frontier, and to yield to us a vast tract of western territory, 
' with one-half of the lakes, by which we shall command 
' almost the whole fur trade. She renounces to us her claim 

* to the navigation of the Mississippi, and admits us to share 

* in the fisheries even on better terms than we formerly 
' enjoyed it. As she was in possession, by right of war, of 
' all these objects, whatever may have been our original 
' pretensions to them, they are, by the laws of nations, to 
' be considered as so much given up on her part. And what 
' do we give in return ? We stipulate — that there shall be 
' no future injury to her adherents among us. How insigni- 
' ficant the equivalent in comparison with the acquisition ! 



116 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1783 ' A man of sense would be ashamed to compare them; a 
^T. 26 I i^QH of honesty, not intoxicated with passion, would blush 
' to lisp a question of the obligation to observe the stipulation 
* on our part." ^ 

In return for these advantages Congress had most 
solemnly undertaken three things, and the people, wearied 
by the sufferings of an eight years' war, would have gladly 
purchased the blessings of peace at a much higher price. 
The first of these conditions was that no obstacle or im- 
pediment should be put in the way of the recovery of 
debts due to British subjects from the citizens of the 
Republic ; the second, that in the future no fresh prosecu- 
tions or confiscations should be directed against loyalists; 
the third, that Congress should sincerely recommend to the 
legislatures of the various states a repeal of the existing acts 
of confiscation which affected the property of these unfor- 
tunate persons. On the last no stress need be laid. Franklin 
was candid as to the difficulties, and in all likelihood it 
was little more than a pious hope. But the first and the 
second were unambiguous, and by every man, honest or 
dishonest, were understood in the same sense when peace 
was joyfully accepted. 

The forms of political knavery are beyond enumeration, 
but they fall into classes with certain conspicuous features, 
according to the development of the community. There 
is the knavery of the pure savage, which differs from that of 
the feudal baron ; and there are knaveries peculiar to a 
bureaucracy, to a despot, and to a people without previous 
experience in international relations. The knavery of the 
American states was of the last-named order. They took 
the benefits of peace which the efforts of Congress had 
secured to them ; they accepted the advantages of the 
treaty which their representatives had signed ; they watched 

1 Works, iv. p. 239. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 117 

and waited until the troops of King George were embarked A.D. 1783 
in transports for England; and then proceeded to deny, in a ^'^' ^^ 
variety of tones, all power in the central government to bind 
them in the matter of the quid pro quo. It was not a great 
thing which Congress had undertaken to do, or one which 
could be of any material advantage to their late enemy. 
All their promise amounted to was that they would abstain 
from the degradation of a petty and personal revenge, and 
this promise they proceeded to break in every particular. 

As Hamilton wisely and nobly urged, the breach was not 
only a despicable perfidy but an impolitic act, since loyalists 
might become good citizens, and the states needed nothing 
more urgently than population. But no sooner was danger at 
a distance, embarked on transports, than the states assumed 
an attitude of defiance. New York in particular proceeded 
to persecute the Tories by novel expedients and with re- 
doubled energy. The thirteen legislatures vied with one 
another in the ingenuity of measures for defeating recovery 
of debts due to British creditors. They derided the recom- 
mendation to repeal oppressive acts and to restore con- 
fiscated property, and proceeded without regard either for 
honour or consequences to pass new acts of wider oppression 
and to order confiscations on a grander scale. It was the 
same spirit which had violated the terms of the Saratoga 
capitulation : the same which in later days preached the 
gospel of repudiation with its hand upon its heart. 

The United States at this date were not independent of 
European assistance, but on the contrary stood urgently in 
need of it. They required capital and credit, and, beyond 
everything, treaties of commerce; but until 1789, when the 
constitution was in being, they called their wants to deaf ears, 
European bankers and ministers of state, mindful of these 
events, evaded — sometimes with less of courtesy and circum- 
locution than was agreeable — all proposals for co-operation. 



118 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1783 Even their politest messages were unflattering. They com- 
'^'^* ^^ plained of the duality of a government that was one and 
indivisible when it desired to purchase a favour or an 
accommodation, but turned into thirteen recusants when 
it became a question of paying the reckoning. They 
declined to be captivated or tempted by the illusion of a 
Congress that dissolved and faded under the pressure 
of an obligation into a welter of truculent and con- 
ceited legislatures, who pleaded their municipal statutes 
against the law of nations, and denied the right of the 
central power to do more than secure prepayment from 
simpletons. 

Against this flagrant and ruinous chicanery the nobler 
spirits of the Revolution revolted, protested and fought, 
but for a considerable period of years in vain. They had 
no regard for popularity, and incurred much hatred. 
Among its opponents Hamilton was foremost in writings 
and action. Clinton, Governor of New York, became at 
this time his enemy, and remained so to the end. Among 
people who had no word upon their lips so frequently as 
freedom, Clinton acted the part of a predatory despot by 
playing ingeniously upon the greed and passions of his 
constituents. It is impossible to withhold a certain degree 
of admiration for this narrow, irascible, obstinate, masterful 
precursor of Tammany, who maintained his domination 
asrainst a coalition of all the virtues and all the talents over 
a prolonged term. In shrewdness, and not from cynicism, 
he called his policy Democracy. Phrases never clouded his 
illiterate and direct intelligence; but he was far from despis- 
ing their utility in dealing with the electorate. Having given 
his policy a name, not with the object of describing it, but 
merely to please the public taste, he fixed it like a ring in a 
bull's nose, and led the passive creature whithersoever it 
pleased him. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 119 

Clinton loved his governorship with a passion that was A.D. 1783 
entirely royal, and he hated Congress because it possessed ^'^- ^^ 
a semblance of superior power. When it was possible to 
do so he thwarted that august impotency and treated it to 
humiliation and contempt. He hated and feared the idea 
of union, and fought against it tooth and nail; for union, 
beyond any doubt, meant the curtailment of his power and 
importance. He hated the loyalists and Tories because they 
had once been his enemies. It is probable that after a 
fashion he loved his own state of New York, was jealous of 
her glory, desired to see her independent, rich and powerful, 
as sometimes a man has a pride in his wife though he 
ill-uses her. 

Such a character holding the governorship of the chief 
commercial state of the Union was the natural leader of the 
revolt against treaty obligations, and in his action it is 
likely that his hatred of Congress was at least an equal 
motive with his hatred of loyalists. His first move was a 
comprehensive measure for disfranchising every one who 
had stayed of his own free will in places occupied by 
British troops or under their nominal control ; but the pro- 
posal was too crude a usurpation for the stomachs of his 
more timid supporters. Then he attempted to impose an 
oath as a condition of enfranchisement — an oath not of 
loyalty in the present and for the future, which would have 
been legitimate, but of immaculate patriotism in the past.^ 
He promoted an edict of perpetual exile against all Tories 
who had left the state. He carried an act enabling citizens 
whose property had been occupied or entered upon by others 
under British authority, during the military occupation, 
to bring suits for damages against such persons as tres- 
passers. This measure struck at the roots of the settlement, 
and such was the intention of the Clintonian party. It 

^ History, iii. p. 29. 



120 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1783 also opened the doors to every kind of extortion working 
* through prejudice against justice, 

Hamilton contended boldly that the act was illegal, 
being contrary to the treaty of j)eace which Congress was 
within its legitimate powers in concluding. Clinton, with 
much adroitness, arranged for a test case in which a poor 
widow sought damages from a wealthy merchant.^ Popular 
sympathy was on the side of Clinton's law, and the circum- 
stances of this particular cause lent themselves to a senti- 
mental treatment. The state courts were swayed by both 
considerations, and would gladly have found a way to enforce 
the Trespass Act and right the widow. But Hamilton left 
them no way. He fought the case upon the great principles 
of national obligation which lay at the root of the matter, 
and wrung a verdict for his client from the reluctant 
judges. 

By this victory he smashed the Trespass Act; but the 
whole policy of repudiation was abhorrent to him, and he 
attacked it at large in the first of his letters from Fhocion. 
One Ledyard, over the signature of Mentor, attempted a 
reply which drew from Hamilton a second letter upon the 
same theme. These two pamphlets are among the noblest 
and most persuasive of his writings. In personal invective 
he was not a great master. He lacked the delicacy of wit 
and melody of phrase which alone can render anger and 
contempt agreeable to a passionless and disinterested 
posterity; but when he writes, as in these, with deep 
sincerity, with candour and good temper, he is disarming 
and resistless. His simple object was to persuade all 
honest men that for them the Clintonian policy of oppres- 
sion was impossible ; and honest men, reading the pamphlets, 
put aside their prejudices and became slowly convinced. 
We find some measure of his success in the rasfe of 

^ History, iii. pp. 11-22. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 121 

the governor's faction. Never, even later when he spoke a.d. i783 

disrespectfully of the French Revolution, was he hated with '^'^' ^^ 

so great a frenzy. A club frequented by Ledyard decided 

to challenge Hamilton, each member in turn, until some 

one at length should have the good fortune to put an end 

to him. But Ledyard, who had, at least, the virtue of being 

able to take blows in return for those he gave, entering 

the club and hearing of this strange proposal, broke out 

in loud indignation : " This, gentlemen, can never be ! 

' What ? You write what you please, and because you 

* cannot refute what he writes in reply you form a com- 
' bination to take his life." ^ And so, reluctantly, the scheme 
was abandoned by its devoted authors. 

It was Hamilton's most fatal weakness as a politician, and 
one of his chief virtues as a statesman, that he was indifferent 
to popularity. The same passion for order and justice, which 
had driven him as a boy to defend his enemies against the vio- 
lence of an excited mob, armed him now against the threats 
and abuse of Clinton's henchmen. He called himself a Whig, 
following the practice of the revolutionary leaders, and his 
definition of the name might almost have converted Lord 
Thurlow himself. "The spirit of Whiggism is generous, 
' humane, beneficent, and just. These men (the Clintonians) 
' inculcate revenge, cruelty, persecution and perfidy. The 
' spirit of Whiggism cherishes legal liberty, holds the rights 
' of every individual sacred, condemns or punishes no man 
' without regular trial and conviction of some crime declared 
' by antecedent laws ; reprobates equally the punishment of 
' the citizen by arbitrary acts of legislation, as by the lawless 
' combinations of unauthorised individuals, while those men 
' are advocates for expelling a large number of their fellow- 
' citizens unheard, untried ; or, if they cannot effect this, are 

* for disfranchising them, in the face of the constitution, 

^ History, iii. p. 45. 



122 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1783 ' without the judgment of their peers and contrary to the 
^"^•26 ' law of the land." 1 

Hamilton's career and merits as a lawyer have been dis- 
cussed at length by men who were themselves great jurists. 
In the present essay, which is concerned with his political 
services, any elaborate survey would be out of place. His 
practice grew rapidly. Abilities that could win a verdict 
against the oppressed widow and the popular governor 
could not be safely overlooked by litigants, no matter what 
political views they might entertain. He was no mere 
advocate to dazzle twelve plain men in a box. With courts 
he was more successful than with juries ; and the higher the 
court, the greater was his influence upon it. 

We are apt, having rarely witnessed the phenomenon, to 
ignore the chief advantage of his circumstances. In the 
vigour of his youth and at the very summit of hope, he 
brought to the study of the divine precepts of law a char- 
acter already trained and tested by the realities of life, 
formed by success, experienced in the facts and disorders 
with which law has to deal. Before he began the study of 
the remedies, he had a wide knowledge of the conditions 
of human society. Although still a boy in years and spirits, 
the memory of playing fields and debating clubs was faint 
and far off; for he had already contended and measured 
himself against characters who have left their mark on 
history. 

It is characteristic of his quality that during the year in 
which he studied for the bar he wrote a text-book on law 
for the use of students. With a succeeding generation of 
students Hamilton's text-book remained in use,^ not from 
any sentimental reason, for the party which he had led 
was extinguished and his own fame lay under a cloud of 
unpopularity, but solely on its merits. 

1 Works, iv. p. 231. " History, ii. p. 282. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 123 

He practised at the bar for seven years before Washington A.D. 1783 
summoned him to his cabinet, and for ten after he had ^' 
resigned his office — altogether barely seventeen years. 
During the whole of this period he was occupied as much 
with public affairs as with his profession. Yet from what 
remains to us in the meagre reports, and in his own notes, 
abstracts and memoranda, from the testimony of his con- 
temporaries and the criticism of men who followed after, 
there exists no doubt that he must be numbered among 
the great lawyers, one of the smallest societies of mortal 
excellence. With him, as with them (for it is the badge 
of their company), law was not so much a slow and 
arduous acquisition as a sudden discovery; not so much 
a painful effort of learning as the intuition of an eternal 
harmony: a reality, quick and human, buxom and jolly, and 
not a formula pinched and embalmed, stiff, banded and 
dusty like a royal mummy of Egypt. Reversing the rule 
of all academies, and following the invariable practice of 
greatness, he learned from the top downwards, not from the 
base upwards ; and if he escaped drudgery, which we are too 
often inclined to place upon a separate pedestal and worship 
for its own sake, it was not at the sacrifice of thoroughness ; 
for principles were a part of his being, and he found his 
details as he needed them, like a man seeking needles with 
a lodestone. 



CHAPTER IV 

Disorder and Anarchy 

The violations of the terms of peace which took place in 
New York were conspicuous, not so much by reason of their 
exceptional flagrancy, as from the commercial importance 



124 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. of that state, from the large number of Tories included in 
M 2fi ^0 ^^^ population, and from the notable part taken by Hamilton 
in opposing a policy which in his eyes was one not merely 
of breach of faith, but of disintegration. 

Up till this time the great difficulty had been to arrive at 
anything approaching unanimity among the states; but 
there was at once a perfect unanimity in refusing to repeal 
the acts of confiscation. There was also a practical unanimity 
in engaging in fresh persecutions of the loyalists, not merely 
by the enactment of oppressive civil laws, but even by deny- 
ing them the protection afforded by a just enforcement of 
the criminal laws. In many districts these unfortunate 
persons were robbed, tortured, and even put to death with 
impunity, and over a hundred thousand were driven into 
exile in Canada, Florida and the Bahamas. Finally, there 
was unanimity among all the most important states in 
taking measures to defeat the recovery of private debts in 
cases where the creditors were Englishmen.^ It was the 
same in Massachusetts and in South Carolina, in Pennsyl- 
vania, Maryland and Virginia, as well as in New York. 

The recovery of private debts was indeed one of the 
stipulations of the treaty of peace, but in dealing with any 
nation which had evolved a public opinion capable of sus- 
taining the most rudimentary code of personal honour it 
would have been superfluous, a thing which would have 
gone without saying. It is remarkable, however, that in 
this period of pristine virtue public opinion was at once so 
childish and so rotten, that we are at a loss whether to 
marvel most at its recklessness of credit or at its unvarnished 
dishonesty. Public opinion was entirely favourable to the 
idea of private theft, and the interest of rogues was con- 
sidered with a tender compassion by the grave and respect- 
able citizens who composed the legislatures of the various 

^ Fiske'a Critical Period of American History, pp. 129-130. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 125 

states. Measures were passed amid popular rejoicing to a.D. 

obstruct the recovery of debts due to British merchants, and ^J?^~}Itl 
•^ . ' ^T. 26-30 

to enable the fortunate Americans to revel unmolested in 
the pleasant flavour of stolen fruit. 

Such lack of morals in the people being added to the 
lack of power in Congress, it is not wonderful that the 
federal government gradually faded into a dim shadow. 
Even the instinct of self-importance was insufficient to 
keep it alive. Having become wholly a farce, it sank 
into indifference. The legislatures of the thirteen states 
treated it with frank contumely; acted in open defiance 
of its authority ; ignored its counsels ; refused its requests, 
and went their various ways in contempt, Delaware 
and Georgia, with stern economy, considered it to be a 
waste of the public money to furnish delegates During 
the six years preceding 1789 the average attendance was 
about twenty-five, out of a total of ninety-one. Frequently 
the meetings were adjourned, which harmed no man, for 
want of a quorum. " Our prospects," wrote Hamilton to Jay, 
"are not flattering. Every day proves the inefficiency of 
' the present confederation ; yet the common danger being 
' removed, we are receding instead of advancing in a dis 
' position to amend its defects. The road to popularity in 
' each state is to inspire jealousies of the power of Congress, 
' though nothing can be more apparent than that they have 
' no power ; and that for the want of it the resources of the 
* country during the war could not be drawn out, and we at 
' this moment experience all the mischiefs of a bankrupt and 
' ruined credit. It is to be hoped that when prejudice and 
' folly have run themselves out of breath, we may return to 
' reason and correct our errors." ^ 

Hamilton took his seat in Congress during November 
1782, and remained for eight months a member of that body. 

' Works, ix. pp. 381, 382. 



126 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. The debates were not open to the public, and the only 

^I?^~}P1 authentic records which remain are the Journals of the 
^T. 26-30 . , , , . . . 

House. Details are therefore entirely lacking; but it is 
certain that he took a great part, if not the most prominent 
part, in its proceedings.^ From the formal entries, from his 
own letters and from contemporary notices, he stands out 
clearly as the courageous advocate of union speaking to deaf 
ears. His disposition was the reverse of reticent. He never 
stored up ideas awaiting the dramatic occasion that would 
receive them with applause. If his mind was full of any 
matter, he announced it regardless of the forces or the 
lethargy that were arrayed against him. All the chief 
measures of his subsequent administration were brought 
under discussion at this period without consideration for 
the hopelessness of success. His ideas in the matters of 
foreign policy, defence, national credit and commercial 
affairs were all mooted in this uncongenial atmosphere.^ 
But in the end even he succumbed to its intolerable 
influence. The absence of any pressing external danger 
removed all chance of an effective effort proceeding from 
within. The time had gone by when a bold demand by 
Congress for sufficient powers to govern with might have 
had some hope of success; and although in a sanguine 
moment Hamilton had drafted a series of resolutions in 
favour of union, he met with so little encouragement that 
he did not in the end submit them to the judgment of the 
lack-lustre assembly.^ 

Meanwhile the policy of breach of faith was producing its 
natural crop of inconveniences. Clintonian methods were 
not the unmixed advantage which his adherents had 
supposed when they engaged upon them in a spirit of light- 
hearted cunning. It was true that Britain was in no mood 
to embark upon a fresh war for the punishment of broken 

1 History, ii. pp. 335-7. "^ Ibid. ii. pp. 568-9. ^ Ibid. ii. pp. 571-8. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 127 

promises. She had surrendered the chief hostage when A.D, 

1783-1^ 
Mr. 26-30 



1 'Tft^ 1 "7(27 

she evacuated her strategical position at New York ; but she 



declined to hand over the eight important frontier posts 
which she held upon the American side of the line between 
Lake Michigan and Lake Champlain.^ These forts were 
much in themselves, and as a symbol of dominion to the 
Indian tribes. They were much also as a matter of pride ; 
while their retention carried with it the whole of the valuable 
fur trade, which consequently, until 1795, when they were 
at last surrendered, brought its considerable profits to British 
merchants. 

Among British statesmen unfriendly to the American 
confederation there was at this time an opinion, not alto- 
gether ill-founded, that the slender bonds of union might 
be broken by a war of tariffs and navigation acts.^ Britain 
still remained the chief customer of the states, as well 
as their chief market for those needs which they were 
unable to produce within their own borders. It was there- 
fore thought by many people that if the pressure of 
commercial restrictions were rigidly applied, individual 
members of the confederacy might, sooner or later, be 
tempted to enter into separate fiscal agreements with the 
British Government out of consideration for their own 
pecuniary interests. By this means it was hoped that a 
considerable number might be gradually and gently de- 
tached from the Union, and in the end led back to their 
old allegiance. 

During the parliamentary session of 1783, after the pre- 
liminaries of peace had been signed, but before the evacua- 
tion of New York had taken place, Pitt, in a different 
spirit, introduced a bill, the object of which was to secure 
unconditional free trade between the mother country and 
the states. For this he has been warmly praised by the 

1 History, iii. pp. 113-14. ^ jr^^-j jij p jQg 



128 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. majority of modern writers, while the House of Commons, 
^^^26^30 "^^i^^i refused to entertain his proposals, has been un- 
sparingly condemned as narrow-minded, short-sighted and 
churlish. 

In so far as its action was due to temper, the result was 
doubtless lamentable, since it has tended to obscure the 
cool motives of policy which were the real mainspring. 
It is not clear, however, that temper had much to do with 
the matter. Historians have perhaps tended to assume 
too readily that a nation which had been worsted in a long, 
costly, and somewhat ignominious war, would be in a mood 
highly unfavourable for considering measures which, while 
they might conceivably have conferred substantial benefits 
upon themselves, would have had the undoubted effect of 
conferring benefits, relatively much greater, upon their late 
antagonists. To a generation which has grown accustomed 
to regard all state regulation of international commerce as 
nothing better than a way of cutting off one's nose to spite 
one's face, it has seemed natural to conclude that the decision 
of the British legislature must have been dictated by no 
more respectable motive than ill-feeling. But this assump- 
tion rests more upon its inherent probability, according to 
modern ideas, than upon any contemporary evidence of 
repute. 

Pitt's view, certainly the view of the later writers who 
have praised his foresight and breadth of mind, was not 
only that the purposed arrangement would have been 
commercially beneficial to Britain by enriching an eager 
and important customer, but further, that it would have 
excited a strong sentiment of gratitude in the citizens of 
the new Republic, and would have swiftly consigned to 
oblivion all the bitter memories of the war.^ It has been 
assumed as an axiom that this admirable result must have 

1 History, iii. p. 57. 



1783-1787 
^T. 26-30 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 129 

ensued; but at the best it was no more than a vague A.D. 
possibility, and upon tlie whole it seems more likely that 
nothing of the kind would ever have occurred. 

For, in point of fact, it was in the states and not in 
England that revenge was elevated into a national object. 
The wholesale repudiation of the terms of peace would never 
have found its necessary support in public opinion had it 
rested merely upon the interest of private debtors. To 
pretend that the policy of Clinton was the result of the 
British regulations concerning trade and shipping is only 
possible to a profligate imagination, or to a memory un- 
retentive of dates. The nature of these regulations was 
unknown, their effect had not begun to make itself felt, 
when the carnival began like some process of spontaneous 
combustion. Nor even had those things been known and 
felt would they have afforded a plausible pretext. For there 
was nothing invidious in the action of Britain. The policy 
she chose to pursue was entirely in accordance with the 
practice of all nations at that epoch. Commercial 
warfare was their normal condition. France, the ally of 
the states, was no less stiff in her enactments, and the 
hostility of Britain excited louder complaints only because 
Britain was of incomparably greater importance to the 
prosperity of the states than any of her rivals. 

Had Pitt's measure been passed it would have meant a 
complete reversal of a policy which had been pursued with 
success since the days of Elizabeth. The refusal of Par- 
liament to approve of so great a revolution implied no 
particular animosity to America, but merely an aversion 
from the sudden jettison of an approved tradition. It is 
credible, and even likely, that a system of unconditional free 
trade might have resulted in the enrichment of many 
British manufacturers and merchants, and in an increase 
of the volume of trade between the two countries; but it 



130 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. would have been none the less a startling violation of a 
1783-1787 principle which had obtained for many generations. This 
principle laid it down firmly that the proper object of 
national policy was to bind together the mother country 
and her colonies in an empire which should be as nearly 
as possible self-sufficing and independent ©t the rest of the 
world. According to this view, it was a mistake to cherish 
our rivals, and strengthen their sinews, even for the sake 
of a pecuniary advantage to ourselves. 

In this case, moreover, there were particular reasons which 
weighed with the majority both in the Cabinet and in 
Parliament against any relaxation of the traditional policy 
of Britain. Then, as now, this country was the chief 
maritime power, and then, as now, she was determined 
at all costs to maintain her supremacy. The conditions of 
this supremacy were sailors and ships, and for these she 
looked to the prosperity of her mercantile marine and of 
her building-yards. Gratuitously to invite America to take 
a share in the carrying-trade seemed little short of madness. 
The right policy was to exclude her from it to the utmost 
extent that was possible, seeing that of all others she was 
the rival who had the greatest natural advantages to support 
her competition. Materials were so plentiful and ready 
to hand that in those days ships could be built in New 
England for less than two- thirds of the price that was 
required in Europe.^ The development of American 
resources and an encouragement of her shipping must, 
therefore, have meant within a few years the closing of 
British yards. These considerations lent an overwhelming 
force to the opposition directed against the free trade 
proposals, and it may even be that on second thoughts Pitt 
himself was converted by their logic. Certainly he never 
again submitted his Utopian scheme. British trade to and 

^ Fiske's Critical Period of American Hiiitory, p. 137. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 131 

from British colonies was accordingly confined as rigidly A.D. 
as before to British bottoms. ^l^^o^Jll 

The result entailed much hardship and widespread ruin 
in the states. In the old colonial days, American shipping 
had depended almost entirely upon the trade with Britain 
and her West Indian possessions. Under the new settlement, 
however, the latter were immediately closed to her vessels. 
The distress thus caused was genuine ; but the complaints 
which it called forth were to a large extent unreasonable ; 
for in fact the states, having voluntarily broken away from 
the Empire, could hardly claim with any justice to pursue 
the same profitable intercourse which would have remained 
open to them had they chosen to remain within it. 

British policy, however, did not stop short at this point, 
but sought a further advantage which the unfortunate pre- 
dicament of the states enabled it to seize without much 
difficulty. A bold attempt was made to confine all trade 
between Britain and America to our own shipping, and so 
long as dissension continued among the thirteen states the 
attempt succeeded, since no measures of reprisal, no unani- 
mous and general counter-strokes, were possible. Duties 
upon imports coming from England, and dues upon English 
ships, could only become an effective weapon if they were 
universally levied at all the ports along the coast, and this 
was out of the question until the Union was something 
more than a mere name. Congress, urged to it by the chief 
commercial states, asked for powers, but asked always in 
vain. Each state was jealous of its neighbours. The 
southern states, who depended upon the export of their raw 
material, were distrustful of the northern states who owned 
the ships, and not without reason suspected a design to 
exclude the English carrying- trade from American harbours 
only in order that Yankees and New Yorkers might be 
enriched by exacting more burdensome freights for de- 



132 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. livering the produce of the plantations to European 

Things accordingly became even worse than during the 
war. The carrying-trade then existed, though its risks were 
high ; but now it was wholly extinguished by the competition 
of their former enemy in American ports. Shipbuilding, 
though no nation had more natural advantages of materials 
and situation, was likewise extinguished ; for, with the loss 
of the carrying- trade, there was no market at home, and 
abroad the hostile duties made sales impossible. The free 
access to the fisheries which had been secured under the 
treaty was in practice but a small boon, since the profitable 
foreign market in the British West Indian possessions was 
closed to the sale of the salted produce.^ And in spite 
of all the grievance and ill-feeling, a large demand arose 
for British goods. For these specie had to be paid down 
on the nail in all cases where wares or materials were 
not taken in exchange, since no British merchant would 
now give one pennyworth of credit, out of respect to the 
measures of the various states for the obstruction of the 
payment of British debts. Even when payment was taken 
in kind the rate of the exchange was ruinous to the 
American producer, for many of his commodities fell under 
the ban of the British tariff, and had to be reckoned, not at 
their market value, but at their market value less the 
amount of the import duties they would have to bear when 
landed in London or Bristol. It has been computed that 
in 1784 £1,700,000 of our manufactures were imported, and 
but £700,000 of native produce taken in exchange.^ The 
balance was paid in hard cash. Specie flowed out of the 
country, so that, in addition to the ruin of the merchants, 
shipowners, shipbuilders and fishermen, there was added a 

1 History, iii. p. 110. ^ /5j-g^ jjj, p iqS. 

' Cambridge Modern Histoiy, vii. p. 312. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 133 

currency question that ultimately led to civil war upon a A.l). 
considerable scale. ^ ' ' 

Financial trouble had dogged the steps of Congress 
throughout the war. As the struggle dragged on, this 
problem increased in difficulty; but so long as hostilities 
continued, the difficulty was by some means overcome. It 
had been to the interest of France and Holland, and of the 
other enemies of Britain, to keep the war alive. They could 
not afford to let it perish of exhaustion. And a further 
reason was found in the argument that when the severe 
drain of war expenditure had ceased, prompt payments of 
interest and a speedy return of the principal would certainly 
be made. Creditors had therefore been sanguine and in- 
dulgent. But in fact all their calculations were upset, for 
with the declaration of peace precisely the reverse of all 
their forecasts came to pass. 

The chief stimulus to contributions from the various 
states was gone, for the common danger no longer existed. 
Far from being in a position to deal handsomely with its 
creditors, Congress could barely support the small charges 
of the nominal government. The interest on foreign loans 
was still unpaid, and repayment of the capital became a 
remote and visionary possibility. European financiers were 
disinclined, therefore, to throw good money after bad. Not 
only were American applications refused ; they were derided. 
In the end even the resourcefulness of Robert Morris could 
do nothing. He had in all likelihood achieved more than 
any other man could have hoped to achieve.^ His dis- 
interestedness no less than his competency was singular in 
that company, for, like Washington, he contributed his private 
fortune to the common stock. But the limit of his powers 
had been reached, and, hopeless of any speedy change in 
the constitution, he felt the position to be impossible. The 

^ Hamilton to Washington, History, ii. p. 503. 



134 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. true remedy was discussed by Congress with ungrudging 

83-1787 
^T 26-30 



1783 1/87 prolixity, but never seriously attempted, and with a fine 



sense of irony it appointed a committee to succeed to his 
functions when he tendered his resignation. 

Commercial treaties were no easier to obtain than loans, 
so that this means of reviving and fostering commerce was 
also closed. No country would conclude a bargain with 
Congress, for the reason that the thirteen states could be 
relied upon to repudiate all parts of the arrangement which 
conferred an advantage upon the other contracting party.^ 
Even the little commerce overseas which was retained 
lacked all security, and was endangered by the want of 
power to protect it. American ships were seized, and 
American citizens sold in slavery by Barbary pirates, while 
their countrymen at home were engaged in arguing the 
question of State Rights, and laying traps for the con- 
fusion of the central government. American diplomacy and 
American subjects were open to insults and injuries from 
the meanest antagonists. The voice of the Union had no 
authority among nations, any more than its bonds had 
credit or its promises were believed. It was indeed a 
somewhat humiliating pass to have come to, within a few 
years after having overcome the richest, proudest and most 
powerful people in Europe. 

Power, prosperity and consideration, which all men affected 
to desire, were only to be had on terms which the states 
could not bring themselves to pay. The dignified entreaties 
of Washington, the unanswerable reasoning of Hamilton, 
failed to move their light minds. The number of the 
plagues was still incomplete. The citizens hardened their 
hearts ; preferring, like Pharaoh, to endure the murrain, the 
locusts, and the darkness, rather than abandon their mean 
jealousies, their rivalries at once sordid and mahcious; 

' History, iii. pp. 87, 90, 91. 



1783-1787 
Mt. 26-30 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 135 

rather than part with, or delegate, a single shred of local A.D. 
sovereignty to clothe the shivering and naked form of 
the federal government. Finally in their madness they 
fell one upon another; each at the beginning looking 
merely for advantage to itself in injury to its neighbours, 
but as time went on seeking injury to its neighbours even 
as an end desirable in itself 

The thirteen states proceeded to indulge themselves in 
the costly luxury of an internecine tariff war. The states 
with seaports preyed upon their land-locked brethren, and 
provoked a boycott in return. Pennsylvania attacked 
Delaware. Connecticut was oppressed by Rhode Island 
and New York. New Jersey, lying between New York on 
the one hand, and Pennsylvania on the other, was com- 
pared to ' a cask tapped at both ends ' ; North Carolina, 
between South Carolina and Virginia, to ' a patient bleeding 
at both stumps.' It was a dangerous game, ruinous in 
itself, and, behind the custom-house officers, men were 
beginning to furbish up the locks of their muskets. 

Wherever there is a boundary there are apt to be disputes, 
and the political conditions being what they were, it was 
not likely that this copious source of ill-feeling would run 
dry. The barbarities of the Pennsylvanians under Patter- 
son, in the valley of Wyoming, outdid even the legends of 
British atrocities, and left a rankling memory in Connecti- 
cut. At one time war between Vermont, New Hampshire, 
and New York seemed all but inevitable. 

Then there came the greatest of all the plagues in tlie not 
unusual disguise of a panacea. The general commercial 
ruin and financial collapse had all but extinguished credit. 
The drain of specie had all but extinguished the currency. 
Credit without currency might in theory work great mar- 
vels; but the lack of both is necessarily fatal. Barter 
became a common expedient. Tobacco, whisky, and salt 



136 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. pork served in different states as the clumsy medium of 
Mt 26-30 ^^c^^^o®- Every industry groaned under the calamity. 
But help was at hand. Towards 1786 the genius of 
democracy discovered a remedy. The sound political in- 
stinct of the people, which it was the fashion of the 
Clintonian school to uphold as equally fitted for a 
general judgment after the event, and for the nicest pro- 
blems of expert knowledge, rose to the occasion and 
demanded paper money. Printing-presses in Georgia and 
the Carolinas, in Pennsylvania, New York and Rhode 
Island, obediently creaked out affluence in response to the 
resolutions of their various legislatures. All the states, 
save only Connecticut and Delaware, were more or less 
disturbed by the agitation which passed like a sudden wave 
over the whole Union.^ 

In the matter of knots the prudent statesman will dis- 
criminate. All are not of the Gordian character, and, as a 
rule, it is safer to unravel than to shear them through. The 
panacea met with a fate unworthy of the high hopes of 
its inventors. The paper currency showed an immediate 
tendency to drop to two cents, or thereabouts, in the dollar. 
Mutton chops could sometimes be obtained for four dollars 
apiece, and a good, wearable hat for forty ; but more usually 
a prudent shopkeeper preferred to lose his customer than 
handle such precarious stuff. 

Clearly something was wrong, and the people taking 
thought discovered that it was the shopkeepers who needed 
coercion. Laws accordingly were passed with this object, 
and when they were defied, the matter came before the 
courts. The judges, sitting amid the noisy demonstration of 
popular anger, decided nevertheless that the laws were 
invalid, and absolved the defendants.^ Up to this point 

^ Fiske's Critical Period of American History, pp. 168-186. 
2 Ihid. p. 176. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 137 

there had been, if not unanimity, at any rate a huge A.D. 

1 'TOO 1 7Q*7 

majority supporting the panacea ; but now there was a ^^ ^^ ^^ 
division. One party grumbled, but owned itself defeated ; 
the other, with a stern logic, discovered that to complete the 
system the judges must be done away with or intimidated. 
In Rhode Island they were accordingly dismissed, and else- 
where there was dangerous rioting. In Massachusetts 
there was civil war. Battles had been fought at Spring- 
field and at Petersham, and upwards of eight thousand men 
were bearing arms, before Shays's rebellion was finally reduced. 
Congress rising to the emergency called out for troops ; but, 
by a stratagem more prudent possibly than dignified, pre- 
tended that they were for use against the Indian tribes.^ 

Paper money was the worst of all the plagues; and yet 
the people still hardened their hearts. ' The League of 
Friendship,' as it was affectionately named, had reached a 
sad dissolution. A union resting upon sentiment, a govern- 
ment depending upon the goodwill of its members, are only 
the make-believes of amiable enthusiasts or the cheats and 
counterfeits of quacks and sophists. The only security for 
union must be found in the strength of the central govern- 
ment, and such strength can only be given by the forms and 
machinery of a constitution. In America during these years 
men thought otherwise, and the words of Washington and 
Hamilton therefore fell unheeded. It was believed that a 
federal power could be preserved by occasional outbursts of 
high emotion. It was forgotten that a government depend- 
ing upon emotion for its authority is more likely in the end 
to be destroyed by that incalculable force than to be saved 
by it. 

1 History, iii. p. 178. 



138 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

CHAPTER V 

The Power of a Vision 

A.D. In the early spring of 1785 a modest but memorable 
^1^^'}]^ meeting took place at Washington's country seat of Mount 
Vernon, between representatives from the states of Maryland 
and Virginia. The occasion was a conference in regard to 
waterways between the eastern settlements and the western 
unpeopled land lying in the valley of the Ohio and to the 
north-west. The greater portion of these vast territories 
had been ceded to the Federal Government by the various 
states who claimed them under their charters, or by virtue 
of a nominal occupation. To the south North Carolina 
stretched out in a wide strip to the banks of the Mississippi. 
Her western population being something more than nominal, 
had refused to be included in the cession, and after an 
unsuccessful effort to form themselves into a separate state 
under the name of Frankland,^ had been compelled to return 
to their old allegiance. 

The development of the western country was one of the 
great dreams of Washington's life. He foresaw the import- 
ance of these possessions at a time when few men were 
willi-ng to give them much thought. They were the fruits 
of the great policy of the elder Pitt, in which, as a youthful 
soldier, Washington had borne a distinguished part. What 
the Treaty of Paris in 17G3 had secured to Britain, another 
Treaty of Paris in 1783 had divided between Britain and 
the victorious colonists. This rich inheritance it was his 
fixed determination to weld into the confederacy. By speech 
and correspondence he had pressed the matter upon his 
fellow-citizens even before peace had actually been signed; 

^ History, iii. p. 121. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 139 

and throughout the whole of the turbulent period which a.d. 
ensued he continued to ure^e the need for development, and 1785-1786 

° . r » ^^_ 28-29 

for the firm attachment of this estate to the rest of the 

Union. When these means proved inadequate, being a 

practical man, he founded a joint-stock company to open 

up communications. 

Even the peculiar advantages of this territory appeared 
to Washington to contain some not inconsiderable dangers. 
The splendid waterways of the Mississippi and its tributary 
streams were not an unmixed advantage, seeing that the 
mouth and the lower reaches were in the hands of Spain, who 
also extended a shadowy claim to the whole western bank 
and to the unknown region beyond. The easiest course for 
the new settlers was to drift their produce down the broad 
current to New Orleans, and the dread of Washington was 
lest this tendency might induce 'a habit of trade' with a 
foreign power ; an intimacy and a mutual interest which in 
the end might lead to a detachment from the Union. 
Consequently, at a time when the chief matter of political 
anxiety with regard to the western lands was the menace 
by Spain against the free navigation of the Mississippi, he 
was more concerned to develop the natural trade routes from 
east to west by clearing the waterways of the James, the 
Potomac, and the Ohio, and by the construction of a system 
of supplementary canals. 

It was for the adjustment of certain differences, and to 
procure the co-operation of the two states, whose sympathies 
had already been enlisted in this enterprise, that the meet- 
ing took place at Mount Yernon in March 1785. As the 
delegates had come together in a businesslike and peaceful 
spirit, other matters of mutual interest were brought tactfully 
under discussion — the advantages of a uniform currency and 
system of duties; the need for a general cohesion and mutual 
support among the confederated states. Under the spell of 



140 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1786 a great character prejudice was for the moment forgotten, 
' ^' and invitations were issued to Pennsylvania and Delaware to 
join in the discussion. But good feeling expanded even 
further — once started on the course of reason it was easy 
to urge it forward — and it was ultimately decided to pro- 
pose to all the thirteen states that in the autumn of the 
following year (1786) they should meet at Annapolis to 
discuss the whole commercial situation. 

Before this date arrived the paper panacea had been 
pricked, and Shays's rebellion was in full blast. In addition, 
the disputes with Spain about the free navigation of the 
Mississippi had come to a head. Threats of the confiscation 
of American ships presuming to enter the lower waters had 
been followed up by action. The southern states were in 
a flame of indignation. Their northern neighbours were 
apathetic. The problems of the Mississippi did not touch 
their interests at any vital point. On the contrary, they 
desired nothing so much as a good understanding with 
Spain, for they had hopes that in this quarter their court- 
ship might not be despised, and that a commercial treaty 
might at last be signed. All this pother about free naviga- 
tion for the sake of a few backwoodsmen seemed to them to 
indicate a lack of the sense of proportion. Jay at the 
Foreign Office took this view of the matter, and, as a com- 
promise, advised Congress to consent to close the river to 
free navigation for a period of twenty-five years.^ The 
southern states were in no mood for such concessions, and 
threatened that if Jay's proposal were accepted they would 
secede and return to the British allegiance. The New- 
England states, with an equal vivacity, threatened secession 
unless the recommendation were confirmed. The crisis was 
averted only by an indefinite postponement; New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island siding with the South. 

' History, iii. pp. 101, 104-5. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 141 

The convention of Annapolis, though it met in stirring A.D. 1786 
times, was but a thin congregation. Only five of the states 
appointed commissioners who attended ; four appointed 
commissioners who did not attend, and the remaining four 
did not appoint commissioners at all. The last class in- 
cluded Maryland, which had joined in issuing the invitation; 
but what was more than all the rest. New York was repre- 
sented by Hamilton, and Hamilton ruled the convention. 

It is something of a shock to the finer feelings that this 
assemblage, the beginning of the movement which cul- 
minated in the constitution, should have been convoked 
for the consideration of purely material things ; for the 
discussion of inland navigation, of customs duties and the 
currency. The folly of distracted effort was gradually 
making itself apparent. The advantages of combination 
were beginning to be dimly surmised. The farce of fiscal 
independence was played out. Even the stiff-necked citizens 
of New York had come to entertain doubts whether their 
private interests as a trading state would not be better 
served in the long run by the pursuit of the prosperity of 
the whole, than by a narrow policy of individual gain at the 
moment. It is notable that the immediate cause of the 
constitutional compact is to be sought, not in the higher 
spheres of political necessity, but in the practical needs of 
business men. Trade necessities, and these alone, were 
the occasion of their meeting and the purpose of their 
deliberations. By these ' sordid bonds ' a loose confederation 
was in due time to be lashed together into such a union as 
the world had never seen. 

In the short session at Annapolis it became evident 
to the delegates, under the searching analysis of Hamilton, 
that the only remedy for the evils affecting trade must be 
looked for in broad constitutional changes which their 
limited commissions gave them no authority to discuss. 



142 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1786 Under the influence of his vigorous spirit the convention 
^"^■^^ had a remarkable result; for out of its unanimous con- 
clusion that it could do nothing great things came to pass. 

Hamilton drafted an address which, after much modifica- 
tion, was adopted. It was his policy and habit to overshoot 
the mark ; to compel the weaker brethren to consider plans 
that were too heroic for their natural timidity, confident 
that the diminished fabric would stiU be of an ampler pro- 
portion than if it had arisen from mean foundations. This 
document set out precisely the object of the convention — 
" To take into consideration the trade and commerce of the 
' United States; to consider how far a uniform system in 
' their commercial intercourse and regulations might be 
' necessary to their common interest and permanent har- 

* mony ; and to report to the several states such an Act 

* relative to this great object as, when unanimously ratified 

* by them, would enable the United States in Congress 
' assembled effectually to provide for the same," ^ New Jersey, 
he pointed out, had given a more liberal commission to her 
delegates, empowering them to discuss not only these, but 
'other important matters.' A complete agreement among 
the thirteen states, which was the chief object of the 
meeting, was precluded by the mean attendance. "Your 
' commissioners," therefore, " did not conceive it advis- 
' able to proceed to the business of their mission"; but 
they place upon the record " their earnest and unanimous 

* wish that speedy measures may be taken to effect a 

* general meeting of the states in a future convention for the 
' same, and such other purposes as the situation of public 

* ajffairs may be found to require." ^ They submit " that 

* the idea of extending the powers of their deputies to other 
' subjects than those of commerce . . . was an improvement 

* on the original plan, and will deserve to be incorporated 

1 Works, i. pp. 335-6. 2 m^^ ^ p^ 337, 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 143 

' into that of a future convention. They are the more A.D. 1786 
' naturally led to this conclusion as, in the course of their ^'^" ^^ 
' reflections on the subject, they have been induced to think 
' that the power of regulating trade is of such comprehensive 
' extent, and will enter so far into the general system of the 

* Federal Government, that to give it efficacy, and to obviate 
' questions and doubts concerning its precise nature and 
' limits, may require a correspondent adjustment of other 
' parts of the federal system." ^ The address concluded by 
recommending that " the states by which they have been 
' respectively delegated would concur themselves, and use 
' their endeavours to procure the concurrence of the other 
' states in the appointment of commissioners to meet at 

* Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, to take 
' into consideration the situation of the United States, to 
' devise such further provisions as shall appear to them 
' necessary to render the constitution of the Federal Govern- 
' ment adequate to the exigencies of the Union" ^ 

Congress was fatuously indignant at such a usurpation : ^ 
indulged in hair-splitting arguments upon legal rights and 
the lack of authority in any body save themselves to 
summon a representative council. But things had come 
into too bad a pass for the groans of Congress to produce 
much impression upon the minds of men. Amidst riots, 
rebellions and threats of secession, on the very brink 
of a war with Spain, people were in no mood to pay much 
heed to the loquacity of angry impotence. Congress, 
deprived of all hope of a sufficient revenue by the con- 
tumacious wrangling of New Jersey and New York,* had 
merely a Hobson's choice — they might consent to the con- 
vention or they might forbid it, but whatsoever course they 
adopted the convention would nevertheless take place. 

1 Works, i. p. .337. 2 j^i^ -^ p 339^ 

3 History, iii. p. 236. * Ibid. pp. 175-8. 



144 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D, 1786 Considerations of dignity seemed to point on tlie whole to 
■^^" "^ acquiescence ; but while the matter was still under debate 
Virginia chose General Washington as one of her delegates 
to the proposed meeting at Philadelphia. The tide was 
running in over the flats of the firth, and a Congress with 
any care for its popularity, had to gallop before it ventre a 
terre. 

The convention of Annapolis was the turning-point. The 
reaction which had ensued when the war was ended, and 
independence for the time being assured, had spent its main 
effort. 

The removal of a common danger had let loose at once, as 
Hamilton had prophesied, all the forces of disintegration. 
States had clamoured about their particular sovereignties. 
Individuals, in a needless panic lest union should mean 
some abatement in the pre-eminence of mediocrity, flung 
all their influence into the centrifugal movement. Mean 
spirits, hating the heroic and incredulous of magnanimity, 
stirred up suspicion against those for whose services 
gratitude was the only recompense possible or welcome. 
Washington aimed at the title of king; Hamilton at the 
reversion of the monarchy. No figment was too gross 
for belief. 

Providence, which is on the side of the big battalions, 
appears to be also on the side of the great idea. Visions 
that were at once noble in their proportions and consistent 
within themselves have played a notable part in the history 
of mankind ; but there is this difficulty, arising out of the 
conditions of the particular time, that a vision is wholly 
without force to move a generation which is unprepared to 
apprehend its meaning. The virtue of the seer who produces 
a practical effect upon the fortunes of any nation is not that 
he sees some image of surpassing splendour which no one 
else has seen, but rather that he sees clearly something 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 145 

which a large number of his fellow- men have already seen A.D. 1786 
dimly. His merit is that he removes a few of the wrappings ^'^' ^^ 
which conceal the pattern of life, and discloses a design 
which though half suspected had lain till that time hidden. 
The result is a vivid presentment, some startling re-arrange- 
ment of familiar things, which contains the promise of relief 
from an intolerable suffering, or adds a sudden value to life 
by giving a nobler purpose to human endeavour, Michael 
Angelo has said that he already saw in the unhewn block a 
statue which to duller eyes remained invisible until his 
chisel had removed the flakes of marble which concealed it. 
The fabric of a vision which worketh great marvels is the 
experience of common men. Nothing is novel or surprising 
in the material, but only in the plan. When once an idea 
of this order has taken possession of the spirit of a nation, it 
will not be overcome by criticism. The forensic method, 
argument and rhetoric undirected by a master thought, can 
never hope to hold it back. For an idea can only be fought 
by an idea. It is not sufficient that it should be crushed by 
disproof; it must be expelled by some more powerful vision 
which usurps its place. 

The inherent truth or falseness of such a vision does not 
seem to afford any measure of the effect it may produce 
upon human institutions. What is shown in an alluring 
picture may be incapable of achievement. Facts may be 
distorted in the crystal until they become mere phantoms. 
The motive and the goal of a great convulsion may be 
nothing better than mirage. Two things only appear to be 
essential to its potency — some exceptional gift of present- 
ment in the seer, and an eager predisposition on the part of 
men. The same strange expectancy, which greets the Mahdi 
or Messiah, met Eousseau more than halfway, overwhelming 
him in gratitude. His gospel immediately entered into a 
place in men's hearts that was empty. He saw beautiful 

E 



146 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 17S6 things; he saw them clearly and believed them to be irue; 
and although to a large extent his vision was pure fantasy, its 
triumph was almost as swift and facile as his dream. There 
are some rare occasions scattered about in history where, as 
if by a common impulse, humanity has paused at its work, 
and, leaning upon its spade, has looked round bewildered by 
a sudden hopefulness ; aware dimly that something fortunate 
has happened, that a new man has appeared in the world, 
and that he is a friend. 

Of all men who have sought to benefit their fellows by a 
change in the old order, Hamilton and Rousseau are probably 
the most opposite in character and aims. Hamilton was a 
man in a world of men, and the affairs of the world he 
lived in were to him an open book. The counters of his 
fancy were not shadows, but real people, real motives, and 
real things. His labour in accomplishment was severe, and, 
by comparison, slow ; for a vision that is free and careless 
has an advantage over one that is burdened and hampered 
by the whole fabric of society. Rousseau, lying under a tree 
beside the road to Vincennes on a hot summer's afternoon, 
'in an unspeakable agitation,' and Hamilton, meditating 
from day to day, as he struggled cheerfully and laboriously 
with the correspondence of General Washington, had little 
in common except the divine gift of revelation. Each beheld 
an immeasurable and splendid prospect, and what he saw he 
believed with an intensity and an unwavering faith that no 
logic could shake. To each his vision seemed to be the 
firmest truth that life contained. Neither the knowledge of 
new facts nor the experience of changing conditions ever 
raised a doubt or provoked a conflict in their minds, but like 
well-disciplined reserves swung swiftly into line, as if such 
reinforcement in the general movement had been from the 
first foreseen and preordained. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 147 

CHAPTEK VI 

The Convention of Philadelphia 

The Convention of Philadelphia was summoned for the 14th A.D. 1787 
of May 1787. In spite of the distracted condition of public ^'^- ^^ 
affairs, the arrival of the delegates was marked by no in- 
decent haste. It was not until the 25th that a quorum of 
seven states was assembled. All were ultimately repre- 
sented, with the exception of Rhode Island, which held 
aloof in ridiculous isolation. Of sixty-five delegates who 
were appointed, ten never attended. The final draft of the 
constitution was signed on the 17th of September by only 
thirty-nine delegates, and out of the total number only 
forty- two were then in attendance. 

The sessions were held in private, and General Washing- 
ton presided. No reports were issued of the debates, which, 
from the notes and correspondence of Madison, Yates and 
others who were present, appear to have been conducted 
with great vivacity, and to have been influenced, not merely 
by strong convictions, but by violent prejudice. Neverthe- 
less, by virtue of the secrecy of the proceedings, speeches 
were addressed mainly to the point, and but little to the 
gallery. It is impossible to overestimate the advantages 
of privacy in such an undertaking. When at last the 
constitution emerged it was a complete thing; to be 
judged by the nation, for whose salvation it was intended 
to provide, as an organism, and not as a series of inde- 
pendent propositions. 

The use and the misuse of popular judgment have been 
subjects of much dispute among wise men from the be- 
ginnings of society. Popular judgment is a sound but 
rough instinct, impatient of diplomacy, unfit for adjust- 



148 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1787 ment, and incapable of compromise. These are the func- 
• tions of individual men, meeting inside closed doors, and 
if their work is to be of the best, it must be left undis- 
tracted by a running commentary of criticism and applause, 
by incitements to combat and appeals for consideration. 
The elimination of the partisan is of the highest importance, 
for the need in such a case is of negotiators, and champions 
of all varieties are a curse. The wider the audience, the 
harder for good feeling to be maintained and for good sense 
to conquer. Even in those days of slower publicity, the 
Convention of Philadelphia would hardly have succeeded in 
accomplishing its work had it been beaten upon day after 
day by a well-informed public opinion and a patriotic press. 

The first labour of the Convention was to settle the 
foundation upon which the Union should be built up. Was 
it to be, as in the past, a confederation or league of states, 
or was it to be a fusion of men into a nation ? 

Its second labour was to draft a constitution that 
should rightly give effect to the principle which had been 
agreed upon. 

In both stages the part played by Hamilton was powerful 
rather than conspicuous. ' He had not great tact,' it has 
been said of him, ' but he set his foot contemptuously to 
work the treadles of slower minds.'^ The criticism is not 
entirely just, for contemptuous calculation is a quality that 
belongs to calmer natures. Moreover, in great matters he 
had something which is closely akin to tact ; a knowledge 
of the dangers arising from his own eager and impetuous 
temper; a power of self-restraint where the argument was 
more safely left to a more conciliatory spokesman. His 
intervention, when he deemed the occasion favourable, was 
on the heroic scale; but even in the earlier debates he 
was an infrequent speaker, not only as compared with 

1 Schouler, History of the United States under the Constitution, i. p. 25. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 149 

Madison and Randolph, but also with others of the second A.D. 1787 
rank. ^^-30 

The importance of Hamilton's influence upon events at 
this period is missed if we attempt to measure it either by 
his speeches upon great occasions or by his writings. His 
pamphlets had borne fruit, his orations resounded in the 
ears of men ; but his most effective weapon was the private 
conference. The Convention did not meet until near mid- 
summer, but early in the spring the federal Congress came 
together in New York, and many of its members were 
already nominated delegates to the assembly that was to 
consider the constitution at Philadelphia. Hamilton spared 
no pains to prepare the ground. He was not one of those 
statesmen who make their rare, stately appearances in a 
dramatic arrangement of lights and slow music. His great- 
ness was as confident and humane as that of Rabelais himself. 
It did not fear the familiar encounter, or the good-natured 
match of wits across the bare mahogany. He loved society, 
and rejoiced to meet his enemy in any gate. His house was 
open to all men without distinction of politics. His hospi- 
tality was splendid in its simplicity and kindliness. Men were 
put off their guard by his wit and gaiety. They were dis- 
armed by his enthusiasm. His eloquence took them prisoners. 
The power of his intellect was hardly suspected under the 
ambush of his extraordinary charm. It is even claimed for 
him that Madison^ was his convert; and judging that 
eminent man by his past record and his subsequent career, 
it is difficult to account for the steadfast course of his 
endeavours during the Convention upon any other hypo- 
thesis than that some more powerful nature had for the 
time being cast a generous spell over his timid and grudging 
disposition. 

When the basis was at length a settled matter, Hamilton 

» History, iii. pp. 239, 303, 323. 



150 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1787 ceased from all public speaking, and even upon two occa- 
^'^' ^^ sions returned to New York to attend to professional 
matters.^ It has been alleged by his enemies that he was 
mortified by the rejection of his own plan, and by his 
apologists that, as his vote was nullified by the opposition 
of his two colleagues from New York, his close attendance 
would have been to no purpose. The real reason was that 
by this time the power of his ideas was secure enough in 
the minds of his party for it to be left without his presence 
to work out the details of the constitution. 

Four days after a quorum of states had assembled, the 
Virginia Plan was introduced by Randolph. Its main prin- 
ciple implied a revolution. Government, to be effective, 
must act directly on its subjects as individual men. To this 
end it must be fully clothed in powers, not merely by 
the unambiguous phrases of a constitution, but also by 
the opinion of a united people. It was not sufficient 
that its authority should be defined beyond a doubt ; but 
further, that the men who obeyed its laws and supphed its 
revenues should feel their submission was rendered, not to 
some remote tyranny or committee of oppressive rivals, but 
to a government that was indeed their own. The essential 
condition of popular affection and awe could be secured by 
one means alone. The loyal support which had hitherto 
been lacking would only be possible if the government 
rested upon election by the people, and if, between the value 
attaching to the votes of all citizens throughout the Union, 
there was a rough equality. Election by the separate states 
must cease ; for clearly there could be no approach to equality 
if a community of 70,000 free inhabitants had the same 
power in the Union as one containing 700,000. Population, 
therefore, whether tempered or not by the contribution of 
revenue, was the basis of the Virginia proposals. 

1 History, iii. pp. 317, 322, 329. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 151 

The machinery of the constitution was to consist of an a.D. 1787 
upper and a lower house, elected by the people. The executive ^^' ^^ 
government was placed in the hands of a single man, to be 
chosen by this legislature. This governor or president was 
to hold office for a short term, was to be removable only by 
impeachment and conviction, and was not to be re-eligible. 
The judges of the supreme court were likewise to be chosen 
by the legislature, which had powers to create such inferior 
federal courts as might be required. 

The ideal of the Virginia Plan and of the national party 
was a union of the people and not a league of states. The 
ideal of the opposite party was precisely the reverse. They 
cared nothing for the equality of the citizens, everything for 
the equality of the states. On June 15, after prolonged 
debate on Randolph's resolutions, the New Jersey Plan was 
submitted to the Convention by Patterson. His proposals 
were put forward avowedly for the protection of the smaller 
states against their more powerful neighbours. His chief 
concern was the pride and dignity of thirteen separate 
nations, which required that no distinctions should be created 
between the power and status of the contracting parties. 
The logic of this policy was anti-democratic, since the unit 
which it considered was not a man ; nor even a particular 
race or breed of men; but a mere boundary, always artificial, 
and in many cases an accident. The Convention as a whole 
was certainly conspicuous by its lack of any enthusiasm for 
democracy ; but the delegates who supported the doctrine of 
State Rights carried distrust of the people to an extreme 
which is remarkable not only in the light of modern de- 
velopments, but of what happened only a few years later. 
The Democratic party was then compounded by the genius 
of Jefferson out of a sheer contradiction ; for the ideas most 
diametrically opposed in principle were those of State 
Rights and the Rights of Man. 



152 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1787 The New Jersey proposals were respectful to Congress. 
They aimed at strengthening in some particulars, but in 
principle maintaining, the existing arrangements. Their 
object was a binding alliance between sovereign states. 
They were utterly opposed to the idea of a nation. They 
contemplated a single house of delegates, voting by states. 
The executive was to consist of a council chosen by 
this legislature, but removable by the hostile vote of a 
majority of the state governments. The supreme court was 
to be appointed in a similar manner; but there was no 
power to constitute any inferior tribunals. 

A plan like this could never be accepted, for it provided 
no cure for the evils that had brought the Convention 
together. Its fatal defect was the same lack of power which 
had made the original Congress impotent during the war 
and contemptible after peace had been declared. For it was 
impossible to preserve the sovereignties of the various states 
without denying to Congress any direct power upon in- 
dividual men. If the central government was restricted 
to an indirect authority which could only operate through 
the state legislatures, it could only coerce at second-hand. 
In any case of recalcitrancy the procedure would be cum- 
brous and unworkable. The federal council would find itself 
obliged in such a case to direct the local government to 
compel the individual; and if the local government, for 
any reason, or upon any pretext, should refuse, the remedy 
would be the coercion of a state, which is not a constabu- 
lary business, but civil war. 

On the other hand, it was urged with great eloquence that 
a reformed Congress, acting through articles of confedera- 
tion, now most solemnly confirmed, revised, corrected and 
enlarged, would have upon its side a very powerful senti- 
ment, and would exercise a prodigious influence. But Wash- 
ington, who in his quiet mind always saw the big objects 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 153 

clearly, had already settled that argument for ever. 'Infiu- A.D. 1787 
ence is not government.' Sentiment is no adequate bond ^ 
for a nation. 

On the 18th of June, three days after the introduction of 
the New Jersey plan, Hamilton submitted his own proposals 
to the Convention. This famous statement occupied five 
hours in delivery, and by all accounts was an achievement 
far overtopping all other speeches made at the Convention in 
force of reasoning, in courage and in eloquence. Unfortu- 
nately we have to estimate its quality at second-hand, for no 
adequate report remains to us. His own notes are methodical, 
but a mere skeleton or list of points to guide the speaker in 
the order of discussion.^ The argument is nowhere opened 
out, and of the style and force which counted for so much 
in the effect upon those who listened, no trace remains 
under his own hand. The reports or notes that were taken 
by Madison ^ and Yates ^ are not only condensed but im- 
perfect. They do not cover more than a small portion of the 
ground. The longer of them would occupy barely a column 
and a half of the Times, while a verbatim report of the 
speech itself would probably have filled about twenty 
columns. Hamilton was an ample speaker; certainly not 
verbose, but exhaustive of the facts and copious in illustra- 
tion. His style does not lend itself easily to abridgment. 

" He was obliged to declare himself unfriendly to both 
' plans. He was particularly opposed to that from New 
' Jersey, being fully convinced that no amendment of the 
' confederation leaving the states in possession of their 
' sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose." ^ People 
had questioned the powers of the Convention to propose 
anything beyond a mere amendment of the existing system ; 
but "we owed it to our country to do, in this emergency, 

» Works, i. pp. 370-378. ^ /j^-^ pp 381-393. ^ j^i^^ pp, 393.403. 

* Madison's Report, Works, i. p. 381. 



154 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1787 ' whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The 
^'^- ^^ ' states send us here to provide for the exigencies of the 
' union. To rely on and propose any plan not adequate to 
' these exigencies, merely because it was not clearly within 
' our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the 
' end." ^ Having swept aside this plea of obstruction, he 
proceeded to examine and condemn the existing situation 
in terms and upon principles with which we are already 
familiar after a study of his previous writings. The esprit 
de corps of the various states had proved hostile to any 
superior government, and this principle was ineradicable, 
seeing that it was founded on human nature. The love of 
power in mediocrities, the ambitions of demagogues, and the 
local attachment of the people to their particular legisla- 
tures, set up a plain and obvious opposition which nothing 
could remove save a power in the central government to 
operate directly upon its subjects. If the weapons of 
coercion of the people were left in the hands of the states 
by their titular master, mastery would pass with the 
weapons, though the title might remain as an empty form. 
For coercion of a sovereign state was impossible by a mere 
abstraction calling itself the central government. The 
practical means were wholly wanting — armies and supplies. 
And even if these could be brought into existence, the 
remedy "amounts to war between the parties. Foreign 
' powers will not be idle spectators. They will interpose ; 
' the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the union 
' will ensue." ^ A powerful influence, also, not necessarily 
amounting to actual corruption, was on the side of the 
states against the central power — the gift of places, the 
dispensation of honours and emoluments. These forces 
made a continuance of the existing system an impossibility, 
and the New Jersey Plan, which aimed at conserving and 

1 Madison's Report, Works, i. p. 382. ' Ibid. i. p. 384. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 155 

perpetuating the present institutions, should therefore be A.D. 1787 
utterly discarded. ^^- ^^ 

The complete extinction of the states would have 
simplified the problem and would have been productive of 
a great economy ; but such a measure, however desirable in 
itself, was out of the question. Hamilton did not propose a 
revolution on so grand a scale, realising that the sentiments 
of the people made it altogether impracticable. Subordinate 
authorities and jurisdictions would still be necessary under 
the strongest government, and the state legislatures might 
well be used for this purpose. 

He despaired " that a republican government could be 

* established over so great an extent. ... In my private 
' opinion, I have no scruple in declaring, supported as I am 
' by so many of the wise and good, that the British Govern- 
' ment is the best in the world ; and that I doubt much 

* whether anything short of it will do in America." ^ He 
quoted the opinion of Necker that " it is the only Govern- 
' ment in the world which unites public strength with 
' individual security." 

To Hamilton the term ' repubhc ' stood for something 
different from the meaning attaching to the word to-day. 
His pattern of a republic was an assemblage in the market- 
place — the direct and turbulent practice of Athens and 
Rome. In 1787 it was this idea which arose most readily 
to the minds of men. The credit of republican institutions 
in the modern sense had yet to be established; and it is 
necessary to bear in mind that even at the present day 
the respectability of this form of government rests mainly, if 
not entirely, upon the success and stability of the American 
constitution. When Hamilton announced his distrust of a 
republic and his preference for a limited monarchy, he was 
using language as it was understood by his audience. He 

1 Madison's Report, Works, i. pp. 388, 389. 



156 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1787 could not foresee the history of the next hundred years ; but 
^"^^ ^^ had he foreseen it he would have claimed with perfect justice 
that the success of the United States was based upon that 
monarchical element which he had spent such great efforts 
in establishing. Throughout the whole discussion the terms 
are used by both sides with a certain degree of ambiguity 
— sometimes as epithets of abuse, at others as quiet words 
of science, Hamilton himself speaks of a monarchy upon 
occasions as if it were synonymous with a despotism, a 
republic as an equivalent for a democracy of the market- 
place; while upon others the adjective monarchical is an 
epithet of praise, implying merely a salutary strength in 
the executive, and the word republic is innocently employed 
as the title of the proposed union. 

It is also worthy of attention that his idea of the British 
constitution which was held up for admiration is oddly un- 
Uke the system under which we find ourselves at the begin- 
ning of the twentieth century. It was not even a correct 
picture of the facts as they stood in 1787. What he had in 
his mind was the British constitution as George the Third 
had tried hard to make it.^ The king's policy working to 
increase the strength of the executive power had, as a minor 
accident of his policy, provoked the War of Independence. 
With the disastrous result of that struggle his attempt had 
failed. To a large extent his failure was due, as Hamilton 
saw, to a lack of central authority and to the obstacles that 
were created by an opposition not yet reduced to its proper 
functions in the state — an opposition whose sympathy and 
encouragement from the beginning to the end of the war 
had strengthened the hands of the rebellious colonists 
against the British king. His Majesty's opposition had been 
of great service to the rebellious colonists, but the danger of 
adopting such an institution was sufficiently obvious. The 
^ Sir Henry Maine, Popular Oovermnent, pp. 212-13. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 157 

aim of the American statesman was to create a system which A.D. 1787 
should be free from the defects which George the Third ^^-^o 
had laboured vainly to remove. It is necessary to under- 
stand, not merely that Hamilton and many of the wisest 
men engaged in the Convention of Philadelphia, including 
the great Washington himself, held these views with a deep 
sincerity, but, further, that their object was attacked by the 
bulk of the opposite party not because of its conflict with 
the principles of a democracy, but because of its antagonism 
to the theory of State Rights. 

Hamilton's ideal was, in fact, an elective monarchy, and 
his guiding political principle a balance of authority. " Give 
' all power to the many, and they will oppress the few. Give 
' all power to the few, and they will oppress the many. Both, 
' therefore, ought to have the power, that each may defend 
' itself against the other. To the want of this check we owe 
' our paper-money, instalment laws, etc. To the proper ad- 
' justment of it the British owe the excellence of their con- 
' stitution. Their House of Lords is a most noble institution. 
' Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient 
' interest, by means of their property, in being faithful to the 
' national interest, they form a permanent barrier against 
' every pernicious innovation, whether attempted on the part 
' of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary senate will 
' have firmness enough to answer that purpose. ... As to 
' the executive, it seemed that no good one could be estab- 
' lished on republican principles. Was not this giving up the 
' merits of the question, for can there be a good government 
' without a good executive ? " ^ 

" Having made these observations, I will read to the com- 

* mittee a sketch of a plan which I should prefer to either of 

* those under consideration. I am aware that it goes beyond 
' the ideas of most members. But will such a plan be 

1 Madison's Report, Works, i. pp. 389, 390. 



158 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A. D. 1787 ' adopted out of doors? In return I would ask, will tlie 
iET. 30 , people adopt the other plan ? At present they will adopt 
' neither. But I see the union dissolving, or already dis- 
' solved. I see evils operating in the states which must soon 
' cure the people of their fondness for democracies. I see 
' that a great progress has been already made, and is still 
' going on, in the public mind. I think, therefore, that the 
' people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices ; 
' and whenever that happens, they will themselves not be 
' satisfied at stopping where the plan of Mr. Randolph would 
' place them, but be ready to go as far at least as he pro- 

* poses. I do not mean to offer the paper I have sketched 

* as a proposition to the committee. It is meant only to 
' give a more correct view of my ideas, and to suggest the 

* amendments which I would propose to the plan of Mr. 

* Randolph, in the proper steps of its future discussion." ^ 

Hamilton's plan may be summarised in a few words. The 
legislature was to consist of two chambers — an Assembly 
elected by the people for three years, and a Senate elected 
by electors chosen for that purpose by the people. The 
Senate was to hold office for life or good behaviour. The 
supreme executive power was to be placed in the hands of a 
Governor, elected in the same manner and upon the same 
terms as the Senate, who should have the right to negative 
all laws passed by the legislature, and who should hold the 
office of commander-in-chief of all the forces of the Re- 
public. With the advice and approbation of the Senate he 
should be empowered to make treaties and to appoint all 
the officers of the state, and the appointment of the cabinet 
was to be in his hands without control. The Senate should 
have the sole power of declaring war. The judges of the 
supreme court were likewise to hold their offices for life or 
good behaviour, and power was to be given to the legislature 

1 Madison's Report, Works, i. pp. 392, 393. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 159 

to create inferior federal courts in every state. The gover- a.d. 1787 
nor, the senators and all officers of the Republic were to be ^'^- ^^ 
liable to impeachment before the supreme court. Laws 
passed by the state legislatures, contrary to the constitu- 
tion or laws of the United States, were to be void, and for 
greater security the governors of each state, who were to 
be appointed by the central government, should have a 
negative upon all local legislation. No state was to main- 
tain any warlike force on land or sea. 

It is abundantly clear from Hamilton's own words that 
he entertained no hope of carrying his plan ; but equally it 
is beyond a doubt that he sincerely held it to be better than 
either of the others. To the New Jersey principles he was 
utterly opposed. He accepted the main proposition of the 
Virginia scheme, but desired to extend it further in the 
direction of strength and permanency. His own proposals 
were brought forward in no unfriendly spirit, but as a 
reinforcement to the movement led by Madison and Ran- 
dolph, with whom he was on terms of confidence and 
alliance. His deliberate purpose, as at Annapolis, was to 
overshoot the mark; to set up an ideal which should to 
some extent compel the minds of men, even in their rejec- 
tion of it ; to terrify the champions of a loose confederation 
with the formidable aspect of an alternative which was 
vastly more disconcerting. At a somewhat later date he 
drafted a complete constitution upon the basis of his own 
proposals, and handed it to Madison for his guidance in the 
subsequent discussion.^ It is worth while to compare it 

^ Works, i. pp. 347-369. The point whether Hamilton read his final 
scheme to the Convention, or read only a skeleton of it, is not without 
doubt. Madison's report of the proceedings is the main authority. He out- 
lived all the members of the Convention, and when he published his report, 
was beyond contradiction. J. C. Hamilton accuses him of suppressing 
certain things, and garbling others, in order to justify the outrageous 
attacks made by himself and his friends upon Hamilton during the first 
administration, when their main charge was his alleged disloyalty to the 



160 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1787 witli the actual constitution of the United States, for there 
Mt. 30 ^j,Q £q^ more conspicuous examples in history of the maxim 
that when people are struggUng towards a decision the man 
who will take the pains to think out and elaborate his own 
plan in a clear consistency is apt to reap a reward entirely 
beyond his hopes, in the domination of his drilled ideas over 
the undisciplined aspirations of his enemies. 

The struggle was long and bitter between the Virginia and 
the New Jersey Plans. At times it seemed beyond possibility 
to avoid a deadlock which would have broken up the Con- 
vention. In the end there was a compromise. The legisla- 
ture was to consist of two chambers, of which the Assembly 
was to be chosen by the people upon a basis of population, 
the Senate by the states upon the principle of equality 
among themselves. In the former, therefore, the national 
principle was to prevail, and in the latter the federal. The 
voting in both branches of the legislature was to be by the 
representatives and senators in their individual capacities, 
and not according to the method of the old Congress. The 
effect of the compromise was to concede certain powers to 
the central government; not, as Hamilton would have wished, 
to give all powers, except such as were expressly reserved to 
the state legislatures. Disappointed in this, his whole 
influence was exerted to make the intention of union clear, 
while keeping the conferred authority vague, indefinite, un- 
trammelled and unlimited. He foresaw that administration 
could afterwards proceed to discover powers that were im- 
plied, though not precisely designated. Although the 
frontal attack had failed, there was still a way round. 

Republic. The matter is not of great importance except to persons who 
are interested in the psychology of Madison, for no one believes those 
charges to-day, and it is hard to imagine that any one but the blindest 
partisans believed them at the time. Young Hamilton also maintains that 
Madison had no right to take notes at all, far less to publish them, as such 
actions were contrary to the spirit and the letter of the arrangement for 
complete secrecy. Cf. History, iii. pp. 284-6, 301-2, 338. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 161 

It was alleged against Hamilton at the time, and after- A.D. 1787 
wards during his administration of the Treasury, incessantly ^'^' ^^ 
and with excessive bitterness, that he desired to establish 
royalty, and that at heart he was an aristocrat. There is 
no colour for the first charge, and there is no doubt of the 
second. Hamilton made no secret of his belief in the 
advantages of an aristocratic power in the commonwealth, 
or of his reasons for that belief. Apart altogether from the 
need of stability and of deliberate judgment, he was deeply 
conscious of the importance of honour in the history of 
nations ; and he was wise enough to grasp the truth that the 
honour of nations ought to be of a composite character, 
deriving its virtue out of the separate and peculiar virtues 
of every order. The people at large are ever eager to act upon 
a sudden emotion of justice, resentment, or pity ; ready to 
accept the plausible coherence of an ex parte statement. 
They are impatient of evidence, and wholly averse from the 
consideration of what may be urged upon the other side. 
The merchant classes, basing themselves upon contract, and 
conscientiously examining into the extent and nature of 
their rights under a bond, judging everything by that 
supreme test, assert confidently that there is no place for 
sentiment in business, and are full of a fine contempt for 
mere tradition. The lawyers bring everything to trial by 
arguments and precedents, interpreting the bond, advocating 
or questioning it with one eye on the immediate issue, the 
other upon some general principle of society. The people 
see national justice as good fellowship. The merchants see it 
as common-sense. The lawyers see it as law. There is some- 
thing beyond all this; not hostile to it, but different. It 
has received a variety of names, but none of them entirely 
suitable. The honour of a gentleman is perhaps nearest the 
mark ; the honour of a man whose position is secure, whose 
authority is acknowledged, who is neither concerned nor 

L 



162 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1787 interested in any struggle for pre-eminence. His own per- 
'^'^'^^ sonal dignity is the spring of his judgments, which are 
instinctive rather than reasoned. His opinions, like those 
of the people, are grounded on the feelings, but they are 
deeper and more constant. They may be contrasted 
with the sudden violence of popular sentiment as the 
current which flows underneath the waves. In addition, 
there is a touch of something conventional and fantastic. 
The parchment of the bond is less honoured than the spirit 
of it ; and while he is jealous, almost unreasonably and to 
extremes, of certain punctilios, there is often present to his 
mind a generous sympathy towards the motives of his 
opponent, and a lofty consideration for his feelings. As an 
element in a republic the honour of a gentleman is of at least 
as much importance as the precedents of the lawyer, the 
honesty of the merchant, or the enthusiasm of the people. 
But while in a swelling and triumphant democracy the 
three last named are always certain of a great influence, it is 
not the same with the first, which requires the support of 
some strong convention if it is to render effective service to 
the state. 

Hamilton was deeply concerned to make this element a 
force under the new constitution. His idea of a senate 
which, like the judges, should hold ofiice for life or good 
conduct, was founded in this sentiment. Though not 
hereditary, and although resting upon popular choice, it was 
to be frankly, and in the best sense, aristocratic. The class 
from which he desired to exact political service was not 
likely, in his opinion, to be willing every few years to 
submit themselves to the calumny and fluster of contested 
elections ; to canvass for votes and to court popularity. It is 
possible that his race and temperament had much to do 
with his view of this matter, but it is probable that his main 
reason lay in his experience gained in the conduct of the 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 163 

war, and in the founding of the constitution. We are con- A.D. 178/ 
scious of a strong current working throughout the war and • ^^ 
in the early years of the Republic always on the side of 
constancy and strong government — of the sustained and 
instinctive effort of a class, capable of cohesion and inured 
to responsibility. Behind Franklin, Madison, Jay, Jefferson, 
Gouverneur Morris, Randolph, Wilson and the other notable 
spokesmen and writers, was a powerful order that cared 
little for notoriety, but without whose silent and devoted 
leadership the dominion of King George the Third might 
never have been overthrown nor the Union of the States 
achieved. From this aristocracy of squires and planters 
Washington himself was sprung; and though circum- 
stances forced him to the utterance of words, he was a 
true type both in his natural silence and in his calm 
eflficiency. 

Hamilton failed. The Constitution of Philadelphia has 
proved itself to be of immense strength, but the principle 
of aristocracy has no part or credit in it. In the light of 
history we are forced to admit that Hamilton's lamentations 
appear exaggerated ; that his prophecies of disaster have not 
come true ; that the swing of democracy has so far been 
able to keep the balance of the state unaided. But ad- 
mitting so much, and even granting to American public 
virtue most of the excellence which its patriotic pane- 
gyrists have so lavishly claimed for it, it is still permissible 
to speculate whether it might not have stood even higher 
than it does in the opinion of the world had it possessed, 
in addition to its other components, that element which 
Hamilton struggled so hard and vainly to include. 

His eagerness to secure an element of aristocracy in the 
constitution of the United States was due much less to a 
love of aristocrats, or to any tenderness for their privileges, 
than to a conviction that it would prove a good bargain for 



164 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1787 the nation. His aim was economic. Popular government 
^'^' ^^ may secure at a cheap price the services of a large number 
of men in easy circumstances, of superior education, and 
with family traditions of loyal service to the state. If it is 
not willing to pay the price, it must rub along as best it may 
with the professional politician. The new Republic chose 
the latter alternative, while Britain, by a most fortunate 
obstinacy, adhered to the former. 

It is easy to deride the House of Lords, the vanity of 
titles and the custom of primogeniture. The philosopher, 
regarding only the value of a man across a dinner-table or 
in popular debate, easily justifies his derision. But there 
is a practical as well as an academic side to the matter, 
leading us to inquire further, if Britain has not gained much 
by her illogical disregard of the principles of natural selec- 
tion, and if the Republic has not lost much by a too 
reverent observance of the Rights of Man ? 

As a matter of logic the democratic argument is con- 
clusive ; as a matter of history it is nonsense. The principle 
of aristocracy in a popular government is a very practical 
device for making use of the upper classes. We use ours 
while the Americans waste theirs. Titles and primogenitur(3 
may be absurd, but the fact remains that the wealthiei 
classes in Britain recognise a public duty attaching to their 
position, while in the United States they do not. The 
tradition of the great English families, and of those whose 
ambition it is to become great, is service of the state in 
peace and war. The tradition of the great families in the 
Republic is as yet, in the nature of things, less defined ; but, 
so far as it may be judged by a foreigner, it seems for the 
most part unconcerned with the duties of government, and 
is tending more and more towards the acquisition of com- 
mercial influence upon a scale such as the world has never 
before seen. The public spirit of its wealthy citizens is 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 166 

measured by huge donatives rather than by loyal service. A.D. 1787 
They appear to entertain a cockney confidence that every ^'^' ^^ 
obligation can be discharged by the signing of a cheque. 
The conspicuous virtue in the one case is honour; in the 
other, enterprise and industry ; but if in a purely practical 
spirit we endeavour to compute the advantage to the state, 
everything is on the side of Britain, from the government 
of a parish to the councils of the nation. 



CHAPTER VII 

The Federalist 

The constitution had been framed at Philadelphia with _^ d, 
an admirable patience ; but there still remained the labour 1787-1788 

r 1-1 ■ . m, -1 P . -. ^T. 30-31 

01 persuading the nation to accept it. The draft m due 
course was reported to Congress, and by Congress the 
decision was referred to separate conventions in the thirteen 
states. As soon as nine had ratified the constitution, it 
was to be at once adopted by those states themselves and 
put in force. The delegates dispersed from Philadelphia in 
September 1787, and the ninth state confirmed the Union in 
June 1788. Between these two events lay a period which is 
remarkable, not merely for the success of its achievement, 
but also for the fact that it threw up as a by-product one of 
the great books of the world. 

The labouring constancy of Washington and Hamilton, 
aided in their work by the plagues arising from misrule, 
had ended the first period of the struggle for union at the 
Convention of Annapolis. They had then succeeded in 
awakening a powerful section of the people to the need 
for a national policy. They had inspired a hesitating 
world with confidence in its own instincts; had guided 



166 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. events and managed interests till the meaning of each 

1787-1788 QYQj^i a^nd i\^Q security of every interest were made to 
^T. 30-31 . . . . -^ '' 

point in one direction, and to produce and sustain the idea 

of an inexorable destiny barring every road save that alone 

which led to the desired goal. 

The work of the second period was done when the draft 
of the constitution was signed by the delegates at Phila- 
delphia. Their business had been to construct a system 
strong enough to fulfil the needs of the present, wide enough 
to admit those of the future. 

The third period was occupied in convincing the people of 
the various states that the reality which had been attained 
in the heat of debate and by the practice of concession, 
corresponded with their various and conflicting ideals ; that 
a document in matter-of-fact phrases, definite, precise, cold 
and formal was indeed a true translation into a practical 
shape of the vague but fervent spirit of their hearts. They 
had to be persuaded on the morning after marriage, that 
Leah was a bride no less desirable than Rachel. It was 
during this period, and while the state conventions were 
being held for the purpose of ratifying the constitution, that 
the Federalist ^ was written. 

It has been said, and probably with truth, that in every 
state there was, at the beginning of the agitation, a majority 
against the new constitution. To the friends of union its 
weakness was a disappointment. To the defenders of State 
Rights its usurpations appeared an outrage. But the alter- 

^ The word itself is a concession. Up till the compromise between the 
Virginia and the New Jersey plans the opposition was between the Nationalists 
(the party of Hamilton and Madison) and the Federalists (the party of State 
Rights). Satisfied with material victory, the former took the name of their 
opponents, but before twelve months had passed they became nearly as 
odious under the new title as they had been under the old one. The 
upholders of State Rights thereupon took the names at first of Beptiblicans, 
afterwards of Democrats. It is under the latter title that they are referred 
to throughout this essay. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 167 

native was nothing less than anarchy and dissolution, and A.D 

1787-1 

^T. 30-31 



against so menacing a combination there was everywhere an ^^^^ ^^^^ 



even larger preponderance, if the real issue could but be 
clearly stated. The object of the opposition was to confuse 
the actual choice. Its leaders were active and unscrupulous, 
strong in a ready-made party organisation of state legis- 
latures. The work remaining to be done was therefore 
harder than any that had yet been accomplished. 

" Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the 
' new constitution will have to encounter," Hamilton wrote 
in the first number of the Federalist, " may readily be dis- 
' tinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men 
' in every state, to resist all changes which may hazard a 
' diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of 
' the offices they hold under the state establishments ; and 
' the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will 
' either hope to aggrandise themselves by the confusions of 
' their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects 
' of elevation from the sub-division of the empire into several 
' partial confederacies, than from its union under one govern- 
' ment." To convert these two classes was impossible ; but 
' the honest errors of minds, led astray by preconceived 
'jealousies and fears,' ^ Hamilton considered it to be within 
the limits of human endeavours to remove. The attempt 
was made in the Federalist, one of the most remarkable of 
political documents. 

The idea of the work was Hamilton's. Something more, 
indeed, than merely the idea — the spirit of the whole enter- 
prise was his. It was his energy that carried the thing 
through, as it was his wisdom that had planned it; and 
without detracting from the deserved renown of his two 
contributors, the lion's share of the credit must rest with 
the creator. Out of eighty-five short essays, which appeared 

^ Worki, xi. p. 4. 



168 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. at intervals of a few days during the autumn and winter of 

1 7Q7_"| 7ftQ 

M 30 31 1'''87-1788, more than fifty were written by Hamilton him- 
self.^ Of the rest, the greater number were by Madison ; a 
few by Jay. The crowning merit of these papers, which 
were produced under great pressure — often while the 
printer's boy was waiting in the office^ — is that they suc- 
ceeded in accomplishing what they set out to accomplish. 
They were the greatest force that worked on men's minds 
to make them consent to the adoption of the constitution. 

It is difficult to bear in mind, as we read the vigorous 
pages of the Federalist, distinguished by their hopefulness 
no less than by their conviction, that Hamilton was by no 
means satisfied with the constitution. But his mind was 
of a practical cast. His military experiences had intensified 
his natural horror of schism and lukewarm co-operation; 
and in big things, at all events, magnanimity was a stronger 
force than any personal consideration. From the moment 
when he attached his signature to the Philadelphia draft he 
became its champion. He accepted it as a whole and with- 
out reserves. If in precise terms it did not achieve all he 
had hoped, he saw, nevertheless, that it contained huge 
possibilities. Courage and patience might still contrive to 
supply many of the omissions. As it realised many of his 
dearest aims, he received it in a spirit of wide compromise 
and wise opportunism, thrusting his preferences upon one 
side, and looking only to the gravest fact — that the chance 
of union was never likely to recur save as the outcome of 
a bloody war. 

The most striking difference between Hamilton and the 
constitution-makers of France a few years later is the absence 
of all illusions regarding the magic of a mere document. A 
constitution was to him but a skeleton ; and had it been put 



^ History, iii. p. 371, says sixty-five. 
2 Ibid. p. 370. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 169 

together by the wisest men, in the coolest hour, there would A.D. 

1787-1788 
^T. 30-31 



still have been no virtue in it until it was inspired with life. ' ^' 



Its strength lay not in the written words, but in the tradi- 
tion that was still to seek. The first administration would 
have greater powers in moulding the destinies of the nation 
than the whole Convention of Philadelphia voting unani- 
mously. For the title-deeds of all political authority are 
elastic. Courage will stretch them, and the process will 
appear inevitable; but with a timid possessor they will 
shrink into a feeble formula. In the one case the intention 
will ever override the words ; in the other even the words 
themselves, like teeth in old gums, will be useless for the 
lack of their natural support. 

The Federalist is pure advocacy, but it is the greatest 
and rarest advocacy, for it appears to the reader to be a 
reasoned judgment. Confident in their cause, the authors 
never shrink from a fair statement of opposite opinions ; so 
that, to the modern, its wisdom and justice are apt to 
obscure the amazing skill of the counsel who conducted the 
case. 

Hamilton had two aims — the adoption of the constitution, 
and its security. He sought to establish the first by an 
exhaustive explanation of the practical conveniences and 
advantages of the Philadelphia plan, by a full exposition of 
its merits, and by showing in contrast the existing paralysis, 
unsettlement and danger. But for the security of the new 
institutions it was necessary to prove also that they were 
founded upon broad and eternal principles, harmonious 
with the ideals of his countrymen. 

A self-respecting nation, as it stands at the cross-roads, 
will deliberate, demanding to be satisfied under both heads ; 
requiring to be shown clearly that its convenience will be 
well and promptly served ; asking, further, for full assurance 
that the remedy for present ills is not contrary to nature, or 



1787-1788 
Mt. 30-31 



170 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. likely to induce at a future time some morbid disaster. It 
occasionally happens that a political party is able to snatch a 
hurried decision on the first ground alone, on some temporary 
personal advantage, truly or falsely alleged; but a verdict 
given in this fashion lacks stability. Having no foundation 
in the real nature of things, it is easily shaken. No sanctity 
adheres to it. When men, despite the promises made to 
them, experience disappointment, they will pull it down 
without reverence, for it draws no aid from a noble tradition. 
A democracy at its best is not content with a proof of 
self-interest, even though it extends to its grandchildren. 
Mere practical considerations may be clearly shown to possess 
a certain permanency, but are not, by that reason alone, 
enough to make a strong tradition upon which men will act 
as it were by instinct, to which they will defer as to the 
precepts of a revealed religion. Public opinion is at once 
a man of affairs, dry, grudging, sceptical of all sciences save 
arithmetic, and an idealist who will reject the most fortunate 
balance of material profit, if the attainment of it is in conflict 
with the national honour. There is a need for some 
spiritual element ; for some ideal, informing policy. The 
politician, ignoring these things, involves us in endless 
debate ; but the statesman, fully aware, is unsatisfied with a 
favourable vote which, given inconsiderately, does not set 
the seal upon the upholding principle. It was not enough 
for Hamilton that the constitution should be accepted, unless 
men firmly believed it with their minds and cherished it in 
their hearts. 

The United States have been fortunate in the possession 
of a great and constant tradition, compounded of an intense 
belief in their institutions, in their destiny and in them- 
selves. It has carried them safely through much rough 
weather, and it is not idle curiosity that puts the question 
how, being so young a nation, they came to gain it ? The 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 171 

Pangloss opinion does not hesitate : that as their institu- A.D. 
tions were good, their destiny favourable, and they them- ^I^'^~}^^ 
selves were born valiant and virtuous, it was impossible 
that belief could be withheld, the conditions being so obvious. 
But the inquiry is still unanswered, for their institutions are 
not conspicuously better than those of other nations that 
have come and gone, except precisely in this, that they are 
more steadfastly believed in. Their destiny likewise could 
have worked no wonders until men had faith in it, which in 
1787 was far from being the case. Few men even surmised 
it, and still fewer then held to it firmly — not even Madison, 
anxious and defensive, but only Washington, Hamilton and 
Franklin, who found no great number of visionaries to 
understand their meaning. 

Without this tradition the emigrants who flocked into the 
states during the nineteenth century, overwhelming and out- 
numbering the descendants of the old colonists who fought 
against George the Third, would never have been compacted 
into a great people. In these exiles and outcasts there 
resided no superior virtue, but rather the reverse. It was 
not merely the pure spirit of adventure, but suffering, 
weakness, despair, discontent, turbulence and crime that 
swept them together out of the dusty corners of Europe, and 
shook them out, Celts and Saxons and Latins and Slavs, in 
the seaports of the states. It is impossible to conceive of any 
immigration more lacking in unity and cohesion, or con- 
taining elements more dangerous to human society. Had 
the same men landed instead in the disunited states of the 
southern or central continent, they would have swollen the 
forces of disorder. But if they came on shore at Boston, 
Philadelphia, or New York, they were met at once by a 
tradition so universally held and so despotic that disagree- 
ment and resistance appeared equally absurd. 

This tradition has the defects of its qualities: extrava- 



172 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. gances, excesses, and upon occasions a preposterous assurance 
I, ~ ^^ which strangers may fairly deride. But men of our nation 
can laugh with good humour because, being governed by a 
like tradition of their own which leads them at times into 
similar absurdities, they can also admire without envy. 
Questioned as to the origin of our faith, we find it hard, 
when taken unawares, to make any suitable reply. We 
know vaguely that we have scrambled to it somehow ; slowly, 
over a long period, through a series of events which, viewed 
carelessly, look almost like accidents. We are inclined to 
believe that its foundations must have been deliberately 
laid by a few great men working in reasonably good material. 
We have a backward vision of Alfreds and Henrys and 
Edwards, far off', 'like misty warders dimly seen.' But in 
our sober moments we do not claim that the tradition 
which governs us so despotically can be fully explained and 
accounted for by our splendid opportunities, by our noble 
laws, or even by the virtue of the mass of our citizens. 
These things are rather the results of the tradition than 
the causes which have produced it. In periods of extreme 
complacency we have perhaps inclined to overlook the most 
remarkable excellence of the British race, which is its 
fertility in leaders ; and leadership is the true cause of the 
tradition no less in the history of a nation than in the annals 
of a regiment. 

Under this aspect America is an admirable example and 
a useful reminder. The great interest which attaches to 
her experiment is that during the whole of its develop- 
ment it has been under a close and rigid observation ; for 
the time is short, and records have been kept. If we choose 
to look we can see the founders of the tradition at work like 
bees in a glass hive, careful, industrious and ungrudging. 
From Washington to Lincoln there is no obscurity any- 
where. And great as was the practical achievement of 



17S7-1788 
^T. 30-31 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 173 

the Federalist in procuring the adoption of the Union, its A.D. 
glory is even greater in having established it among those 
firm things which a nation with loving reverence has deter- 
mined to place beyond all question. 

For the rest of the world who are not the subjects of the 
Union the Federalist has the value of a great book, and this 
not merely for the style in which it is written, or even for 
the wisdom it contains. Style is a wonderful pickle that is 
able to preserve mediocrity of thought under favourable 
conditions for many centuries. Ingenious and consistent 
thought will frequently preserve itself even in the teeth 
of obviously uncomplying facts. The greatness of the 
Federalist, though it is lacking neither in style nor con- 
sistency of thought, is something different, something 
altogether unique. Men speak of it in the same breath 
with L Esprit des Lois and II Principe] and it has at 
least this in common with those works, that it deals with 
the problems of government, not merely on the surface with 
a tidy ingenuity, but fundamentally. Like them, it has had 
an immense influence both upon thinkers and upon men of 
action. But the contrasts are also valuable. Montesquieu 
was a curious analyst, a man of wit and eloquence; but 
he was almost at the opposite pole from the visionaries. 
He expounds a situation, explains it, comments upon it, and 
sums it up with the charming attribute of French writers, 
that his conclusions seem inevitable even on the occasions 
when we know his premises to be inaccurate. But he is 
always outside the actual controversy ; keenly interested, but 
entirely detached ; calm and impartial in his demeanour, 
even if in his heart he cherished certain preferences. He 
is considering other people's affairs all the while; never 
concerned in vindicating anything for which he is personally 
responsible. The conspicuous quality is his fertility in 
suggestion; the book is oftener on the knee than in the 



174 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. hand, and the reader far away on the wings of his own 

Machiavelli, on the other hand, is always the man of 
action — the would-be man of action — or at least the 
counsellor of men of action. In a sense he is an idealist, 
and would have built up a state; but he lacks the true 
spirit of the revolutionary, for he never contemplates, nor 
ever appears to desire, any change in the rules of the game. 
He is of opinion that he could play it better and more 
intelligently than his contemporaries ; and it is not derogat- 
ing from his genius to say of him that he writes somewhat 
in the manner of Cavendish on Whist. Assuming the con- 
ditions which exist — the nature of man and of things — to be 
unchangeable, he proceeds in a calm, unmoral way, like a 
lecturer on frogs, to show how a valiant and sagacious ruler 
can best turn events to his own advantage and the security 
of his dynasty. If we can conceive of Montesquieu and 
Machiavelli set upon the same problem, the construction 
of an ideal state, the former would have sought for the 
wisest balance, the latter for the strongest prince. 

The morals which Montesquieu draws out of his analysis, 
the maxims which Machiavelli prepares from his experience, 
are entirely different from the method of the Federalist, 
which advocated a plan; explained and justified it; pre- 
vailed upon a nation of practical men to make a trial of it. 
This plan has noAV been at work for upwards of a hundred 
years, and its strength appears to-day to be greater than 
it was at the beginning. A book which has helped to 
produce a phenomenon of this order would possess an 
interest for mankind, even if it were not, as the Federalist 
is, a classic at once in style and thought. 

The science of political philosophy in recent times has 
drawn in its horns, setting an example of modesty which 
its economic sister shows some disposition to imitate. Its 



1787-1788 
Ml. 30-31 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 175 

pretensions are to-day less confident ttian in the England A.D. 
of the seventeenth century, or the France of the eighteenth. 
Since Edmund Burke it has wisely chosen to waive its 
early ambition of absolute power, accepting a position of 
influential dignity rather than of executive authority. In 
its present mood it is ready to agree with the Law of 
England that a superior virtue resides in judgments de- 
livered upon particular issues, and that obiter dicta, however 
entertaining, are not sound rules to go by. The author 
writing on themes of government, as it were at large, with- 
out direct responsibility for the result, and chiefly for the 
edification of the intelligent classes and the general im- 
provement of the world, can still enjoy an ample reward 
for his fancy and his industry. But the statesman whose 
effort is to explain, to justify and to recommend a particular 
policy, is on a different plane. If his plan in the end 
succeeds and becomes notable, the words in which he urged 
its adoption command a deeper attention. He challenges a 
verdict not merely upon his principles, but in their result ; 
so that if his work has stood, the statement of his belief on 
which it was based has a superior authority with succeeding 
generations. 

The opponents of Union had no artillery of sufficient 
weight to reply to the Federalist and to withstand its 
tremendous attack. They trusted vainly to the machine; 
relying upon intrigue in the state legislatures, upon light 
calumny and incredible misstatement. Confronted with a 
real issue which for the moment has touched men's hearts, 
even the strong management of a modern party has found 
itself discomfited. An organisation is an excellent thing in 
itself, but at such times it cannot fight ideas with bogeys. 
People refused to believe that Washington wished to be 
a king. They refused to believe that a state would deprive 



176 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. its subjects of freedom and install a tyranny were it to part 
^I^^o^t^ with a portion of its sovereignty to the central government. 
They were told, in the hallowed phrases which have done 
duty since the days of Cleon the demagogue, that the 
Convention of Philadelphia aimed at making the poor poorer, 
and the rich richer ; at the domination of the few and the 
slavery of the many ; ^ but men remained unconvinced even 
by this familiar eloquence. It was urged upon the maritime 
states that to part with a shred of their fiscal independence 
was to make over a portion of their natural wealth for the 
benefit of their neighbours ;2 but even their faith in this 
plausible appeal began to crumble before a wider vision and 
a nobler aim. Finally they were assured that the plan 
was fantastic and unworkable; that it was but the wild 
experiment of ' visionary young men.' Every pamphlet and 
every platform of the opposition echoed with this tremen- 
dous charge, and young men who see visions may, if we 
consider the result, take comfort throughout the ages. 

On the 17th of June 1788 the Convention of New York 
state met at Poughkeepsie to consider the draft constitu- 
tion. This event stands in somewhat the same relation to 
Hamilton's political career as the taking of the first redoubt 
at Yorktown to his military service. It was a brilliant 
episode, a gallant action upon which popular imagination 
has fastened, attracted by the spectacle of enemies meeting 
one another in the gate. ' Two-thirds of the Convention,' 
Hamilton wrote, ' and four-sevenths of the people are against 
us.'^ Governor Clinton was his opponent, not himself an 
orator, but a character of impressive size. Even in private 
conferences he was hardly articulate, but he knew clearlj 
the direction in which he had reasons for not travelling. 

* History, iii. j). 449, also pp. 452-4. 

^ Cf. Clintou's policy in New York, History, iii. p. 174. 

3 Works, ix. pp. 432-3 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 177 

He controlled a majority of forty-six against a minority of A.D. I78i 
nineteen.^ But there comes a time in most struggles that '^'^' ^^ 
are prolonged when it is not enough to direct the battle, 
when the leader who is willing to risk a personal encounter 
prevails over his opponent who seeks to control the move- 
ment from a windmill. Clinton was strong, narrow, un- 
scrupulous and very stubborn, but he had in him nothing 
of the stuff of a paladin. His military career had been 
inglorious, and in debate he pushed others forward to 
do the fighting, lashing them into combat with a surly 
condemnation. 

Since our narrative of the events at Poughkeepsie is 
mainly drawn from the notes and journals of the opponents 
of union, we may believe that the accounts of Hamilton's 
prowess are not exaggerated. He fought every point, and 
was at first beaten upon every point. His eloquence could 
make no impression upon the mechanical majority. He drew 
tears from his audience, both sides alike ; spoke for hours at 
a time, and all men hung upon his words. But still, at the 
vote, forty-six hands went up against nineteen. The system 
on which the discussion was conducted is very puzzling. 
The constitution was rejected by a clear majority, and next 
day Hamilton returned undaunted to advocate it once more. 
Again it was rejected, and again he refused to accept the 
decision as final, arguing for delay, hoping that the news of 
ratification by other states would gradually wear down the 
obduracy of his opponents. 

A friend finding him one day alone, " took the liberty to 
* say to him, that they would inquire of me in New York 
' what was the prospect in relation to the adoption of the 
' Constitution ; and asked him what I should say to them. 
' His manner immediately changed, and he answered : ' God 
' only knows. Several votes have been taken, by which it 

^ History, iii. p. 483. 
M 



178 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1788 ' appears that there are two to one against us.' Supposing 
^T. 31 c Yxe had concluded his answer, I was about to retire, when he 

* added, in a most emphatic manner : ' Tell them that the 

* Convention shall never rise until the Constitution is 
'adopted.'"'^ Minorities are to be measured by spirit as 
well as numbers, and the buoyancy of the nineteen who 
followed Hamilton was disconcerting. 

Suddenly there came a collapse. Melancthon Smith, the 
able leader in debate of the Clintonian party, announced 
his willingness to ratify ' upon conditions.' Hamilton refused 
to entertain the idea of a compromise, and wisely took the 
admission as a signal for a more vehement assault. The ob- 
jections that were made to a complete acceptance " vanished 
' before him. He remained an hour and twenty minutes on 
' the floor. After which Mr. Smith, with great candour, got 
'up; and after some explanations, confessed that Mr. 
' Hamilton by his reasoning had removed the objections he 

* had made." ^ 

In spite of this defection, Clinton refused to budge, and 
for a time it appeared as if his silent legion would stand by 
him in sufficient numbers to ensure his victory. But day 
by day the news of ratification by other states came to 
strengthen the weaker party. All eyes were turned upon 
Virginia, where the influence of Washington was pitted 
against the open opposition of Monroe and the puzzling 
advice of Jefferson, who wrote from Paris that he was in 
favour both of acceptance and rejection. But when at 
last, over the dusty summer roads, Hamilton's triumphant 
gallopers brought word of the adherence of the great 
southern state, the battle was decided against the strong. 
On the 25th July the minority of twenty-seven was changed 
into a majority of three. 

While we may accept without hesitation Hamilton's 

1 History, iii. pp. 522-23. * Ibid. iii. p. 524. 



THE UNION OF THE STATES 179 

estimate that four-sevenths of the population of New York a.d. 1788 
state were opposed to the Union, we must also believe the '^' ^^ 
contemporary accounts, which assure us that on his return 
to the city it seemed as if a unanimous people had come out 
to celebrate his victory. It was not only the Convention of 
Poughkeepsie which had been conquered by his masterful and 
persuasive influence. The minds also of the men who wel- 
comed him with hymns and banners ^ had been subdued and 
fascinated by the dramatic spectacle of a ' visionary young 
man ' struggling against the discipline of overwhelming 
odds, day after day for six weary weeks, and in the end 
overcoming all opposition, by the prowess of a great char- 
acter strung to its highest pitch by the inspiration of a 
great idea. 

' History, iii. p. 528. 



BOOK III 

THE FEDERALISTS 

A.D. 1789-1791 



The feudal system may have worn out, but its main principle, that the 
tenure of property should be the fulfilment of duty, is the essence of good 
government. The divine right of kings may have been a plea for feeble 
tyrants, but the divine right of government is the keystone of human 
progress, and without it governments sink into police, and a nation is 
degraded into a mob. — Disraeli. 



BOOK III 
TEE FEDERALISTS 

CHAPTER I 

President Washington 

Congress met at New York in April 1789. Upon a canvass a.d. 1789 
of the returns from the electoral colleges, it was found that ^^" ^^ 
General Washington had been chosen President by a 
unanimous vote. 

" As he approached the Hall of Congress, he was seen to 
' retain the firm, elastic step of a yet vigorous soldier's frame. 
' His thin hair of hazel brown, covered with powder, was 
* clubbed behind, in the fashion of the day. His dress was of 
' black velvet. On his side hung a dress sword, and around 
' his neck a ribbon to which was attached, concealed, a minia- 
' ture of his wife, worn, it is stated, from his nuptials until his 
' death. ' Time,' wrote Fisher Ames, ' had made havoc upon 
' his face. He addressed the two Houses in the Senate 
' Chamber ; it was a very touching scene, and quite of the 
' solemn kind. His aspect grave, almost to sadness ; his 
' modesty, actually shaking ; his voice deep, a little tremulous, 
' and so low as to call for close attention — added to the series 
' of objects presented to the mind, and overwhelming it, pro- 
' duced emotions of the most affecting kind upon the members. 
' I sat entranced.' " ^ 

^ Fisher Ames, 3rd May 1789, History, iv. p. 8. 



184 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 The first President had the gift of seeing into the heart of 
^^ a situation better than most men, and he therefore doubtless 
understood that his unanimous election was not the begin- 
ning of the Millennium. He had a just pride in his fame in 
the world, an honourable concern for the good opinion of his 
fellow-countrymen, and it needed no prophetic instinct to 
perceive that in this new adventure both were to be placed 
in jeopardy. Even in his own trade of soldier it was hardly 
possible that he could have added to his laurels by fresh 
enterprises, and in the unknown trade of politician it was 
not unlikely he might suffer total eclipse. Nor could he 
hope in this hazardous undertaking to retain the all but 
universal affection which had rewarded his conduct of the 
war. Popular government in its working was predestined to 
result in a cleavage, and he who had been the leader of the 
whole people would find himself before long only the leader 
of a party. Beyond these considerations was a fervent desire 
for rest after an arduous life. ' The business of America's 
happiness/ in Hamilton's phrase, ' was yet to be done.' ^ It 
was a true statement of the case, and to the younger man, 
whose aim was not peace but achievement, the prospect 
appeared radiant and delectable. With Washington, how- 
ever, it was entirely different. No action of his life shows a 
finer patriotism than his acceptance of office ; for he foresaw 
both the danger and the labour, and judged notwithstanding 
that duty left him no escape. 

The constitution which had been framed at Philadelphia, 
and afterwards accepted by the people, was as yet a lifeless 
thing. At the most it was only a licence to begin governing, 
granted to a few energetic characters who had faith in their 
own capacity to make the experiment succeed. Nothing 
appeared more likely than that this licence would be 
promptly withdrawn if the early years were marked with 

^ History, iv. p. 2. 



THE FEDERALISTS 185 

failure, or even if delay occurred in achieving some con- A.D. 1789 
spicuous success. The life of the Union being bound up in ^'^' ^^ 
the strength of its government, the first thing to be done was 
to establish that strength upon sure foundations by the bold 
use of the powers which had been bestowed. In the weak 
hands of men afraid to act upon their warrant, afraid to 
construe it widely and even to exceed its strict and literal 
intention, the constitution compacted with so much care 
and accepted with so much misgiving must infallibly have 
gone to pieces. In twelve months the states, which were as 
yet united only upon paper, would have split again into 
disunion. There was no magic in the charter itself that 
could have drawn order out of the existing chaos. The 
document signed at Philadelphia was little more than an 
opinion and a hope. It was by the vigour and courage 
of Washington's administration, and by the interpretation 
placed upon the constitution by his boldest minister, that 
the United States ultimately became a nation. 

The enemies of Union both within and without were 
hopeful that a weak government would undo the work of 
the Convention. France, who conceived her interest to lie 
in a distracted league, was unfriendly to the idea of an 
American nation, and incredulous of the accomplishment of 
such a miracle.^ The ' French ' party in the states bestirred 
themselves in bringing forward the name of Benjamin 
Franklin, whose advanced age alone was a sufficient obstacle 
to his efficiency. The minority, who had vainly opposed the 
act of union, were equally averse from the appointment of 
a strong president, and endeavoured in a timid and subter- 
ranean fashion to promote this impossible candidature. 
The adherents of Gates, whose personality appears at all 
times to have exercised a fatal fascination upon impotent 
intriguers, were favourable to any nomination which would 

* Instructions to De Moustier, History, iii. p. 559. 



186 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 have excluded Washington from power. But in fact the 
'^'^* ^^ only question worth an answer was whether Washington 
himself would consent to serve. In this case the issue was a 
foregone conclusion. The real obstacle was neither France 
nor Gates, but Washington's own reluctance, his ' great and 
sole desire to live and die in peace and retirement on my 
own farm.'^ In the letters which passed between Wash- 
ington and Hamilton during the summer and autumn of 
the previous year ^ there is proof of the genuine aversion of 
the former from the cares of office, and of the determination 
of the latter that he must be compelled to make a sacrifice 
of his inclination. 

It is clear that Hamilton grasped the importance of 
immediate effort. The enemies of the constitution, though 
temporarily discouraged, were numerous and powerful. 
They would gladly have obstructed the creation of any 
government, but as that had not been possible, they were 
prepared, as soon as occasion offered, to pervert its inten- 
tion. Hamilton thoroughly understood the value attaching 
to the early acts of an administration charged with the 
perilous inauguration of a brand-new system. While he 
was well aware of the fatal consequences of any serious 
mistake, he was also aware that any delay on the part of 
the executive in exerting its authority would be construed 
as hesitation, and would restore the strength and spirit of 
the opposition. He sought, therefore, to impose his own 
policy at once, and to entrench it in such a fortress of pre- 
cedents that only a revolution would be able to dislodge 
it. While men of slower natures were looking about them 
stunned by defeat, or bewildered by success, unsettled and 
disorganised — like an establishment of servants brought up 
to town and deposited in a new and unfamiliar mansion 
— he alone, and at once, grasped the opportunity afforded 

1 History, iii. p. 553. ' 1788. History, iii. pp. 550-58. 



THE FEDERALISTS 187 

by these circumstances to a self-possessed and energetic A.D. 1789 
character with a clear knowledge of his own mind. While ^'^- ^^ 
public affairs were in this plastic condition, purposes could 
be achieved with but little difficulty that at a later date 
would have required stupendous effi)rts for their accomplish- 
ment. At such a time things might also be done which 
could never be undone. 

National unity was in a sense already attained ; the 
principle had been accepted in the most solemn fashion ; 
but the constitution, where it was vague, imperfect, or 
inadequate, had still to be defined, developed and extended. 
The financial position was rotten. It was of paramount 
importance to place it at once on a sound and honest basis. 
The natural resources of the empire were enormous, but 
they needed the care of a strong and watchful sovereign to 
bring them into early prosperity. A continent upon the 
eastern side of the Atlantic, distracted by jealous rivalries, 
invited the American people to flattering but deadly alliances, 
in which Hamilton dreaded to see the new Republic en- 
tangled either by reckless sentiment or by a spirit of 
inveterate revenge. 

With these objects he set himself at once to extend 
the power and prestige of the federal government, and 
to curb and diminish the importance of the states; to 
provide for or discharge all debts according to the strict 
letter of the bond ; to pursue the deliberate advantage of 
his own country among nations, equally unmoved by affection 
for France and by hatred of England, and equally indifferent 
to the enthusiasm of most men, and to the indignation of a 
few, as the Revolution in Paris pursued its startling career. 
And in all circumstances, at every turn of events and clash 
of interests, he kept before his eyes the subordination of 
classes, industries, and states, to the national purpose and 
the advantage of the commonwealth. 



188 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 The complete sovereignty of the central government over 
^' all citizens and states of the Union had been the chief sub- 
ject of controversy from the beginning. This principle, not 
altogether unintentionally, had been to some extent put out 
of sight during the discussions at Philadelphia. It was not 
fully admitted even by the clauses of the constitution. 
Still less had it been accepted by the people with all its 
unforeseen consequences when they ratified the action of the 
majority of their delegates. It was the chief object of 
Hamilton's policy to establish this principle so firmly that 
it could not be overthrown or even questioned. The chief 
object of his opponents was precisely the reverse. They 
aimed at limiting the central sovereignty, while he sought 
to extend it. Where the terms of the compact admitted of 
a doubt, they endeavoured to construe them in a sense 
favourable to the state legislatures, unfavourable to the 
federal government. Both parties admitted the need for a 
balance of power as a check upon rash administration, but 
while Hamilton was determined to produce this balance out 
of the forces which existed within a single nation, the 
opposite party held no less fervently by the old idea that 
the end in view could only be successfully accomplished by 
the competing interests of many nations within a league. 

This difference in political faith was fundamental. Long 
after Washington and Hamilton had passed away, cheerful, 
well-meaning men and despondent, wise men endeavoured 
vainly to adjust by compromise what could only be settled 
by victory. Any solution of the antagonism between the 
Federalist ideal and the pretensions of the State Rights 
party was wholly beyond the reach of concession or accom- 
modation. For the policies were in direct opposition, like 
two men whose sole but essential quarrel is simply for 
the upper hand. Bland mediation, soothing make-believe, 
patched-up temporary arrangements, were hopeless nego- 



THE FEDERALISTS 189 

tiators, for there was in such a case no choice of alter- A.D. 1789 
natives. In the end one man must prevail, the other must ^^* ^^ 
submit. 

It is conceivable that had the times been more pro- 
pitious, had Hamilton been as admirable a party leader 
as he was a statesman, had he lived, or had the Federalist 
party at the beginning of the nineteenth century dis- 
covered some other chief capable of sustaining their 
spirit and guiding their counsels, the difference might have 
been settled by a political victory. But each year of delay 
added to the danger by complicating the issue with fresh 
interests. The growth of population, the development of 
territory, the increase of wealth, added strength and con- 
fidence to the opposing parties, so that by the time Lincoln 
came to undertake the government of the country ^ there 
remained only one possible solution — the stricken field. 
'In campaign, battle, hospital, and prison,' it has been 
computed that a million of human lives were sacrificed,^ in 
order ' that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth 
of freedom.' ' Certainly it was not a cheap victory. The 
thing which commands our admiration is that three-quarters 
of a century later a man should have arisen, the equal of 
Washington in character, of Hamilton in perspicacity, 
who had the courage to maintain the Union even at this 
staggering price. 

A great nation does not for any mean or trivial difierence 
split into two camps of eager volunteers and engage in 
civil war until one of the sections yields through mere 
exhaustion. Long before four campaigns had ended, the 
virus of personal hatred would have spent itself, the pre- 
tensions of a mere phrase would have been detected. The 
War of Secession would never have been fought by men, 

^ March 1861. "^ Cambridge Modern History, vii. p. 453. 

'^ Lincoln's Address at Gettysburg. 



/ 



190 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 bewitched by rival logicians in dispute regarding the 
^'^' ^^ abstract propositions of constitutional law. The spirit which 
combated against union in the Philadelphia Convention, in 
the early Congresses and in the cabinets of Washington, 
was the same spirit, and engaged in the same struggle, in 
the cabinet of Buchanan and on the field of Gettysburg, 
seventy years later. It is a spirit that compels respect 
from its most determined opponents — a spirit of an im- 
practicable ideal, but still an ideal. But between the 
fanatics for State Rights whom we condemn, and the 
upholders of the dignity and utility of local authorities 
whom we have been taught to admire, there is in fact only 
a difference of degree. A commonwealth in which this 
spirit had ceased to exist might be safely marked as a 
dying race; but in the view of the statesman it can never 
be allowed the upper hand. Like the steam in a boiler, 
it serves its purpose by its efforts to escape from imprison- 
ment and control ; but if these efforts are successful, there 
is an end of the utility. 

The struggle between Federalism and State Rights soon 
made a wide cleavage in the first cabinet. Washington's 
own convictions and sympathies were on the Federal side ; 
but he considered that his supreme duty as a Federalist, no 
less than as a patriot, was to compel the new constitution 
to prove itself capable of being worked. The country had 
to be governed, a political system had to be inaugurated 
at all costs. With this end in view he set to work 
reluctantly and wearily, composing diff'erences and enduring 
obloquy, with the same calm judgment and undramatic 
courage that had directed his conduct of the war. The 
weight of this immense and unfamiliar character was not 
to be resisted. While Hamilton laboured at the founda- 
tions, Washington helped him to keep the enemy at bay, 
and approved the work, step by step, as it was accomplished. 



THE FEDERALISTS 191 

It may well be doubted whether without this fortunate A.D. 1789 
co-operation the constitution would ever have existed except '^'^' ^^ 
as a historical document. 



CHAPTER II 

The Threefold Policy 

The governing principle of Hamilton's policy, of "Washington 
who supported Hamilton, and of the whole Federalist party 
who followed him, was to establish a supreme sovereignty. 
The first step towards the accomplishment of this object 
was dull but arduous. Out of nothing the whole machinery 
of government had to be called suddenly into existence. 
Controversy was silenced for the moment by an over- 
whelming necessity. At this stage the difficulties were 
mainly those inherent in the nature of the task, and were 
not to any important extent the result of the spirit of 
faction. But so soon as the machinery was contrived, 
departments organised and provision made for the pressing 
needs of the Union, the governing principle became visible, 
and according to the dispositions of men it appeared ad- 
mirable in the eyes of some and hateful in the eyes of 
others. 

Hamilton sought his prime object by a threefold means. 
The idea of his financial policy was the welding of the 
Union, of his commercial policy the development of the 
estate, of his foreign policy to confirm independence. Each 
of these undertakings was planned upon the heroic scale in 
accordance with the nature of its author ; but all were 
subordinate to his main end, and never, even in the dust 
and heat of political controversy, were they permitted to 
escape from their true proportions. 



192 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 The period during which Hamilton's ideas have directed 
• ^^ the course of American history has not yet ended, and is not 
likely to end in our day; but the time during which his 
personal influence controlled the policy of government is 
reckoned only at twelve years, while his official career lasted 
for but little more than five.^ The administration of Wash- 
ington began in April 1789 and ended in March 1797, Upon 
his retirement from political life, John Adams, also a member 
of the Federalist party, was chosen to succeed him. Adams 
was no friend to Hamilton, but his cabinet did not allow him 
to break the spell during the term of his administration. 

In March 1801 Thomas Jefferson, the founder and leader 
of the Democratic party, having defeated the Federalists, 
became President of the United States. For four- and- twenty 
years from that date the highest ofiice in the Union was 
occupied in turn by three men^ who not only held the whole 
trend of Hamilton's policy in abhorrence, but were among 
the bitterest of his personal enemies. The Federalist party, 
seriously crippled even before the death of its leader,^ 
gradually crumbled into discredit when deprived of his 
support. In these circumstances it was only natural that 
the ideals of Hamilton earned but a scanty respect. Much 
was said about the need for undoing his work, and some- 
thing was attempted towards that end ; but, fortunately in 
one respect, his fame was so completely obscured for the 
time being by the superior radiance of his successors that it 
was judged unnecessary to signalise the triumph of the 
Democrats and the ruin of the Federalists by the incon- 
venient process of destroying institutions which were already 
perceived to be indispensable to the prosperous management 
of affairs. 

^ Federalist Administrations (Washington and Adams), April 1789-March 

1801 ; Hamilton Secretary of the Treasury, September 1789-January 1795. 

^ Jefferson, Madison and Monroe. ' Hamilton's death, 11th July 1804. 



THE FEDERALISTS 198 

The ultimate object of the threefold policy was to establish A.D. 1789 
a set of principles, by weaving them into the fabric of the '^'^" ^^ 
national tradition, before the opponents of strong govern- 
ment should have the opportunity of office. Hamilton 
sought to accomplish his ends by a series of legislative 
measures and by a course of steadfast conduct on the part 
of the executive. If these measures and this course of 
conduct were to fulfil his ultimate object, it was necessary, in 
his opinion, that each separate act should succeed in a con- 
spicuous manner in achieving its own particular and 
immediate object. Good results must be shown forthwith. 
The great mass of the citizens must be affected by a sudden 
and fortunate contrast, with a sense of a great benefit due 
unmistakably to the federal arrangement. And yet it was 
equally necessary that the policy should be wise and well 
grounded. For although a rapid improvement was for 
every reason desirable, it was above everything desirable 
that the measures of the first administration should possess 
the quality of permanence. It was essential that their purpose 
should not be impaired at a later date by the need for 
frequent alterations and adjustments which in careless or 
hostile hands might have endangered the existence of the 
essential principles. If Hamilton's threefold policy succeeded 
in detail, the result, in his opinion, would be to produce 
throughout the country a feeling of gratitude and even of 
reverence, not to himself personally or to his party, but 
towards those new institutions which were standing upon 
their trial. In addition to this general aim, there was also 
a particular intention in many of his acts, notably in those 
which dealt with the funding of the debts and other problems 
of finance, to enlist powerful interests and classes upon the 
side of the federal government by assuming obligations and 
responsibilities towards them which had . previously been 
distributed among the separate states. 

N 



194 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 It may also be said of Hamilton's policy, viewing it from 
^"^^ ^^ a different standpoint, that its object was the same as that 
of the war itself. The struggle with Britain had been for 
the sake of independence, and for that alone. After immense 
sacrifices the states had succeeded in getting rid of every 
vestige of direct external control. Hamilton's aim was to 
secure the measure of independence which had been thus 
attained, and to extend the work a stage further by getting 
rid of all influence from without, not only direct but indirect, 
not only political in the strict sense, but general. 

The aim of his financial measures (in which he succeeded) 
was to make the nation independent of external creditors, 
of European usurers, bankers and governments who had 
supplied the funds necessary for carrying on the war either 
at onerous rates, or, as in the case of France, in order to 
gain an influence which would enable them to promote 
their own political ends. 

The aim of his foreign policy was independence of European 
intrigue, and the exclusion of its diplomacy, not merely from 
all direct appeals to the individual states, but from a position 
in which it could exercise pressure upon the federal power. 
And in his practical and foreseeing mind he clearly understood 
from the beginning that if the Old World was to be kept 
from interference in the aff'airs of the New, it could only be 
by a stiff and unyielding refusal upon the part of the 
Union to be drawn upon any pretext into the quarrels of 
the European continent. In this aim also he succeeded; 
for if he did not actually secure the formula which is now 
known as the Monroe Doctrine in the definite phrases of a 
state document, he none the less by irrevocable acts 
laid the foundations and raised high the edifice of that 
foreign policy which his country has pursued from that day 
to this. 

Independence was likewise the aim of his commercial 



THE FEDERALISTS 195 

policy, which was framed with the dehberate intention of A.D. 1789 
creating a self-sufficing nation. American industry was to ^"^^ ^^ 
be made as free from the hazards of European markets as 
American politics from the influence of European govern- 
ments. His method was to arrive at a balance between 
the production of food and raw materials on the one hand, 
and manufactures, shipping and other forms of commerce 
upon the other. It was possible, in his opinion, with the 
prudent assistance of legislation, to come speedily to a 
point at which all the necessities of life and instruments 
of labour, and even the greater part of the luxuries that 
were in common demand, should be supplied from the 
fields and farms, the mines, mills and workshops of the 
new republic. A nation which was content to drift along 
the path of least resistance must suffer the inconveniences 
and dangers of a lop-sided development. A nation in 
which the manufacturing or the agricultural interest was 
in an overwhelming predominance would never be proof 
against foreign hostility or catastrophe, as a nation might 
hope to be which maintained the principle of a strong 
internal market for commodities of every kind. 

Hamilton's desire to establish his commercial policy did 
not succeed. It is true that he has set forth his ideas in 
one of the most memorable reports ever made to Congress. 
It is true also that his proposals were welcomed by the 
great majority of his own party as well as by many of his 
opponents. But although in certain isolated cases he was 
able to introduce his system of national development, it was 
so little advanced when his power ended that the propor- 
tions of the fabric did not affect the imaginations of men so 
as to impel them, willing or unwilling, to complete the work. 
Unlike his foreign and financial policies, his commercial 
policy did not crystallise into a tradition or an institution. 
The foundations were not even laid, but only staked out ; 



196 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 and altlioiigh the elevation and the working plans existed 
ready to the hand of* the builder, they were laid aside and 
soon forgotten. All that can be claimed is that the idea 
was perfect in his own mind. But only after many years 
had elapsed did it begin to assert an authority among men 
who, under the pressure of circumstances and not by means 
of their own clear foresight, had begun to travel slowly in 
the same direction. 

The fate of Hamilton's threefold policy after his death 
is worth noting at this stage. That part of it which dealt 
with finance was accomplished during the term of his office. 
Although his opponents had blustered heroically about their 
intentions, it was never undone, because it was too strong to be 
pulled down by peaceful means. The principles of his foreign 
policy were fully accepted in practice before the retirement 
of Washington. Their sound patriotism was too obvious to be 
disregarded by his successors, who, when their passions were 
cooled and the malice of rivalry had died away, completed 
the structure and confirmed the tradition. But of his com- 
mercial policy the plan only was bequeathed to future 
generations. His policy, therefore, succeeded in accomplish- 
ing the greater number of the particular objects it set out 
to accomplish. In no instance was it defeated. It was only 
delayed. Even when some counter idea for the moment 
overcame it, the victory was never followed up by effective 
occupation. It is true that his commercial policy did not 
prevail, but the doctrine of Free Trade did not usurp the 
vacant place. Free Trade was never even set up with 
success as an alternative to his commercial policy. The 
obstacle was merely a kind of lethargy which descended 
upon men in what has been termed ' the era of good feeling,' 
an indisposition to decide upon any new and definite policy. 
The spirit of the times was an easy contentment with exist- 
ing institutions, even though these were obviously incom- 



THE FEDERALISTS 197 

plete Men preferred to live in an unfinished palace, despite A.D. 1789 
the dangers and inconveniences attaching to their lazy ^'^' ^^ 
occupation, rather than to engage in any strenuous efforts 
to complete the structure. 

When we come to consider further what was to Hamilton 
the main and ultimate object of his threefold policy — the 
firm establishment of a supreme and sovereign government 
— we find that here also he has been successful — successful 
even beyond his own hopes, but still not wholly successful. 
The Union still exists. The forces of disintegration have 
been kept at bay. This result, however, has not been 
attained by the peaceful means which Hamilton had planned, 
but only as the outcome of civil war waged upon a tremen- 
dous scale. In placing these limits upon the renown of his 
achievements, we must in fairness take into account the 
prodigious nature of his ambition. We are bound to 
remember also this fact, that if the Union, for which he 
sacrificed his own life, was not preserved without the further 
sacrifice of a million lives, it was, beyond any doubt, from 
the love of the institutions he had raised, and by the 
force of the tradition made by his great spirit, that men 
were found willing to pour out their blood like water to 
secure all that he had won for them, and nearly all that he 
had dreamed of winning. 

When we consider the course of events during the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century, it is impossible not to be 
struck by the prevalence of lethargy in the counsels of 
Hamilton's successors, and even in the people themselves. 
There is a tendency among the statesmen who followed him 
to leave his work for the greater part where he had left it ; 
if complete, complete; if half-done, half-done; if only 
planned but not begun, to lay the plan aside. Hamilton 
was as great a builder as he was an architect, as necessary 
in the one capacity as in the other ; and for more than half a 



198 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 century after his death no man was found equal to the task 
^' of finishing the work. When a further advance was re- 
quired by circumstances, his successors, like the architects 
and builders of an inferior age, were apt to carry out the 
original intention in a feeble, grotesque, or disproportioned 
style. In the case of the commercial policy this tendency 
is everywhere conspicuous. The plan lay ready to hand, 
but when Hamilton's successors came to put it in execution 
they showed at first a futile hesitation, and in the end a 
riotous extravagance, owing to their inability to see the 
problem as a whole. The fine symmetry and the noble 
purpose which existed in the mind of Hamilton were 
entirely missed. Under the shelter of his name, what he 
dreaded most has come to pass, and the advantage of 
interests and of classes has been preferred to the wellbeing 
of the nation. His system of foreign policy had less to 
fear from mutilation, for it was not only planned, but for the 
most part already built. Yet even here it is impossible not 
to detect the absence of the master's hand. Although his 
ends have been achieved, his wise maxims have been ignored 
even upon grave occasions. " There appears to me too much 
' tartness in various parts of the reply," Hamilton wrote at 
the crisis of the negotiations with Britain. " Energy without 
' asperity seems best to comport with the dignity of national 
' language. The force ought to be more in the idea than in 
' the expression or manner." ^ And again, ' real firmness 
is good for anything ; strut is good for nothing.' The 
note of his system was a quiet adherence to essential things 
and a contemptuous aversion from exasperating methods. 
His preference was for the aristocratic spirit and ritual. A 
courteous and dignified demeanour was to his thinking a 
better weapon than the self-conscious, highflown aggressive- 
ness which delighted the hearts of the Democrats. The 

^ History, vi. p. 5. 



THE FEDERALISTS 199 

Monroe Doctrine and the modern tariff policy of the United A.D 1789 
States are both in a certain sense direct inheritances from ■ ^^ 
Hamilton. But, viewed under another aspect, both contain 
an element of caricature, not only in their style, but even 
in their methods and ultimate aims. We miss the grand 
manner which despised provocation. A certain bustling 
assurance, with all its loud talk of business principles, 
does not reach the high level of his energy, while it 
misses many things which were firmly held in his luminous 
and well-proportioned view. 



CHAPTER III 

Hamilton' s Difficulties 

An attempt has been made to explain the Federalist 
principle and to draw a rough outline of the policy by 
which Hamilton purposed to establish it as a precedent for 
future governments and as a part of the national tradition. 
Even this inadequate account will have been enough to 
indicate the splendour and audacity of his enterprise ; but 
for a true understanding of his character it is necessary that 
we should bear in mind the difficulties which surrounded 
him on every side. 

The first of these is the shortness of the period in which 
the work was done. Five years and a few months was the 
brief term of Hamilton's official career. Within seven 
years after his retirement from Washington's government 
his enemies came into power. 

Nor was shortness of time the greatest of Hamilton's 
difficulties. We must realise also that, except for the few 
months between his appointment as Secretary of the 
Treasury in September 1789 and the meeting of the second 



200 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1790 session of Congress early in the following January, there 
was hardly a day during the whole of his administration 
when he was not challenged and obstructed at every turn 
by a powerful opposition. 

While it is true that throughout the remaining term of 
the first Congress^ parties were not yet organised upon a 
strict system, and that the cleavage was uncertain and not 
wholly partisan ; yet this fact had its disadvantages as well 
as its benefits, for the members, lacking discipline, were 
often and easily persuaded to sacrifice a principle to a 
passing sentiment. Accordingly, although upon the whole 
the Federalists who followed Hamilton were in a con- 
siderable majority, it happened on more than one occasion 
that Hamilton's measures were defeated, and it was the 
exception when any important Act was carried without 
some mischievous alteration or illogical curtailment. 

In the second Congress ^ the opposition was organised, 
fanatical and unscrupulous. Not only Hamilton's policy, 
but his personal integrity, was constantly and bitterly 
assailed, and although these attacks were on every occasion 
rolled back with disaster upon their instigators, the perti- 
nacity of these enemies was untiring. Apart from the 
distraction and annoyance, the mere time occupied in the 
defeat of the eager malice of the Democrats was a serious 
impediment to his labours. 

In the third Congress ^ there was, if possible, a still more 
savage and relentless temper. The difficulties of adminis- 
tration were enhanced by the fact that the Federalists now 
no longer held a majority in the House of Representatives, 



^ The Ji7-st session of the first Congress lasted from the beginning of April 
to the end of September 1789 ; the second session from January to August 
1790 ; the third session from December 1790 to March 1791. 

2 October 1791 to March 1793. 

8 December 1793 to March 1795. 



THE FEDERALISTS 201 

but were outvoted on every party division by the Demo- a. D. 1790 
crats. Moreover, during this period Hamilton was occupied ^t. 33 
for several months with the suppression of the Whisky 
Rebellion/ which had been excited by the blundering in- 
trigues of the opposition. A military expedition, headed by 
Washington, was required to restore order, and although 
Hamilton accompanied the Federal forces without a military 
command, the direction was mainly in his hands. 

The rapidity with which parties came into existence is 
hardly a matter for surprise. The ordinary man is apt to 
cry out lustily whenever he is hurt or inconvenienced, and, 
unless he be perpetually reminded that his complaints are 
unreasonable, there is always a danger that he will settle 
down into a regular opposition. 

The process of union or confederation must always be to 
some extent a painful business. As in the case of badly 
set limbs, bones have to be broken by the surgeon and 
reset before the patient can regain his proper shape and 
the full use of his members. It was not only bad citizens 
and dishonest rascals, not only men who sought a profit in 
disunion or in the repudiation of debts, who composed the 
Democratic party. There were also included in it all those 
who still clung, many of them unconsciously, to the doctrine 
of State Rights, and dreaded as if by instinct the rule of a 
central government which in their panic they identified with 
tyranny. And to these were added, in a remarkable alliance, 
the adherents of the new-fangled and fashionable doctrines 
of the Rights of Man, 

Gradually but swiftly, therefore, a party, compounded of 
malcontents of every variety and enthusiasts belonging to at 
least two incompatible faiths, grew up and consolidated in 
antagonism to the policy of the administration. To say that 
this party was hostile to the Union would be too sweeping 

^ 1794. 



202 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1790 a charge ; but it is none the less true that it was hostile 
^^- '^^ to the conditions upon which the very existence of the 
Union depended, and in time it became even more hostile 
to the personal forces that were engaged in maintaining 
the Union. In many minds the necessity for strong govern- 
ment was only admitted at particular moments under the 
lash of adversity. People who had called out for a true 
sovereign during the crisis of the war became careless 
as soon as peace was declared, and many likewise who 
had been clamorous for Union in the intolerable dis- 
orders of 1787 grew lukewarm in the comparative tran- 
quillity of 1790, The constant tendency among this 
class of citizens was to be content with an instalment of 
comfort. They grudged paying the full price which would 
have ensured them a permanent possession of the whole 
benefit. 

Parliamentary opposition was neither the last nor the 
worst of Hamilton's difl&culties. Before many months had 
passed the cabinet was divided no less sharply than Con- 
gress, till in the end the majority of its decisions were 
arrived at by the casting vote of the President. In such 
circumstances a perfect loyalty among its members would 
have been a difficult achievement had they been men of 
the nicest honour. But even an outward show of co- 
operation proved to be quite unattainable. Confidence was 
entirely destroyed. The opposition out of doors was 
directed, encouraged and comforted from within. The 
measures of government were damned in advance by a 
zealous Democratic press well supplied with information by 
its supporters in the Cabinet. 

It must be admitted, after the event, that Washington's 
original conception of cabinet government was founded on 
a capital error, and even that his management of his 
administration was marred by very grave mistakes. There 



THE FEDERALISTS 203 

is little cause for wonder and none for reproach in such a A.D. 1790 
verdict ; for though Washington was by nature a statesman ^^ 

as well as a soldier, neither by nature nor by training was 
he a politician. His instinct did not foresee the pitfalls that 
were hidden in parliamentary institutions of an entirely 
novel and unprecedented type. 

His idea of a strong cabinet was a representative cabinet. 
Not only was it his desire that it should be representative 
of geographical divisions, of north and south, of Virginia, 
New England, and New York, — in itself both a sound and 
a politic aim, — but he wished also to make it representative 
of the various currents of political thought, and this was 
necessarily disastrous. It may be urged that at the time 
when he chose the members of his cabinet there was no 
sharp division of opinion ; that to all appearance differences 
had been successfully ended by the compromise of Phila- 
delphia ; that the whole country was in an optimistic mood, 
and proceeded upon the assumption that every good man 
had rallied once and for all to the support of a government 
charged with the task of establishing the Union. It is 
difficult to withstand an enthusiasm of this character, but 
in Washington, who had a wide knowledge of mankind in 
general and of his own countrymen in particular, we must 
suspect a certain measure of incredulity. For he had seen 
the two opposing principles at work from Lexington to the 
Convention of Philadelphia, and was well aware of their 
force and essential hostility. 

The confidence of any people in its government is grounded 
in the opinion that the government knows its own mind. A 
cabinet which is representative of conflicting ideas can only 
hope to tide over some sudden crisis. Its existence supposes 
a common enemy. When the crisis is past it can only 
maintain itseK by the most rigorous inaction. For with- 
standing some temporary danger it may have considerable 



204 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1790 virtues, but for carrying through a policy it is a miserable 
" ^' instrument. 

The result of this attempt to reconcile irreconcilable 
ideals was a bitter disagreement which ended in an open 
and public scandal. Had the opposing forces been equal, 
the functions of government must have been suspended by 
hopeless paralysis. Only the overwhelming character of 
Hamilton rescued the administration from disastrous 
failure. Washington, whose influence in a united cabinet 
would have been a tower of strength, was put out of action 
at the height of the battle. His convictions were on the 
side of the Federalists, but his sense of duty forced him to 
play the arbiter. At moments when a bold pronounce- 
ment was the thing most needful, he was engaged in a con- 
scientious examination of arguments. In political matters 
his mind worked slowly. Having provided himself with a 
ministry of conflicting principles, he felt bound to consider 
their conflicting advice. By his delay in coming to a 
decision he frequently lost the advantage of prompt action, 
and raised suspicions that there was room for doubt upon 
the merits of the case. 

But, further, he was guilty of a tactical error in retaining 
colleagues with whom he was in utter disagreement, whose 
characters he had come to distrust. He seems to have 
cherished the illusion that by adopting this course he would 
disarm their hostility, and would pin them down to an 
approval of his measures. The result was altogether dis- 
appointing. The reluctance of Jefl:erson, the Secretary of 
State, and of Randolph, the Attorney-General, was published 
upon the housetops. The scrupulous deliberation of Wash- 
ington bound them to nothing, but merely tolerated the 
presence of informers in his own camp. 

The well-meaning plan of a representative cabinet was 
therefore in the working of it a complete failure. The broad 



THE FEDERALISTS 205 

basis proved to be a mere will-o'-the-wisp. The great matter A.D. 1790 
was that the federal idea should get clear away, and to this ' ^" 
end the necessity was a cabinet of perfect sympathy, even 
though it was chosen upon a narrower principle of selection. 
The mistake of Washington lay in imagining that the 
strength of a government was determined by the number 
of its friends at the beginning. Disillusionment came too 
late, when he found the opposition to his administration 
was led by his own ministers. 

In addition to these difficulties arising out of the gigantic 
nature of the task, the shortness of the time, the growth of 
parties, the hostility of Congress, and the dissensions in the 
cabinet, Hamilton was further impeded by the rules adopted 
by the two Houses for the transaction of their business. If 
ever it may be said with safety of any man that, given the 
opportunity, he would have been a great parliamentarian, it 
may confidently be said of him. He had the true genius 
for debate in addition to his other and nobler qualities. His 
management of the Convention of New York ^ is in itself a 
sufficient proof of his capacities in this direction. A man 
who could carry his party to victory against a majority of 
two-thirds of the convention and four-sevenths of the people 
would hardly have failed in persuading the triumphant 
Federalists in the first and second Congresses to pass in 
their integrity the measures necessary for the conservation 
of the republic. When, therefore, it was determined by the 
legislative bodies that not only were ministers to be ex- 
cluded from debate, but even their reports and recommenda- 
tions were to be made in writing, it was as if on the eve of 
battle a general were to be forbidden to make use of his 
artillery. Under this regulation the business of a minister 
was merely to prepare his measures for the consideration of 
Congress. The defence and explanation of the policy was 

^ At Poughkeepsie, 1788, ante pp. 176-179. 



206 ALEXANDER HAMILTOIs 

A.D. 1789 taken altogether out of the hands of its author and left to 
^T. 32 friends who, however devoted and intelligent, could hardly 
be expected to understand its bearings in all their width 
and depth. Objections that should have been dealt with at 
the moment were left to wander at large. Opponents who 
should have been smitten hip and thigh upon their first 
hostile movement were often allowed to hold the field for 
want of a proper challenger. Principles were obscured by- 
irrelevant issues, and by sudden appeals to sentiment or the 
authority of phrases. But the chief evil was the exclusion 
of that personal force which transcends all argument and 
tactics, which causes its will to prevail in popular assembUes 
not so much by an appeal to the emotions or even to the 
reason of men, as by the direct impact of character, asserting 
its mastery like the lion-tamer by some inexplicable quality 
inherent in the eyes, the voice and the demeanour. 



CHAPTER IV 

Secretary of the Treasury 

The bill to establish the Treasury department passed into 
law on the 2nd of September 1789, and Hamilton was 
appointed to the Secretaryship on the 11th of the same 
month. In view of the condition of the public finances, it 
was the hardest post under government. Having regard to 
the disposition of mankind when called upon to pay taxes, 
it was the most perilous. And under every aspect it was the 
most important. Friends endeavoured in vain to dissuade 
him from accepting a position which, while it involved the 
sacrifice of a lucrative practice for a stipend inadequate to 
cover the expenses of his household, might also destroy 
a career of brilliant promise by engaging him in an under- 
taking foredoomed, in their judgment, to failure. 



THE FEDERALISTS 207 

The story goes that Washington consulted Robert Morris, A.D. 1789 
the late Superintendent of Finance, upon the dismal pro- 
spects of his department. ' What are we to do with this heavy 
debt ? ' ' There is but one man in the United States who 
can tell you,' Morris replied ; ' that is Alexander Hamilton. 
I am glad you have given me this opportunity to declare to 
you the extent of the obligations I am under to him.' ^ 

Hamilton was appointed Secretary of the Treasury at the 
age of thirty- two, and found himself a great minister of 
state, with a salary of £700 a year. He gave up his pro- 
fession before he had been able to effect any substantial 
savings, in order to undertake the office of Chancellor of 
the Exchequer to an embarrassed and almost bankrupt 
nation, impoverished by a long and costly war. There was 
neither treasury nor treasure, revenue nor stafif of experts, 
system of accounts nor practice of audit — only a crowd of 
solicitous and noisy creditors, and a government without the 
means of paying even the modest expenses that had to be 
incurred from day to day. The currency was in disorder. 
Commercial credit, the fundamental condition of progress 
and prosperity, had ceased to exist. The minds of all men 
were filled with uncertainty, and the life of every industry 
was threatened by the national insolvency. 

One great advantage Hamilton certainly possessed, for 
there was nothing to undo, no creaking system and stiff 
traditions to be destroyed ; but against this may be set the 
disconcerting fact that he was without even the skeleton of 
a service or the remnant of an organisation. Not only had 
he to devise a method, create a machinery, find and train 
his servants ; but he was peremptorily required to furnish an 
immediate revenue, and, while providing it under so great 
pressure, to think out and establish a permanent financial 
policy with which these hasty expedients should not be at 

^ History, iv. p. 30. 



208 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 discord. Beyond all this lie was determined so to fashion 
^'^' ^^ the measures of his department that they should contribute, 
directly as well as indirectly, to the strength of the con- 
stitution which was on its trial. He found himself, there- 
fore, confronted with a labour of drudgery and detail. At 
the same time he was clearly aware that in his hands lay 
the power of affecting the destiny of his country far beyond 
the scope of his particular department. The distracted 
Congress turned to him as a saviour, and within ten days after 
his appointment demanded a report on ways and means.^ 

The confidence with which all men regarded him in these 
days of confusion is a strange phenomenon. Hamilton enjoyed 
even at this date a great financial reputation ; but when we 
come to investigate the basis on which it rested, and the 
means by which it was acquired, it is impossible to suppress 
a smile. His sole practical training for administering the 
finances of the republic had been those few years spent in a 
storekeeper's office in a West Indian sugar island, between 
the ages of eleven and fifteen. He was favourably known 
to many as a charming and handsome young soldier, who 
had written General AVashington's despatches in a most 
admirable style ; who had very gallantly taken a redoubt 
at the crisis of the war ; who had been called to the bar, and 
had at once sprung into a great practice; who, ever since 
he was a college student, had written political pamphlets, 
memoranda and letters ; who had had a large share in 
framing the constitution, and an even larger share in pro- 
curing its adoption by his countrymen. But these charac- 
teristics, qualities and accomplishments, however admirable 
in themselves, hardly seemed to warrant the confidence 
Avith which men saw him undertake the hardest office in 
the first administration. 

But beyond this what was there to show ? Only, so far 

^ History, iv. pp. 32, 45. 



THE FEDERALISTS 209 

as can be gleaned from history, tlie fact that while he was A.D. 1789 
Washington's secretary, harassed by the want of supplies ^^ 

and the ill conduct of affairs, he had written and talked 
about finance and figures, revenue and credit, with an ease 
and decision that made people gape with astonishment. He 
had no credentials save his conversation and his letters. 
He was wholly without training, and had never borne an 
ounce of financial responsibility in the whole course of his 
public career. 

Of all political reputations the reputation for financial 
ability is the easiest to acquire and to lose. A man of 
any notoriety can almost have it for the asking. If he 
has but a small eminence from which to show himself 
to his fellow-countrymen, and a persuasive tongue, or even 
a sufficiently solemn aspect of silent wisdom, he need not 
fear that his fitness will be too severely scanned at the 
beginning. It is almost enough to have been a banker 
in order to be believed a financier. To have become 
suddenly wealthy by speculation, by manufactures, or by 
keeping shops, places his intellectual fitness beyond ques- 
tion, and people then only demand to be satisfied of his 
integrity. For the world hates boredom, and to be forced 
to do arithmetic is for nine-tenths of humanity the gloomiest 
and the most irritating of all forms of boredom. And the 
world also hates, except in rare moments of spiritual exalta- 
tion, to look its indebtedness in the face, fair and square. 
The suspicion of insolvency lurking in the heap of bills 
intensifies its natural disgust with the subject. If a per- 
suasive man suddenly appears, talking fluently of sinking- 
funds and conversions, saying, " Gentlemen, leave it all to 
' me. I see my way. I promise you everything will 
' come right," or if a silent person, who is known for 
his private success, be pushed forward by his admiring 
friends, the world is usually willing, especially when times 

o 



210 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 are bad, to let the dismal burden be strapped upon his 
^^•^- shoulders. 

But if confidence be easy to win in this department of 
human affairs, it is even easier to lose. Bankruptcy has a 
penetrating quality which disconcerts the efforts of the 
bravest charlatan who seeks to banish it with incantations. 
Two months before Hamilton entered Washinsf ton's cabinet 
the Bastille had fallen, and the ancient monarchy of France 
was rocking upon its foundations. For that great disturbance 
of society it may be fairly claimed that persuasive financiers 
had as large a share of the credit as incompetent monarchs 
or extortionate nobles or any other class of mankind. 

In what precisely the quality of state financier consists it 
is difficult to say. Only one thing is certain about him, that 
he must be persuasive in an altogether remarkable degree. 
This is not to lay down the rule that he must be smiling and 
bland and full of amiable prognostications of fair weather ; 
but he must be able to inspire confidence, not only in the tax- 
payers whose affairs are in his charge, but also in the moneyed 
classes with whom the duties of his office place him in 
relations. To speak in terms of his department, his credit 
is of even more importance than his cash. Under a certain 
aspect it almost seems as if, given persuasiveness, a scrupu- 
lous adherence to copy-book precepts will do the rest. A 
moderately clear head, infinite pains and a stiff back will 
carry him a long way. In a nation already enjoying pro- 
sperity these qualifications have often proved quite adequate 
to the purpose ; but in other and more difficult circumstances 
we are conscious of something beyond, which, as it is too 
volatile for definition, we allude to vaguely as genius. Two 
or three men whose names are recorded in history have 
possessed it, and Hamilton is one of these. 

The results in such cases are the only proof; but when, 
impelled by curiosity, we attempt discovery of the methods by 



THE FEDERALISTS 211 

which this peculiar success has been achieved, they continue a.d, 1789 
to elude us. In Hamilton's fluent reports everything appears ^'^' ^^ 
so simple, so obvious, so entirely in accordance with common- 
sense ; everything is so orderly and neat and inevitable, so 
exactly what we should ourselves have recommended un- 
hesitatingly in similar circumstances, that the intelligent 
reader, almost from a kind of modesty, and being accustomed 
to associate genius with a mist or an obscurity, becomes 
sceptical of its existence where nothing of the magician 
is allowed to appear. The cloak, and the hat, and the 
wand, and the air of mystery are all absent, and there is 
nothing at all remarkable except a certain lucidity. 

Hamilton set himself to work, and the principles of 
finance, like the principles of law, immediately surrendered 
to him. His instinct grasped the few essentials of his task 
firmly and clearly. When these were once established, 
industry and firmness did the rest. Swiftly and unhesitat- 
ingly he proceeded to grapple with the multitude of im- 
portant details, inevitable trifles, and pure irrelevancies ; not 
in a spirit of sightless drudgery, but like some traveller on 
a frosty autumn morning who sees before him on the sunlit 
plain the spires and steeples that are his goal, and steps out, 
brisk and cheery, in the full swing of his stride, whistling 
and singing on his way. 

With insight, and with what in a sanguine financier is 
even rarer and more wonderful — with sufficient foresight, 
yet not too much — he devised his method and constructed 
his machine. He collected his staff as best he could, 
and imbued them with his own orderly and indefatigable 
spirit ; arranged a system of audit, checks, records and 
divisions, good enough for his immediate purpose, and, as 
the event has proved, good enough for the United States 
until the present day. 

Regarded merely as an official Hamilton is a great man, 



212 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 for lie constructed his department upon principles that 
have never needed to be altered because they have never 
hampered the national development. Nothing of this work 
has ever been undone by succeeding generations of public 
servants, but has merely expanded and unfolded under 
the pressure of circumstances. When we consider the 
rapidity with which the United States have grown in 
population, wealth and intricacy since 1790, far exceeding 
the progress of any people recorded in history, and even 
far beyond the hopes that Hamilton himself entertained, we 
are amazed at the qualities of practical wisdom that en- 
abled him to create the Treasury. For his contrivance was 
like no human-made garment that is soon worn threadbare 
and outgrown, but rather like the bark of a tree, that from 
the very nature of its being is never inadequate, since it is 
a part of the living organism which it covers. 

Our admiration increases when we remember that he was 
not left in peace like a mathematician in his study to con- 
struct a system, and to emerge by and by at his leisure 
and apply it deliberately to the phenomena of life. He was 
rather in the position of a camp cook who, under a sniping 
fire, is required to build his oven and to supply baked bread. 
Congress was impatient for advice upon a multitude of 
questions and for practical suggestions in a great variety 
of perplexities. And not only the urgency of Congress, but 
the pressure of hard facts rendered delay impossible. 

At the time Hamilton accepted office the cabinet was 
still incomplete. Kjiox, the Minister for War, and Ran- 
dolph, the Attorney-General, were both subordinate figures. 
The most important office in the first administration, after 
the Presidency and the Secretaryship of the Treasury, was 
the Secretaryship of State.^ The most important character 

^ i.e. for Foreign Affairs. It is not intended to suggest that constitution- 
ally the Secretaryship of the Treasury is the superior office, but only that 
in the peculiar circumstances of the time it was the more important. 



THE FEDERALISTS 218 

in the first administration, after Washington and Hamilton, A.D. 1789 
was Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of In- '^' 
dependence, a prominent legislator of Virginia and Minister 
of the United States at the court of France, who accepted 
the post of Secretary of State shortly before Christmas 1789. 
The nomination of Jefferson, who was widely respected, had 
been pressed by Madison and welcomed by Washington. 
The new minister was, however, unable to enter upon the 
duties of his office until the following March, when, upon 
his arrival at the seat of government in New York, he 
found Congress plunged in an eager discussion of Hamil- 
ton's comprehensive plans for dealing with the public 
credit. 

It was said of Hamilton by his enemies at a later time, 
that he took an unconstitutional and arrogant view of his 
own position, and that he regarded himself not merely as the 
head of a department responsible solely to the President, 
but as something in the nature of a prime minister respon- 
sible on the one hand to the President, as to a monarch, 
and on the other hand to Congress. Although this state- 
ment is an ill-natured exaggeration, it is none the less true, 
not only that he threw the net of his department as widely 
as possible over the waters, but that his activity extended 
and his influence predominated far outside the limits of 
his own office. Every important proposal brought forward 
by his colleagues was minuted and reviewed by Hamilton, 
and it may be added that a large number, if not the 
majority, of these proposals were offered at his instiga- 
tion, and were drawn upon lines which he had already 
sketched out. From the beginning to the end of his official 
career the cabinet was literally overwhelmed by his wide 
interest and untiring industry; and although in a short 
time his insistence provoked a violent resentment in certain 
quarters, in the main issues his policy prevailed, and the 



214 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 government submitted to the force of his will, whether the 
various ministers liked it or not. 

The power of getting work done was one of his most 
remarkable qualities, and excites our astonishment alto- 
gether apart from his force of character. The diversity of 
his occupations during the first ten months of office, between 
the date of his appointment and the end of the next session 
in Congress, is little short of appalling. He organised the 
Treasury Department and the revenue system. He sifted 
and analysed the various debts, reported on the public 
credit, and recommended a policy with regard to it. He 
provided supplementary reports at every stage of the Fund- 
ing and the Appropriation Bills ; further reports on the 
much-needed amendment of the Revenue Act, and on the 
voluminous and intricate claims of individuals against the 
Treasury. He issued circulars to the collectors of customs, 
and framed an Act to provide more effectually for the duties 
on imports and tonnage. These were matters which came 
naturally within the scope of his department, and we marvel 
only at the amount of the work accomplished. When we 
remember, however, that no permanent service of experi- 
enced officers stood at his elbow to provide him with the 
necessary assistance, we marvel even more. 

But this activity was not the sum of his labours. During 
the same space of time he made a digest of the navigation 
laws ; reported on the depreciation of the currency, on the 
purchase of West Point for military purposes, and on the 
Post Office department, with regard to which he drafted a 
bill. He drafted bills as to official foreign intercourse, 
remission of fines and forfeitures, and for the establishment 
of lighthouses. He also made a summary of the acts for 
registering and clearing vessels, and drew up a plan for the 
sale of public lands. Nor must it be thought that the first 
ten months was a period of exceptional industry. He con- 



THE FEDERALISTS 215 

tinned the same course until he resigned his office, and A.D. 1790 
during the later years, when foreign affairs and domestic ^'^" ^^ 
disorders became the chief cares of government, when the 
attacks of his opponents were levelled, not only against his 
measures, but against his personal honour, the burden of 
work was far heavier than in this earlier period of compara- 
tive calm. 



CHAPTER V 

The Public Credit 

When Congress met at the beginning of the new year,^ it 
was obvious that the chief subject of its deliberations must 
be the disordered finances of the Republic. During the war 
with Britain both the Federal Congress and the governments 
of the various states had contracted a variety of onerous 
debts for the advantage of the common cause. The total 
sum that had been borrowed in this way amounted to some 
sixteen millions sterling. When it is a case of raising the 
wind at a time of national difficulty, it is beyond reason to 
look for a clear and uniform system. Financiers, both state 
and federal, had to get money how and when they could, and 
the result was a bewildering confusion of accounts, creditors, 
securities, rates of interest and principles of repayment. In 
many cases payment of interest was heavily in arrear, while 
any repayment of the capital was almost too remote a con- 
tingency for contemplation. ' We are in a wilderness,' wrote 
Madison sadly, ' without a single footstep to guide us ' ; ^ 
and Ames puts the same thought in more grandiloquent 
language : ' We perceive a great, unavoidable confusion 
' throughout the whole scene, presenting a deep, dark and 
* dreary chaos, impossible to be reduced to order without 

1 7th January 1790. 2 History, iv. p. 47, 



216 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1790 ' the mind of the architect is clear and capacious, and his 
JEt. 33 ( pQ^ej. commensurate with the occasion." ^ 

Fortunately, ' the mind of the architect ' was well suited 
to the needs of the problem. Fortunately, also, there was a 
promptitude in his action which, in the particular situation 
of affairs, was invaluable. On the day after Congress assem- 
bled Hamilton announced that he was ready to submit a 
full report on the public credit, and desired to be instructed 
whether he should discharge this duty by speech or in 
writing. According to some commentators Congress feared 
lest they might come too much under the spell of his 
eloquence, and it was for this reason that they signified their 
wish to consider a written statement of the national finances. 
The report was immediately placed upon the table, and the 
House of Representatives proceeded to consider its contents 
a week after they had met.^ 

The principle of Hamilton's first series of financial 
measures was a copy-book heading; the most universal, 
indeed, of all that family of aphorisms — Honesty is the best 
Policy. He held that nations should pay their debts 
punctiliously, both as a matter of honour, and because it 
was wise. 

The federal debt was due partly to foreign, partly to 
domestic creditors; and there were besides the various 
debts due by the several states. Hamilton's simple and 
comprehensive plan was that the central government should 
recognise all these liabilities at their face value, should 
undertake full responsibility towards the various creditors, 
and should see to the discharge of all arrears of interest in 
accordance with the bonds. With these objects he proposed 
to consolidate the whole in a National Debt, with a proper 
provision for redemption by means of a sinking-fund. As 
the new constitution now gave a much greater security to 

^ History, iv. p. 47. ^ 14th January 1790. 



THE FEDERALISTS 217 

the lenders for the principal as well as for the punctual A.D. 1790 
payment of interest, he considered himself entitled to pro- ''' 
pose, as an equivalent for the assumption of these responsi- 
bilities by the federal government, a reduction of the vary- 
ing and exceedingly onerous terms of the original bargains 
to a uniform and more moderate rate. 

About Hamilton's proposals for dealing with the foreign 
debt there was little disagreement ; ^ but a fierce contest arose 
with regard to the domestic debt, and one still more fierce 
on his scheme for the assumption of the state debts by the 
central government. 

In the case of the federal domestic debt it was contended 
with some truth that there had been speculation. Many of 
the original holders had parted with their securities much 
below the face value under the pressure of necessity or 
through hopelessness of redemption. The deserving patriots 
who had lent money, or parted with money's worth in goods 
or services on behalf of the national cause, would not receive 
the chief benefit under the proposed arrangement. A tribe 
of gamblers, usurers and speculators who had bought up the 
paper at a huge discount would derive an unholy profit. 
The evil was grossly exaggerated. Hamilton maintained 
firmly that whether honest men or rascals held the bill, a 
promise to pay remained a promise to pay. A self-respecting 
nation, like a self-respecting merchant, must honour its 
signature and meet its engagements as to interest and 
principal alike. With this solid argument he answered 
every opponent — the loose-tongued, loud-voiced demagogue 
who loved repudiation for its own charms ; and the fantastic 
sentimentalist who believed, in all sincerity no doubt, that 
hardship might be set right by injustice. 

It was Hamilton's fate to encounter the doctrine of 
repudiation at many points in his public career, and when- 
^ History, iv. p. 50. 



218 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1790 ever he met with it he gave no quarter. It was abhorrent to 
"^" him as a gentleman. As a statesman he judged rightly that 
if successful it would prove ruinous to his country by the 
destruction of credit, and by corrupting the character of its 
citizens. This doctrine of repudiation has had a singular 
vitality in American politics, and has appeared on a variety 
of occasions in suitable disguises. Sometimes, as in the 
present instance, it was a moralist, eloquent upon the un- 
worthiness of the creditor; at others it was a strategist 
arguing in favour of dishonesty as a form of warfare,^ 
threatening nations who had incurred the displeasure of the 
United States with the cancellation of all public bonds and 
private debts due to their subjects. 

Madison, Hamilton's old colleague of the Federalist, came 
forward with an amiable and well-meaning plan for a 
division between the original and the present holders of 
domestic federal debt.^ By this means he pretended that 
the sufferings of the army might be equitably recognised. 
He argued warmly that soldiers who had disposed of their 
warrants for arrears of pay at large discounts were justly 
entitled to receive a further benefit when at last a stable 
government was in a position to redeem the pledges of its 
predecessor. This view of the matter was pressed upon 
Washington not only by Madison, but by the Secretary of 
State.^ Fortunately the plausible but unsound plea ended 
in failure. The * poor soldier ' argument, like the ' poor 
widow' argument, was destroyed by Hamilton's vigorous 
common-sense. The case was well put by one of his 
supporters : ' The original holder has no claim upon the 
justice of the government. His claim is on its humanity.' * 

But unfortunately 'humanity' implied further taxation, 
and this attempt upon the part of Madison to shift the 

* e.g. History, v. pp. 523-24. ^ History, iv. p. 76. 

* History, iv, pp. 129-30. * Lawrence, History, iv. p. 79. 



THE FEDERALISTS 219 

burden of recompensing the army from the shoulders of A.D. 1790 
the citizens to the shoulders of the creditors of the Union ^^" ^^ 
was only repudiation in a more ingenious form. The 
niggardly individual, anxious merely to withhold as much 
as possible from the tax-gatherer, does not easily find a plea 
that lends itself to noble-mouthed rhetoric. A society for 
the avoidance of personal obligations would not be felt 
to rest upon a strong moral basis ; but if it can be pre- 
tended that not a private but a patriotic motive is involved, 
a better stand may be made. According to the practice of 
demagogy, the doctrine of repudiation was in this way raised 
to a higher moral plane. In the twilight of words and 
phrases the seductive idea, like a lady of doubtful virtue 
and waning beauty, was arranged in a charitable and be- 
coming shadow, and honesty was insulted by her lovers. 

Madison has been bitterly assailed, and not without 
excuse, by the admirers of Hamilton. Much has been made 
of apparent contradictions in his course of conduct, and of 
changes in his attitude, towards men and ideas. His stead- 
fast advocacy of the Union at the Convention of Philadelphia 
has been contrasted with his refusal during the first period 
of federal government to support the measures by which 
alone the Union could be turned into a reality. And from 
this it has been argued that a sour jealousy, and not any 
earnest conviction, directed his actions during Washing- 
ton's administration. But viewing the contest from a 
remoter standpoint, these contradictions and changes be- 
come of less importance. The accusation of a flagrant and 
interested inconsistency fails to convince the modern reader 
of its justice. 

Madison was an upright, unimpassioned man, but he was 
an idealist only under compulsion. Diffidence was his most 
remarkable characteristic. The impression he makes upon 
the mind is of something unusually formal and precise. It 



220 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1790 appears altogether incredible that he was upon any occasion 
^' untidy in his dress; that he ever mislaid a penknife or a 
memorandum ; that he ever shook with laughter or shouted 
with joy. He is the type of the elderly young man who has 
pleasure only in sedate company. His intellect was power- 
ful but full of cobwebs. We contrast it with the intellect 
of Hamilton, which excites a certain measure of distrust 
because of its preternatural and appalling perspicacity. 
Men of slow wits have admired Madison for his defects, 
have judged him wise because he shared their own in- 
firmities, and prudent because he ran away from the con- 
sequences of his opinions. He loved discussion, though he 
was averse from wrangling. In spite of his temperament 
he never shrank, as Jefferson always did, from meeting his 
enemy in the gate. He was no less conspicuous for his 
personal courage than for his timidity as a statesman. " I 
' think him a little too much of a book politician, and too 
* timid in his politics," wrote Fisher Ames. ". . . He seems 
' evidently to want manly firmness and energy of character."^ 
The reproach, upon analysis, seems to resolve itself into this 
— that he was wanting not so much in the courage of his 
ideas, as in ideas. It was an epoch of construction, and he 
was deficient both in boldness and in imagination. As a critic 
he never lacked confidence, but criticism was not the supreme 
need of the moment. 

Madison was also peculiarly subject to personal influence. 
It has been considered amazing that, having supported a 
national policy at Philadelphia, he should have run counter 
to it almost from the beginning of the federal government. 
But it is really more amazing that he took the line he did 
durinsr the convention. For his course before that event was 
entirely consistent with his subsequent action. It almost 

* Fisher Ames, History, iv. p. 75. 



THE FEDERALISTS 221 

seems as if at Philadelphia he was under some kind of A.D. 1790 
enchantment, and advocated a policy which was discordant ^'^" ^^ 
to some extent with the natural mood of his mind. It is no 
surprise, therefore, that he fell speedily under the influence 
of Jefferson, whose procedure was far more sympathetic to 
his disposition. We have a feeling that even at Philadelphia 
Hamilton frightened him. Hamilton's methods were too 
swift, his manner too peremptory ; his very confidence was 
provocative of doubt and hesitation. Madison was by nature 
suspicious of the constructive statesman, and inclined to the 
belief that inaction was usually wisdom and action folly. 
Consequently he was attracted by the Jeflfersonian policy of 
drifting into danger, preferring it to strenuous efforts, even 
though these had for their object to escape from the fatal 
current. 

It may be true, but if true it is unimportant, that he was 
jealous of Hamilton; for he was in essentials too honest 
a man to be guided by such considerations. If his tempera- 
ment had been sympathetic to the policy of Hamilton, we 
may believe he would have supported that policy even 
though he had hated its projector. Even after reading the 
seven volumes of Hamilton the younger we decline to be 
convinced that Madison was anything but a good man. He 
was a good man in the most intolerable sense. His excessive 
virtue deprived him of charity. He appropriated all virtue 
to himself and his followers. His sincerity upon this point 
would be detestable if it were not so ludicrous. He believed 
fanatically that his opponents were utterly corrupt. He 
made and permitted to be made, under the shelter of his 
name, the grossest charges against their personal honour, 
charges which his common-sense must have told him clearly 
were nothing better than rubbish had he not been wholly 
possessed by this illusion as to his sole property in virtue. 

From the date of his opposition to Hamilton's proposals 



222 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1790 for dealing with tlie debt his course of action towards his 
'^'^' ^^ former friend is wanting not merely in generosity but in 
candour. At every point his constitutional antipathy to 
constructive statesmanship appears ; but there is also a 
more bitter and personal accent of hostility which can be 
traced to the resentment of one who, having been temporarily 
led out of his natural course by the influence of a superior 
character, has returned to his ancient habits and looks back 
upon his aberration with horror. His manner towards 
Hamilton from this time forward is always grudging. His 
favourite Aveapon is that of the common politician — the 
suggestion of motives so mean that they are wholly in- 
credible. The triviality of his attacks is painful. The dis- 
interested reader turns the pages quickly, anxious not to 
dwell too long upon the humiliation of a worthy gentleman, 
whose friends, had they been true ones, would often have 
drowned his eloquence in a discreet tumult or would have 
led him away to recover his sense and his dignity. 

In the end Hamilton carried his point as to the federal 
debts, and vindicated the sanctity of contract all along the 
line. He routed with equal success the people who wished 
to escape taxes, though they had profited by the loans, and 
those others who professed themselves willing to pay, pro- 
vided that a portion of the funds were taken away from the 
legal holders and given in charity. The federal debts, both 
foreign and domestic, were in the end recognised and con- 
solidated, and provision made for full payment of all the 
arrears of interest. 

The assumption of the state debts was a harder matter. 
States which had incurred small debts, or none, upon 
account of the war, were persuaded without much difficulty 
to regard it as monstrously unfair that the large debts of 
their neighbours should be saddled upon the Union. The 
mere diiierence in the amounts stank of injustice to the 



THE FEDERALISTS 223 

simpler class of citizens, while for the more refined there A.D. 1790 
was the argument that the heavily indebted states must ^'^' ^^ 
have been negligently administered. Opponents of the 
government policy clamoured for a hostile and searching 
scrutiny of reasons, expenditure and accounts. 

By such means it was made to appear that a certain 
corporate dignity was outraged by Hamilton's high-handed 
procedure. Finally Congress,^ by a majority of two, refused 
Hamilton's proposal to take over the war debts which the 
states individually had incurred for the common good. 

Hamilton determined to have this decision reversed, and 
he accomplished his end in a characteristic fashion by giving 
a civility in exchange for a loaf of bread. It so happened 
that the states of little debts, and therefore disposed 
against assumption, were for the most part southern states, 
while those of big debts were mainly northern. Each 
of these parties desired, for sentimental reasons, that the 
capital of the Federal Republic should be fixed within its 
own boundaries. Hamilton spoke with Jefferson, who was 
of the southern party, and Jefferson gave a dinner-party. 
Being, according to his own account, but a child in such 
matters, he remained silent, and allowed his guests to talk. 
As the result a compact was arrived at whereby the 
majority adverse to assumption of the state debts was 
converted into a minority ,2 and the south in return was 
allowed to possess the honour of the capital city of the 
Union.2 

In his treatment of the debt Hamilton was not concerned 
merely with the honour of his country, nor did he regard 
the matter only with the merchant's eye to the advantages 
of good credit in case of further troubles. His measures 
were something more than financial. They had a deliberate 
political intention. The constitution, as has been stated 

» 12th April 1790, « July 1790. » Ford's Jefferson, i. pp. 161-62. 



224 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. already, did not entirely satisfy him. He felt that the plain 

1790-1791 ^QQ^Q^QOf of its terms did not convey sufficient power to the 
^T. 33-34 '^ / ...... 

administration, nor secure beyond question solidarity in 

the Union. His efforts accordingly were directed towards 

supplementing its deficiencies. 

The political object of his financial policy was to bind the 
moneyed classes firmly to the central government ; to induce 
them to look to that quarter for the security of their capital 
and the punctuality of their dividends ; to fix their interests 
in it rather than in the state governments. The interests 
of this powerful class being thus made dependent upon the 
existence of the Union, it was natural to suppose that they 
would cherish it and contribute to its strength, as the family 
of a man whose wealth is in annuities zealously and tenderly 
endeavours to prolong his days in peace. It was a legitimate 
aim, but it could hardly hope to escape opposition when 
once its purpose was fully detected. 

Hamilton claimed for his measures that they would 
' cement more closely the union of the states ' and ' establish 
public order on the basis of an upright and liberal policy.' ^ 
He was fully aware that, if successful, they would strengthen 
the central government in comparison with the state 
governments — to a large extent, indeed to the detriment of 
the latter — by assuming a great portion of their respon- 
sibilities, and by identifying and allying the safety and self- 
interest of the creditors with the power and permanency 
of the federal authority. It was a deliberate aim, and it 
succeeded. The champions of State Rights who had 
opposed the constitution naturally strove against these 
extensions of its hated principles with the energy of despair. 
This zealous panic swept many of the timid and hesitating 
off their feet, Madison among the number. It gathered up 
also in its course all the disappointed, all the feeble, critical 

1 Works, ii. p. 232. 



THE FEDERALISTS 225 

and disaffected folk whose ardour and constancy were not A.D. 
sufficiently tempered to carry them beyond the threshold of ^^^~}J^2 
Union on into its consequences. 

The establishment of the National Bank during the next 
session of Congress (1791) carried this policy of allying 
property with order a step further. Its practical advantages 
were obvious, the necessity for it overwhelming. Commerce 
was in a diseased condition, suffering from a kind of 
paralysis. Natural wealth and human industry existed in 
abundance; but any means of making capital sufficiently 
mobile for the uses of mankind was altogether absent. 
Credit and confidence were lacking. The want of the 
facilities of exchange and of a reliable medium of circula- 
tion had reduced portions of society to the primitive and 
laborious methods of barter. Hamilton's policy was boldly 
opposed to the doctrine of laisser faire. In his opinion it 
was the duty of the state, in these circumstances, not 
merely to preserve security and order, but actually to create 
credit. He laid this down as a legitimate function of 
government ; and, in spite of the opposition which deplored 
a further increase in the stability and influence of the 
central government, the practical urgency of the remedy 
secured its adoption by Congress. 

But a more serious obstacle then remained to be sur- 
mounted. The question of legality was raised, and the 
President was known to entertain doubts. Banking was 
alleged to be outside the four corners of the constitution ; a 
thing which could not be undertaken lawfully by the central 
government. Jefierson, Madison and others laboured this 
argument in minutes and memoranda which Washington 
carefully considered. Hamilton, in reply, set up the 
doctrine of invplied powers} If nothing could be done 
that was not expressly named in the articles of union, 

1 Works, iv. pp. 445-93. 
P 



226 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 these articles could never fit the uses of a great and de- 
■ velopmg state. The constitution under so strict an inter- 
pretation would be but a lifeless legal document and 
nothing more; a bone for dogs to quarrel over and not a 
rod to govern with. This constitution, Hamilton contended, 
was, and was meant to be, merely an outline. It was neces- 
sary to look at its great intention, and to judge it to be the 
possessor of all the powers implied in that intention. The 
Secretary of the Treasury prevailed and the President 
signed,^ and the greatest jurist of the early days of the 
Republic^ decided that Hamilton was right and his 
opponents wrong. 

The passing of the Bank Bill was an important landmark. 
The main principles of Hamilton's financial system were 
then established. The framework was complete. Speaking 
broadly, he had succeeded at every important point. His 
measures, it is true, had suffered certain changes during 
their progress through the two houses of Congress. It had 
been necessary to make concessions in detail in order to 
save the spirit of his policy. Nor do these concessions 
appear in any case to have been improvements upon the 
original plan. Where there had been a direct simplicity 
they introduced a certain confusion. They shrank from a 
full acceptance of the highest standard of financial integrity, 
and aimed rather at doing substantial justice than at boldly 
affixing the seal to any great principle of finance.^ Con- 
sequently they failed to secure the absolute safety of the 
policy, which in subsequent sessions had to suffer many 
attacks and did not come off entirely scatheless. But on 
the whole, when we consider all the difficulties of the case, 
and make due allowance for the effect of Hamilton's exclu- 

1 25th Feb. 1791. ^ joj^ Marshall, History, iv. p. 489. 

' Cf. History, iv. pp. 145-50, where the measures as passed are compared 
with the measures as originally drafted. 



THE FEDERALISTS 227 

sion from the discussion, his triumph was one of the most A.D. 1791 
remarkable order. '^'^' ^* 

For another reason also the passing of the Bank Bill was 
an important landmark. The cleavage in the cabinet dates 
from this event. Jefferson was hostile to the measure upon 
every ground. He regarded it as an invasion of State 
Rights and an infringement of the constitution. In his 
opinion it had no practical merits, and violated every 
sound principle of law directed against mortmain, alienage, 
descent, distribution and monopoly. After the cabinet 
discussions upon this question, the correspondence of Jeffer- 
son with Hamilton, which only a month earlier had been 
' yours respectfully and affectionately,' ^ passes into the 
third person. Henceforward there was no friendship 
between the two men, and very soon their enmity became 
a public scandal. 

From the summer of 1790, when the assumption and 
funding of the debt were finally settled, there was a rapid 
and steady increase of prosperity throughout the country.^ 
Hamilton's immediate aim was realised even beyond his 
hopes. A conspicuous benefit to the nation had attended 
his earliest measures. Within eighteen months Britain was 
so much impressed that she accredited an agent to the 
government of the United States.^ At the beginning of 
1791 a loan of two and a half millions of florins was 
opened in Holland, and filled in two hours upon better 
terms than could be obtained by any European power save 
Britain.* The subscriptions to the National Bank were 
completed in a single day.^ Carried away by the sudden 
change from bankruptcy to credit, men lost their heads, 
and in spite of Hamilton's earnest protests^ engaged in 
the wildest speculation. As a matter of course the panic 

1 History, iv. p. 280. 2 /j;^;, j^, pp_ 281-82. 3 jn^^ j^. p. 286. 

* ibid. B jjjid^ 6 ji{^^ iy_ p_ 287-88. 



228 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 which ensued caused much distress while it lasted, but 
was speedily overcome. The chief evil was rather the 
handle it gave to the prophets of evil among the opposition 
than any permanent damage to the community. It was 
attributable in no sense to Hamilton's measures, but only 
to the folly and cupidity of a section of the people. 

The first Congress ended its existence ^a week after the 
Bank Bill had passed into law. 

CHAPTER VI 

Commerce and the Union 

At the beginning of December 1791, a few days after the 
opening of the first session of the second Congress, Hamilton 
submitted to the House of Representatives a report on 
Manufactures} The policy advocated in this document 
was something much more than an outline or a skeleton. 
Its survey of existing facts and conditions was comprehen- 
sive; its aims definite; the action which it recommended 
was in full accord with the spirit of his previous measures. 
Self-contained and independent, it was none the less an 
essential part of the great federal plan. 

Of the important proposals introduced and urged by 
Hamilton this alone was not accepted by the nation during 
his lifetime. It has even been alleged that he did not 
expect it to be accepted by his contemporaries ; but it seems 
incredible that he should have intended it merely as a legacy. 
For not only is it entirely contrary to our conception of the 
remarkably practical character of Hamilton's statesmanship 
that he should engage in anything which he did not believe to 
be ripe for accomplishment, but the internal evidence of the 
Report itself is conclusive. It enters into the most business- 
like details. It is filled with concrete arguments drawn from 
1 Works, iv. pp. 70-202. 



THE FEDERALISTS 229 

the hard facts of the year seventeen hundred and ninety-one A.D. 1791 
when it was written. It is restrained and reasonable, per- • 
suasive and disarming. Its eagerness and hope stamp it as 
having had an immediate object and not a remote one. A 
man does not write like this to give advice to posterity, but 
only to wring the necessary consent from to-day. Haste is 
visible in every page, but nowhere impatience. The docu- 
ment has the appearance of a letter that has been written 
at unnecessary length, because the occasion was pressing 
and the writer lacked the leisure to prune it to a more 
sententious form. It recalls the correspondence of Bismarck 
with its rough, careless logic and vigorous redundancy. It 
is wanting in compactness but never for a moment in 
lucidity. He repeats the same argument in slightly different 
forms, but there is never the slightest doubt either as to 
what he wishes to do or as to why he wishes to do it. As a 
state document it stands in the first rank, not only by virtue 
of its quality of thought, but by reason of its ultimate 
authority. The report on Manufactures is filled with the 
personal charm of the author and with the hopefulness and 
sincerity of youth, but at the same time it is as clear and 
shrewd as the letters of a banker to his agent or a merchant's 
valuation of his stock. It is a strange but distinguished 
figure among state documents in all their great variety; 
but perhaps still stranger and more distinguished when it is 
remembered that the theme on which it is written has been 
named ' the dismal science.' 

Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations had appeared in 1776 — 
the first year of the American Revolution. Hamilton had 
studied the book with care, and had written a commentary 
upon it, which unfortunately has been lost.^ The contact of 

1 Mr. Sumner doubts this, but his argument does not seem conclusive 
against J. C. Hamilton's statements, History, ii. p. 514, on the authority of 
P. S. Duponceau (1783). The commentary was written while Hamilton was 
still a member of Congress (Sumner's Hamilton, p. 108). 



230 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.T). 1791 two braius so frosli and original, and so froo from oant, was 
"' ^' too TftluaWo to have gono into the dust-liGap. Adam Smith, 
tho absont-mindod student and philosopher, educated at a 
Scots university, matured by seven years' study at Oxford, 
had been appointed in duo time to lecture upon Logic 
and Moral Philosophy to the undergraduates of Glasgow. 
Friendly, interested and clear-eyed, ho mixed in tho society 
of tho merchants and manufacturers of that thriving city, 
drank their claret and joined in their discussions; and while 
he continued to lecture on logic and ethics, on rhetoric and 
the belles lettres, in accordance with the terms of his founda- 
tion, his mind began to revolve the problems of the wealth 
of nations as a subordinate part of " an immense design of 
* showing the origin and development of cultivation and 
' law ; or, as we may perhaps put it, not inappropriately, of 
' saying how, from being a savage, man rose to be a Scots- 
' man." ^ ^^^latever may have been the case with the rest 
of his speculations, those aflecting conunerce were founded 
upon the study of the facts at first hand. 

Adam Smith published a book on the Moral Sentiments, 
and on the strength of the reputation it produced, was 
appointed bear-leader of tho young Duke of Buccleuch, 
whom it was decided to send upon the grand tour. In this 
capacity he travelled for three years in Europe, spending 
most of his time in France, and studying the conditions of 
humanity everywhere with an eager eye. AVlien he returned, 
he lived for ten years quietly with his mother in the village 
of Kirkcaldy in the ancient kingdom of Fife, meditating 
upon tho plan of his life's work without excessive impa- 
tience. ^^^len sixty-three years of age he published tho 
IVealth of Nations, the first instalment of this great plan 
and also the last; for the fame of it procured him the 
appointment of Commissioner of Customs, and during the 

^ Bagehot, Biographical Studies, p. 255. 



THE FEDERALISTS 231 

remaining fourteen years of his life he lived very comfort- A.D. 1791 
ably in Edinburgh society, performing a task for which he ^'^' ^* 
was entirely unfitted. 

Adam Smith cannot have been conscious of the immense 
influence his famous work would afterwards exercise upon 
the fortunes of his country. He was an elderly philosopher 
contemplating the conditions of an old world, that had not 
yet begun to renew its youth, in a spirit of gentle curiosity. 
Hamilton was a young statesman considering the future of 
a great continent which he had the ambition to mould, not 
only by the force of his thoughts, but by the vigour of his 
acts. In Adam Smith he found a lucid analysis of causes 
he had been revolving, a discussion of systems he had been 
constructing in his own mind with a determination to bring 
them into operation as soon as opportunity should make it 
possible. In their conclusions there was doubtless some dis- 
agreement, but they were at one at least in their method ; 
in their preference for observation of the facts at first hand 
over all the other and easier ways of arriving at conclusions 
in political science. 

Hamilton's report urges the importance of the immediate 
establishment of manufactures upon two fundamental 
reasons — military security and national development. 
"Not only the wealth but the independence and security 
' of a country appear to be materially connected with the 
* prosperity of manufactures. Every nation, with a view to 
' those great objects, ought to endeavour to possess within 
' itself all the essentials of national supply. These comprise 
' the means of subsistence, habitation, clothing, and defence. 

* The possession of these is necessary to the perfection of 
' the body politic ; to the safety as well as to the welfare of 
' the society. The want of either is the want of an important 
' organ of political life and motion ; and in the various crises 
' which await a state it must severely feel the effects of 



232 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 ' any such deficiency. The extreme embarrassments of the 

^' ' United States during the late war, from an incapacity of 

' supplying themselves, are still matter of keen recollection; 

* a future war might be expected again to exemplify the 
' mischiefs and dangers of a situation to which that incapacity 
' is still, in too great a degree, applicable, unless changed by 

* timely and vigorous exertion. To effect this change, as 
' fast as shall be prudent, merits all the attention and all the 
' zeal of our public councils : it is the next great work to be 
' accomplished." ^ 

But national development requires, no less than military 
security, manufacturers and traders in addition to farmers 
and planters. It is a question of good husbandry. The 
human and material resources of the imperial estate must 
both engage the attention of government. If military security 
calls for a self-contained and self-sufficing confederation, 
commercial security and national welibeing demand a de- 
velopment which shall be symmetrical and not lopsided, 
a society of varied enterprise and multitudinous employ- 
ments. A nation of specialists, whether farmers or bankers, 
manufacturers or traders, lacks the essential condition of 
permanency, for its various parts do not aftbrd an adequate 
support one to another. Its wealth depends upon its inter- 
course with foreign nations. If circumstances should arise 
when this intercourse is violently interrupted, if its supplies 
are cut off, or its surplus goods refused, it will experience 
a shock, ruinous to a greater or less extent. The wars, 
disasters and policies of strangers are a constant menace 
to its prosperity. It is at the mercy, not only of the malice 
of its rivals, but of the misfortunes of its friends. 

But there is an argument beyond mere commercial safety. 
The development of a nation will be much more rapid if it 
encourages a town population to support its country people ; 

1 Works, iv. pp. 135, 136. 



THE FEDERALISTS 233 

artisans to consume the produce of the fields, farmers to A.D. 1791 
employ the output of the mills. The establishment of work- ^' 
shops will therefore prove a benefit to the United States 
by ' creating in some instances a new, and securing, in all, 
a more certain and steady demand for the produce of the 
soil.' ^ 

Moreover, in a fully developed community the natural 
genius, aptitude and inclination of every man desiring to 
earn his living will readily find work suitable to his character. 
It clearly makes for the wealth of any country if it can 
'furnish greater scope for the diversity of talents and dis- 
positions which discriminate men from each other.' ^ In 
such a state also employment will be found for classes of 
the community not hitherto engaged in business : for the 
wives and daughters of husbandmen who would otherwise 
be idle, or insufficiently or less remuneratively employed. 

The immigration of good citizens will be stimulated. Manu- 
facturers and workmen of the Old World, impatient of its 
'burthens and restraints,' attracted by their "greater-personal 
' independence and consequence under the operation of a 
' more equal government," tempted also by the boon of " a 
* perfect equality of religious privileges . . . more precious 
' than mere religious toleration," will flock into such a state 
if only they can be inspired with the hope of being able 
to pursue their own trades and industries there 'with an 
assurance of encouragement and employment.' ^ But these 
men, the best and the most intelligent of the middle and 
working classes of Europe, will not transplant themselves 
without excessive provocation, if by emigrating they have no 
alternative to engaging in agriculture, an avocation to which 
they have served no training, and the pursuit of which 
would entail the sacrifice of all their technical skill and 
inherited experience. 

» Works, iv. p. 87. ^ Ibid. ^ Ibid. p. 92. 



234 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 To this composite and self-contained state will also accrue 
^ the advantages of a scientific division of labour, whereby 
the national prosperity is increased through men becoming 
experts in particular departments. And as the minds and 
characters of the people are like a natural field of various 
soils that may be cultivated, well or ill, suitably or unsuit- 
ably, just as much as swamps of rice, or acres of corn, or 
plantations of tobacco, the state which develops at the 
same time in a multitude of directions will reap a benefit 
in a political as well as in a commercial sense — both directly 
in its wealth and indirectly in the character of its citizens. 
Its varied opportunities will "cherish and stimulate the 

* activity of the human mind by multiplying the objects 
' of enterprise."^ The imaginations of the restless and 
ambitious spirits will be touched with a magic wand. 
"Every new scene which is opened to the busy nature of 

* man to rouse and excite itself, is the addition of a new 
' energy to the general stock of effort. The spirit of enter- 

* prise, useful and prolific as it is, must necessarily be 
' contracted or expanded, in proportion to the simplicity or 

* variety of the occupations and productions which are to be 
' found in a society. It must be less in a nation of mere 
' cultivators than in a nation of cultivators and merchants ; 

* less in a nation of cultivators and merchants than in a 

* nation of cultivators, artificers, and merchants." ^ 

With the utmost care and tenderness, avoiding the con- 
tentious phrase and all words of provocation, Hamilton 
examines in turn a variety of arguments and opinions that 
had been urged and held at different times against the 
establishment of manufactures in general, and in the peculiar 
circumstances of the states. The old doctrine of Quesnay 
and the Economistes, that agriculture is more profitable than 
the labour of the mill and workshop, because in the fields 

^ TVorks, iv. p. 94. ^ Ibid. iv. pp. 94, 95. 



THE FEDERALISTS 235 

man works with Nature as a partner, but in the other case A.D. 1791 
man works alone, is examined at a length and with such '^' 
respect as somewhat amazes us at the present time. Hamil- 
ton meets the contention that labour would be diverted 
from the land, and that the narrow capital of the new 
empire would be insufficient for engaging in a competition 
with Europe, and other arguments of the same character 
with a respectful eagerness and a good nature that are full 
of persuasiveness. 

Having established the necessity of manufactures on the 
grounds of military security and national development, 
having proved the advantages, direct and indirect, to wealth 
and character, to stability and progress, of a composite and 
well-balanced industrial society, he comes to the practical 
consideration — how is such a condition of things to be 
created ? 

It had never been allowed to exist in the colonies, but it 
showed hardly greater signs of life in the free republic. It 
might never exist. It certainly would not come to pass 
speedily if left to the action of individuals. To consummate 
the federalist policy a rapid prosperity was of the highest 
importance, and this would only be attained under the care 
and direction of government. It was the function of the 
state, according to Hamilton's argument, to provide induce- 
ments that would make men engage readily in manufacture ; 
to sustain the young industries against the ruthless and 
deliberate assaults of more powerful communities; to meet 
the commercial regulations of foreigners with a vigorous and 
consistent policy of national defence. 

He viewed his country ever as a whole. States and divi- 
sions meant nothing to him. Local sentiment affected him 
with so little sympathy that he failed, except on one occasion,^ 
even to use it as a weapon. In his imagination there was a 

1 Ante, p. 223. 



236 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 great continent united by a miraculous good fortune into one 
^'^' ^^ state, of unknown extent, of undefined limits, unexplored and 
uninhabited save for a fringe along the Atlantic seaboard, 
but surmised to be habitable and fertile throughout the 
length and breadth of its territories. The rapid development 
of this great inheritance meant much more to Hamilton's 
mind than the mere addition of so many families and so 
much wealth to the national stock. It meant the oblitera- 
tion of state rivalry and the sweeping out, as by a flood, of 
the litter and decay of ancient jealousies. Its ultimate inten- 
tion, like all the rest of his policy, was union. His vision 
was of one great nation, capable of producing within its own 
wide borders everything that its citizens would require for 
life, for comfort, and even for luxury. Independent of its 
neighbours, it might hope to escape from embroilment in 
their quarrels ; dependent on the co-operation of its members, 
it would be secured in the possession of internal peace. But 
a lopsided expansion, an absorption of nine-tenths of the 
inhabitants in pastoral and agricultural pursuits, was in his 
opinion neither a swift nor a sure means to this end. Such 
a development was more likely to occur, was in a sense 
easier and more natural than the other ; but as a gardener 
will take pains to secure an even and symmetrical growth 
in his plantation, by pruning, by the removal of obstacles 
at the roots, by the admission of light, by the destruction 
of oppressive neighbours, by defence against the winds and 
storms ; so, he argued, should the state regard it as one of 
its most important duties to promote a healthy industrial 
society of varied employments which gave mutual support. 

The reply of the economist that all this would come to 
pass in good time if it were really desirable, failed to satisfy 
him. There is no such great hurry, argued his opponents. 
The intelligent self-interest of the individual will produce 
manufactures in their proper season. His opponents spun 



THE FEDERALISTS 237 

amiable theories on the nature of the economic man — and a.d. 1791 
hazarded sanguine prophecies of his glorious destiny, if '^' 
left to his own devices, without help or hindrance from 
government. 

Hamilton believed in the possibility of a commercial 
policy. The doctrine of laisser faire did not appeal to 
him any more than it would have appealed to a tobacco- 
planter in reference to the cultivation of his estate. The 
effort, it is true, can only come from the individual, as 
the sap can only come from the soil ; but the direction of 
effort, if it is not to run to waste, must come from elsewhere. 
There are things desirable in commerce too big, and by their 
nature impossible, for private citizens to achieve even in 
combination. In the frankest terms he disputed the 
pessimist creed of leaving things alone and letting men 
blindly wander round in hopeless circles of wasted effort. 
He contended that a commercial policy in a positive and not 
in a negative sense was necessary in the circumstances of 
the case. 

Hamilton had definitely committed himself to this solution 
of the problem when he founded the National Bank with 
the avowed object of creating commercial credit. It would 
be incorrect to say that the report on Manufactures carries 
this policy one step further ; for in reality it travels to the 
very end of the journey. It contains both the science and 
the art of modern commercial development. The policy that 
has slowly and awkwardly struggled into existence during 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, which is pursued 
every year with greater confidence and perspicacity by all 
the great industrial nations, with the exception of the 
United Kingdoms, is Hamilton's policy. He thought it out 
for himself, keenly contemplating the commercial facts of 
New York and the New World, by much the same method as 
Adam Smith, the basis of whose speculations was the trade 



238 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 of Glasgow and the Old World. The reality and force of 
^'^' ^* the writings of both men are derived from their intimate 
thoroughness. The foundations of their practical experience 
were narrow, but they were firm. Their theories grew out 
of the facts themselves and not out of the theories of other 
men. 

The state, in Hamilton's view of the matter, may create 
the industrial conditions it desires, precisely as a landowner 
goes about his forestry. The effort truly comes from the 
nature of man in the one case and of trees in the other ; but 
if, possessing a waste of good land, you would provide a high 
arching forest of oak for your great-grandson to cut, where 
now there is but a thin straggle of stunted trees, you will not 
leave the achievement of your design to random gales sowing 
acorns fortuitously from the sparse, indigenous trees ; but you 
will trench and drain, and plant, and provide artful shelter, 
and clear the choking undergrowth. You will not create 
the great woods, it is true, for that is the work of nature's 
unintelligent force; but your direction is none the less a 
condition of its creation, without which it might never have 
been, or at the best would have taken as many centuries for 
its growth as under your plan it will require decades. Un- 
combined human effort is nearly as blind and unintelligent 
a force as the nature of trees ; and the functions of the state 
and of statesmen were in Hamilton's opinion the same as 
those of the squire and his foresters. 

Having established his principles, that it is the interest of 
the state to possess the most varied industrial society, and 
also its duty to attempt the creation of such conditions, he 
plunged into a detailed discussion of the ways and means to 
this end in which it is unnecessary to follow him. Duties 
and bounties and premiums have their various uses for 
different objects. Landways and waterways are to be 
improved and extended at the charge of government. 



THE FEDERALISTS 239 

Inspectors of produce are to be appointed to guard 'the A.D. 1791 
good name ' by seeing that quality is maintained. Inven- ^* 

tions are to be carefully secured to the inventors. A 
board with ample funds at its disposal is to devote itself 
to the encouragement of arts, agriculture, manufactures 
and commerce. 

Hamilton was out of sympathy with the orthodox French 
economists of the eighteenth century. He found but little 
virtue in their uncreative logic. He disbelieved in the 
Economic Man — a being without bowels, with an interior 
like a clock, accurately ticking the progress of the human 
race under the impulse of the magic spring of enlightened 
self-interest, and never needing to be either wound or regu- 
lated. The besetting vice of the economists was their pre- 
ference for argument over observation. They based their 
reasoning upon axioms when they should have gone to the 
facts. They conceived that they could treat the wealth of 
nations by a series of propositions like those of Euclid. 
At each stage they became more and more the victims 
of words that did not correspond with realities, of syllogisms 
that under analysis were little more than mere arrangements 
of phrases. To a large extent their ideas were completely 
dead things, like the conclusions, paradoxes and truisms of 
the ingenious schoolmen of the middle ages; as painfully 
industrious, as technically exquisite, as those samplers 
which were sewed by our great-grandmothers, and of nearly 
as much use and benefit to the world. 

Hamilton, on the other hand, saw the facts themselves 
in a magic crystal. His clear view held the closer objects 
in an easy and true proportion; but also, in the full 
meaning of the splendid common phrase, it went ' far and 
wide.' It was a vision of bold extent and distant range. 
He beheld a unity, where all objects fell into place as in 
a picture. What his mind grasped and concerned itself 



240 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 with was not the advantage of a single trade or group 
^T. 34 q£ trades, of a single state or group of states, but the 
advantage of the whole inheritance. His idea of good 
statesmanship was good stewardship; an active direction 
and continuous effort towards an unmistakable goal. It 
was not enough, in his opinion, to remove obstructions. 
You do not necessarily render a river navigable for all 
time merely by tearing out the snags and other foreign im- 
pediments that lie there blocking the water-way. For there 
are sandbanks to be dug away, channels to be dredged, 
banks to be protected with piles, buttresses and groins. 
There are precautions against flood and drought. There 
are shiftings of the course, natural but unforeseen ; con- 
ditions that change on a sudden, and a constant wear and 
tear. To give the greatest freedom to the force of the river 
may have the undesired effect of creating, as the final result, 
a wide impracticable shallow through which no barge of 
commerce can ever hope to penetrate. 



CHAPTER VII 

Stewardship of the Estate 

The wisest commercial policy that ever came out of the 
human brain could never hope, it was contended by Hamil- 
ton's opponents, for a richer fruitfulness in its effect than to 
benefit certain classes at the expense of the community, 
certain trades to the detriment of commercial society, 
certain towns, districts, states, or groups of states against 
the best interests of the nation. This proposition being laid 
down with greater or less plausibility by many speakers and 
writers as one of the laws of nature, unalterable by any 
contrivance of man, their argument proceeded in perfect 



THE FEDERALISTS 241 

order to the inference that Hamilton's real but unavowed a.d. 1791 
intention must therefore be the advantage of private indi- ^^- ^* 
viduals and particular sections. 

Hamilton met his opponents upon both grounds. With 
much detail he proceeded to show how a commercial policy 
was capable in intelligent hands of benefiting the nation as a 
whole. As for the personal accusation, his career from first 
to last had been such as to render it incredible to any sane 
man, but more especially to his present critics, who, in 
former contests, had incessantly taunted him with his 
indifference to local privileges. Much more vehemently 
than his opponents, Hamilton held that the duty of the 
state in every circumstance was to look beyond the interest 
of the individual and the section to the general advantage. 
For the state to benefit one of these units, be it merely a 
man or half the empire, is an evil if that benefit is the sole 
intended result of its action ; but, on the other hand, the 
state should never shrink from conferring such an advantage 
upon particular trades or classes, if it clearly foresees that 
this course will ultimately conduce to the swifter develop- 
ment, the greater prosperity and the firmer security of the 
nation. 

An advantage given to one man does not necessarily mean, 
when it is fairly examined, a corresponding burden imposed 
upon another. You cannot argue safely from physics to 
politics. But even if such were the case, the burden of this 
year may nevertheless become a benefit in that which 
follows. The burden of one generation may build up a fine 
estate for its successor. What a man to-day is compelled 
to forgo may be recovered by his children and grandchildren 
with heavy accumulations at compound interest. 

There was, Hamilton maintained, a habit of exaggeration 
in the argument of his opponents that the immediate 
increase of price which his proposals might entail would 

Q 



242 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 prove oppressive to the consumer. There was a tendency 
also to ignore the advantage which all alike would derive 
when the general object of his policy was attained. The 
doctrine that in helping one person you are necessarily in- 
juring another has in it a pinch of truth, but a pinch only. 
It is subject to many qualifications. It is alleviated from the 
beginning by countervailing benefits. But supposing that 
it were true in that wide and absolute sense which is claimed 
for it by its professors, what is the alternative ? If the 
state is to fulfil the purpose for which it was called into 
being, it must act ; and by its every action it must cause 
more or less of injury to some of its citizens, more or less 
of benefit to others. A complete paralysis is the only 
alternative. It is not only in matters affecting trade that 
this argument holds good, but in every department of 
government, and perhaps more in that of public defence 
than in any other. The question that awaits an answer 
upon the introduction of any measure is always the same : 
Will the proposed reform promote the health and vigour of 
the nation ? 

The action of the state ought therefore to be guided 
calmly to one end — the advantage of the whole in the 
present and in the future. All men are agreed that appeals 
from any class for favour should be coldly regarded. What 
has not been so generally perceived, is that the comple- 
mentary duty is of equal force; that prayers for govern- 
ment to stand still, to hold its hand, and to abstain from 
interference with existing conditions, lest a benefit should 
thereby accrue to some interest or industry, must be ruled 
by the same tests and as resolutely set aside upon the same 
grounds. 

But if division of labour among men is the cause of a 
rapider increase of wealth than under conditions where each 
has to perform for himself a hundred tasks for which he has 



THE FEDERALISTS 243 

no inclination and but small capacity, surely, urged the A.D, 1791 
opposition, the same argument applies to nations ? Let each ^" 
people therefore attend to those labours in which they are 
most proficient, in which nature and their own inclinations 
will render the most admirable assistance. Hamilton con- 
ceded the justice of this argument, but upon one condition 
— 'if the system of perfect liberty to industry and com- 
merce were the prevailing system of nations.' 

" In such a state of things each country would have the 

* full benefit of its peculiar advantages to compensate for its 
' deficiencies and disadvantages ... a free exchange mutually 
' beneficial, of the commodities which each was able to supply, 
' on the best terms, might be carried on between them, 
' supporting, in full vigour, the industry of each. . . . And 
' though the circumstances which have been mentioned, and 
' others which will be unfolded hereafter, render it probable 

* that nations, merely agricultural, would not enjoy the same 
' degree of opulence, in proportion to their numbers, as those 

* which united manufactures with agriculture, yet the pro- 
' gressive improvement of the lands of the former might, in 
' the end, atone for an inferior degree of opulence in the 
' meantime ; and in a case in which opposite considerations 
' are pretty equally balanced, the option ought, perhaps, 
' always to be in favour of leaving industry to its own 
' direction. 

' But the system which has been mentioned is far from char- 

* acterising the general policy of nations. The prevalent one 

* has been regulated by an opposite spirit. The consequence 

* of it is, that the United States are, to a certain extent, in 

* the situation of a country precluded from foreign commerce. 

* They can, indeed, without difficulty, obtain from abroad 
' the manufactured supplies of which they are in want; 

* but they experience numerous and very injurious impedi- 

* ments to the emission and vent of their own commodities. 



244 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 ' Nor is this the case in reference to a single foreign nation 

'^^" ^* ' only. The regulations of several countries, with which 

' we have the most extensive intercourse, throw serious 

' obstructions in the way of the principal staples of the 

' United States. 

' In such a position of things, the United States cannot 
' exchange with Europe on equal terms ; and the want of 
' reciprocity would render them the victim of a system 
' which should induce them to confine their views to agri- 

* culture, and refrain from manufactures. A constant and 
' increasing necessity, on their part, for the commodities of 
' Europe, and only a partial and occasional demand for 
' their own, in return, could not but expose them to a 

* state of impoverishment, compared with the opulence to 
' which their political and natural advantages authorise 
' them to aspire. 

' Remarks of this kind are not made in the spirit of com- 
' plaint. It is for the nations whose regulations are alluded 

* to, to judge for themselves, whether, by aiming at too much, 
' they do not lose more than they gain. It is for the United 
' States to consider by what means they can render them- 
' selves least dependent on the combinations, right or wrong, 

* of foreign policy. ... If Europe will not take from us the 
' products of our soil, upon terms consistent with our interest, 

* the natural remedy is to contract, as fast as possible, our 

* wants of her." ^ 

One may be permitted to doubt whether Hamilton would 
have made even this concession had he been confronted with 
a situation of perfect liberty in commerce between the nations. 
For it conflicts, to some extent, with his master principle of 
a varied society and multitudinous employments as the con- 
dition of healthy and rapid development. Even had every 

1 Works, iv. pp. 100-102. See also draft of Smith's speech (January 1794) 
by Hamilton, lV(^rks, iv. pp. 205-2'l. 



THE FEDERALISTS 245 

gateway been open throughout the world, it is probable A.D. 1791 
that on this ground he would still have judged it wise, in ^'^- ^* 
the special circumstances of the United States, with their 
vast natural wealth, their undeveloped resources and un- 
inhabited fertile tracts, to pursue a strictly national rather 
than a cosmopolitan policy in matters of commerce. But 
this condition of perfect freedom did not exist, was not 
likely to exist, and has in fact never existed. On the 
contrary, the strictly national policy has imposed itself 
gradually, piecemeal, but in the end completely, upon all 
the nations of the world save only upon Britain. Opinion 
has often halted. Motives have rarely been without con- 
fusion. The waves have slipped back upon the sand ; but 
the tide has ever continued to advance. The concession of 
the principle, guarded by an impossible ' if,' was wise argu- 
ment; for granting the foundations of his opponents' 
contention, accepting their theory under ideal conditions, he 
was able with still greater force to establish the validity of 
his own counsel. 

Another argument with which modern ears are not 
unfamiliar, is " the proposition that industry, if left to itself, 
' will naturally find its way to the most useful and profitable 
' employment. Whence it is inferred that manufactures, 
' without the aid of government, will grow up as soon and as 
' fast as the natural state of things and the interest of the 

* community may require. 

' Against the solidity of this hypothesis, in the full latitude 
' of the terms, very cogent reasons may be offered. These 
' have relation to the strong influence of habit and the spirit 
' of imitation ; the fear of want of success in untried enter- 
' prises ; the intrinsic difficulties incident to first essays 
' towards a competition with those who have previously 

* attained to perfection in the business to be attempted ; the 
' bounties, premiums, and other artificial encouragements with 



246 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 ' which foreign nations second the exertions of their own 
^'^' ^* ' citizens, in the branches in which they are to be rivalled. 

' Experience teaches, that men are often so much governed 

* by what they are accustomed to see and practise, that the 

* simplest and most obvious improvements, in the most 

* ordinary occupations, are adopted with hesitation, reluctance, 
' and by slow gradations. The spontaneous transition to new 
' pursuits, in a community long habituated to different ones, 

* may be expected to be attended with proportionably greater 

* difficulty. When former occupations ceased to yield a profit 
' adequate to the subsistence of their followers, or when there 
' was an absolute deficiency of employment in them, owing to 
' the superabundance of hands, changes would ensue ; but 
' these changes would be likely to be more tardy than might 
' consist with the interest either of individuals or of the 
' society. In many cases they would not happen, while a bare 
' support could be insured by an adherence to ancient courses, 
' though a resort to a more profitable employment might be 

* practicable. To produce the desirable changes as early as 
' may be expedient may therefore require the incitement and 

* patronage of government."^ 

An endeavour has been made to describe the main purpose 
of Hamilton's report, but the effort is quite inadequate to 
the occasion. In a condensed form his eager advocacy is 
stripped of aU its charm and much of its persuasiveness. 
The leading quality — its practical intensity — is dimmed by 
the omission of a multitude of instances drawn from the pre- 
dicament of commerce at the time when he wrote. It would 
be altogether impossible to follow his methodical analysis and 
defeat of minor objections ; his examination in detail of the 
industries which, in his opinion, it was possible advantageously 
and at once to establish in the United States; his review 
* Works, iv. p. 104. 



THE FEDERALISTS 247 

and consideration of the various means and resources of a.d. 1791 
which government might make use for planting and foster- ^'^- ^'^ 
ing manufactures; his enumeration and criticism of taxes 
conducive and inimical to commercial prosperity — for to 
attempt such an undertaking would result in reprinting at 
length the whole of this voluminous document. 

In none of his measures does Hamilton show more 
remarkably the great force of his instinct for reality, his 
piercing insight into the true conditions of things, his grasp 
upon the facts of the case. Like Adam Smith, he will look 
at matters with his own eyes in the first instance; and 
having made his survey, then and only then, he goes for 
counsel and a second opinion to the works of others who 
have considered the same problems in a similar spirit. 

For the skilful craftsman, quick of eye and ready with his 
hands, tired out and hungry after his day's work, it is an 
irksome effort to study out of books the science of his 
avocation. He is aware, or at any rate he is frequently 
reminded, that by so doing he would sharpen his intelli- 
gence, improve his output, and derive much collateral profit. 
But under the influences of fatigue and repletion he is 
disinclined. Sleep steals upon his eyelids. In point of fact 
he is lazy, but he justifies himself by affecting to view all 
book-learning with contempt. For the man who works not 
with his muscles but with his mind, be he statesman or 
philosopher, laziness sits in the other scale. Books and 
words and syllogisms are as easy to him as the brace-and-bit 
and the plane to a carpenter. He is under an everlasting 
temptation to substitute the lazy methods of logic for the 
hard and uncongenial processes of observation. In his 
library he is happy ; but you derange his whole life, and 
render him miserable, if you condemn him to a week's work 
in a merchant's office. 

In economic science mere syllogisms have never been 



248 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 enough. Political insight requires some more substantial 
'^'^- ^^ food than the insight of other men. The philosopher is 
required to sacrifice his leisure, to observe the facts of the 
world he lives in as well as to reason about them, if the 
results of his labour are to serve the nation and to endure. 
Hamilton accepted this necessity like a cheerful, winter- 
morning bather, plunging daily into the actual confusion 
of things. His opponents drew the bedclothes up to their 
noses, turned lazily upon the other side, and dreamed 
dreams of an Arcadia while a very different world was 
astir. 



BOOK IV 



THE DEMOCRATS 
A.D. 1791-1794 



* By-ends. — Wliy they, after their headstrong manner, conclude that it 
is their duty to rush on their jou/rney all weathers ; and I am waiting 
for wind and tide. They are for hazarding all for God at a clap ; 
and I am for taking all advantages to secure my life and estate. They 
are for holding their notions, though all other men he against them ; hut 
I am for religion in what, and so far as, the times and my safety will 
hear it. They are for Religion when in rags and contempt ; hut I am for 
him when he walks in his silver slippers in the sunshine, and with 
applause.'— Tre Pilgrim's Progress. 



BOOK IV 

THE DEMOCRATS 
CHAPTER I 

Thomas Jefferson 

Thomas Jefferson is one of the most remarkable figures 
in history. Of Welsh descent, he was born in Virginia in 
the year 1743. At his father's death he inherited a small 
estate, and to this he added by shrewd purchases, so that at 
the date of his marriage, in his thirtieth year, he was the 
owner of some five thousand acres and fifty slaves. He was 
bred to the law, and enjoyed a lucrative chamber practice 
which was the chief source of his income ; but at the same 
time he cultivated his own land, and, like Washington, 
had more happiness in this pursuit than in any other. In 
Virginian society he was not eminent either by reason of 
his birth or wealth. He was merely a substantial country 
gentleman. His circumstances were "easy from the begin* 
ning; and shortly after his marriage the death of his 
father-in-law was the means of adding largely to his 
resources. Hardship, therefore, of the pecuniary sort, had 
no share in his education. Until near the end of his days 
he was undisturbed by anxieties arising from any lack of 
funds. 
Jefferson was a patriotic citizen who served his country 

251 



252 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

with ungrudging labour for close on half a century. He 
was a member of the House of Burgesses in his own state, 
and of the Continental Congress both before the war began 
and after its conclusion. For two troubled years ^ he was 
the Governor of Virginia ; for five ^ he was minister at the 
Court of France; for four^ he was Secretary of State in 
Washington's cabinet. He was Vice-President of the United 
States from 1797 until his election to the Presidency in 
1801, and only retired from official life at the end of his 
second term in 1809. He died in his eighty-fourth year 
By a dramatic coincidence his death occurred upon the 
fortieth anniversary* of the famous Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, of which he was the author. 

He is described by his biographer ^ as ' thin and raw-boned,' 
with ' red hair, and freckled face and pointed features.' His 
height was well over six feet. He was large in frame and 
loose-limbed. We are told that he Avas studiously unkempt, 
and even slovenly in his dress and person ; ' made up ' 
elaborately, as his enemies suggest, for the part of a sterling 
democrat. His uncouth disorder upon high occasions, his 
disregard of the ordinary conventions and ceremonies of 
state, slippers down at the heel, corduroy breeches very much 
the worse for wear, neck-cloth awry and not overclean, do 
not impress the modern reader as they appear to have im- 
pressed the admiring citizens of his own day. We are not 
struck by the sincerity of a great nature contemptuous of 
trifles, but rather by the ingenuity of a great actor who had 
carefully weighed the value of the meanest accessories. 

The portraits of Jefferson are of a considerable variety, 
and difficult to reconcile one with another. There is 
dignity in all of them, and kindliness in most. But there is 
also an expression of anxious vigilance. The face suggests 

1 1779-80. 2 1784-89. » 1790-9.S. 

^ 4th July 1826. " Tucker. 



THE DEMOCRATS 253 

a sensitive and shrinking nature which, by the sport of 
circumstances, or by a perverse ambition, has been led to 
play the wholly unintended part of a man of action. Jeffer- 
son was a bold horseman, but in every other sphere where 
courage and swift decision are usually looked for, he was 
dilatory, timorous and unready. He was an affectionate 
friend, adored by his familiars, and brilliant under the glow 
of their sympathy. But as an enemy he was less admir- 
able : untiring, but unchivalrous ; never fighting in the open 
where he could avoid it, and never taking blows without a 
whine. He hated to hear any man applauded who was not 
under his immediate patronage; and, what is perhaps his 
strangest quality, seeing that he was a scholar and had 
much experience of the world, he detested whole classes 
of his fellow- creatures for no better reason than because 
they were invested by tradition with some kind of respect. 

When Jefferson first came into prominence certain ideas 
were in the air, and these ideas were believed by their 
lovers to be capable of forming the solid foundations of 
states. By their enemies, on the other hand, they were 
denounced as pernicious nonsense, impossible to be trans- 
lated into political action save at the cost of anarchy and 
disorder. The poetry, religion and philosophy of the 
revolutionary epoch had a great vogue for nearly three 
generations, and when Jefferson, as a member of Congress, 
drafted his famous Declaration of Independence, they had 
been in men's minds for a quarter of a century. The 
dominant note at this time was the love of mankind, no less 
intense because of its vagueness, and a bitter indignation 
against officers and institutions that were deemed to be the 
cause of human suffering. 

When Jefferson for a second time appeared in distin- 
guished pre-eminence as Secretary of State these ideas were 
in their second period, of which the note was a blind and 



254 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

bloodthirsty rage that had its origin in failure. Despite 
the prophets the millennium had not yet arrived. The 
contrivances of despots, the zeal of their minions, the 
cowardice of doubters, were assumed to be the causes of 
the delay. Ultimate defeat was held to be impossible, for 
the stubbornness of the facts themselves had not then 
begun to be suspected. 

To this age of impatience there succeeded an age of com- 
parative peace. The violence of emotion had produced 
a natural exhaustion. A dim perception of the things that 
must be rendered unto Caesar had somewhat abated the 
confidence of poets and the dogmatism of philanthropists. 
The manners and hearts of men became the objective of 
such revolutionaries as still maintained their faith. The 
institutions of the state would be moulded in the end 
through the awakened conscience of mankind, when the 
spots of the leopard were changed and the Ethiopian had 
become white. 

Roughly the revolutionary epoch lasted for three-quarters 
of a century.^ Its first period was one of brotherhood, the 
second of rage, the third of a mild and patient aspiration. 
Jefferson was prominent in each of these phases. His 
sympathy never wavered, his hope never failed. In his 
own country certainly, and in other countries possibly, the 
majority of good men was with him from the beginning to 
the end of his career — the majority of the idealists, the 
unselfish, the thoughtful, the articulate and the unwise. 
They were not practical men, but they were sincere, and 
Jefferson was their champion and exponent. Fidelity to 
ideas rather than success in action was their concern. They 
judged their leader more by the eloquent orthodoxy of his 
messages and manifestoes than by any test of efficiency in 
office. 

1 1750 to 1825. 



THE DEMOCRATS 255 

This is the first, and the greatest, and the most worthy 
of the causes that made Jefferson a famous character. He 
was a kind of Don Quixote ; with this difference, that half 
the world shared his illusions. 

A further cause was the political exhaustion that followed 
upon strenuous effort. Jefferson came as chief magistrate to 
a people longing for peace after war, rest after revolution.^ 
Independence was secured, union accomplished, a consti- 
tution created and set in movement. The natural temper 
of men in such conditions is towards the enjoyment of what 
has been won by so great sacrifices. They desired to go 
about their business, to cultivate material prosperity, to have 
leisure and to breathe freely. 

This condition in the United States coincided with 
the third phase of the revolutionary spirit throughout 
the Western world. Public opinion, while deprecating 
violent action, conversion by fire and sword, and all 
attempts upon the grand scale to translate its aspirations 
into statutes, was grateful to one who kept its faith 
alight by obiter dicta, and persuaded mankind by his 
glowing deliverances that the triumph of these principles, 
though postponed, was inevitable. Martyrdom during the 
first quarter of the nineteenth century was not prized among 
friends nor inflicted upon enemies. The period was one of 
easy faith. Men searched for welcome signs of conformity 
in their neighbours rather than for spots of heresy. The 
little outward forms of democracy in which Jefferson took 
an uncouth delight were in fact better tribute-money than 
a stern and rigid adherence to the formulas of equality and 
fraternity. The literal observance of the Rights of Man had, 
to tell the truth, become inconvenient and embarrassing. 
The virtuous citizen, while cherishing the ultimate hope, 
abstained from the pedantic practice of perfect brotherhood. 

» 1801. 



256 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

Finally, there is the sound practical reason for Jefferson's 
pre-eminence that, very fortunately for his reputation, he 
had fallen upon an age of dwarfs, which had succeeded to 
an age of giants. After the defeat of Adams, the deaths of 
Washington and Hamilton, the ostracism of Burr, there 
were no possible rivals. We look in vain for any sign of 
lusty nature among his conspicuous heutenants and suc- 
cessors. Madison and Monroe belong to a different breed of 
men. Jefferson was the last of the giants ; and consequently, 
while he continued in life, he was secure of his reputation, 
through the absence of all competition. A kind of sanctity 
encircled his head. He was the grand keeper of the Touch- 
stone of Democracy. Men voyaged from long distances, and 
put him to exorbitant expenses in grateful entertainment 
of them, merely to look upon his features and boast of it 
to their grandchildren ; and in the end he died, as he had 
lived, in the odour of phrases. 

It is better to concede all Jefferson's faults, and having 
done so to make a single bold claim that few will be found 
to dispute, though to some it will appear as an explanation 
of his success rather than as a proof of his virtue. There 
was a quality in him which Hamilton and other great 
statesmen of the constructive school have usually lacked. 
It is the old battle of the moralists against the evangelists, 
of salvation by works or by grace. Jefferson believed in 
humanity without any reservations, and the causes of his 
great influence must therefore be sought for in his faith 
and not in his acts. Hamilton disbelieved in humanity, 
unless it had the support of strong laws and the leadership 
of great men. To the people, craving for an affectionate 
confidence, these limitations implied distrust. The world 
which needed his works and profited by them forgot him 
for the time in favour of a rival who was not merely barren 
of achievements, but who also lacked the gaiety, courageous 



THE DEMOCRATS 257 

bearing and charm of manner which are in the usual way 
strong aids to popularity. 

Hamilton was a master; but Jefferson men felt to be a 
Mend. He lived in their hearts. It was useless to point 
to the ledger account of benefits conferred. The mass of 
citizens was not ungrateful to Hamilton, nor wilfully dis- 
respectful to his memory ; but towards Jefferson there was a 
homage of a wholly different order. His love for them was 
sincere, his faith in them was constant. Freedom and 
fraternity were ever on his lips, so that not only his followers 
in the North, but possibly even he himself, came to forget 
that he was a Virginian slave- owner to the last. 

That the manner of his climbing into power, and his way 
of dealing with his enemies, do not conform with his own 
ideals of virtue, cannot fairly be brought as evidence that he 
was insincere. In the case of every public character wide 
allowance must be made for divergence between his public 
professions and his private practice. He has a right to 
plead an imperfect world for much apparent inconsistency. 
And for Jefferson it is necessary to make a further excuse. 
In his own timid disposition he had more to fight against 
than most men. It led him constantly into situations from 
which he chose to escape by some mean device, or on some 
disingenuous plea, or even by plain untruth. But if it be 
some excuse for him as a man that he was found continu- 
ally acting under the influence of his fears, it is also his 
severest condemnation as a servant of the state. 

According to one of his bitterest critics, "Jefferson was 
' a practical theorist. His theory was the general credulity 
' of mankind. Upon this credulity his life was the success- 
' ful practice." ^ This judgment is true up to a certain 
point, but misses, as prejudice usually does, the real interest 
of his character. It is true that he practised successfully 

^ J. C. Hamilton, History, iv. p. 463. 
R 



258 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

upon tlie credulity of mankind, but his art was to a large 
extent unconscious. For no man was ever yet born so 
clever that he could live upon popularity merely by his 
wits. To succeed at the game it is necessary that he should 
be himself a dupe. The appeals of Jefferson were in many 
cases so absurd that they could never have earned even a 
temporary assent, had he not himself believed in them with 
the utmost sincerity. For all his shrewdness, his character 
was one of an extraordinary simplicity. The things in 
which he believed are possibly astounding, but the fact of 
his belief in them is beyond all question. 

In observation no statesman has excelled, and very few 
in the whole history of the world have equalled, Jefferson. 
The whole of the uppermost, emotional nature of individual 
men was an open book to him. Their vanities, their en- 
thusiasms, their ambitions, needed little study and no 
reasoning. He felt them by a kind of sympathy. His 
instinct within these limits was unerring. The profound er 
depths he did not understand. He saw only what was 
reflected in the mirrors of his own feelings. The sterner 
qualities of mankind were hidden from him. Steadfastness 
under discouragement and amidst the doubt of friends, 
renunciation that was silent and undramatic, volcanic 
passions and cold equity he could not see, for his own 
nature held no glass to reflect them. He did not fully 
understand Hamilton. He was baffled by his frankness and 
miscalculated, convinced it must be a cloak to conceal some 
interested motive. He never understood Washmgton beyond 
the fringe of his character. He was incapable by his nature 
of understanding the personal dignity of a Scots shep- 
herd, or of a Jew pedlar, or the unbreakable loyalty of a 
blackguard. But he looked into most men, if he did not 
look entirely through them. He was as superior to Walpole, 
who traded mainly upon their meanness, as he was inferior 



THE DEMOCRATS 259 

to Chatham, who knew how to use their virtues. In prac- 
tising upon the emotions no man was ever more adroit and 
at the same time less self-conscious, and no man ever reaped 
a greater profit on his genius. 

Jefferson's greatest skill was in dealing with men as in- 
dividuals ; but he was also a capable analyst of mankind 
in the mass. To his credit it must be set down that 
he made no attempt at bribery. He did not offer doles 
and never hinted at spoliation. There was no grossness in 
his method. The harmonics that he fiddled were entirely 
upon the strings of sentimentality. He had a flair for 
what was or might be made popular. He understood and 
interpreted what was felt at the moment, and he had the 
gift to foresee what would be felt at the next moment. It 
was less art with him than a kind of instinct, which is 
shared by the theatrical manager and all great showmen. 
He knew what the public wanted, and he knew also what 
it was easy and possible to educate it to want ; and what it 
wanted or might want he was always ready to provide. 

The charge against him in this respect is not dishonesty, 
for if any of his beliefs were sincere his belief in the Vox 
populi, vox Dei theory is entitled to respect. If the popular 
voice was truth, the part of a wise and virtuous statesman 
must be to listen and obey, to anticipate and prepare. It 
may appear to us amazing that any man should have held 
such views; but granting that he did, it is impossible to 
impeach him upon the accusation that he pandered to popu- 
larity. The real difficulty is at a later stage. The popular 
voice uttered such discordant judgments that obedience to 
them all would have seemed to most men to force the 
abandonment of the divine mansion of reason. But in 
Jefferson's case there was apparently no struggle. He ex- 
ploited an emotion until it showed signs of flagging, and 
then passed on to another which he had helped to kindle. 



260 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

Disaster was forgotten not only by himself, but by his con- 
stituents, in the hope and excitement of a new venture. 
So quick was he to seize and interpret the mood of the 
moment, that a grateful people easily overlooked the fact 
of his having championed with equal fervour some prior 
emotion of which they had come to repent. 

But just as Jefferson failed to penetrate the profound and 
noble qualities in his personal friends and enemies, so he 
missed the essential things in national affairs. The desires, 
indignations and enthusiasms of the majority of citizens 
in any country at a given moment are not necessarily 
synonymous with the material or spiritual needs of the 
people. In the former he was a sharer, and as he lived in 
a period of peace and not of stress (when unreality must 
have found him out), he had an immense reward for his 
sympathy. But looking beyond this sympathy what is 
there to show ? What institutions owe their origin to 
his efforts ? What problems did he solve ? The record 
of his actual achievements is almost negligible. The 
opportunities which he missed entirely dwarf his meagre 
accomplishment. 

The irony of events forced or permitted Jefferson to 
assume the role of a leader of men. Whatever the virtue 
of his qualities, it was not an executive virtue. Yet he put 
himself to slavery for many long years, endured endless 
mortitications, and, according to the computation of one of 
his editors, wrote upwards of forty-five thousand letters, 
most of them long ones, to achieve a triumph which, 
viewed as statesmanship, was nearly, or wholly, barren. 
Reading his correspondence, we doubt whether he even 
enjoyed the pleasures of the pursuit, for he was not a com- 
bative man or a sportsman. It seems rather that he was 
haunted by a sense of duty impelling him to snatch power 
out of the hands of certain dangerous characters who had 



THE DEMOCRATS 261 

proved their iniquity by deriding a set of phrases which 
were more to him than all religion. His success was con- 
spicuous but tragic. In the end he ousted his enemies and 
cast down the revilers; but his phrases played him false. 
No power could translate them into policy or law, because 
they did not correspond with any translatable human facts. 
For the greater part they were only words, and for the rest 
they were the fancies of a poet. 

Although Jefterson outlived Hamilton by more than 
twenty years he was his senior by fourteen, and this fact 
accounts for much of the bitterness which marked their 
relations. When Jefferson arrived at New York in March 
1790 to take up his duties of Secretary of State, Hamilton 
had been already at work for six months. His fame was in 
the mouths of all men. He was the hero of the particular 
crisis. Jefferson was not used to subsist upon the crumbs of 
applause. That he genuinely hated Hamilton's political 
ideals there can be no question; nor that he hated his 
methods and his pre-eminence even more than his ideals. 
Hamilton's swift, practical way of setting to work and accom- 
plishing his ends without allowing his opponents the luxury 
of phrasemaking and prolonged debate was wormwood to 
him. The temperaments of the two men were as far asunder 
as the poles ; not different in the sense that they were com- 
plementary, which might, under favourable circumstances, 
have made them fast friends, but in that they were intensely 
antipathetic in every particular, from the philosophy of life 
to the cut and fashion of their clothes. And beyond all this 
there was the same personal rivalry which disturbed the 
peace of the archangels. Jefferson, the writer of the Declara- 
tion of Independence, which it had been the custom to con- 
sider the noblest and most famous document in the whole 
history of the world; Jefferson, the minister at the court 
of the most Christian king, the friend of philosophers, 



262 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

the philosopher of fine ladies, the counsellor of the most 
eminent statesmen of Europe — for such a man in the prime 
of his life to be dragged at the chariot wheels of an energetic 
young upstart was altogether intolerable, and Jefferson must 
have been something more than human had he accepted the 
position with magnanimity. 

It has been suggested that Hamilton regarded himself in 
the light of a prime minister. It is certain that he insisted 
upon making his policy operate in every department of 
the state. His clearness of thought, swiftness of decision, 
cogency in argument, whether spoken or written, gave him 
an enormous advantage, both with the cabinet and Congress. 
His faculty for getting his own way was little short of 
miraculous. Washington was his staunch supporter. General 
Knox, the Minister for War, always followed his lead. Even 
Randolph, the Attorney-General, with the bravest intentions, 
was constantly detached from his allegiance to Jefferson by 
the magnetism of his rival.^ 

If it were possible to consider Thomas Jefferson and 
Alexander Hamilton quietly, as types of human tempera- 
ment and modes of thought, stripped of all personal rivalry, 
the whole pageantry of the times swept aside, and all the 
husk of fashion, prejudice and affectation torn from each 
character, there would still remain a violent and eternal 
opposition. The small accidents of their official relations 
merely provided a dramatic setting to an enmity which was 
as fundamental as that of fire and water. 

The ideal of Hamilton was the hive, the ideal of Jefferson 
was the bee. To the former the state was everything; 
to the latter, the divine nature of man. To Jefferson 
an individual was much more important than a state, a 
state much more important than the Union. In proportion 
as human life took on a corporate character and strength, 

^ Jeffersou to Madison, Histijry, v. p. 344. 



THE DEMOCRATS 263 

he became less interested in its fortunes and more apt to 
regard it with jealousy and suspicion. In his honest and 
sincere belief, a man as an amiable, prosperous individual, 
not the state as an aggregate of self-sacrificing men, was the 
true goal of politics. 

Never in the history of the world has there been a full 
realisation of Hamilton's dream. The nearest approach to 
it is the popular conception of the Empire of Japan — a mass 
of intelligent humanity, reckless of their lives, yet filled with 
the joy of life, eager for distinction, hungry for success, 
alert, practical and merry; but at the same time subordinate, 
humbly and piously subordinate, to a pure abstraction. 
With a people inspired to so high a pitch, the triumph and 
security of the race would dominate every individual aim, 
interest and affection. The maxim of such a polity is 
combination ; but the inevitable corollary is caste. 

If, as Hamilton's enemies contended, his passion for order 
and strong government would certainly, in the event of 
its full success, have bound the United States of America 
into a conservative Venetian republic within the space of a 
few generations, Jefferson's counter policy, with the same 
fortune, would assuredly have plunged them into anarchy 
and bloodshed within a decade. The passion of Jefferson 
was individual freedom. Often it amounted to a formula — 
sometimes to a quite extravagant formula; but there was 
a reality underlying it. He had a genuine belief in the 
goodness of humanity viewed as individuals. He hated the 
idea of the hive. He could never understand the fascination 
of its abstract glory, or realise that it possessed any practical 
utility. Sacrifices to such an end were not even a puzzle 
to him, but merely a foolish paradox. His nature was im- 
pervious to any national anthem. What was important to 
him, and holy, was the free growth of men, restricted no 
more than was absolutely necessary by laws or conventions. 



264 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

He desired to see tliem grow up in tlieir natural shapes, and 
believed that these shapes would be more 'natural' on a 
bleak, wind-swept moorland, or in a crowded forest, than in 
any cared-for park or sheltered garden. He was an enthu- 
siast, who hoped for good with so fervent and extreme a 
faith, that he openly avowed a preference for government by 
newspapers and disparaged the virtues of a settled constitu- 
tion. It is hardly exaggeration to say that he would have 
rejoiced to see the state a dismasted hulk, so confident was 
he that by the action of beneficent and eternal currents, she 
would drift for ever upon a smiling sea, within bow-shot of 
the delectable islands, without the aid of sails or rudder. 
Hamilton lacked the same enthusiasm, Avas entirely wanting 
in such confidence. His passion was good seamanship, trim 
tackle and a hearty crew. To drift was for him ever the 
greatest of all evils; and the advocate of such policy was 
in his opinion a madman, an incompetent, or a coward. 

Under the British system of government Hamilton must 
necessarily have been a head and shoulders above all 
other statesmen of his time and country. Jefferson, on 
the other hand, would not have taken any rank whatever 
among statesmen, but would have arrived at eminence 
in some different sphere. Our parliamentary plan has 
many faults, but certain compensations. It hinders the 
work of a minister and wastes his time, but at least it 
enables him to defend his own measures. And there is 
this safety in it, that our party leaders must always be men 
of courage. Sometimes in our haste we may permit our- 
selves to speak disparagingly of debate, and if the result 
of debate were merely the prevalence of eloquence over 
silence, of good arguments over bad ones, it might justly be 
contemned as a means of selecting men to govern the 
country. But debate is something a great deal more re- 
spectable. The glory of the British parliament is that men 



THE DEMOCRATS 265 

subdue it by their characters to a far greater extent than by 
their arguments. It is required of a leador that he must 
be prepared at any moment to stand up to his enemies, to 
give blows and to take them. This test can never be 
escaped. Occasional brilliant appearances will never put 
any man in power, or keep him in power if he has happened 
to arrive there by some accident. Private influence or 
intrigue, literary gifts of the highest order, are all in vain. 
The system is sound, although of necessity it excludes many 
aspirants of shining talents. The rule is absolute that, 
before a man may be permitted to govern the nation, he 
must have proved himself capable of prevailing over his 
rivals in single combat and face to face. 

Jefferson did not shine in controversy. He hated it — it 
is not unjust to say that he feared it. His abstinence from 
debate has been explained by a huskiness of the voice, but 
in reality it was much more a matter of temperament. He 
avoided personal strife whenever it was possible to do so, 
and upon the whole his foresight to that end was amazingly 
successful. But when occasionally the unexpected happened 
and he found himself confronted with a determined adversary, 
he never hesitated to escape, nor gave much thought to the 
dignity of his demeanour. 

Many instances are alleged against him,i and of these the 
most conspicuous is his failure as governor of Virginia 
during the war. It is not credible, as his enemies have 
insinuated, that Jefferson feared for his life, or would have 
hesitated in the extreme necessity to give it for his country. 
But in any crisis he was unprepared, and emergency always 

1 " He deserted from Congress instantly on hearing of the battle of Long 
Island. He abandoned the chief magistracy of Virginia while the enemy 
were in possession of that state, and when an impeachment was hanging 
over his head ; and he retired from the Department of State (January 1794) 
when everything indicated imminent peril to his country." — History, v. 
pp. 438-39 ; ak-o v. pp. 339-55 ; iii. p. 65. 



266 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

found him in a fluster. He was a quiet, studious, patriotic 
and unwarlike citizen, but as a governor, called upon 
suddenly to repel a bold invader supported by a mere 
handful of men, he was a lamentable failure. He could 
inspire no confidence in his legislators, because he was 
utterly unable to collect his own wits. He lacked the clear 
and practical sense of an objective, the swiftness of decision, 
the cheerful and cool resourcefulness that the occasion 
demanded. The policy of his life was to toss phrases into 
the ears of mankind, like honey-cakes to Cerberus. But it 
was impossible to deal with men who carried muskets by 
this easy prescription. Jefferson proved himself incom- 
petent as governor of Virginia to repel the British troops 
under Arnold, and by reason of the same defects in his 
character he would have been no less incompetent to deal 
with the funding of the national debt, for creditors are an 
equally obdurate class of antagonists. 

The contrast between Hamilton and Jefferson is forced 
upon us at every turn, in acts as well as in theories, in 
trifling fashions and in serious beliefs. Nowhere is it more 
remarkable than in the style of their writings. Jeflerson is 
flowing, desultory and familiar. He has an entertaining 
spice of peevish humour and captious satire; an aptness 
in outflanking his opponent by some ingenious digression. 
Hamilton, on the other hand, is ever grave and eager; 
formal if not actually distant; terse, vigorous and direct in 
attack, preferring the frontal to all other methods. He 
never deals in trivial annoyance. If he wounds it is not 
because he desires to hurt, but because his intention is 
to destroy. 

The contrast is as obvious in their opinions as in their 
style. Hamilton made his party round his convictions. 
The men who thought as he did, the men who were won 
over by his appeal, came to him and attached themselves. 



THE DEMOCRATS 267 

Jefferson's opinions, on the other hand, cannot escape a 
suspicion of having in many cases been chosen deliberately 
in order to attract a party to follow him. There is no single 
instance where he stood out boldly against a popular cry. 
Hamilton, on the contrary, Avas more often found fighting 
against the sentiment of the moment than in agreement 
with it. He never hesitated to risk his favour with the 
people if his ideas of justice were opposed to their passions. 
He was always a leader. Jefferson at his best was never 
more than a patron, and usually he was only a purveyor. 
His unique faculty for self-persuasion alone saved him from 
actual dishonesty. 

It has been the custom to excuse Jefferson, and even to 
praise him, on the grounds that his feelings were stronger 
than those of ordinary men. But the difference was really 
less in the strength of his feelings than in the weakness of his 
control. He had the shrewdness to make a merit of a vice, 
and he succeeded so well that he has not only been forgiven 
for his lack of self-command, but has built upon it the proof 
of his sincerity. Like many persons who profess the widest 
philanthropy and are beset by loose emotions, he was vindic- 
tive and at times ferocious. He exulted over the suffering 
and degradation of individuals and classes against whom he 
had merely a theoretic grudge. His apologies for all that 
was worst in the French Revolution are painful reading. 
"We miss not only an intelligent estimate of these events, 
but any semblance of magnanimity. His most solemn 
judgments are tainted by a morbid spirit of literary revenge ; 
they never arrive at that pitch of authority which overawes, 
and although he is often cruel, he is never stern. 

To search for the explanation of a great renown, and to 
find so little that corresponds to our ideas of a hero, is 
disappointing. We are wearied by apologists who concede 
nothing to Jefferson's dispraise except his inconsistencies, 



268 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

and attribute even these to an excessive honesty ; who keep 
harping upon his half-virtues, and would persuade us that 
after all tact is a kind of leadership, and perseverance a 
sort of courage; that eagerness for popularity is but a 
healthy love of approbation, and that untruthfulness which 
springs from timidity or the imagination is less heinous 
than if its origins were in some sinister ambition. It is 
hard, listening to such instructors, not to go the whole way 
with the Federalists and to rate him as a mere mountebank 
whose title to fame consists not in the value of his work, 
but in the skill with which he imposed upon his own day 
and generation. The ambition of a man like Hamilton is to 
get certain things which he believes in done, of a man like 
Jefferson to keep himself poised upon the top of a wave. 
In spite of his eloquent morality he held no opinion so 
firmly that he would risk his popularity to achieve it. In 
spite of his belief that the greatest work of God is a man 
and not a polity, he hated minorities, and hated even more 
to be in a minority. In spite of his admiration for rational 
as opposed to traditional government, he not only distrusted 
reason as many wise men have done — he detested it. An 
argument drawn from experience was almost as offensive to 
him as a hard fact. He was satisfied that he had penetrated 
to the heart of any matter when he had ranged it under one 
or other of his ready- made formulas. 

It is easy to understand why Jefferson should have hated 
Hamilton, Two so different dispositions were bound to dis- 
agree, and to disagree with bitterness. What is difficult to 
understand, unless on the ground of a peculiar temperament, 
is the inveteracy of Jefferson's malice. He outlived Hamil- 
ton for more than twenty years, and during the whole of 
that period his popularity had been prodigious and uninter- 
rupted. Towards the end of his life he became the object of 



THE DEMOCRATS 269 

a hero-worship almost religious in its character. Men came 
from all parts to gaze upon his countenance, and the name 
of Hamilton was for the time being forgotten. 

In this serene and blissful atmosphere Jefferson set to 
work upon the revision of his correspondence and memoirs. 
It was with him no perfunctory task of notes and dockets, 
ordering of dates and filling in of initials ; but a very serious 
and painstaking effort to leave the golden memory of the 
author without a single smut or stain. Passages were re- 
written. Incidents where some tarnish had fastened were 
industriously scrubbed. His share in ancient controversies 
was explained in a new light. His case was fortified by 
evidence that flowed easily from the cells of his resourceful 
memory. In the end it may be believed he was well satisfied 
with his work, and felt entirely confident that he had painted 
such a portrait of a virtuous citizen as the world must ever 
afterwards accept as the highest type. 

The intended portrait of the virtuous citizen is a dull 
and lifeless presentment in thin and fading tints. On the 
canvas behind it, glowing through the transparency, is the 
true Jefferson in strong lines and gorgeous colours — Jeffer- 
son the skilful politician, the ingenious sophist, the intriguer 
against his enemies, the distorter of evidence and of facts ; 
above all, perhaps, Jefferson the unforgiving. The ATias and 
the Autobiography give us a masterly, but too savage like- 
ness, and it is no wonder that his friends and admirers have 
never ceased to lament their publication. The Confessions 
of Rousseau are less convincing, because at times we cannot 
keep back the suspicion that a dramatic instinct of self- 
abasement has inspired his candour. The value of Jefferson 
is not his candour, for there is none, but his inadvertence, 
which is without a parallel. In his efforts to enhance his 
own glory he considered it essential to blacken the reputa- 



270 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 tions of his enemies, and as a consequence he has given us a 
description of his own character to which his bitterest 
enemy would not wish to add a line. 



CHAPTER II 

The Origin and Growth of Parties 

The Democratic party which came into existence during the 
year 1791 (although it did not acknowledge its existence 
until considerably later) was lineally descended from the 
Conway Cabal.^ It had its origin in the intrigues of which 
Horatio Gates was the hero, and " an intimate connection with 
' the project of forcing General Washington from the com- 
' mand of the army." ^ The conduct of the war required an 
efficient direction of the united energies of the states. " The 
' friends of Washington were, therefore, the friends of ener- 
' getic counsels. His opponents resorted to the usual instru- 

* ment of disaffection, an appeal to jealousy of power." ^ In 
the period which preceded the convention of Philadelphia 
the dividing line was still the same. It was the same during 
the sessions of the convention ; the same when a national 
government undertook to work out the salvation of the 
union. 

"From the very birth of the colonies, jealousy of power 
' had been the dominant thought of the American mind. . . . 

* This feeling produced the Revolution. This feeling pro- 

* longed its struggles. This feeling postponed the com- 
' pletion of the Confederation. This feeling prevented its 
' invigoration. This feeling produced the compromises of 

* the Constitution. This feeling delayed and almost pre- 

1 Ante, p. 103. 2 History, iv. p. 417. ^ Ibid, iv, p. 418. 



THE DEMOCRATS 271 

vented its establishment. The majority of the American a.d. 1791 
people were against it. Its founders were in a minority. ^'^- ^* 
' Its supporters were a conservative party dealing with the 
' masses. Of this party, while Washington was the head, 
' avowing himself a Federalist, Hamilton was the exponent, 
' both of its theory and of its practice." ^ 

The division was between the upholders of State Rights 
on the one hand, and the friends of a strong government on 
the other. During the Conway Cabal, throughout the 
' League of Friendship,' and in the Congress which met in 
the autumn of 1791, the chief issues were ever the same. 
The same fustian was talked about liberty. The same 
catchwords were invoked ' to call fools into a circle ' ; and 
to a large extent the same men were engaged in the contest, 
and the same methods were set to work. 

Jefferson accordingly found a State Rights party ready- 
made when, outraged by the rivalry of Hamilton and offended 
by the rejection of his own advice in the matter of the 
National Bank, he determined to undertake the organisation 
of an opposition to the government of which he was a 
member. His genius in the manipulation of political forces 
thereupon effected a strange alliance between the party of 
State Rights and the party of the Rights of Man. He suc- 
ceeded, by his consummate tact, in inducing those citizens 
who hated and feared the tyranny of the Union to co-operate 
with those others whose guiding principle was a hot affection 
for the French Revolution. It was a work which earns the 
praise of an incomparable dexterity, for at the beginning the 
mistrusters of strong government were far further removed 
than their opponents, the Federalists, from any admiration 
for democracy;^ while the Democrats would have found 
little to object to in Washington's administration had it been 
willing to support the arms of France and do homage to the 

1 History, iv. p. 463. " Ibid. pp. 436-38 and 444. 



272 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 principles of tlie Rights of Man. The cause of the cohesion 
of this oddly compacted party was to a large extent the 
endurance for twelve years of a government which both 
sections detested with an equal cordiality, though originally 
for widely different reasons. Before the end of this period 
the supporters of State Rights had for the most part become 
hearty Democrats, while the Democrats had succeeded in 
persuading themselves that a system of contumacious states 
would prove more favourable than a powerful Union to their 
ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. 

All the sections who composed the Democratic party had 
a common ground in their hatred of Monarchy. It mattered 
little that even upon this point their agreement was more a 
matter of a word than of things. It is true that monarchy 
to the lovers of democracy meant the personal rule of a king, 
and to the upholders of State Rights a strong rule of any 
kind, even one which rested on manhood suffrage. But as 
party leaders are well aware, an ambiguous word is often 
good enough for the purposes of an opposition. It is only 
when the ' outs ' exchange places with the ' ins ' that the 
double meaning is apt to become the cause of embarrass- 
ment. Every act done or supposed to have been inspired by 
Hamilton, was branded as a covert design to overturn the 
Republic and establish a Monarchy. The confusion of mind 
which associated the quality of strength in government with 
the idea of a despot was sedulously encouraged by the 
leaders of the opposite party. It is not credible that either 
Jefferson or Madison believed that Hamilton aimed at set- 
ting up a king, but for political purposes they fostered the 
suspicion in simpler minds,^ till finally the charge of treason 
against the Republic became the burden of every Democratic 
speech and pamphlet. The objects of the invective were at 
first the Secretary of the Treasury and his corrupt adherents, 

^ History, iv. pp. 459-60. 



THE DEMOCRATS 273 

but in the end the President himself was openly and fiercely A.D. 1791 
attacked for his ' mimickry of kings.' • ^^ 

In the same month which saw the end of the first Congress, 
Jefferson and Madison started upon a northern tour. They 
visited New York, and held interviews with Livingston, who 
had been disappointed of office, with Clinton, who detested 
the whole policy of union, and with Aaron Burr, whose pre- 
dominant passion was intrigue, and whose constant expe- 
rience was defeat. From New York the two emissaries 
passed on to Vermont and Connecticut. The object of their 
journey was to create an opposition to Hamilton's policy 
and the results became obvious as soon as the second 
Congress assembled in the autumn. 

In June 1788, when ratification of the constitution was 
on hand, Madison had written to Hamilton a remarkable 
letter,^ in which he warned him of the dangers to be appre- 
hended by all true lovers of the Union as soon as the first 
administration should begin its labours. " Notwithstanding 
' the fair professions made by some, I am so uncharitable as 
' to suspect that the ill-will to the constitution will produce 
' every peaceable effort to disgrace and destroy it. . . . My 
' conjecture is, that exertions will be made to engage two- 
' thirds of the legislature in the task of regularly under- 
' mining the government." This letter, which is signed 
'yours affectionately,' is a startling forecast of the course 
which was to be pursued less than three years later by its 
author. 

The anti-federal party soon rallied. Its defeat at Phila- 
delphia had never become a rout. The spirit of State 
Rights was still a powerful force. To Jefferson, who had 
aided Hamilton, timidly and doubtfully, it is true, during 
the session of 1790, to carry his financial measures, it soon 
became apparent, not only that a rival had thereby been 

^ History, iii. p. 480. 
S 



274 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 Strengthened, but that the policy of this rival was directed 
^'^' ^'* against a set of maxims which represented Jefferson's most 
cherished ideals. Jefferson was by nature all in favour of 
loose ties and a vague optimism. He despised institutions. 
Preferring as he did the guidance of newspapers to the rule 
of cabinets, he considered that mankind could only be 
governed fortunately by rhetorical appeals founded upon 
the Rights of Man. His natural dislike to precision in 
thought, definiteness in policy and force in execution, was 
excited by a competition and strengthened by an oppor- 
tunity. 

Jefferson was a man of singular astuteness, and it was not 
long before he realised that although for the moment power, 
and even an appearance of popularity, were on the side of his 
rival, there was a strong and very bitter party hostile to the 
Secretary of the Treasury on personal grounds and opposed 
with an equal detestation to the general trend of his policy. 
These persons felt that they had been outmanoeuvred at the 
Convention of Philadelphia and overwhelmed in the popular 
agitation which followed it. They considered that their 
ruin was in process of being completed by the audacity and 
vigour of Washington's minister of finance. These mal- 
contents were disorganised and leaderless. Madison, their 
most respectable figure, had contributed to the disaster by 
assisting Hamilton to mould the constitution and to write 
the Federalist. Although a statesman of undoubted ability, 
Madison lacked .the qualities needed for inspiring con- 
fidence in common men, for party intrigue and for bold 
attack. 

Jefferson therefore set himself actively to work in opposi- 
tion to Hamilton. In spite of his want of personal courage, 
he was a dangerous antagonist. Conversations with 'old 
friends,' private letters well seasoned with political counsel, 
the mildest but the most indefatigable pulling of wires, 



THE DEMOCRATS 275 

advice that was never too much forced or obtruded, gradu- a.D. 1791 
ally compacted a party in opposition to the government of '^'^- ^* 
which he was himself a minister. Everything was so 
gentle, it hardly earned the title of an impulse. He appeared 
to act sadly, and from a sense of duty. Only a depraved 
spirit could suspect him of ambition. His sole desire was 
to do good stealthily. He wished for nothing so little as 
the fame of a notorious attack; but merely induced the 
younger generation to come forward and to speak their 
minds, glad if the advice and encouragement of the ' wave- 
worn mariner' could be of some small service to them. 
Accessible and genial in a private circle, Jefferson acquired 
an influence by the strangest method that has ever been 
practised in public life. In the peculiar circumstances 
which now began to develop, he was an unmatched party 
leader. Timid, but untiring; ingenious, subterranean and 
resourceful, he played his game, unaffected by the hatred, 
suspicion and contempt of his immediate associates; and 
in the end he won it by a strange mixture of virtues and 
vices, of tenacity and cunning, by a wonderful knowledge 
of the less admirable emotions of men, and by an unwaver- 
ing confidence in their importance under any system of 
popular government. 

The Democratic party, which from the beginning of the 
second Congress offered a vigorous opposition to all the 
measures of the administration, was planned, concentrated, 
organised, named and inspired by Thomas Jefferson, the 
Secretary of State. It was an anomalous arrangement, but 
for the attainment of its object, which was the destruction 
of the government, it had very obvious advantages. 

The reasons of Jefferson's bitter opposition to Hamilton 
were both public and personal, and there is no great difficulty 
in understanding either. As a statesman Hamilton stood for 
Federal Government against State Rights ; for a strong execu- 



276 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 tive against tlie Rights of Man; for the actual inequality 
'^' against the philosophic equality of human creatures ; for 
business against nonsense. The literary brain of Jefferson 
employed its leisure with the invention of names ^ to convey 
his iniquity. An intention to subvert republican institu- 
tions was constantly alleged. The idea of a king was sus- 
pended as a constant menace; but it was always difficult 
to give substance to the threatened dynasty. Hamilton's 
frankly expressed admiration for certain British institu- 
tions enabled Jefferson to foster the suspicion that he 
desired to bring about a union with that country, and 
to replace the necks of free Americans under an odious 
yoke. 

Like many other great men, Hamilton had a polar quality 
which attracted love and hatred with a force that meaner 
natures are exempt from. His capacity for uniting his 
enemies was inferior only to his gift for inspiring devotion in 
his friends. He was great in the simple manner; not at 
all astute, but merely overwhelming and irresistible. He 
was one of the greatest strategists, but only, very rarely, 
even a respectable tactician. Every man, enemy or friend, 
saw how his course was laid. He never divided his 
enemies by conjuring up a timely mist upon the waters. 
He was combative ; loved the giving of blows and cared 
little about receiving them. In the matter of smiting he 
had a heavy hand. On great occasions he was capable of 
a great restraint, but his natural character was eager and 
vehement, intolerant of fools and impatient of prudential 
management. His youth made it unforgivable that he should 
be so outspoken. Many envied his success ; some certainly 
hated his ideals ; and there were others, grave men, important 
among their neighbours, who had felt over their shoulders 
the lash of his contempt. 

' 'Monocrals, • Auglymeii,' etc. etc. 



THE DEMOCRATS 277 

A few montlis later,^ the results of Jefferson's northern A.D. 1791 
tour and his collaboration with Madison became manifest. ^'^' ^* 
A journal was started to assail the government. Its editor 
was one Freneau, a gentleman of a light and caustic vein, 
with a turn for metrical satire. The Secretary of State 
appointed him to a subordinate post in his office. The 
pay was small ; so small that the appointment has the 
appearance of a blunder. The patronage was of such a 
trifling sort, as far as money went, that the moral support 
assumed the chief part. Freneau's paper with great vivacity 
proceeded to assail all the acts of the administration except 
those which could be attributed to the impulse of his patron. 
Hamilton's financial policy was fiercely attacked. The charge 
of corruption figured constantly in the largest type ; though 
the nature of the bribe, and the persons who had been 
bought, were involved in mystery. The briber alone stood 
out clearly for execration. 

Under Jefferson's able inspiration Freneau played the 
game of indefinite slander with great vigour. From cor- 
ruption he passed on to treason. Hamilton and the 
Federalists were scheming to subvert the Republic and 
impose a monarchy. The temper of the times was jealous, 
and the plain man accordingly did not always dismiss the 
charge as incredible ; but hearing it often repeated came at 
last to think there must be something in it. 

During Hamilton's remaining years of office his chief 
work in connection with the Treasury department was the 
defence and completion of his financial policy. But in 
addition he was forced to undertake a more irksome labour. 
His character was persistently assailed, at first upon the 
vague charge that, out of the public funds, he had corrupted 
others, and when that had failed, upon the cruder accusa- 
tion that he had manipulated loans, and made away with 

1 October 31, 1791, Works, vii. p. 239. 



278 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 millions for his private benefit. There was never even a 
priTYia facie case under either head. The accounts were so 
perspicuous, the records so complete, that no honest purpose, 
however blundering, was capable of misunderstanding their 
import. Jefferson and Madison, who instigated these attacks 
and drew a profit from them, can never have been unaware 
that they were false ; but they argued wisely that for their 
immediate purpose truth or falsehood was not a matter 
of any great importance. What was of paramount import- 
ance was that Hamilton should be hindered in his work, 
and if possible should be driven out of public life. 

Even had there been no dangers to the state arising out of 
the progress of the French Revolution, these departmental 
and personal concerns would have left Hamilton but Httle 
time for the prosecution of his commercial policy upon a 
grand scale. When the occasion presented itself, as in the 
case of the fisheries ^ and the system of import duties,^ he 
did not hesitate to advance a few steps towards his end, but 
it was entirely out of the question to attempt the realisation of 
his dream of " erecting one great American system, superior 
* to the control of transatlantic force or influence, and able to 
' dictate the connection between the Old and the New World.'"^ 
The report upon Manufactures, presented to the second Con- 
gress, within a few weeks after its assembly, was therefore 
left by him, reluctantly, without any serious effort to carry it 
into accomplishment. 

Jefferson's attitude towards this commercial policy was 
hostile at every point. He hated it for two very good 
reasons : it was obnoxious upon different grounds both to 
the party of State Rights and to the enthusiasts for the 
Rights of Man. The former saw in it a new attempt to 
aggrandise the Federal power, the latter were up in arms 

1 History, iv. pp. 361-62. ^ j^^^ ^^ 392-95. 

8 Ibid. iv. p. 314. 



THE DEMOCRATS 279 

because it offered an affront to the phrases of liberty. The A.D. I79i 
first objection was grounded in the facts, the second was '^' 
based upon a purely verbal misconstruction; but for the 
purpose of an opposition the one was as good a weapon as 
the other. 

Jefferson was a free-trader, as one would have expected 
him to be, but it is more than doubtful if he knew what the 
phrase meant. It was enough that a doctrine paid a kind 
of lip-service to the idea of freedom for him to subscribe 
to it without a second thought. For those who will not 
observe the conditions of their own time, the formula is 
ever the proper weapon. Jefferson was a reader of books, a 
weaver of fanciful philosophies, an accepter of general prin- 
ciples, a worshipper of words, a hater of the confusion 
of things. He loved everything that was 'free,' or that 
called itself ' free,' with the passionate unreasonableness of a 
collector of Stuart relics. His fundamental belief (if we may 
use these words to describe opinions which never at any point 
touched a firm bottom, but merely swam like a kind of 
' sud ' upon the stream of expediency) was a set of formulas 
which he had learned by rote during his official career in 
France. It was bad enough, according to the precepts of 
this philosophy, that free citizens should be required to pay 
taxes of any kind whatsoever. It was intolerable that imposts 
should be levied except to supply the barest necessities of 
the simplest form of government that would fit the needs 
of the time. He would have derided the idea that any 
country could be taxed into prosperity, or that under any 
circumstances a system of duties could become an aid to 
national development. A scheme which had for its object 
to place the industry and commerce of the states under the 
care of the federal government was either visionary and 
absurd, or else was the cloak to some ulterior end. Had it 
been possible to prove to him that such a scheme was in fact 



280 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 attainable and would produce great benefits to the com- 

iET. 34 j;Qyjjjt,y, his opposition would still have remained the same. 

It was more important, in his opinion, that private men 

should be left free to manage their own affairs, than that the 

afi'airs of men in the aggregate should be well managed. 

The system of Jefferson prided itself upon a consistency 
that scorned compromise. All men were equal, and, with 
the exception of black men in certain favoured latitudes, 
they were born free. All countries were the same. If it 
were not for the injurious artifices of government, friend- 
liness would be the rule among mankind. Truth was a flat 
and easy projection like Mercator's, not a rough crystal with 
a thousand planes. In the navigation of his fancies Jefferson 
allowed neither for wind nor current, neither for deviation 
of the compass nor for the tide that is in the affairs of men. 
He could not love a man who would dissect a beautiful 
theory ; Hamilton, on the other hand, would not away with 
arguments unless they were based upon a knowledge of the 
conditions. To Jefferson, liberty, equality and fraternity 
were the pillars of the temple, and free trade seemed for the 
moment to be a necessary consequence of the plan. A few 
years later, it is true, fashions in thought and rhetoric under- 
went a chansre. The doctrine of free trade ceased to be an 
article of the Democratic faith. Its place was taken, under 
Jefferson and his successors, by a crude and spasmodic pro- 
tection which was hardly less opposed to the national prin- 
ciple of Hamilton than to the original highflown professions 
of his rival. Those erratic efforts formed no part of a 
permanent and noble purpose, but were merely the hand-to- 
mouth expedients of compliant demagogues. 

Jefferson's attitude towards the financial policy of Hamil- 
ton was at the beginning by no means unfavourable. It was 
only when he came to realise the strength and permanence 
of the feelings aroused against it that his opposition was 



THE DEMOCRATS 281 

declared in unmistakable terms. Even as late as the spring A.D, 1791 
of 1791, after his quarrel with Hamilton over the National ^^-^^ 
Bank, we find clear expressions of approval, and a sound per- 
ception of the benefits which the country had derived from 
the measures of the previous sessions.^ It is necessary to 
discriminate very carefully between the feelings which 
Jefferson gave utterance to at the time when these measures 
passed into law, and those other feelings which he was led 
to entertain a short time afterwards, when the exigencies of 
creating a political party became his chief concern. And it 
is necessary also to discriminate between what Jefferson 
really felt in 1790 and 1791, and what in later years he had 
the audacity to maintain that he had felt during that period. 
It is not too harsh a judgment to condemn the account con- 
tained in the Anas as unworthy of belief. The misrepre- 
sentation of the chief incidents of the time and of Hamilton's 
measures, motives and methods is not less remarkable than 
his undeserved depreciation of his own astuteness. 

It is true, however, that Jefferson was entirely ignorant of 
finance. He not only confessed the defect in his intelligence, 
but made a merit of it. To understand finance was a thing 
only possible for rogues. We are not unfamiliar with the argu- 
ment at the present day. The rhetorical censor, baffled and 
brought to book, invariably rushes to this classical asylum. 
" You are too clever for me. You can prove anything. But 
' all the same, the plain man knows very well that my 
' charges are true, and that you are a knave." This method 
argues a great reliance upon the opacity and indolence of 
a democracy, but there is no gainsaying the fact that it 
occasionally attains its purpose. 

Jefferson alleges in his letters and Anas ^ that Hamilton's 
measures were grounded in corruption and dishonesty ; but 
his own moral sense was never a very trustworthy guide, 

1 History, iv. pp. 486-87. ^ Ford's Jefferson, i. p. 160. 



282 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 and upon any question concerned with finance, his intelligence 
^^ was as inadequate as his conscience. There was not merely 
a looseness in his judgment on this subject, but that real 
mental impediment which prevents most women and many 
men from being able to understand the simplest balance- 
sheet. When he disliked anything or anybody, he picked 
the handiest word from his vocabulary, and corruption 
was the most apposite term of abuse to employ in a case 
where money was in question. His own views upon national 
finance are of a charming crudity. In magniloquent and 
persuasive language he strove to persuade his followers to 
contest the whole matter of the debt, basing their argu- 
ments upon the proposition of Thomas Paine, ' that no gene- 
ration has the right to bind posterity.' With an amusing 
precision he calculated a generation to exist for a period of 
nineteen years, and he earnestly recommended that any debt 
which had remained undischarged for such a time should 
be cancelled.^ Posterity was to be allowed to enjoy private 
freedom and political safety ; but the present age must either 
discharge the bill in full, or the bill itself must be wiped off 
the slate. He protested that although he aided Hamilton to 
carry ' assumption ' in the manner that has been already ex- 
plained,^ he almost immediately came to regret it. He would 
persuade us that, at the time, he entertained no very decided 
convictions, and that his childlike simplicity was practised 
upon by his unscrupulous colleague. He explained in vivid 
but unconvincing detail the manner in which he was ' duped ' 
by Hamilton.^ Jefferson, indeed, is unique in his mis- 
fortunes, inasmuch as, at the time, he endured considerable 
unpopularity (to his mind ever the worst of all possible 
human calamities) through his supposed complicity in finan- 
cial integrity,* and after his death discarded the reward of 

1 Ford's Jefferson, ix. p. 389. ^ j^nte, p. 223. 

^ Ford's Jefferson, i. pp. 161-62. * History, iv. p. 449. 



THE DEMOCRATS 283 

his martyrdom by allowing it to transpire that his sympathies A.D. 1791 
were wholly upon the side of repudiation. For posterity, '^" 
looking back upon the deeds of its great-grandparents, is 
always a stern moralist, and in this matter of the debt un- 
hesitatingly approves Hamilton's action and condemns the 
opposition he was forced to endure. 

The first session of the second Congress did not meet under 
the most promising conditions. It is true that the country 
was enjoying a prosperity which had passed the dreams of 
the optimists. It is true also that, upon the whole, there was 
a disposition to support the Union, and to acknowledge the 
benefits which the administration of Washington had already 
conferred upon the nation. The composition of Congress 
reflected this general feeling, and the Federalists were in a 
considerable majority, though by no means firmly bound 
together upon party lines. But, on the other hand, there 
was an ominous lawlessness in Pennsylvania, where Gallatin 
had begun his evil work of agitation against the excise ; while 
Virginia, the proudest of all the states, was deeply offended 
by the superior strength and dignity of the central govern- 
ment. 

It was evident from the beginning that there was an 
organised party, far superior in discipline to the supporters 
of the government, determined to offer opposition to the 
Federalist principle at every point. The character and policy 
of the Secretary of the Treasury w^ere the main objects of 
attack. He brought forward proposals to give effect to the 
decisions arrived at during the previous sessions; but no 
matter how obvious or how formal were his recommenda- 
tions, they were made the occasions of factious opposition. 
Reason and consistency had no concern in the matter. It was 
sufficient that Hamilton was favourable to any measure for 
it to be obstructed by all the forms of Congress, and by all 
the invective of the opposition. Whether he proposed to 



284 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1791 increase the debt by a small sum in order to render the pro- 
' cess of ' assumption ' complete and equitable, or to decrease 
the debt by providing for its rapid discharge by means of a 
sinking fund, the settled hostility never varied. His pro- 
posals for the discharge of obligations due to foreign officers 
who had served during the War of Independence were 
assailed with objections as fierce and as captious as his pro- 
posals to provide a revenue adequate to the exigencies of the 
Union by means of an excise. An attempt was even made 
by Madison, in the full hope of success, to prevent the House 
from asking the Secretary of the Treasury to report upon 
Ways and Means. The insolence of the suggestion was 
deliberately designed to force Hamilton to resignation. 
Jefferson in private conferences endeavoured to detach a 
sufficient number of the Federalists, while Madison in 
Congress coloured the argument with a show of reason. 
The manoeuvre was in the nature of a surjjrise, but in the end 
it was defeated by a small majority.^ 

Erom its inauguration in January the National Gazette 
pointed out the way and cheered on the antagonists of the 
administration. Jefferson, in addition to his quiet labours 
among the weaker Federalists in Congress,^ turned his per- 
suasiveness to the task of instilling a suspicion of Hamilton's 
integrity in the mind of the President.^ The swashbucklers 
of the party were incited to make attacks in Congress, and 
Madison reinforced their ingenuous philippics with a more 
solemn malice and a more lingering innuendo. The charge 
of treason gradually gained strength. The charge of cor- 
ruption passed into a new phase. At first it had been 
alleged upon the grounds that unworthy men who had 
bought up the obligations of the states and the confedera- 
tion at a discount were, by Hamilton's system, to be paid off 

» Hidory, iv. p. 389. ^ /j,-^^, i^_ pp_ 388-90. 

» Ibid. V. pp. 34-35 and 38-40. 



THE DEMOCRATS 285 

at par. That was felt to be a straining of the meaning of A.D. 1791 
words, and accordingly, as the charge was one too profitable ^'^' ^* 
to be withdrawn, Madison invented an accusation which he 
rightly considered would not be unworthy of the epithets 
his followers had employed. Clearly, though in an indirect 
form, he accused Hamilton of having bribed the members 
of Congress who were fundholders, and the moneyed classes 
generally, by creating an artificial price. Stock had been 
bought, it was alleged, on behalf of government for the pur- 
poses of the sinking fund at a price higher than the true 
market price.^ It would be unfair to Madison's intelligence 
to suggest that he believed in the truth of his accusation, 
and equally unfair to his cool nature to put forward the 
excuse that he was carried away by a perfervid tempera- 
ment. It is only fair to judge Madison to some extent from 
his own standpoint. There was no confusion in his thoughts, 
or heat in his action. He was merely an intolerably good 
man whose objecu it was to rid himself and his country of a 
bad man. He was willing to pay a price for this benefit 
which would have staggered meaner natures, and to his own 
conscience it is conceivable that he excused the means he 
employed on the grounds that the game of politics, like the 
game of war, leaves veracity out of its rules. 



CHAPTER III 

Charges of Corruption 

The Democratic party was planned and organised during 
the spring and summer of 1791, and its efficiency was well 
proved in the session which followed; but until after the 
scandals of August 1792 the opposition made no parade of 
their strength, acknowledged no leader either in Congress or 

^ History, iv. p. 528. 



286 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1792 in the Cabinet, and would not even have admitted that they 
'^' had any formal existence. Everything was wrapped up in 
secrecy, and it was intended that an excellent discipline 
should wear the appearance of a perfect spontaneity. 

During the earlier part of the previous session^ the loose 
ranks of the Federalists had been unprepared for any con- 
certed attack. They had continued as before to indulge 
their jDrivate fancies, acting upon the assumption that in 
every division members would vote according to their senti- 
ments and not by order. As a result, government measures 
had suffered defeat and alteration upon more than one occa- 
sion, and critical issues had often been determined by 
dangerously narrow majorities. Gradually it had become 
clear that some secret caucus was pursuing a consistent 
course with the firm intention of forcing Hamilton to resign. 
This attempt, having ended in failure, had been succeeded 
by a second attempt, the object of which was to tarnish his 
honour. The friends of the Secretary of the Treasury, stirred 
with indignation, had demanded a frank exposure of the 
hidden enemy; but in this they had been discouraged by 
their leader, who held that in the interests of the Union it 
was necessary for the moment, at all costs, to conceal the 
divided counsels of the Cabinet and the antagonism of the 
joint authors of the Federalist. Perhaps it would have been 
better had Hamilton continued of this mind for a twelve- 
month longer ; but patience under attack was not with him 
a natural quality, and the ingenious malice of his enemies 
was a remarkable thing even in the history of politics.^ 

Hamilton's view of the situation after the session had 
ended is set forth with his customary frankness in a private 
letter to Colonel Carrington.^ He was then fully aware that 

1 24th October 1791 to 8th May 1792. 

' e.g. the St. Clair incident, History, iv. p. 416 and v. pp. 122-27. 

3 26th May 1792, Works, ix. p. 513. 



THE DEMOCRATS 287 

the obstruction of his measures and the attacks upon him- a.d. 1792 
self had not been mere casual explosions, but part of a pre- ^'^- ^^ 
concerted scheme. He had taken office against the advice 
of his frieads, confident that he would have the hearty- 
support of Madison, whom he knew, from Madison's own 
assurances, to be in agreement with him upon all essential 
points. Madison had been in favour of a funded debt, and 
of the assumption of the state obligations. He had been 
opposed on principle to discrimination and to repudiation in 
that or in any other form. He had advised strongly that an 
excise was a proper means of raising revenue. But from the 
very beginning of the administration he seemed to have 
gone back upon all his former opinions. Hamilton was sur- 
prised and chagrined, but nevertheless had received with 
incredulity the tales of gossips who alleged a personal 
animosity, and had refused to believe that so sincere a lover 
of the Union could have been turned from his principles by a 
crabbed jealousy. But after the work of last session it was 
impossible to doubt any longer that Madison had exchanged 
friendship for enmity, had thrown consistency overboard, 
and had cast in his lot with the party which would have 
gladly seen the Federalist burned by the common hangman. 
It was clear also that Madison was co-operating day by 
day with Jefferson. The similarity of the views put forward 
by the Secretary of State at cabinet councils, with those put 
forward simultaneously by the actual but unacknowledged 
leader of the opposition in Congress, was too marked to be 
the result of a mere accident. Jefferson's enmity was alto- 
gether unveiled. He held conversations with all and sundry 
upon the iniquities of the Treasury policy. His particular 
friends were the most active assailants of Hamilton's integrity 
in public discussions and private talk. The virulence of 
Freneau's paper was unceasing, and it was notorious that 
Jefferson and Madison had been the promoters and were 



288 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1792 still the patrons of this enterprise. In the whole of Madi- 
Mt. 35 gQQ'g conduct there had been a more uniform and persevering 
opposition than Hamilton had been able to resolve into a 
sincere difference of opinion.^ But even Madison's speeches 
in Congress afforded no adequate measure of his hostility. 
During the coarser and more violent attacks, as a rule, he 
had lain 'perdu' and had put up others endowed with a 
more reckless effrontery to do the dirtier portion of the 
work. On one occasion, however, he had departed from this 
prudent principle,^ and had made a direct imputation of 
dishonesty against the Treasury. 

Hamilton's letter goes on to enumerate his various dis- 
agreements with Jefferson and Madison since the inception 
of Washington's government. In all these disagreements 
the object of his adversaries had been to narrow the inter- 
pretation of the constitution and to abridge and curtail the 
federal power. In no case had they been able to achieve 
their ends, and Hamilton surmised that this constant current 
of success on the one side, and of defeat on the other, had 
made the opposition furious, and had produced a disposition 
to subvert their competitors, even at the expense of govern- 
ment.^ 

In conclusion, Hamilton pointed out the hollowness and 
insincerity of the clamours which had been raised against 
the tyranny of the central power. The real danger lay not 
in the possible suppression or extinction of the states, which 
were things beyond the wildest terrors, but in the preserva- 
tion of the federal government which was engaged in a 
struggle for its very life. At every moment fresh attempts 
were being made with an untiring audacity to pare down the 
powers and whittle away the sovereignty of the Union. The 
constant attempts at encroachment on the part of the larger 
states were now becoming more and more difficult to with- 

1 Works, ix. p. 520. » See ante p. 285. ^ Works, ix. p. 530. 



THE DEMOCRATS 289 

stand, owing to the authority which attached to the names A.D. 1793 
of the men who led and stimulated these attacks. If success ■ 
should attend their efforts, the result must be fatal. There 
would be an end not only of the Republic, but of republican- 
ism as a principle. Hamilton had feared from the beginning 
that a pure, unmitigated republic would prove too weak a 
form of government to preserve the Union against the tur- 
bulence of the states. It had been his constant effort 
throughout the administration to make the experiment of a 
republic succeed. The accusations which were brought 
against him of treasonable designs, of a preference for mon- 
archy, of a desire for reunion with Britain, were entirely 
false ; but what lent them colour was his determination to 
establish republicanism above the reach of disorder and 
intrigue by clothing it with powers adequate to its functions. 
Strength in government was the only principle capable of 
maintaining the Republic against the attacks of its numerous 
ill-wishers. 

A few weeks later ^ Washington forwarded to Hamilton a 
long list of objections to the Federalist policy, and asked 
that he might be supplied with the proper answers. The 
authorship of these objections was wrapped up in no mystery. 
They were formidable only because they were so numerous, 
so wearisome, so trite, so hollow and so obscure. Jefferson 
had the gift to make even his own confusion a weapon 
against his enemies. As Hamilton complained with some 
pathos, the chief difficulty of making an answer was the 
difficulty of attaching any clear meaning to the accusations. 
The rhetorical attacks of an intelligent man who has the 
force of character to play the part of a stupid one are the 
severest trial to the temper of him who has to provide a 
reply. But as Washington was most diligently assailed by 
Jefferson, in season and out of season, with the object of 

1 29th July 1792. 
T 



290 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1792 sowinpf in his mind a distrust of Hamilton and all liis works, 
^'^" ^^ it was essential that the vague indictment should be answered 
at length. The objections were therefore dealt with down 
to number ' twenty-one ' with a painstaking and, upon the 
whole, good-natured solemnity. The analysis of the mean- 
ing of the various charges appears in most cases conclusive 
without the need of any reply to them. The labour entailed 
may well have been grudged by the head of a great depart- 
ment working long after hours in the ordinary routine of 
his ofl&ce. 

This unjustifiable attack was the last straw. Early in 
August, Hamilton broke loose from his wise and self- 
imposed restraint. In a series of letters (anonymous only 
because the fashion of the times preferred such signatures 
as An American, Amicus, Catullus, Metellus, A Plain 
Honest Man} and so forth, to any private name) Hamilton 
proceeded to deal out justice to his colleague the Secretary 
of State. Freneau escaped with a few light touches of the 
lash; the weight of the thong fell upon the shoulders of 
Jefferson. The gist of the accusation was that Jefferson 
had started a paper to vilify the government of which he 
was himself a member; that he had from the beginning 
been unfriendly to the constitution; that he had been 
opposed almost without exception to all the measures of 
the administration, but notwithstanding had clung to 
office ; and that the value of his opinion upon any matter 
connected with financial probity was nought, seeing that 
during his ministry in France he had seriously recom- 
mended a fraud upon the creditors of the United States 
so -^ross and palpable that the old Congress had con- 
temptuously rejected it.^ All these charges were proved 
up to the hilt. Disloyalty, fatuity, ignorance and hypocrisy 
were established against the poor man so relentlessly that 
1 Works, vii. pp. 230-303. « 72,^^, yij. p. 235. 



THE DEMOCRATS 291 

the mere fact of his survival compels a certain degree of A.D. 179 
admiration. Hamilton's popularity rose with the vehe- ^'^' ^^ 
mence of the counterstroke. The Federalists were elated. 
Washington, who vainly desired peace, was perturbed to the 
point of remonstrating with both parties. The letters of 
his two ministers in reply are worthy of consideration. 
Hamilton is frank and fierce, but says he will endeavour 
to comply — when he has finished with the business: like 
some panting, victorious dog that is chidden by its master 
for a street brawl. Jefferson answers at great length and 
with a stammering affectation of serenity; as if he had 
been in no wise rufiled, — a whine, a snarl and a great 
flow of eloquence about his wrongs and his virtue. It 
has been doubted whether the controversy on Hamilton's 
part was altogether dignified. For the time it served its 
purpose. It was rough cudgel play ; but it must be remem- 
bered that an outraged minister has no such safety-valve 
in the United States as is provided by the British House of 
Commons. He is debarred from speechmaking, and has no 
opportunity of defending himself in debate. Under these 
restrictions, to trounce a not too scrupulous adversary in 
the newspapers is certainly excusable, and, according to 
circumstances, it may even be good policy. 

The history of the two sessions of Congress^ which 
followed upon these events is not a pleasing retrospect 
either to the patriotic American or to the sanguine lover 
of popular government. Hitherto the assault had been of 
a somewhat general character. The demerits of Hamilton's 
policy had been under review. Corruption had been freely 
alleged, but the argument had depicted the Secretary of 
the Treasury as the disdainful tempter, oiffering rosy- 

^ The second session of the second Congress (5th November 1792 to 3rd 
March 1793), and the first session of the third Congress (2nd December 1793 
to 9th June 1794). 



292 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. cheeked apples to the lips of greedy followers. The new 
If ~}Jnl method was an accusation of personal dishonesty, veiled 
but unambiguous. A great concern was displayed for the 
fullest information with regard to the disbursements of 
the exchequer, A full explanation was required of this 
matter, a precise account of that one. The reports that 
were demanded covered the whole field of expenditure 
and finance since the Federal Government had come into 
existence. These demands were in themselves innuendos, 
and the multitude of the demands was designed to over- 
power the efforts of the responsible minister to reply to 
them, and to obfuscate the judgment of public opinion. 

There is a dreary monotony in the records of Congress. 
Resolutions were moved and defeated. Reports were de- 
manded and supplied. Committees inquired and reported. 
But the result was invariable. There was always an answer 
which left no possibility of doubt in the minds of those 
who were at the pains to consider it. Like a gambler who 
doubles his stake after each reverse of fortune, the opposi- 
tion increased in violence as often as their charges were 
proved clearly to be calumny. Every fresh exposure made 
them more desperate. They never learned caution, and it 
must be admitted to their credit they never lost heart. 
Persistency in anything, even in calumny, has some hope 
of success if it is prepared, no matter how the luck runs, to 
double after every loss. The insensibility which refuses to 
be routed upon the proof of falsehood may commend itself 
in the long run merely as a good fighter; for a popular 
audience is apt upon occasions to be more interested in 
good fighting than in the pursuit of truth. 

The hero of this period was Giles of Virginia, a pre- 
posterous, pugilistic character, to whom notoriety was much, 
and failure in calumny merely failure and not disgrace. 
Behind him we have a vision always of Madison with a 



THE DEMOCRATS 293 

sponge, a basin and a towel. Madison does not cut a very A.D. 

1792-1^ 
^T. 35-3G 



dignified figure, but we excuse his solemn anxiety, for be 



had heavy wagers on the event. It was natural that he 
should nurse his ' fancy ' with the most sedulous attention. 
He was not much of an ally, had little share in the glory 
of the encounter, but was reserved for the humiliation of 
defeat, in which the heroic Giles was unable fully to 
participate by reason of the grossness of his nature. 
Jefferson, in the meanwhile, hating controversy, shook his 
head; muttered suspicions to the President; averted his 
gaze from the eyes of men, and studied his square toes, 
while the mischief proceeded which he had so ingeniously 
set to work. 

In spite of his violence, his reckless disregard of truth, 
his unconcern for the feelings of his enemies, Giles does not 
offend the moral sense to the same degree as his employers 
offend it. It is difficult to think of him without a smile, 
and the smile is not altogether unfriendly. He was a 
squat, untidy, blackavised little man, with a prodigious 
vitality, ^ quick eye and a shrewd instinct in a melee ; a 
stout fellow with loud lungs. In a combat he was entirely 
without scruples, and, allowing for certain pasteboard con- 
ventions of rhetoric, equally devoid of highflown professions. 
Politics to him was a mere game, and the pleasure he 
derived from it was not the sordid results of success, but 
mainly the joyful exercise of his talents. He went into 
Congress as a man enters the ring, and finding himself there 
he hit out just as hard as he could. The more eyes he 
blacked, the more noses he caused to bleed, the more 
complacent he became. He did not rate himself highly; 
except upon his particular gift in the matter of the ' knock- 
out.' His attitude towards Jefferson and Madison was 
a mixture of good-humoured condescension and absurd 
respect — the attitude of the prize-fighter to the ' toffs ' who 



294 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. have put their money on him. His attacks were in the 

\I^^^^^^ brutal manner, his violence was outrageous, but he does 
iEi. 35-36 ' . . » . 

not produce the impression of malice. He was vain, and 

Jefferson, for the time being, flattered his egotism. He was 
fluent, and Madison guided the torrent of his eloquence. 
Quick in mean manoeuvres, shrewd in small issues, un- 
scrupulous, reckless, persistent and 'game,' he combined 
the sharpness of the old-fashioned country attorney with 
the hardness of the old fashioned fox-hunting squire. No 
fence was too high, no hedge too thick, no joke too broad, 
no blow too heavy, no plea too desperate. He had none of 
the finer feelings, and, to do him justice, he believed that all 
mankind were made in his own image. He was a gamester 
in politics, but it is not to be denied that he was passionately 
attached to his own state of Virginia, and that he sincerely 
detested the constitution with the whole force of his nature. 
During the session which began in the autumn of 1792 
and ended in the spring of 1793, the energies of Giles were 
kept fully employed. Speaking generally, all measures 
which emanated from the Treasury, even the most formal 
and necessary provisions, were opposed and obstructed. 
Shortly after Congress assembled Hamilton introduced 
proposals of a far-reaching character for the reduction of 
the debt. Finding upon every side the evidences of a 
remarkable prosperity, he considered himself well justified 
in calling upon the country to bear a somewhat heavier 
taxation to diminish the national indebtedness. The credit 
of the United States with European bankers stood at a 
remarkable height. Loans had been issued at Amsterdam 
during the autumn which bore interest at the low rate of 
four per cent.^ But in spite of these favourable conditions 
the Democrats, unwilling that Hamilton should have the 
renown of so conspicuous a reform, encountered his sugges- 

1 History, v. p. 109 



THE DEMOCRATS 295 

tions with a determined opposition. The discussion, by one a.d. 

means or another, was put off from week to week, until the ^J?^'}]^^ 
^ Ms. 35-36 

expiration of Congress put an end to the opportunity. It 

was an extraordinary spectacle. Hamilton, who had been 
reproached with the utmost bitterness for his supposed 
desire to perpetuate the debt, was now seen exerting all 
his influence to discharge it, and did not shrink from the 
odium of new taxes to attain his object. His opponents, 
on the other hand, who had clamoured so loudly against 
the debt, resisted every measure proposed to carry their own 
recommendations into effect, and offered no substitute that 
would have met the case.^ 

Immediately after Christmas, Giles and another were put 
up to ask for statements showing how the moneys derived 
from the various Dutch loans had been applied, for further 
statements covering the whole field of borrowing, and for 
returns of all the employees of the Treasury with their 
salaries and other particulars. Within ten days all this 
information was supplied.^ Then the Senate became anxious 
for information about the National Bank, the appropriations 
of surplus revenue, and a variety of kindred matters. The 
following day its curiosity was fully satisfied.^ Finally, in 
the fourth week of January, Giles opened his general assault. 
Taking for his text a purely technical point as to the 
authority under which certain foreign loans had been raised, 
he called for five reports to be made by the Treasury.^ The 
speech of Giles admitted of no misunderstanding. ' Candour 
induced him ' to make it quite clear that he accused the 
Secretary of the Treasury of malversation. He definitely 
alleged that the accounts submitted by Hamilton to Con- 
gress a few weeks earlier had been deliberately cooked, and 
that there was in fact an unaccounted for balance, amount- 

^ History, v. pp. 144-46. ^ Ihid. v. pp. 174-77. 

3 Ibid. V. p. 177. * Ibid. v. pp. 178-200. 



296 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1793 ing to a million and a half of dollars. The Democratic 
^T. 36 pj,gss hastened to join in the chorus, teemed with articles 
upon corruption, and even pointed to the President as an 
accomplice in the frauds. 

The campaign, it is needless to say, had been planned by 
Jefferson. He was anxious to bring pressure to bear upon 
Washington, and to break up the alliance which so far had 
defeated all his efforts. The resolutions which Giles moved 
were drafted by Madison in his own hand.^ Hamilton, 
weary but imperturbable, issued his instructions, and the 
Federalists joined with the Democrats in voting for the 
fullest inquiry. 

Hamilton's organisation and system served him well. 
The Treasury and its chief had to work for a month long 
after hours, but by the third week of February, Congress 
had before it a full statement of all receipts and disburse- 
ments since the beginning of the national government; 
The accounts were stated so clearly and simply that it was 
impossible to mistake their import. The answer to the 
opposition was cold, businesslike and complete. In so 
orderly a proceeding we do not look for genius, but only for 
lucidity. The lucidity of Hamilton was a thing to be 
dreaded. In his hands it became a weapon of destruction. 
His demeanour was quiet and formal as he proceeded to 
explain the system of his accounts and vindicate the 
integrity of his procedure ; but indirectly, and apparently 
without resentment, certainly without temper, he explained 
the motives of the inquiry, and exposed the tactics of his 
enemies. 

Hamilton as a controversialist had an altogether excep- 
tional gift for the countorstroke. Regarded merely as a 
fighter on behalf of his own honour, he is far more admir- 
able in defence than when he delivers the attack. Eighteen 

^ They still exist in the State Department, History^ v. p. IS 



THE DEMOCRATS 297 

months before, he had fallen upon Jefferson and driven him A.D. 1793 
moaning, out of his entanglements ; but that was a clumsy '^' 
achievement by comparison. In attack he had a tendency 
to get too much heated; to hit too hard and too pro- 
miscuously; to rely too much on his muscles, too little on 
his eyes; but in defence he is consummate. Quiet, and 
grave, and self-possessed, he yields nothing and overlooks 
nothing; but as the attack pauses and begins to reel, he 
steps forward in the same quiet, grave and self-possessed 
manner, without an appearance of haste, or enmity, or effort, 
and places his blows so gently that it is hard to believe he 
is putting forth his full strength. Every touch is a shock, 
and the end of his enemies is ignominious disaster. 

The rout was completed when the Democrats played into 
his hands by a false manoeuvre. Anxious that Hamilton 
should not be formally acquitted, anxious also that if 
possible the charges should be kept hanging over his head 
while the elections for the new Congress were in progress, 
the indefatigable Giles was put up to move nine resolutions 
of censure which it was intended should be debated until 
the term of the second Congress had elapsed,^ but not put 
to the vote. In this scheme he was defeated by the sudden 
outburst of feeling not only in the House itself, but out of 
doors. At the last moment the Democrats wished to with- 
draw the resolutions, but the triumphant Federalists refused 
to allow their opponents this means of retreat. The nine 
accusations were accordingly carried to the vote, and 
Madison and Giles kept one another company in a series of 
ignominious minorities, as a frail curate and a drunken 
roisterer might keep one another company in the stocks 
after a Saturday night's caxouse. 

The next session was ^ dreary echo of its predecessor. 
The only important change in the situation y\as that in the 

1 4th March 1793. 



298 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. lower House the Democrats, thanks to the French Revolu- 
^ ~|, tion, held a clear majority. But as regarded the attacks 
upon Hamilton, the course of events was a dull repetition of 
the manoeuvres of the year before. 

Hamilton's short letter to the Speaker gave a formal 
challenge : " It is known that in the last session certain 
' questions were raised respecting my conduct in office, 
' which, though decided in a manner most satisfactory 
' to me, were nevertheless, unavoidably, from the lateness 
' of the period when they were set on foot, so accelerated 
' in the issue, as to have given occasion to a suggestion 
' that there was not time for a due examination: un- 
' willing to leave the matter on such a footing, I have con- 
' eluded to request the House of Representatives, as I now 
' do, that a new inquiry may without delay be instituted 
' in some mode, the most effectual for an accurate and 
' thorough investigation; and I will add, that the more 
' comprehensive it is, the more agreeable will it be to me. 

*I cannot, however, but take the liberty of assuring the 
' House that a like plan to that which was pursued in the 
' last session will never answer the purpose of a full and 
' complete inquiry, while it would lay on me a burthen, with 
' which neither a proper discharge of the current duties of my 
' office nor the present state of my health is compatible. The 
' unfavourable effect upon the business of the department 
' of the very considerable portion of my time which was 
' engrossed by the inquiry of the last session has not yet 
' entirely ceased." ^ 

This letter was written upon the 16th of December, and 
the challenge was immediately taken up. Giles, loyal to his 
employers, and unaffected by the ruin of his previous efforts, 
made a gallant attempt to pursue the charges of corrup- 
tion, founding his arguments upon the testimony of a clerk 

^ Works, iii. p. 179. 



THE DEMOCRATS 299 

who had been dismissed from the Treasury. His success in A.D. 
this endeavour ended with the appointment of a select ^^ ^^ 
committee to inquire. Upon the 29th of the same month 
its report was issued. The conduct of the Secretary was 
justified at all points, and by a body in which his opponents 
held a majority against him, the charges were pronounced 
to be ' wholly illiberal and groundless.' ^ 

Towards the end of February, Giles returned to the attack. 
A committee was appointed to inquire into the conduct of 
the Treasury. Although two-thirds of this committee were 
members of the opposition, and none of Hamilton's more 
capable supporters were chosen to serve upon it, but only 
new members filled with awe of their more famous col- 
leagues, it is improbable that the sordid labour was under- 
taken with any great hope of success. After an exhaustive 
and hostile inquiry this packed tribunal was obliged, like all 
its predecessors, to report not only a complete exculpation 
of the minister, but praise for his loyal and upright service. 
Congress, therefore, had no alternative but to accept this 
verdict without a dissenting voice.^ " It was a cruel thing 
' in Congress," Colonel Heth wrote to Hamilton, " and 
' somewhat unprecedented, I presume, to oblige your per- 
' secutors and prosecutors to sit as your judges; and what 

* was still more ill-natured, to compel them to make a report 

* by which they were obliged to convict you of purity of 
' conduct, unshaken integrity, and a constant watchfulness 
' over the public interest." ^ 

But still the opposition to all Treasury measures upon 
whatsoever principle was unbroken. Everything was con- 
tested, and yet in this assembly where the Federalists were 
in a minority the essential things were in the end accom- 
plished. "You are strange fellows," wrote a good-natured 
Democrat to one of his opponents ; " formerly you did what 

1 History, v. p. 425. » jn^^ ^i p, 33 3 JlJi^l^ y^ p_ 34^ 



300 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. * you chose with a small majority ; now we have a great 
' !J^g ' majority and can do nothing. You have baffled every one 
' of our plans." ^ It was not a matter of tactics. The 
opposition was forced to yield in the end always by the 
manifest good sense of the proposals of their great adversary. 
When the same Congress met again in the autumn of 
1794, Hamilton notified the Speaker of his intention to retire 
early in the new year, in order that any inquiries into his 
conduct which might be deemed necessary should be set 
on foot without delay. But by this time even Giles was 
surfeited with defeat, and Madison was too much relieved 
at the thought of Hamilton's withdrawal from office to 
engage in any new intrigues. Hamilton's plans for pro- 
viding further support to the public credit were of course 
opposed, but the opposition was perfunctory. In the end 
his project for the redemption of the debt was carried, and on 
the 31st of January 1795 he retired from office. " In every 
' relation which you have borne to me," Washington wrote 
upon this occasion, " I have found that my confidence in 
' your talents, exertions and integrity has been well placed. 
' I the more freely render this testimony of my approbation, 
' because I speak from opportunities of information, which 
' cannot deceive me, and which furnish satisfactory proof of 
' your title to public regard." 

The opposition to Hamilton during the period under 
review had been the extreme of political hatred. His 
measures were attacked in the first place, his character in 
the second. With the principle of the former no fault 
can be found except the fault of bad judgment ; nor 
must the spirit in which it was pursued be judged too 
harshly. Patriotism has a vague boundary; and if the 
Democrats were frequently found far beyond the debat- 
able land, they were not different in this particular from 

^ History, v. p. 588. 



THE DEMOCRATS 801 

political parties all the world over. Misrepresentation of A.D. 
the meaning and effect of measures, misrepresentation of ^J^^}Jtt 
the motives which produced them, are conditions unfortu- 
nate enough, but inevitable, of all government by party. A 
strong minister pursuing a clear policy must be prepared for 
such assaults, and his admirers will do well to pass them by 
without too much emphasis. 

But the second method falls under a different category. 
It is bad leadership that assails the private honour of an 
opponent, as Jefferson did, relying upon the abstruse- 
ness of accounts and the confusion of the subject, when 
debated in heat before a popular audience, to make it 
impossible for his opponent to get clear away. He says 
in his memoirs that he believed Hamilton to be a man of 
unblemished personal integrity .^ and there is no reason to 
doubt that in this case he was speaking the truth. Indeed, 
to any one in close personal relations with the Secretary of 
the Treasury, however hostile his disposition, this fact was too 
obvious for argument. But none the less it was Jefferson who 
launched the charges of corruption against his colleague, in 
the same manner as he had attacked his measures — through 
the mouths of his well-drilled partisans. When Hamilton 
rolled up this furious assault with the same crushing 
disaster to his opponents that he had dealt out to their 
previous more legitimate efforts; when, to the amazement 
even of his friends, he so disentangled both accounts and 
charges that plain men not only escaped from the con- 
fusion, but perceived that it had been intended, and the end 
to which it had been devised, the reaction for the time 
being against the opposition and their leader was sharp 
and scornful ; and had it not been for other considerations, 
which will be dealt with in the following chapters, it must 
have been overwhelming. Hamilton's defence of his per- 

^ Ford's Jejjtrson, i. p. 166. 



302 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1795 sonal honour, no less than his defence of his national policy, 
^'^- ^^ was complete. At no single point was he touched. The 
victory exacted enormous labours. It damaged his health 
and interfered seriously with his administrative work. But 
the result of the one is as satisfactory to those who hold 
his memory in respect as the result of the other was for- 
tunate for his country. In an age when the charge of 
corruption was the commonest, and as a rule the most 
reliable weapon of attack against a minister, Hamilton 
resisted with success every effort to attach the shadow of 
a suspicion to the uprightness of his administration. But, 
unfortunately, the very commonness of the charge made 
men overlook the recklessness and the malice which alleged 
it without just cause. Hamilton, indeed, came out of the 
struggle unscathed, and for the moment a hero; but no 
infamy attached, as it would have done to-day, to his 
accusers. Jefferson and Madison did not, strange as it may 
appear, suffer in their reputations as honourable citizens. 
Giles continued unashamed to be a great figure in debate. 
Full justice was not done at the time, great injustice was 
done in the years which followed, and only in comparatively 
recent days have the actors in this drama come to be rated 
at their true values. 

So in the earliest years the great constitutional doctrine 
that it is the duty of an opposition to oppose was fully 
grasped. These heroes of freedom were faithful to the logic 
of this principle, if faithless in later days to the logic of 
their own precepts. They liad condemned the funding 
and assumption of the debts because they placed a burden 
on posterity, because the idea of a permanent federal debt 
was inseparable from corruption, and because they were 
charged with a rate of interest which it was possible 
to represent as intolerable. When Hamilton, finding the 
credit of the country good beyond his expectations, its 



THE DEMOCRATS 303 

wealth rapidly expanding, and confidence secured both at A.D. 1795 
home and abroad, proposed to extend the operation of the ^^ 

sinking fund, to borrow at a lower rate of interest, to in- 
crease taxation so as to pay off the heavy-interest, short- 
loan stock and to redeem the whole debt at an earlier date, 
the same opponents, with different cries, condemned the 
proposal and secured its defeat. 

Within a decade the opposition came into power, hold- 
ing it for many years without a break. Jefferson, Madison 
and Monroe, three of Hamilton's most relentless critics, 
were presidents in succession, each for a double term of 
office. But under their rule Hamilton's organisation of the 
Treasury was preserved. His financial methods were main- 
tained. His system of audit, which had been derided as the 
intended accomplice of corruption, was accepted as a fit safe- 
guard of the exchequer. His princi23les of national credit 
and taxation were adopted and afterwards extended. Even 
the bank charter after remarkable vicissitudes was renewed. 
All the main pillars of his hated administration were kept 
intact, partly because no one was found bold enough to 
change them, but chiefly for the reason that there had never 
existed, except among the ignorant, any belief that they were 
fraught with danger. 



CHAPTER IV 

Foreign Bangers 

It appeared to Hamilton, taking stock of the situation in 
the third year of his office,^ that the unexpected was in 
course of happening, and that the plan of his campaign must 
be changed accordingly. To his credit stood the policy of 
the Treasury, organised, in working order and successful far 

1 January 1792. 



304 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1792 beyond even his own sanguine anticipations. Sound finance, 
the foundation of the independence of states, was now Ukely 
to maintain itself, and to strengthen its tradition year by year. 
The commercial policy was before the world for discussion ; 
enthusiastically approved by some, vigorously denounced by 
others. To carry it, however, would have taken more time 
and effort than had been necessary in the case of its pre- 
decessor. All political conditions had hardened in the mean- 
while, and any proposals which Hamilton might now have 
introduced were certain to be opposed by the whole weight 
of an organised party. 

It is a fair question — Why did Hamilton leave the idea 
of his commercial policy as a kind of legacy ? Why was 
the thing not accomplished during his administration? 
If he truly loved his idea, why was it set on one side to be 
tardily undertaken by a third generation ? He was an 
indefatigable minister against whom no resistance could 
make head. Had he chosen to urge it, surely success must 
have ensued? But he did not choose to urge it, and from 
this some people have argued that he came to think better 
of his first opinions. 

The true answer is somewhat different. The French 
Revolution upset many well-laid plans. The stately policies 
of the Old World were tripped up and stumbled ; the eager 
projects of the New were arrested by it. All the nations, 
except the Chinese, held their breath and, like men in an 
earthquake, waited with their hands on the latches to make 
fast, to undo, or to escape. 

Pitt dreamed a great dream as to how he might reap in 
peace what his father had sowed in war. The consolidation 
of an empire, the development of its resources, were the 
objects which attracted his ambition ; but the realisa- 
tion of this ideal required as its condition a Britain aloof 
and unconcerned in the affairs of its neighbours. Against 



THE DEMOCRATS 305 

kings and the old diplomacy, had these institutions con- A.D, 1792 
tinned to exist, he was fully secured. But the dynasties ^' "^ 
began to topple headlong, and the new systems which 
took their place disturbed all calculations. A great peace 
minister was therefore forced against his will to become a 
war minister. The defence of the empire, and not its 
development, was his unexpected task ; and the boundaries 
which he had never wished to widen were set further and 
further over the face of the earth. 

Hamilton no less than Pitt desired to give himself wholly 
to the task of husbanding the national estate and gathering 
in the harvests of prosperity. He aimed at being indepen- 
dent of his neighbours and at peace with them. It may be 
believed that he cursed the French Revolution as a fisher- 
man curses a gale which suddenly opens upon him just as 
he has overtaken the shoal. The energies of both statesmen 
were diverted from a fruitful object to a barren defence, 
necessary, but in their eyes most lamentable. There is no 
difficulty in understanding the disappointment of such a 
transfer, though we recognise clearly a fertility in their 
efforts which the dust and heat obscured to some extent 
from the actors themselves. The tradition of Pitt is not 
sterile, and although Hamilton was forced to abandon his 
vision of industrial development, he has earned the credit of 
establishing the principles of foreign policy over a period 
which has not yet ended. 

The quality of permanence is the most remarkable virtue 
in Hamilton's statesmanship. What he did at his leisure 
after much planning, as well as what he did hastily under 
great pressure, work which he imposed upon himself because 
he loved it, and irksome labours forced upon him by events, 
have the same character. They endure. Men, so far, have 
been unable to alter them. Enemies had but a short time 
to wait for the opportunity. They came eager and exultant, 

u 



306 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1792 with axe and crowbar, furiously raging, but hardly a stone of 
■ the edifice was displaced. 

In the making of the constitution, in the establishment of 
public credit, in la3dng down the plain rules of reason for 
the relations of the United States with the outside world — 
in each case we find the same quality of permanence. The 
cause is not difiicult to trace. Hamilton knew what he 
wished to accomplish. He knew what forces could be 
employed for the purpose. He valued them accurately, and 
so disposed and arranged them, that out of its own vigour 
each gave to the others its due support. He built like a 
good bridge-maker, so that the stress confirmed and 
strengthened the fabric. This is only possible to a man 
who has the instinct of reality; who patiently considers 
things, not as he wishes them to be, but as they are ; who 
works not with words, but with actual forces. A phrase- 
maker is often serviceable in a work of destruction. He 
is of considerable use when it is a question of clearing 
out slums and rookeries; but as a builder he is of little 
value, except occasionally to sing cheerfully while the other 
men are at work. 

To the opposition the French Revolution came as a god- 
send. The ferment which this event excited in men's minds, 
the difficulties of government in steering through the 
typhoon, afforded an opportunity of putting a term to the 
triumphal progress of Hamilton's administration. At a time 
when all men are furiously taking sides upon the alfairs of a 
stranger, rulers have commonly found it hard to keep a true 
course. While one set of partisans denounces their lukewarm 
apathy to noble sentiments, the other set contemptuously 
derides their timid respect for popular fanaticism. In such 
circumstances an astute opposition finds its most favourable 
opportunity, and the new Democratic party was accordingly 
highly favoured by events. 



THE DEMOCRATS 307 

Everything turns, at this critical moment, upon the A.D. 1792 
relations of the United States with Britain on the one hand, ^"^^ ^^ 
and with France on the other. From 1783 to 1793, from 
the Peace of Versailles to the declaration of war by France 
against Europe, the tendency of American policy had been a 
vivacious unfriendliness to Britain and a sedate attachment 
to France. 

The legacy of the War of Independence was a strong 
resentment towards the mother country. The British view 
of the matter was that we had been beaten, but that the 
beating had not changed the face of affairs to any serious 
extent. Our position with regard to the great European 
powers was hardly affected by it. We had not put forth our 
full strength. A remote dependency had broken away, and 
there was an end of the matter. It was annoying that we 
should have lost our colonies, but a naval defeat in the 
narrow seas would have been a matter of incomparably 
greater importance. Americans, on the other hand, were 
exasperated because Britain would not treat its own calamity 
in a more serious spirit, and because King George's cabinet, 
until the Union, six years later, made difficulties about 
accepting the thirteen states as a real nation in spite of 
their famous victory. An aristocratic government, polite 
and correct, showed by nun^.erous indications that it did not 
intend to deal with them as with an equal. To this grievance 
was added the injury inflicted by the commercial regulations 
of Britain during the period of disunion. Neither of these 
causes of anger was serious. A firm union was the obvious 
cure for both, and almost as soon as Washington's ad- 
ministration was formed the remedy began to work. The 
thing which really mattered was the non-fulfilment of the 
treaty of peace. Britain still held the frontier posts, alleging 
as her justification the breach of faith in regard to the pay- 
ment of British debts, and the ill-treatment of the loyaUsts. 



308 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1792 To France, on the other hand, there was an attachment, but 
^" until 1791 or even later, it was an attachment of a political 
rather than of a sentimental kind. King Louis xvi. had 
been an ally in the past because an alliance had suited his 
own interests. That fact was clearly understood by American 
statesmen, who considered that France was likely to continue 
her alliance in the future for the same reason. But gratitude 
to France was never the attitude of the government of the 
states towards the government of Paris during this period. 
Gratitude was not due, seeing that the service rendered had 
not been in any sense disinterested. 

Consequently, until the spring of 1792, when the Revolution 
was in full blast, such a sentiment would have been ridiculed 
had it ever been seriously urged. Americans, while the idea 
of democracy was still in the background, viewed the 
assistance which had been given by Louis xvi. in its true 
light. His government had no affection for the rebellious 
colonists, but merely desired to distress a dangerous rival. 
The conduct of France during the negotiations for peace had 
been viewed none too favourably by the new Republic, and, 
it must be added, the conduct of the new Republic had been 
viewed none too favourably by the ancient monarchy. 

The ending of the war left no debt outstanding as between 
nations, except an account which was recorded in dollars, 
and this, thanks to Hamilton, was in process of being rapidly 
wiped out. France had aided the American arms, and her 
ample reward had been the wounds thereby inflicted upon 
her European enemy. The treaty of alliance was complete 
within itself. Its terms constituted a fair bargain. In case 
the American possessions of King Louis were attacked with- 
out provocation, the states were bound to come to his aid ; 
and in case the United States were menaced in their freedom 
or possessions, France was to render a similar service.^ 

' History, ii. p. 417. 



THE DEMOCRATS 809 

Therefore, though it is true that, during the ten years a.d. 1792 
following the signature of peace, Americans regarded ^'^- ^^ 
Britain with dislike, it is altogether untrue that they 
regarded France with any emotional fervour. Until the 
French Revolution brought certain ideas into prominence, 
' gratitude ' to France never assumed importance as a 
popular cry. 

Beyond this there was a legal question. Louis was dead 
and his system was ended. That in itself was enough to 
have done away all obligations under his treaty with Con- 
gress. But to make the case clearer, his successors in the 
government had passed the scythe over all his promises. 
The Revolution had denounced and solemnly torn up all 
the treaties made by the fallen monarchy.^ Nothing stood. 
A new reckoning was opened, and all the old accounts were 
sponged off the slate. And it was only after these events 
had occurred that the treaty between France and the United 
States was invoked with frenzied zeal as a holy and binding 
arrangement. It was then claimed by eloquent people on 
both sides of the Atlantic that the American treaty had 
been impliedly excepted from the massacre of the old 
diplomacy ; that it was a debt between nations and not 
between rulers ; that the conditions of a defensive war and 
danger to the American possessions of France were to be 
ignored upon a generous interpretation ; and that, in plain 
words, if France chose to go into war with any adversary or 
upon any pretext, the United States were bound in honour 
to follow her to the ends of the earth. 

At the conclusion of the War of Independence, Hamilton, 
as we have seen, pressed upon his countrymen, in season and 
out of season, the sanctity of their treaty obligations. The 
principle of loyal observance of engagements was a funda- 
mental article of his creed. The obligations incurred 

1 History, v. p. 239. 



310 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1792 ' for ever ' under the original treaty with France, when 
Mt. 35 f'rench aid was the only hope of final success in the struggle 
against Britain, were no less and no more sacred in his 
eyes than the obligations incurred towards Britain when 
the treaty of peace was signed ; for valuable consideration 
had been given in both cases. He viewed the situation, 
however, without malice or excitement, and arrived early 
at the conclusion that circumstances, which were by no 
means unlikely to occur, might easily 'effect a revolution 
in the state of our foreign politics.' ^ 

To France under the monarchy, her alliance with Spain 
was a far more precious asset than her alliance with the 
United States. If these alliances at any time should prove 
incompatible, the ministers of King Louis would never 
hesitate for a moment which to choose. The European 
situation must necessarily be regarded before the American. 
Nor was it unlikely that such a conflict would arise between 
the treaty obligations of France with Spain on the one hand, 
and with the Union on the other ; for, of all nations, Spain 
was the most probable antagonist of the Union. The dangers 
caused by the troubles with Britain on the Canadian border 
were trivial as compared with the menace from the South. 
Spain held a strong position at the mouth of the Mississippi. 
She claimed the right to control the navigation of that 
river, and if her pretensions could have been enforced, the 
development of the states would have been throttled. She 
claimed, moreover, all the wide but undefined territories 
lying between the western bank of the Mississippi and the 
Pacific coast. 

It was clear to Hamilton's mind that sooner or later this 
conflict of interests would have to be settled, and it seemed 
probable that the mode of settlement would be a war. In 
such case France would be compelled to choose which of 

^ History, iv. p. 194. 



THE DEMOCRATS 311 

her allies she would retain, and it was unreasonable to A.D. 1792 
suppose that she would sacrifice the more valuable of the ^'^' ^^ 
two. On the other hand, if war broke out, the aid of 
Britain would be as serviceable against Spain as the aid 
of France had in former times been serviceable against 
Britain. Nor was it likely, in the circumstances which 
have been imagined, that it would be difficult to obtain the 
co-operation of King George's government. 

Hamilton was therefore anxious, while maintaining friendly 
relations with France, to cultivate good, if not precisely 
friendly, relations with Britain. On commercial as well as 
on political grounds he was eager to arrive at a good under- 
standing, for he saw clearly the enormous benefit which 
would accrue to the states by a treaty to facilitate trade. The 
first step towards this end was to get rid of the disputes, 
charges and countercharges which had arisen out of the 
treaty of peace. It was of the first importance that the 
atmosphere of hostility and distrust should be changed, so 
that the negotiation might be undertaken in a frank and 
reasonable spirit. Hamilton had the lowest opinion of 
provocative methods even in dealing with his enemies. 
When it was a question of promoting neighbourly relations, 
provocation seemed to him a form of insanity. While he 
would not have hesitated to adopt commercial regulations 
that would have benefited his own country at the expense 
of Britain, he was utterly opposed to the popular demand 
for legislation which would have injured and irritated 
Britain without bringing any advantage to the states. To 
Madison's proposals^ for an invidious tariff which would 
have injured both Britain and the States for the benefit of 
France and Holland, he was even more strongly opposed, and 
by his influence with the senate he succeeded in securing 
their defeat. 

1 May 1789, History, iv. p. 7. 



312 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1792 The sound sense of Hamilton's policy seems obvious 
enough to-day, but it is not diificult to enter into the 
feelings of those who held a different view. Their judg- 
ment was clouded by the memories of the war. To recom- 
pense the ally and to injure the enemy appeared in the 
temper of the times a very natural and proper course of 
action. Even Washington was at first inclined to look with 
favour upon Madison's proposals. 

Union and the establishment of a federal government 
had changed the attitude of the British Cabinet towards the 
States. Britain was not slow in testifying a respect for 
the new order which it had denied to the old. This 
change of attitude was not more remarkable in the case 
of our own country than in the case of others; but as 
our enmity or friendship was, in commercial matters at 
all events, immeasurably more important, the contrast 
was more remarked. The success of Hamilton's financial 
policy in raising the credit of the nation produced 
as great and favourable an impression in London as in 
Amsterdam or Paris. In the autumn of 1791 Hammond 
was accredited as the first British minister to the United 
States. A few months later an American minister was sent 
to England. 

In these events Hamilton saw a favourable opportunity 
for breaking down the ancient prejudices. But Jefferson, in 
whose department the matter lay, held opposite opinions. 
He had no wish for friendly relations with Britain, but, on 
the contrary, desired, as he states quite clearly, to keep ' alive 
an altercation ' with that power.^ In all likelihood he sin- 
cerely believed this to be the best means of inducing Britain 
to deliver up the frontier posts which she held as hostages 
for the fulfilment of the terms of peace ; but if so, he mis- 
judged the conditions. For Britain was incomparably less 

^ History, v. p. 8. 



THE DEMOCRATS 313 

inconvenienced than the States by the non-settlement of the A.D. 1792 
differences. The matters of dispute were so remote that ^* 
they easily passed out of recollection. If London merchants 
were aware in a dim fashion that the treaty of peace had not 
been carried into effect, they were also sensible that, thanks 
to the hitch, they enjoyed a very practical benefit in the 
monopoly of the fur trade, which would cease so soon as the 
frontier posts were given up. In the States, on the other 
hand, the disadvantages of the situation were felt keenly, and 
the whole problem, with its annoyances and humiliations, 
was viewed at much closer range. The diplomatic position 
of the Americans was a disadvantageous one, for the im- 
portant reason that they were impatient while Britain was 
indifferent. The right means of adjustment was to create 
an atmosphere in which both parties could come together 
good-temperedly to remove a serious danger. 

Jefferson's diplomacy was bad because he misjudged the 
immediate interests of the two countries. It was also bad 
because he allowed his personal ties with a certain section of 
Parisian society to colour his whole view of the situation. 
In Hamilton's opinion, both Jefferson and Madison were 
radically unsound and dangerous in regard to foreign politics. 
"They have a womanish attachment to France, and a 
' womanish resentment against Great Britain. They would 
' draw us into the closest embrace of the former, and involve 
' us in all the consequences of her politics ; and they would 
' risk the peace of the country in their endeavours to keep us 
' at the greatest possible distance from the latter." ^ If these 
gentlemen were left free to pursue their own course, ' there 
would be, in less than six months, an open war between the 
United States and Great Britain.' ^ 

Throughout the spring and summer of 1792 we find 
Hamilton constantly pleading for a candid, good-tempered, 

1 Hamilton to Carrington, 26th May 1792, Works, ix. p. 527. ^ Ibid. 



314 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1792 businesslike attitude.^ He desired a commercial treaty with 
• ^ Britain which, in the circumstances, would have been more 
productive of benefits than commercial treaties with all the 
rest of the world. But Jefferson, and not he, was foreign 
minister. A confused thinker with a settled purpose is one 
of the most formidable opponents. Jefferson was constantly 
overruled by the cabinet, but unfortunately no power could 
take the ' atmosphere ' out of his department. The temper 
of the discussion was in his hands so long as he was allowed 
to retain his office. It was comparatively easy to force an 
alteration of the purport of a despatch, but less easy to intro- 
duce a more cordial spirit when the medium of negotiation 
was his rasping phrases. 

The progress of the French Revolution was a heavy 
handicap to Hamilton's efforts towards a good understanding 
with Britain. The popular sentiment had hitherto been 
dislike of Britain for her supposed hostility to the interests 
of the States. But now affection for France trumped up a 
plea of gratitude, and Britain, who was correctly surmised 
to be on the brink of war with her European neighbour, was 
hated with a much greater fervour for the sake of France 
than even from the memories of the War of Independence, 
or for her retention of the frontier posts. 

To this gospel of unreality Washington, the fortunate 
inheritor of the temperament of an English squire, was as 
deaf as the uncharmed adder ; but to Hamilton, cursed with 
the perfervidum ingenium Scotorum, the eloquent and 
invulnerable confusion was a maddening opponent. As the 
crisis developed he concentrated his efforts upon foreign 
affairs. Jefferson, in his ministerial capacity, became a 
reluctant conduit for the decisions of the cabinet. These 
decisions were in the main Hamilton's. Jefferson did what 
he could — grumbled, and delayed, and obstructed in council ; 

^ E.g. History, v. pp. 1-20. 



THE DEMOCRATS 315 

foamed over in indignant private correspondence, which A.D. 1792 
was intended to have a wide publicity. But Hamilton's ^'^' ^^ 
main ends were achieved, and his opponent was forced in the 
end, willy-nilly, to register his decrees. 

The outburst of popular feeling in favour of France was 
the result of two sentiments, neither of which was well 
grounded in the facts. The American people were stirred 
with gratitude on account of an imaginary generosity and 
were flattered by an imaginary imitation. In the crisis of 
their own fortunes they had derived efficient help from 
Frenchmen and from French policy. Many persons held 
that the alliance had provided what was absolutely indispens- 
able for the achievement of independence. And now, some 
ten years later, it appeared to the ordinary citizen that the 
glorious example of the American Rebellion was the type 
and model of the French Revolution. The spirit that 
animated the philosophers and the 'speculatists' was acknow- 
ledged, somewhat too readily, for the same goddess who 
had presided over the highly practical deliberations of 
Philadelphia. 

The situation is crammed with paradox. The alliance 
with the rebellious subjects of King George the Third was 
the royal policy of King Louis the Sixteenth, whom the 
Revolution held a prisoner, covered with insults and was 
shortly to decapitate. The active sympathy and personal 
sacrifice in the cause of the States came from the aristocrats, 
from Lafayette and from others, some of whom the Revolu- 
tion sent fleeing for their lives, while others less fortunate it 
put to death. What had benefited the colonists, if we may 
borrow the felicitous phrase which Jefi:erson subsequently 
adopted to describe the most unfortunate of monarchs, 
had been the cold-blooded calculation of ' a human tiger.' 
What had comforted their hearts had been the ' high-flown 
chivalry ' of comrades in arms, to whom France now offered 



316 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1792 the generous choice of furtive exile, the dungeon, or the 

Mt. 35 guillotine. The debt of American gratitude was due, if at 

all, to a king and his nobles, but by an effort of the popular 

imagination the bill was made payable to the assassins of the 

true creditors. 

The resemblance of the National Assembly to the Con- 
vention of Philadelphia is visible only to the eye of faith, 
gazing over a thousand leagues of ocean. To the cool 
observer, untouched by cynicism or sentiment, the two 
assemblages stand out in the most remarkable contrast both 
in methods and results. In the one case there was a com- 
petition with a gallery for judges: — limelight, rhetoric, 
general ideas, Rights of Man, paper constitutions, quack 
prescriptions, applause, heat and chaos. In the other there 
were closed doors, practical speech, disagreement, compromise 
and a working plan. It needed a superlative degree of 
self-deception to perceive any imitation, conscious or uncon- 
scious, by which it was possible to be flattered. 

Yet if it happens that men are in the mood to display 
gratitude, skilful politicians, interested in fanning their 
emotions, will never find any serious difficulty in making 
a respectable bonfire with worse materials than the 
superficialities of resemblance that lay to Jefferson's 
hand. His forces were strengthened by the fanaticism of 
the phrasemonger. Finance and commerce he did not 
understand ; but in ' general principles ' he was an expert. 
The popular enthusiasm was duly fed with literature 
and speeches. A new edition of Tom Paine was brought 
out as an antidote to John Adams, who had propounded the 
sturdy view that France for the moment was little better 
than a rubbish-heap. The government was blamed for its 
coldness. The growing distrust of the Federalist party 
towards France was ascribed to their vicious inclination 
towards royalty. The j udicious neutrality of Washington was 



THE DEMOCRATS 817 

explained by the malign, hypnotic influence of Hamilton, So A.D. 1792 
the tide rose, tubs were thumped, banquets held, toasts drunk, 
the tricolour became fashionable, newspapers indulged in 
dithyrambic prose and doggerel, and Jefferson all the time 
sat writing his forty-five thousand letters and guiding the 
storm. 

CHAPTER V 

The French Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality 

The opinions of Hamilton and Jefferson with regard to the 
French Revolution afford a remarkable contrast. No other 
occasion shows a sharper difference between the insight of 
the two men into the causes and consequences which are 
the business of statesmen. 

Than Jefferson, no man out of France ever gave himself 
greater airs of knowledge. He was a sort of godfather to 
the convulsion. His official career in Paris had lasted from 
the middle of 1784 to the end of 1789. When he arrived, 
the monarchy seemed firmly established. Before he left, 
the Bastille had fallen. His opportunities for observation 
were altogether exceptional, and yet there was hardly an 
event in all the startling series which he foresaw, or for 
which he was prepared. 

He undertook a famous journey through the French 
provinces, in the course of which, while pursuing the most 
admirable methods, he arrived at no suspicion of the storm 
that was brewing. His admirers have praised his practical 
shrewdness, as described in his own narrative. He invaded 
the privacy of the peasants, supped their coarse broth, 
tasted their black bread, questioned them beside their 
own hearths, turned over their bedding when they were 
looking the other way, and by every means that occurred 
to him investigated the conditions of their existence. But 



318 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 17S9 although he practised the methods of common sense, he 
^T. 32 arrived at nothing worth finding out. He noted never a 
sign of approaching disaster; thought the peasants in 
certain parts were not so well off as in others; compared 
them favourably with their fellows in Italy ; was of opinion 
that things would be very much better if their leases were 
longer; moralised at considerable length upon general 
topics, and ended his expedition over the crust of lava 
completely satisfied that no aristocrat would ever have seen 
into the heart of things as he had done. There can be 
nothing but praise for his methods. His freedom from 
disdain, from class prejudice, from pedantry, was admir- 
able. His easy familiarity makes a pleasant picture; but 
there is the end of the matter. It is merely the idyl of 
a virtuous citizen holidaymaking. There was no discovery. 
And yet he started upon his tour in the month following 
the first Assembly of Notables, at which he had been 
present, and ended it only two years before the fall of the 
Bastille. 

Jefferson was in Paris during July 1789; but in the 
events that were taking place around him, in the bloodshed, 
in ' the leading in triumph ' of King Louis, he heard no 
tremendous mutterings. The situation was difficult, and 
in a sense dangerous, but to his hojDeful mind it was not 
beyond solution by maxims. So far as his notes on France 
have a real human interest, it is purely as a record of the 
gossip of the court, the tattle of political intrigue, the 
entertaining superficialities. When he came to examine 
matters of a different order he was blind. The profounder 
movements were concealed from his gaze. He neither 
understood the nature of the passions that were wrenching 
at the masonry, nor the value of the blocks that were being 
angrily torn out. His philosophy entirely misconceived the 
fabric of society, and to the end he remained confident of a 



THE DEMOCRATS 319 

bloodless amelioration, not of social conditions, but of the A.D. 17S9 
forms of government. 

Hamilton had a truer perception. In a letter to Lafayette 
in the same year, but before the news of July ^ had reached 
America, he writes : — " If your affairs still go well when this 
' reaches you, you will ask why this foreboding of ill, when all 
' the appearances have been so much in your favour. I will 
' tell you. I dread disagreements among those who are now 
' united (which will be likely to be improved by the adverse 
' party) about the nature of your constitution ; I dread the 
' vehement character of your people, whom I fear you may 
' find it more easy to bring on, than to keep within proper 
' bounds after you have put them in motion; I dread the 
' interested refractoriness of your nobles, who cannot be 
' gratified, and who may be unwilling to submit to the 
' necessary sacrilices. And I dread the reveries of your 
' philosophic politicians, who appear in the moment to have 
' great influence, and who, being mere speculatists, may aim 
' at more refinement than suits either with human nature or 
' the composition of your nation." ^ 

This is no gibing of a partisan, but the high seriousness of 
a wellwisher. Lafayette and Hamilton had been loyal and 
affectionate comrades since they first served together on 
Washington's staff. The letter is not a state document, but 
the casual correspondence of friends : four or five pages of 
news hurriedly written on the morrow of his appointment as 
Secretary of the Treasury. Some years later Talleyrand used 
of Hamilton the remarkable phrase that he had 'divined 
Europe,' although he had never left the shores of America. 
The quality of his mind was to see the essentials of any 
situation in great simplicity. From poor and incomplete 
accounts his imagination was able to construct a picture of 
the event in its true proportions. His thoughts seemed to 

^ 1789— Fall of the Bastille. 2 Works, ix. p. 460. 



320 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1789 work without the support and encumbrance of other men s 
•^ theories, directly upon the facts; very patiently, but also 
very swiftly. 

Jefferson meanwhile, with all the advantages attaching to 
first-hand knowledge, saw in these ' speculatists ' the hope 
not only of France but of the world. Flattered by theii" 
confidence, he participated with immense gusto in their 
councils and discussions. The company was indeed worthy 
and congenial, for no ' philosophic politician ' in Paris could 
have excelled the American minister in the fashionable 
drawing-room entertainment of spinning the foundation 
stones of society out of the gossamer of intelligent con- 
versation. He went daily to listen to the debates of 
the National Assembly, and was even asked to join the 
deliberations of the committee charged with drawing up 
another constitution. He patched up coalitions and ad- 
justed differences between discordant 'speculatists.' He 
advised that a sSance royale should be held, and the king 
come forward with a Charter of Rights in his hand; and 
so great were both his zeal and his knowledge, that he 
drew up an elaborate sketch of a charter suitable to the 
occasion. His motives were in every case beyond reproach. 
His discretion under circumstances that were doubly trying, 
in their own nature and in his, was admirable. He made 
many friends and no enemies. He returned to his own 
country with an enhanced, though somewhat vague, reputa- 
tion ; but living five years in France he had seen only the 
surface of events, while Hamilton, Washington, Adams, Jay, 
Gouverneur Morris, and other men living in America, no 
less well-wishers to France than himself, dependent upon 
belated despatches and tardy packets for their informa- 
tion, penetrated much deeper into the reaUties of the 
revolution that was proceeding, and entertained much 
graver fears of its results. 



THE DEMOCRATS 821 

The feeling of Hamilton from the beginning was that the A.D. 1789 
French had gone the wrong way to work ; that people of the ^^' ^^ 
greatest influence were engaged in the hopeless endeavour 
to fit facts to their own principles, instead of looking for 
principles that would fit the facts. In the eloquence and 
impatience of these unpractical leaders he saw the gravest 
dangers lurking, and with each arrival of fresh intelligence 
his judgment found confirmation. There was no hostility 
to France, but, on the contrary, a very cordial wish for her 
prosperity. She had been a faithful and valued ally in 
time of war, and the alliance had continued after the 
restoration of peace. It was the interest, therefore, as well 
as the sentiment, of the United States and of Washington's 
government, that French disorders should be brought to a 
prosperous conclusion. Naturally, also, Americans were in 
sympathy with reforms that aimed at admitting the popular 
element into the constitution ; but having themselves only 
recently arrived, after years of struggle and compromise, at 
what they hoped might prove to be a strong and enduring 
government, they were keenly alive to the dangers of haste 
and sceptical of the value of general principles. 

When Jefferson landed in America in the winter of 1789 
he found himself in an atmosphere of doubt and appre- 
hension, very different from that irresponsible elation which 
he had left behind him at Paris. The lack of confidence 
in general principles, of belief in the virtues of enthusiasm, 
of admiration for popular debate and the eloquence of 
tribunes, filled him at first with amazement and shortly 
with disgust. Having taken no part in the great Federal 
struggle, he might well have been excused if he underrated 
the difficulties of setting up a strong government. But 
beyond this important fact it is necessary to bear in mind 
that his supreme object in the making of constitutions 
was not a government which should be strong, but a 

X 



322 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1792 people that should be free. His ideal was an executive 
^'^" ^^ nation, inspired by noble emotions. The fimctions of the 
ruler, or the first citizen, were merely to expound and 
interpret from time to time in sonorous language the senti- 
ments latent in every righteous breast. The Revolution in 
France had not then become a party question in the 
United States, but with such a divergence of opinion upon 
essentials political division was bound to be the result. 

When a man returns from his travels he looks to have 
his opinions on climate, scenery and manners treated with 
respect. He resents nothing with a deeper mortification 
than that people who have never stirred from home should 
assert contrary views based upon a knowledge at second- 
hand. The perspicacious, well-informed person of sedentary 
habits is as much the natural enemy of the credulous and 
inquisitive globe-trotter as a cat is the natural enemy of 
a mouse. No punishment is harder to bear with than 
correction by fellow-creatures who have had opportunities 
of knowledge inferior to your own. Jefferson may therefore 
be forgiven if he felt uncharitably towards the cold critics 
who declined to share his enthusiasm. 

He hoped, and not in vain, for a better disposition and a 
more favourable judgment in the people at large. From 
the date of his return until the middle of 1792 (two and 
a half years later) the popular tide of sympathy rose 
rapidly, and for nearly two years more it stood at the turn. 
In these matters his flair was usually to be trusted. He 
gauged the rhetorical possibilities of any cause with the 
eye of a general selecting a position. 

The great cleavage came during 1792, and parties were 
then divided with that peculiar bitterness which frequently 
attaches itself to causes which are remote and ill understood. 
The fact which caused public opinion to precipitate was 
the certainty that France was preparing for war. Phrases, 



THE DEMOCRATS 323 

maxims, and general principles were no longer the pre- A.D. 1792 
dominant partners ; for having admitted violence to be a "^ 
member of the firm, they found themselves ousted from 
all influence and direction. As was natural the party of 
physical force was gradually gaining the upper hand, while 
the more timid revolutionaries, who were willing to debate 
interminably but shrank from action, were daily growing 
in discredit. In comparison with paper constitutions and 
edicts which nobody heeded, even riots and massacres 
appeared to be preferable ; for the temper of the times was 
weary of speeches and cried loudly for simple solutions and 
definite achievements. 

The extreme party desired war because they had deter- 
mined on a Republic ; and as Lafayette also desired war, for 
the reason that he aimed at a duly regulated monarchy, it 
was to be predicted, in view of such an alliance, that war 
was likely to ensue. Exiled princes were making trouble on 
the Rhine, and upon this menace in April war was declared 
against Austria. In August, France was invaded by the 
Duke of Brunswick. Prussians and Austrians menaced 
general principles and the millennium with advancing 
cannons. Tyrants, screamed the party of Jefferson, were 
about to throttle Freedom. But by the end of October 
jubilant salvos announced that the sacred soil of France 
was freed from the hirelings of despotism. To the panic 
of the early autumn there succeeded an exaltation and 
self-confidence that was worth many army corps. The arms 
of France were offered magniloquently to the service of all 
men who would spurn the base condition of slaves and rise 
against their rulers. ' All governments are our enemies ; all 
peoples are our friends.' On the first day of February 
1793 war was declared on Britain and Holland. 

Upon these facts glowingly expanded, American opinion 
was persuaded to rivet its attention. The coalition against 



324 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1793 liberty was drawn and coloured according to the rhetorical 
^T. 36 probabilities, so that a statement of the dull truth was 
disbelieved. That the Emperor would have preferred most 
things to war ; that the King of Prussia saw nothing in it 
but an uncomfortable disturbance; that Pitt detested the 
idea with his whole heart ; that the outbreak was the con- 
trivance of Jacobins anxious for external enemies, in order 
that they might add the count of treachery to the indictment 
of their king, and of scatter-brained Lafayette, whose gift 
it was to pursue his ends by means that secured their 
defeat — these simple facts had no chance of persuading a 
heated opinion that had already settled by geometrical 
principles the nature of tyrants on the one hand, and of lovers 
of liberty on the other. 

In these circumstances the rumour of war not unnaturally 
excited a thrill of sympathy. The declaration of a Republic, 
the retreat of the allies, the victories of Dumouriez and 
the conquest of Savoy, evoked a frantic outburst of applause. 
Stripped of all mendacity, the situation was great enough to 
have moved men's hearts to wonder and admiration ; but 
under the inspiration of Jefferson's luxurious fancy it became 
something akin to a religious frenzy. When in February 
(1793) Britain, the oppressor of American freedom, was forced 
reluctantly into the confederacy of tyrants, indignation, un- 
mingled with surprise, excited popular sensibility to the 
highest pitch. Not only in the classes addicted to indulgence 
in clamour and sensation, but among the general body of 
citizens, a large majority were ready to take up arms upon 
a sincere impulse of fraternity, though upon an erroneous 
plea of alliance. 

In Europe other incidents of this ominous autumn and 
winter had arrested a gloomier attention. Even men who 
were eager to excuse the excesses of the 10th of August, 
and to applaud the declaration of the Republic, were struck 



THE DEMOCRATS 825 

dumb by the September massacres and the execution of the a.d. 1793 
King. With a boundary no broader than the Rhine or the ^" 
Channel it is not easy to shut out the noise of murder, or to 
Hsten patiently to the edifying discourses of theorists who 
complacently account for it on general principles. For the 
moment the roar of the Paris mob drowned the apologies, 
explanations and bluster of ' the Society of the Friends of 
the People,' the ' London Corresponding Society,' the ' Society 
for Constitutional Information ' and the ' Sons of Freedom.' 
But in the states three thousand miles away Jefferson found 
himself but little inconvenienced by the doings of Robespierre, 
Danton and Marat. So much had been already discounted 
of possible horror by the judicious language of Jefferson and 
his immediate friends, that the public opinion of clubs and 
newspapers was fully prepared, not merely to condone or 
approve, but even to exult in the most violent forms of 
purification by blood.^ 

In a small society it is impossible for a man of eminence 
and many friends, a great talker, a prodigious letter- writer, 
accessible at all times to his political supporters, patron of 
the arts and letters and inspirer of journalists, to keep him- 
self free from the condemnation of history on the plea that 
no public speech or state document can be alleged against 
him. If his indulgent opinion of homicides, his hopeful 
rejoicings over the millennium did not actually claim fresh 
glory from what was happening at Paris, at least they found 
an easy explanation in the depravity of tyrants. You 
cannot, if you are a man of Jefferson's eminence, be held 

1 History, v. p. 259. When it was reported (untruly as it turned out) that 
the American ambassador (Gouverneur Morris) had been murdered at Paris, 
the supposed murder was excused by the Democratic papers on the ground 
that the sentiments of their minister were favourable to the fallen dynasty. 
Astonishment was even expressed that he had been ' suffered to live so long, 
under the protection of an American diploma, to ti-iumph in unexampled 
folly and impertinence.' 



326 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1793 irresponsible for the results of your confidential communica- 
• tions, made to all men and sundry, merely by labelling 
them as ' private.' For he intended that they should pro- 
duce a public effect. He was no incontinent babbler when 
he used the nomenclature of natural history to inform the 
popular mind, and described the classes of society that had 
incurred his reprobation as lions, and tigers, and kites, 
and mammoths, and hydras, and hysenas, and wolves. 
Jefferson understood his times, and the method which we 
should now consider to be somewhat banal, was an admirable 
success. 

The preparation had been so complete that upon the 
occasion of the September massacres Jefferson was able to 
soar unflustered into one of his noblest flights of perverse 
unreality. " In the struggle which was necessary, many 
' guilty persons fell without the forms of trial, and with 

* them some innocent. These I deplore as much as any- 
' body, and shall deplore some of them to the day of my 

* death. But I deplore them as I should have done had 
' they fallen in battle. It was necessary to use the arm of 
' the people, a machine not quite so blind as balls and bombs, 
' but blind to a certain degree. A few of their cordial 
' friends met at their hands the fate of enemies. But time 
' and truth will rescue and embalm their memories, while 
' their posterity will be enjoying that very liberty for which 
' they would never have hesitated to offer up their lives. 
' The liberty of the whole earth was depending on the issue 
' of the contest, and was ever such a prize won with so little 
' innocent blood ? My own affections have been deeply 

* wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rather 
' than it should have failed I would have seen half the 
' earth desolated ; were there but an Adam and an Eve left 

* in every country, and left free, it would be better than 
' as it now is. I have expressed to you my sentiments 



THE DEMOCRATS 327 

* because they are really those of ninety- nine in a hundred a.d. i793 
' of our citizens." 1 ^''■^^ 

Fourteen hundred persons — men, women and boys — were 
murdered or executed in Paris between the 3rd and the 7th 
of September 1793, among them, inadvertently, some male- 
factors who already inhabited the prisons when the packing 
was begun. For the rest, they were selected with much care 
by the most vigilant and discriminating of ruffians ; herded 
together thoughtfully and without haste (as was only seemly 
when ' the liberty of the whole earth was depending on the 
issue '). Only the manner of their death lacked the appear- 
ance of premeditation, and this was in accordance with the 
plan. ' A few of their cordial friends met at their hands the 
fate of enemies,' is Jefferson's complacent comment, with 
finger-tips devoutly pressed to finger-tips, and eyes turned 
heavenwards. But except the dozen or two poor devils of 
malefactors, what ' cordial friends ' had Robespierre among 
the victims ? It would be impious to attach such meaning 
to the words of Jefferson, a man who was twice President 
of the United States, and believed in the love of humanity ; 
but for any other meaning we search vainly in the vacuity 
of his rhetoric. 

King Louis, ' the friend of America,' had been for Jefferson 
a subject of much praise during his ministry in France. 
His dispositions were solidly good. He was capable of great 
sacrifices. All he wanted was to be assured it would be for 
the good of the nation. He was the honestest man in the 
kingdom, and the most regular and economical; a true 
friend to liberty. 

On January the 21st the head of the honest and solidly 
good man was taken off by the grateful nation whose well- 
being was his chief care. Jefferson retained his heroic 
calm: — "We have just received here the news of the 

^ Ford's Jeffersoii, vi. pp. 153-54. 



328 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1793 ' decapitation of the King of France. Should the present 
' foment in Europe not produce republics everywhere, it will 
' at least soften the monarchical governments by rendering 
' monarchs amenable to punishment like other criminals, 
' and doing away with that rage of insolence and oppression, 
' the inviolability of the king's person." What wonder that 
Madison, under the influence of such noble precepts, should 
become almost tepid in his enthusiasm ? ' If he were a 
traitor he ought to be punished as well as another man.'^ 
What wonder that simpler people with no official reticence 
should carry the principles of their excellent master to a 
more fantastical conclusion ? We read of a dinner of the 
Second Regiment of Philadelphia Militia, to which Governor 
Mifflin and the French ambassador were invited, at which 
" the head of a pig was severed from its body, and, being 
' recognised as an emblem of the murdered King of France, 
' was carried round to the guests. Each one placing the 
' cap of liberty upon his head pronounced the word ' Tyrant ! ' 
' and proceeded to mangle with his knife the head of the 
' luckless creature doomed to be served for so unworthy a 
' company." 2 

If it be the proof of a really great man that he can look 
upon the consequences of his works approving and undis- 
mayed, Jefferson's reputation needs no other establishment. 
For all this bloodthirsty inanity he had no reproaches, but 
only for his own government that refused to be drawn into 
the war. The excitement that was making was, in his judg- 
ment, the flood-tide to float him off an uncomfortable sand- 
bank into power ; but, in spite of all his letters and intimate 
conversations, the ebb came and he was still fast aground. 

The Cabinet disagreements, noted by Hamilton in his 

^ History, v. p. 222. 

' Hazen, Americaii Opinion on the French Hevoluiion, p. 183. 



THE DEMOCRATS 329 

letter to Carrmgton,i increased in bitterness during the A.D. 1793 
autumn and winter of 1792. The news of victories gave '^' 
strength to those partisans of France who sought to entangle 
their country in a war with Europe, more perhaps for the 
purposes of an opposition than even for the sake of the 
sentiment. In the peculiar situation of the United States, 
ha\ing regard to the youth and complexity of their institu- 
tions, an exemption from war was no less necessary for the 
development of their natural resources than for the security 
of their political system. Upon the preservation of peace, 
Hamilton believed with good reason that the success of the 
experiment in republican government would depend.^ 

Leaving out of account the fact that the French Revolu- 
tion had deliberately cancelled all the international obliga- 
tions of the monarchy, and admitting in its fullest latitude 
the argument that a nation has the right in its own dis- 
cretion to change its form of government, Hamilton firmly 
denied the further right which was claimed " to involve other 
' nations, with whom it may have had connections, absolutely 
' and unconditionally, in the consequences of the changes 
' which it may think proper to make." ^ 

The plea that the friendship of France for the United 
States was of so exceptional a character that it ought to 
override the natural interpretation of the treaty, could not be 
supported for a moment. Judged by its actions the govern- 
ment of the Revolution was no less oppressive than the 
government of King Louis had been towards the commerce 
of their ally. Its restrictions, in disregard of frequent assur- 
ances of attachment, were firmly enforced. Advances towards 
a more liberal policy had even been met with insult and 
menace.* The government of King George, which it was the 
popular habit to execrate on all occasions, was a gentler task- 

1 May 1792, Wwks, ix. p. 528. 2 History, v. p. 215. 

8 History, v. p. 238. ^ Ibid. v. p. 215. 



330 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1793 master and a more generous client. In Hamilton's opinion 

^'^' ^^ there was therefore nothing in the interests of the United 

States, or in the obligations of the treaty, or in the demeanour 

of France, which could justify engaging in a war for her 

support. 

The news that war had been declared on Britain reached 
Philadelphia in the early days of April 1793. A month 
earlier the second Congress had come to an end, with the 
signal defeat of the first great campaign of Madison and 
Giles against the integrity of the Secretary of the Treasury. 
In the ordinary course of events the new Congress would not 
meet until the early winter, and therefore the sole responsi- 
bility of dealing with the emergency was fortunately placed 
upon the shoulders of the Cabinet. 

In the war which France had undertaken in the previous 
autumn against Austria and Prussia there were no dangers 
for America. There had been a strong sympathy towards 
the revolutionary campaign, a great rejoicing in its success; 
but there the matter ended. The citizens of the United 
States had no desire to take up arms in the quarrel, and had 
they so desired it would have been a practical impossibility 
to gratify their impulse. But when war broke out between 
France and Britain, every day found more people in a belli- 
cose mood. Circumstances had unfortunately placed no 
barriers against the realisation of their object. War with 
Britain was only too possible, both by sea and land. 

It was therefore necessary, if war was to be avoided, that 
the government should take up a strong and decided line. 
Four days after the news arrived, Hamilton wrote to Jay 
urging the need for a declaration of neutrality, and asking 
him to draft an instrument suited to the occasion. Wash- 
ington was in full agreement that it was the duty of the 
executive to impose a strict neutrality upon its subjects. 
The Cabinet met, and the matter was discussed. Jefferson, 



THE DEMOCRATS 331 

as may be supposed, was altogether hostile to any measures A.D. 1793 
which might give offence to the susceptibilities of France. ^'^' ^ 
He argued strongly for his favourite policy of drift. He 
accused Hamilton of aiming at a defensive alliance with 
Britain. His organ, the National Gazette, started simul- 
taneously a skilful campaign, the object of which was to 
identify Hamilton, and even Washington, with 'a British 
party.' 1 It exulted in the execution of Louis xvi., and 
pointed a moral for the benefit of all tyrants and imitators 
of royal ceremonies. 

Washington was slow in certain matters. Finance was 
always a laborious effort to him; but upon this issue his 
vision was clear, his judgment swift. He had no doubts or 
scruples, but at the first glance knew his own mind through 
and through. The United States were on no account to be 
dragged into a war which did not touch their interests at a 
single point. 

Hamilton, with his customary energy, made all the pre- 
parations and found most of the arguments. He drafted 
the questions for the consideration of the Cabinet which 
met on the 19th of April to consider the tremendous 
issue. Jefferson opposed neutrality on principle, and was 
defeated. He urged delay, and was again defeated. He 
then argued the matter on constitutional grounds. The 
President had no powers, without the consent of Congress, 
to take such a step as was contemplated. He favoured 
calling a special meeting of the two Houses to debate the 
matter. This advice, had it been accepted, must have meant 
war. For delay of any kind meant war, and further, the 
new Congress contained a majority of the Democratic 
party. 

The Cabinet was firm. The Declaration of Neutrality 
was agreed to ; only, as a concession to Jefferson's feelings, 

1 History, v. pp. 218-22. 



332 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1793 the word 'neutrality' was left out. The substance was 
^'^' ^^ secured, but the offensive description was omitted. On the 
22nd of April it was promulgated. 

It has been said that when Washington issued his Declara- 
tion of Neutrality he could not have been more violently 
execrated by the Democratic party had he proclaimed a mon- 
archy. When we recall Washington's services in war and 
peace, his clear and disinterested character, and then turn to 
the political literature of the day, we are once more struck with 
admiration for the rapidity with which the United States 
had assimilated the fashions and procedure of government 
by party. Merciful opponents excused the President as 
a man of weak intellect hypnotised by Hamilton, his evil 
genius. More vigorous and less refining orators brushed 
aside such excuses, and advocated dealing with the in- 
iquitous despot in the simple manner of Robespierre and 
Marat. 

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the extravagance of the 
period, further than to mark it for a dangerous and consider- 
able force. It was as much an epidemic as the yellow 
fever. 

The sequence of events during this fateful year may be 
briefly chronicled. The Minister of France, Citizen Genet, 
arrived in Charlestown on the 8th of April, and proceeded 
by leisurely steps to the seat of government at Philadelphia, 
where he arrived in the middle of May. Jefferson was 
overflowing with kindness — a contrast to the calm correcti- 
tude of his chief. In the face of British protests against the 
infringements of neutrality that were occurring every day, 
it was necessary to communicate the firm intentions of the 
Cabinet to Genet, who was the prime instigator of these 
events. A week after his arrival he was at loggerheads 
with the government to which he was accredited, and 
Jefferson, who in private was everything that was agreeable 



THE DEMOCRATS 333 

and indiscreet,^ was compelled reluctantly, in official a.d. 1793 
correspondence, to repel the outrageous pretensions of his '^' 
friend. By the month of June Genet began to talk of 
'appealing to the people,' and Hamilton had published 
the first numbers of his famous letters of Pacijicus. 

The sympathy of Jefferson was misleading. The popular 
ferment which saluted the French minister on every hand 
was even more misleading. The situation was dangerous, 
and it was also intolerable. In all the great seaports were 
seen tricoloured ensigns floating above the American stan- 
dards. French ships of war were moored so as to command 
the feeble batteries. The coasts were lined with privateers, and 
cruisers roamed the high seas commissioned to capture every 
neutral vessel. An internecine party, rallying against their 
own government, tendered homage to a foreign minister. 
The foreign minister was found rebuking Washington as a 
violater of the laws, dictating to him his duty, and appearing 
to divide with him the affections of the people. The Cabinet 
was often in discord, while Britain, with every justification, 
was threatening reprisals. Hamilton urged the necessity of 
prompt and vigorous measures against the French minister, 
and in the end his counsels prevailed.^ 

At the beginning of August, Hamilton's draft of the rules 
of neutrality was agreed to by the President and the majority 
of the Cabinet. It was determined to ask for Genet's recall. 
Hamilton was in favour of making public the correspondence 
with this strange ambassador, confident that the announce- 
ment would appeal to the good sense and dignity of the 
nation. Jefferson was opposed to this step, and again 
advocated the calling together of Congress. 

Jefferson, fearful of the consequences which seemed 
imminent, spoke of resignation in the following month; 
but Washington, indignant at the attacks of the Democratic 

1 History, v. p. 262. 2 Ibid. v. pp. 314-15. 



834 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1793 party and their press, and determined to pin the Secretary 
^'^" ^^ of State to the policy of the government, refused to entertain 
his retirement before the end of the year. This attitude was 
natural ; but it is difficult to see in what way it was of any 
benefit to the administration. The chief advantage in the 
arrangement has accrued to the reputation of Jefferson in 
modern times. His animosity against the Federalist policy 
of aloofness from European quarrels is now usually over- 
looked. What is remembered is that he was Secretary of 
State when, at the height of revolutionary enthusiasm, it 
was wisely decided, in the teeth of the popular frenzy, to 
pursue a course of neutrality. It is also remembered that he 
was the mouthpiece through which Genet was censured and 
exposed. By reason of Washington's compulsion Jefferson 
has accordingly earned a great credit for sagacious statesman- 
ship of which he was not only entirely innocent, but the 
most determined and hysterical opponent.^ 

Throughout August Hamilton pursued his success. It 
was decided that British prizes wrongfully captured were to 
be restored and compensation given. Jefferson's doctrine 
that ' French ships of war and privateers with prizes may 
come and go freely, English may not,'^ was emphatically 
repudiated. Hamilton drafted letters to Genet of no amiable 
tenour, and to the United States ambassador in Paris, de- 
manding Genet's recall. To these documents Jefferson was 
obliged meekly to append his signature. Finally, at the 
very end of the month Genet's unwary insolence completed 
the victory. He launched a public attack upon Washington 
and his administration. The National Gazette clamoured 
indignant approbation of his action. But the country viewed 
the matter in another light. Suddenly, from all sides, there 

^ History, v. p. 337. Cf. also Reddaway's Monroe Doctrine, pp. 
15-16. 
2 History, v. p. 232. 



THE DEMOCRATS 335 

was a rally. A foreign agent had dared to insult the chief A.D. 1793 
officer of the Union. ^''- ^^ 

By December, Genet had sunk to the sad plight of a 
blackmailer. He wrote angry letters threatening disclosures ; 
had instalments struck off, and demanded that they should be 
officially circulated in Congress. Jefferson, on the eve of his 
retirement, was anxious to escape the pain of sending the 
necessary reply. But Washington was obdurate, summoned 
a hasty Cabinet on a Sunday, and the last act of the 
Secretary of State was a reluctant but emphatic denuncia- 
tion of his former confederate.^ 

On the 31st of December Jefferson, with a sigh of relief, 
relinquished his office. The National Gazette was dis- 
continued, and the Democratic party arrived at the wise 
decision that in the present state of popular feeling they 
would no longer champion the cause of France against their 
own government. 

To support the policy of neutrality against the fanatics 
Hamilton wrote the letters of Pacificus which, apart from 
their special argument on the facts, will ever remain a classic 
of wise, dignified, illusionless, unprovocative statesmanship. 
Gradually, in the face of an indomitable resolution, the 
violence died away. Once more Jefferson (now no longer in 
office) saw the assault that he had planned and cheered on 
thrown back with disaster. Common sense had prevailed. 
The citizens of the United States had come to realise that the 
policy of safety was a higher patriotism than the indulgence 
of any sentiment. A consciousness that their antics had 
been somewhat ludicrous, a suspicion that for two years 
or more they had been the dupes of a parody of free- 
dom, began to steal upon them ; and with these the slow 
conviction that a government they did not love had all 
the time succeeded in keeping its head in spite of threats 

^ History, v. p. 436. 



336 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1793 and unpopularity. They began to remember that after all 

^^'" ^^ they were for the most part Anglo-Saxons, and that for 

such a stock it was possibly unbecoming to caper round 

poles of liberty, to embrace in the streets, to guillotine 

emblematical pigs and to wear tricolour ribbons. 

Citizen Genet, the ambassador of the French Republic, 
came to America with the deliberate object of engaging the 
Union in a war against tyranny. The disposition of the 
shouting portion of the populace was altogether favourable 
to the purpose of his mission. Had the rule of the country 
which accredited him held good in that to which he carried 
his credentials, he might easily have fulfilled his hopes. 

He was a gay and sanguine gentleman of pleasing address 
and a facile eloquence in several tongues. Handsome, 
debonair and audacious, with a fine ruddy complexion and 
busy and bustling manners, he advanced to the assault of 
the position unencumbered by the gyves of experience, or 
suspicion of any variety, racial or climatic, among citizens 
who gloried in their freedom. With a sublime air of 
condescending fraternity, as became one who had arrived 
by express from the fashionable Metropolis of Liberty, he 
wore his tricolour ribbon with a good-natured swagger, and 
played the lofty gentleman to open-mouthed rustics of 
virtue. He was not so much an ambassador to Washing- 
ton's government as its patron ; less of a diplomatist than 
the vice-gerent of the Rights of Man. His portmanteaux 
were stuffed with letters of marque. He had hardly stepped 
upon the quay before he began putting privateers in com- 
mission. The enlistment of American subjects was a regular 
item in his daily routine. For this well-born and accom- 
plished youth, with a fresh experience of the instability 
of the most ancient and glorious of European Governments, 
the resistance of any human institution to his summons 
seemed a chimsera as ridiculous as the virtue of Clarissa to 



THE DEMOCRATS 337 

Lovelace. With the government he was civil, of course, A.D. 1793 
and good-humoured, as a gallant in a Restoration drama ^'^' ^^ 
with the husband, or the father, of his mistress ; kindly, but 
contemptuous, letting it be understood that he considered 
official dignity to be somewhat in the way. 

He was in no hurry to present his credentials. To do 
him full justice we must endeavour to put ourselves 
into his point of view, and to realise that the power 
to which he conceived himself to have been truly accredited 
was the Sovereign People. The forms of diplomacy 
lingered, but these were merely survivals, harmless if 
every one understood their symbolism, but otherwise to be 
torn down and destroyed like other pasteboard rubbish of 
the feudal era. In his opinion, the proper business of an 
ambassador was to be in close touch and direct communica- 
tion with the Popular Master to whom, in any respectable 
state, the executive, legislative and judicial powers stood 
in the relation of humble servants. Nor when forms were 
tedious and involved delay did he consider it necessary to 
observe them pedantically. Where there was such absolute 
good feeling, such a perfect understanding as was proved by 
the enthusiastic uproar of his reception, to tie the hands of 
all men and his own by the punctilious observance of cere- 
monies would have been to chill ungratefully the warmth of 
his welcome. 

And so without delay Genet proceeded to his business, 
taking the parade and shoutings as sufficient warrant 
for his vigour. Privateers were desirable to prey upon 
the commerce of Britain and her allies. He accordingly 
chartered and fitted them out, providing them with stores 
and munitions of war. Privateers needed officers and creAvs 
to man them ; so that logically he was compelled to give his 
attention to enlistment and commissions. Prize courts in 
safe and comfortable American harbours were conveniences 



338 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1793 demanded by civilisation; so with French consuls forjudges 
■ he established these tribunals. Everywhere as he went he 
spoke with enthusiasm of ' the alliance ' between the two 
Republics as a thing already in existence ; of mutual sacri- 
fices, loans, and subsidies; of French help that had been 
given to colonists struggling for freedom ; and of the obliga- 
tion of a grateful return, seeing that the debtors were men 
of such well-known honour and probity. 

Among his hearers, while the progress lasted, there was 
no one to say him nay; but on his journey northward he 
learned that Washington had issued his Declaration of 
Neutrality. Genet read the terms of this document with 
incredulity and horror. Privateers, enlistment and prize 
courts were things that must altogether cease. British 
merchantmen must not be seized in American waters, and 
if so seized must be immediately released. Some mind, 
evidently not that of Jefferson or of the Sovereign People, 
was forcing this reluctant minister to utter very hard and 
definite forbiddings, which were an outrage not merely upon 
the decency of gratitude, but upon the very chastity of 
freedom. 

To all lovers of fine comedy Genet will ever be a hero, 
miscalculating so buoyantly, suspecting nothing, clothed 
always in a smiling dignity, till suddenly Jefferson, his 
confidential valet, and Jeffersonism, the credit-balance of 
his account, faded into thin air, and a grim Washington 
supported by a grave and polite Hamilton appeared in 
unlooked-for authority.^ Altogether in the background 
stood his friend Jefferson, perturbed and deprecatory, with 
an anxious recollection of sundry letters and conversations 
'as between friends' which it might be inconvenient to 
reconcile with his official duty, if an irate emissary, out- 
raged in his office and feather-brained by nature, should 

1 History, v. pp. 335-37. 



THE DEMOCRATS 339 

entertain no scruples with regard to publication. The A.D. 1793 
scruples of an angry Genet were but pea-sticks against a '^'^' ^^ 
hurricane.^ 

Facts following the written words began to take place. 
Force under severe provocation at last stretched out a paw, 
making it clear that the warning was to be supported by the 
aid of constables and prisons, or if the lamentable necessity 
should arise, even by gunpowder and cannon-balls. The 
private sympathy of Jefferson was consoling to Genet as a 
man ; but when it became apparent that the sentiment was 
merely 'as between friends,' and not politically efficacious 
in the smallest degree, it is hardly to be wondered at that 
contempt succeeded to amazement, and wrathful revelations 
to contempt. 

Genet may be forgiven for finding the situation some- 
what puzzling. Looking around him he saw still the same 
fervour of popular demonstration; anger loudly expressed 
and almost equal to his own against the Declaration of 
Neutrality. Not only the people, but their leaders, Madison 
and Monroe, spoke of the act with horror, — ' a most unfor- 
tunate evil ' ; injurious to ' the national honour by seeming 
to disregard the stipulated duties to France'; wounding 
'the popular feelings by a seeming indifference to the 
cause of liberty ' ; violating ' the forms and the spirit of the 
constitution ' ; a ' millstone ' round the neck of Washington's 
reputation, and so forth and so forth.^ Even the Secretary of 
State himself made no secret of his opinion that he viewed 
it with detestation, speaking of it openly as ' an English 
neutrality.' 

Genet grew daily more bewildered by his environment. 
He was in a strange land ; not free, as he had supposed, but 
governed by a baleful paradox. The Will of the People was 

1 Hiaory, v. p. 374. 

^ Madison to Jefferson, 19th June 1793 ; History, v. p. 28^. 



340 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1794 not then really supreme. Ministers carried out measures 
-^T. 37 -^v^jiich they privately denounced. What power sat over the 
heads of the citizens ? Why and by whom were they thus 
compelled and coerced ? The one clear thing in the situation 
was that the lesson of liberty had been learned only by 
halves. Tyranny held the reins in a misnamed Republic. 
In the New World things were even more topsy-turvy 
than in the Old, for here the theory of the Rights of Man 
walked hand in hand with the dark practices of despotism. 

Only a touch seemed necessary, only a bold word, and 
the shackles of paradox would be struck for ever off the 
limbs of struggling Democracy. To him, Genet, minister 
plenipotentiary of the French Republic, the glorious duty was 
clearly appointed by destiny. So, without undue hesitation, 
he struck manfully at the encumbering chains. 

The result was not what he had foreseen, but as nearly 
as possible the reverse of it. He appealed directly to the 
Sovereign People, which might have been endured, but for 
the fact that the appeal was by its nature an attack upon 
the President of the United States, and this was unforgiv- 
able in any foreigner.^ Thereupon paradox deepened to a 
tragedy. The Sovereign People was shocked beyond all 
words capable of expressing it; Jefferson and Madison and 
Monroe were seen publicly and privately wringing their 
hands and casting ashes on their heads.^ 

To Citizen Genet, logically pursuing the path of General 
Principles, it appeared that he was in the land of the mad. 
His gallant effort had miscarried. Failure descended upon 
him and his mission. Letters of recall arrived in time to 
prevent further mischief. He passed rapidly out of sight 
in a haze of banquets and sympathy, blustering eloquently 
in a swiftly dying fall. Dreading what might befall him if 
he returned to France, he became an American citizen, and 

1 History, v. pp. 357-58, also p. 377. "^ Jefferson to Madison, v. pp. 342-45. 



THE DEMOCRATS 341 

married Governor Clinton's daughter. He had come near A.D. 1794 
to provoking a revolution in the United States; but although ^'^' ^^ 
he found himself well placed for combustibles and had acted 
with great spirit, he did not arrive at his object. He had 
blundered into an error of tact for which his origin and 
experience afford sufficient excuse ; for how was a French- 
man to understand a wilful race which rated its institutions, 
even in their first youth, far beyond logic ? 



CHAPTER VI 

The Treaty with Great Britain 

The danger of a war, undertaken out of sympathy with 
France, may be said to have ended with the retirement of 
Jefferson and the discredit of Genet. But two dangers were 
still to be dreaded. The one was internal disorder; the 
other was a war with Britain, arising partly out of the 
unsettled grievances and partly out of fresh provocations. 
The year 1794 was therefore a period hardly less critical 
than its predecessor. 

Britain, engaged in a struggle for life or death, judged it 
sound policy to take advantage to the uttermost of her 
naval supremacy. It was her object to cut off all supplies 
that came by sea to France, and to this end she adopted a 
procedure with regard to neutral shipping that neutrals had 
every right to resent as high-handed and oppressive. The 
question has been argued as if it were one of morals, but 
in reality it was purely a matter of military expediency. 
Which was the greater evil from the standpoint of Britain : 
to allow her enemy the advantage of sea-borne commodities, 
or to provoke the United States to take up arms? The 
principle of the calculation is easy to state, but the sum 
itself was less easy to work out. The fact that Britain 



342 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. I79t modified her action from time to time, that orders were 
^^' ^^ issued, amended, withdrawn, and renewed, seems to indicate 
that she was by no means certain as to the wisdom of her 
policy. There was a wavering note. Things hung in the 
balance. It is perhaps safe to assume that had her relations 
with America been frank and friendly, the regulations would 
never have been pressed to a point at which they could 
have caused serious offence. But the reverse was the case. 
While it was true that the attitude of Washington's govern- 
ment was correct, the feeling of the nation was notoriously 
hostile, and all the power of the executive had been unable 
to keep the people within bounds. In addition there were 
the outstanding disputes with regard to the non-fulfilment 
of the treaty of peace. While these were left unsettled it 
was beyond hope to get rid of mutual distrust. 

Early in March, particulars of the latest orders to British 
men-of-war became known in Philadelphia. Their character 
was so oppressive that common men, and even the coolest 
members of the government, judged them to be altogether 
intolerable. The day following the receipt of this informa- 
tion, Hamilton put his views into writing and submitted 
them to Washington. He urged the importance of fortify- 
ing the chief harbours, raising troops, and placing certain 
special powers for the time being in the hands of the 
President.^ When so sincere a friend of peace as Hamilton 
was found denouncing the grievance as ' atrocious,' it seemed 
much more likely than not that war would break out. 

Still he did not abandon hope. He was as anxious as 
ever to pursue an honourable neutrality if it were practic- 
able; but he judged it wise to prepare for war, with the 
double object of impressing Britain with the earnestness of 
American intentions, and of putting the country on a foot- 
ing to prevent injury, and to strike an early, decisive blow 

^ History, v. pp. 507-8. 



THE DEMOCRATS 843 

if it were assailed.^ At the same time he advocated a frank a.d. 1794 
discussion with the British government. The language and '^'^'- ^'^ 
temper of the protest should be firm and determined, but 
provocation should be studiously avoided. He was in favour 
of a special mission to England to negotiate for the with- 
drawal of the oppressive regulations and the removal of the 
old grievances of the loyalists and the frontier forts. 

Washington approved this policy at every point, but the 
Democrats, under the leadership of Madison, opposed it root 
and branch. They lamented among themselves that their 
enemy should have been beforehand with them in advo- 
cating resistance to Britain.^ They defeated the Army 
Bill. They accused Hamilton, possibly with a grain of 
truth, ' of turning every contingency into a resource for 
accumulating force in the government.' ^ In private they 
admitted that war was probable,* but in Congress they 
pretended that Britain could be brought to reason by com- 
mercial pressure.^ While they were eager to engage in 
provocations that must inevitably lead to war, they were 
resolute that no preparation for the consequences of their 
action should be undertaken. If a commercial campaign 
proved insufficient, there still remained the weapon of 
repudiation. The debts due to British citizens should be 
sequestrated.^ This plan was proposed upon various occa- 
sions and with difficulty defeated; but it had the chief 
weight of the Democratic party behind it, and was warmly 
supported by Monroe.'^ 

Washington, determined to put an end to the danger if it 
were at all possible, accepted Hamilton's proposal for a 
mission to England, He wished Hamilton to undertake 

^ History, v. p. 516. 

2 Livingston to Monroe, HUtory, v. p. 507. 

2 Madison to Jefferson, Ihid. p. 517. 

•* Madison to Jefferson, Ibid. p. 517. 

« History, v. p. 616. « Ihid. v. p. 523. '' Ibid. v. p. 570. 



344 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1794 the duty — ' an abler and an lionester man they cannot 
'^^' ^^ find.' ^ The whole Federalist party would have accepted 
this nomination with enthusiasm; but the clamour that 
had been raised against Hamilton was too strong,^ his 
unpopularity among his opponents was too great, for the 
appointment to be made. In the peculiar circumstances 
it would have been unwise to send to London the man who 
was constantly denounced as the leader of the British party. 
He himself refused on these grounds to entertain the idea, 
and a further reason for his refusal is found in his desire to 
be free to advise the Cabinet in the crowd of impending 
difficulties which he clearly foresaw. 

In the end, upon Hamilton's advice, Jay was nominated 
by the President. By way of speeding him on his mission, 
the opposition brought forward motions in Congress for 
non-intercourse with Britain, and their supporters outside 
Congress burned him in effigy. But during April con- 
ciliatory despatches arrived from London, the Senate 
approved of the mission, and before the middle of April 
the minister sailed. Time at least was gained by this 
measure. The opposition was outmanoeuvred. For the 
moment the British bogey dropped out of sight, and 
another set of troubles came into prominence. 

For several years a dangerous agitation had been in 
progress against the excise. The centre of disturbance 
was Pennsylvania, and the leading mind, if not the leading 
character, was Gallatin, who in Jefferson's subsequent ad- 
ministration succeeded to the office of Secretary of the 
Treasury. The ostensible cause of rebellion was the duty on 
whisky. The real danger was a widespread terrorism and an 
armed defiance of the powers of the Union. The example of the 
French Revolution had strengthened the natural disposition 

* Washington to Taj'lor, History, v. p. 535. 
2 Ibid. v.'p. 533. 



THE DEMOCRATS 345 

of a large body of the people to regard strong government A.D. 1794 
as identical with tyranny. When laws were felt to be ^'^' ^^ 
irksome by any considerable number of the citizens, it 
became excusable to render them null and void by non- 
compliance. Force might justifiably be encountered by 
force. The basis of any true republic being, according to 
the prevalent ideas, the voluntary obedience of the people, 
it was clear that the cardinal principle of Union was violated 
if taxes were imposed by Congress upon whisky. For to 
such an exaction Pennsylvania, and other districts also, were 
violently opposed. It seemed to infringe their private 
interests. Their consent was therefore involuntary, and it 
followed that they were entitled to withhold it if they 
desired so to do. 

These doctrines had been disseminated far and wide 
by the industry of the secret democratic societies, whose 
connection with the official Democratic party was intimate if 
informal. In Congress the opposition had been overcome 
by an invulnerable alliance between Hamilton, the ablest 
mind, and Washington, the most revered character in the 
Union. There are reasons for the belief that in many 
quarters a physical resistance to the tyranny of the central 
government was regarded as the only means open for securing 
freedom. But it is clear that the chief sympathisers with 
these loose principles of anarchy did not regard the time as 
fully ripe. By temperament they were averse from reasoning 
out the consequences of their propaganda, and ever shrank 
from a definite course of action when it could be avoided. 
Their preference for a policy of drift was not confined to 
dealings with foreign nations, but was equally notable in 
domestic affairs. 

In July lawlessness came to a head. Hamilton's opinion 
was in favour of mobilising an army of twelve thousand men 
by the 10th of September, and issuing a proclamation calling 



346 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1794 upon the rebels to disperse. The majority of the Cabinet 
concurred in this view. The only dissentient was Randolph, 
who had succeeded Jefferson as Secretary of State. His 
arguments are highly characteristic of the Democratic party 
to which he belonged. He doubted whether the rebellion 
was serious ; doubted also the legality of the course proposed 
to be taken ; doubted if the troops would serve ; doubted if 
public opinion would support the measures of government. 
He was afraid that the insurgents might enter into an 
alliance with Britain, and concluded with the sagacious 
observation that the expedition would certainly cost a great 
deal of money.^ Although Randolph had not then fallen 
into disgrace, his judgment was disregarded. It was after- 
wards alleged that he had been friendly to the rebellion, but 
judged it premature and feared it might miscarry from a 
lack of funds. A year later it transpired that at this very 
time he had made an extraordinary request to the French 
ambassador for money ,^ and Washington forthwith dismissed 
him from his office. Randolph published a vindication 
which earned the approval of Jefferson, joined the Demo- 
cratic attacks on Washington's character which were then 
in progress, and likened his late chief to Tiberius and an 
assassin. Washington's opinion was less rhetorical but no 
less emphatic : ' A damneder scoundrel God Almighty never 
permitted to disgrace humanity.' ^ 

In spite of Randolph's opposition, fifteen thousand troops 
were assembled on the appointed day. Washington was in 
chief command, and Hamilton, without any military rank, 
seemed nevertheless to direct the whole of the proceedings. 
It was he who had proposed the prompt and overwhelming 
display of military force. The policy was his, and so also 
were the matters which flowed from it — the Cabinet 

1 History, vi. pp. 70-71. "^ History, vi. pp. 72-73, also p. 247. 

' History, vi. p. 309. 



THE DEMOCRATS 347 

opinions, instructions to state governors, proclamations, a.d. i794 
reports and vindications necessary for the purpose of inform- '^' 
ing and guiding public opinion. The conduct of the war, if 
the short and bloodless campaign can be described by such 
a title, seems also to have been in his hands more than in 
those of any of the generals. When Washington, towards the 
end of October, returned to Philadelphia, Hamilton remained 
for several weeks longer guiding the movements of the ex- 
pedition. The situation has its humorous side — Hamilton's 
appetite for work and responsibility is so prodigious that his 
comrades in the campaign, no less than his colleagues in the 
Cabinet, appear to have resigned themselves to his direction 
and to have left everything in his hands. 

Most, if not all, of Randolph's prognostications proved 
untrue. The insurgents did not seek to enter into an 
alliance with Britain. Public opinion did not withhold its 
support. The troops did not refuse to serve, but, on the 
contrary, turned out with enthusiasm and in greater numbers 
than were required. The rebels faded away, overawed by 
an overwhelming display of power, and by the fourth week 
of October their unconditional submission was accepted. 
The wisdom of providing forces adequate to the worst con- 
tingencies was never more admirably exemplified. What 
might with more timid counsels or a more foolhardy confi- 
dence have proved to be a serious and bloody contest, rending 
the Union from one end to the other, was quietly extinguished 
and left no bitter memories behind it. 

The campaign in suppression of this rebellion was blood- 
less. The opposition of men who had issued terrible mani- 
festoes in praise of freedom and all its consequences, who 
had shown the boldest enterprise in the tarring and 
feathering of revenue officers, melted ignominiously before 
the progress of the army. The importance of the incident 
lies in two facts. Under one aspect it was the vindication, 



348 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1795 by a display of armed force, of sane government against the 
^T. 38 vague and disorderly clamour of the party which aimed at 
an alliance with the revolutionary government of France. 
Under the other it was the first stern proof that the central 
authority of the United States was able and willing, without 
the aid, or favour, or goodwill of any intermediary legisla- 
ture, to put forth its strength and to exercise a direct 
and overwhelming coercion against its rebellious subjects. 
Under both aspects it was a salutary demonstration, and 
neither Washington nor Hamilton was blind to the double 
intention and effect. 

Meanwhile there was good news from Jay. In November 
the government learned of the probable success of his 
mission. Hamilton's resignation took effect at the end of 
January 1795. Early in March the draft of the treaty 
reached Philadelphia. The Senate met in June to consider 
it, and after a fortnight's discussion accepted it conditionally. 
The terms having become public through the indiscretion 
or bad faith of a senator, the country Avas plunged im- 
mediately in an agitation which had not been exceeded in 
violence even by the outburst of sympathy with France. 
Jay was accused of having accepted bribes. Hamilton, 
when he addressed a meeting in New York, was stoned 
and hooted down. Washington was attacked for ' his mock 
pageantry of monarchy and apish mimickry of kings.' ^ He 
was taunted with being the tool of Hamilton, and was even 
accused of peculation.^ An impeachment of the President 
was loudly demanded.^ 

The Democrats were bolder in Congress, upon platforms 
and in the press, than they had shown themselves in the 
field. From the date of the Whisky Rebellion to the end 
of his term of office Washington was the object of their 
constant attacks. His censure of the secret Democratic 

1 History, vi. pp. 282-83. ^ Ibid. vi. p. 29(5. ^ j^j^i ^i. p. 283. 



THE DEMOCRATS 349 

societies in his opening speech to Congress had the effect A.D. 1796 
of extirpating these pests, but the official Democratic party ^' 
fiercely resented his action and forced him to endure various 
petty discourtesies at the hands of the legislature. Gallatin, 
the ex-rebel, was now the most prominent figure of the 
opposition. He had succeeded Giles, who had become old- 
fashioned, as the chief fabricator of injurious innuendoes, 
and Madison, whose creaking constitutional prolixity had 
grown somewhat wearisome, as the intellectual leader of the 
party in debate. Under his inspiration the campaign of 
words, spoken and written, was conducted with a zeal and 
a measure of success which partly retrieved his timid and 
ignominious disaster in the rebellion. Nor must it be lost 
sight of that all the while Jefferson, from an unassailable 
obscurity, was still directing the movements of the party. 

Washington issued his Farewell Address in September 
1796, and John Adams succeeded him in the Presidency 
in the following March. The Democratic press excelled even 
its past records upon the occasion. " The man who is the 
source of the misfortunes of our country is this day reduced 
to a level with his fellow-citizens, and is no longer possessed 
of the power to multiply evils on the United States. If 
ever there was a period for rejoicing this is the moment." 
The name of Washington would no longer continue to give 
currency to political iniquity and to legalise corruption. 
In the retrospect of his eight years of administration it 
was considered marvellous that a single individual could 
have cankered the principles of republicanism in an en- 
lightened people, and should have carried his designs against 
the public liberty, so far as to have put in jeopardy its very 
existence. The eloquent writer concludes that the day of 
Washington's retirement should be commemorated as a day 
of jubilee throughout the Union.^ 

1 The Aurora, 4th March 1797, History, vi. p. 607. 



350 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1797 The new President sat in the Speaker's chair, and alone, 
Mt.40 in front of the judges, sat the late President. John Adams 
made his address, took the oath of office, and retired. 
During the short ceremony Washington remained standing, 
and when it was over made a courteous bow to the vast 
throng of onlookers and returned to his home on foot. 
The assembly dispersed silently, many of them in tears, 
and followed him on his way. He smiled gently at this 
spontaneous exhibition of affection and turned to acknow- 
ledge it, but could find no words. " It is the general report," 
John Adams wrote, " that there was more weeping than 
' there ever has been at the representation of a tragedy, 
' But whether it was from grief or joy, whether from the 

* loss of their beloved President, or from the accession of an 
' unbeloved one, or from the novelty of the thing, or from 
' the sublimity of it, arising from the multitude present, 

* or whatever other cause, I know not. One thing I 
' know. I am a being of too much sensibility to act any 
' part well in such an exhibition. Perhaps there is little 
' danger of my ever having such another scene to feel or 
' behold."! 

CHAPTER VII 

T%e Foundations of Foreign Policy 

Before the end of Washington's administration the founda- 
tions of foreign policy were laid as firmly as the foundations 
of public credit, of order, and of the executive power. The 
Declaration of Neutrality and Jay's treaty with Great Britain 
were the two most noteworthy acts in the chain of bold 
conduct, whose tradition has maintained itself in subsequent 
times. The thing done, rightly claims the chief place, but 
the reasons for the doing of the thing are hardly less impor- 

1 History, vi. pp, 606-7. 



THE DEMOCRATS 351 

tant. Hamilton's writings during this period are therefore A.D. 
deserving of close attention, both because of the effect they ^I^^"V?' 

'^ '' My:. 36-40 

produced at the time and because they set out the broad 
principles upon which his policy was founded. 

The letters of Pacificus were written during the summer 
and autumn of 1793, to stem the tide of feeling in favour of 
France ; the letters of Americanus in February 1794, to stem 
the tide of feeling against Britain. In July 1795 he wrote 
the letters of Horatius, and began the series over the sig- 
nature of Camillus, to justify the ratification of Jay's treaty 
by the Senate and the President. In September 1796 Wash- 
ington issued his Farewell Address — one of the most famous 
documents in American history — and this also was from 
Hamilton's pen. 

These Latin names are somewhat absurd to our way of 
thinking, but they were then the fashion. Every one knew 
that Pacificus, Americanus, Horatius and Camillus were 
Hamilton, just as every one knew that Helvetius was Madison. 
The writers made no secret of their identity even as they 
wrote ; but clearly the practice must have conciliated some 
notion of propriety, for it was universally adopted except by 
Tom Paine. 

It was impossible, in Hamilton's view, for a nation to act 
towards other nations as a man of warm feelings would act 
towards his neighbours. A nation cannot afford to indulge 
itself in hatred or affection, magnanimity or revenge. In 
deciding upon its course of action, sentiment is as irrelevant 
a consideration as malice, and wars of chivalry are as ini- 
quitous as wars of religion. The statesman who bends to 
an emotional outburst of public opinion as richly deserves 
to be shot as a general who surrenders a city out of com- 
passion for the inhabitants. The stern test of the righteous- 
ness of a war is the permanent security of the state. A 
government which goes knight-erranting out of sympathy 



1793-1797 
^T. 36-40 



352 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. for foreign nations is like a trustee who subscribes to cliarities 
out of the property he has undertaken to administer. A 
government, like a trustee, is responsible for the estate.' Its 
business is sound investments, not the encouragement of 
deserving institutions or the succour of honest, poor men 
overwhelmed by adversity. Pity and prejudice are equally 
out of place when ministers, in whom king or people has 
placed the serious confidence of decision, come to determine 
the tremendous issues of alliances and wars. 

Some philosophers, indeed, have discovered a distinction 
in the case of a Democracy. A nation which goes mad is 
surely free to do as it likes. But a nation, in Hamilton's 
judgment, is in the position of a tenant for life who must be 
restrained from spoiling the timber, pawning the heirlooms, 
and dilapidating the estate for his successors. In such 
issues there is room only for the charity of individuals who 
may deal as they please with their life interest, and be 
praised unreservedly for their sacrifice. They may give 
their own lives, and their own money if they choose, to the 
side which engages their approval, but out of the trust 
funds not a penny and not a grenadier. Lord Byron was 
all right ; Exeter Hall, as a rule, is all wrong. 

Aloofness from the struggles of other nations has been 
freely judged to be uncharitable and ungenerous ; but what 
government that has fully realised its responsibilities will 
ever engage in crusades and adventures ? It is reasonable 
to expect that ministers should have wiser and cooler heads 
than the electors, and the courage necessary to stand out 
against the tumults of popular indignation, that are often 
ready, upon a sudden impulse, to risk the safety of the state 
and even the freedom of future generations. 

Nor does a man need to have lived for many years in a 
free country to realise that in such outbursts there is apt 
to be much hoUowness and considerable error. What did 



^T. 36-40 



THE DEMOCRATS 353 

tlie citizens of the United States actually know of the A.D. 
conditions of Frenchmen three thousand miles away ? J, "V?! 
Tardy and irregular packets brought news with a fine gloss 
of rhetoric on the facts. Battles and revolutions made good 
reading and stirred the blood ; but the causes were more 
lightly touched upon and less eagerly studied. Phrases 
and ideas were translated by glib pedants who had no 
suspicion of a difference between the Gallic and the Saxon 
scale, between the Liberte of Paris and the Freedom of 
New England. 

When one nation is swept by a violent admiration or by 
a tempest of hatred for another, it is nearly certain that 
the situation has not been truly understood. Nations are 
not like the characters in a novel. They are rarely fit 
subjects for chivalry; still more rarely are they odious. 
Partisans — and more particularly remote partisans — are ever 
blinder and more furious than their principals. They are 
mesmerised by the dramatic and led to conceive of friends 
impossibly good, enemies impossibly bad, and both im- 
possibly uniform throughout — nations of devils and nations 
of angels. No man ever sees his own countrymen under 
this homogeneous aspect ; for there is always the candour of 
the Opposition and the obvious imperfections of his neigh- 
bours to correct and temper the illusion. 

That Hamilton profoundly distrusted the French Revolu- 
tion, and heaped scorn upon its pretensions with regard to 
liberty and the Rights of Man, gave point to his arguments, 
but did not in the least affect his main position. Had his 
sympathies been entirely in the other scale his principles 
of statesmanship would still have compelled him to advocate 
the same policy which he pursued. 

In the struggle of France against the world, the sole 
concern of Washington's government was the true interest 
of the United States. Gratitude to Frenchmen was a 



354 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D, wortliy feeling for private men to entertain ; but gratitude 
1793-1797 ^ France was a meaningless phrase. French aid had been 

^T, 36-40 1 mi 1 ■ /• 1 • 

politic, not sentimental. The object of their statesmen was 
neither love of American freedom nor hatred of British 
tyranny, but merely the warrantable desire to injure and 
embarrass a dangerous enemy by comfort extended to its 
subjects in rebellion. So long as the interests of France 
and the interests of the states lay along the same line, it was 
wise and patriotic to join forces; but at a later time, when 
the ways diverged and the benefits of such co-operation 
would have accrued only to one side, the risks and the 
dangers to the other, it would have been a breach of trust 
for government to yield to popular clamour and to enter 
into a new alliance out of consideration for the advantage 
which had been reaped from a similar engagement in former 
times. 

The counter policy of Jefferson was in Hamilton's opinion 
a huge bubble blown up by windy rhetoric and a purely verbal 
enthusiasm. Gratitude was not due even to the King of 
France; how therefore could it be due to the subjects who 
had cut off his head ? Freedom was a great name, but a 
poor casus belli unless it were your own that was menaced. 
Events which had occurred were to be considered done with. 
They left no legacies. Britain the ancient enemy, France 
the ancient friend, must be treated on a bare equality. 
Hatred of Britain was a vague and unreal sentiment. If 
encouraged to the length that it was allowed to prevent the 
one nation from entering into relations with the other for 
their mutual advantage, there could be no folly too impos- 
sible for mankind. To remain on bad terms with Britain 
by choice, and from a general dislike that eluded definition 
both as to its nature and its object (for no man was alto- 
gether certain whether it was directed against the king, 
the government, or the people), was a paradox that filled 



THE DEMOCRATS 855 

his clear mind and humane spirit with immeasurable A.D. 

o-'-p'-. .. ... '^Z 

In Hamilton's opinion the honour of his nation was in no 
way engaged to support the arms of France. So far as 
honour entered into the discussion it was at a wholly different 
point. He was deeply concerned that the United States 
should hold their head high among nations, scrupulously 
observing the sanctity of their engagements even towards 
the subjects of those with whom they were at war. The 
doctrine of repudiation of debts, whether public or private, 
towards which Jefferson had a kindly indulgence, was to 
Hamilton the most destructive and abominable of all 
policies, striking at the roots not only of respect among 
nations, but of stability of government and preservation 
of the Union. 

When it was suggested by the Democratic faction that 
Britain might be brought to terms by a policy of whole- 
sale confiscation of the debts due by American citizens 
and the American government to her subjects, Hamilton 
did not trim his phrases to the popular tune. " Serious 
' as the evil of war has appeared, at the present stage of 
' our affairs, the manner in which it was to be apprehended 

* it might be carried on was still more formidable, in my 
' eyes, than the thing itself. It was to be feared that, in 
' the fermentation of certain wild opinions, those wise, just, 
' and temperate maxims, which will for ever constitute the 

* true security and felicity of a State, would be overruled ; 
' that a war upon credit, eventually upon property, and upon 
' the general principles of public order, might aggravate and 
' ombitter the ordinary calamities of foreign war. The con- 
' fiscation of debts due to the enemy might have been the 

* first step of this destructive process. From one violation 

* of justice to another the passage is easy. Invasions of 

* right, still more fatal to credit, might have followed ; and 



1793-1797 
^T. 36-40 



356 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. ' this, by extinguishing the resources which that could have 
' afforded, might have paved the way to more comprehensive 
' and more enormous depredations for a substitute. Terrible 
' examples were before us, and there were too many not 
* sufficiently remote from a disposition to admire and imitate 
' them."i 

The interests of the States, in Hamilton's view, were not 
in Europe, but only in America. With the future of that 
continent their destiny was bound up ; but whether Europe 
should succeed in erasing the name of France from the 
map, or France in subduing the whole of Europe, mattered 
not one pin's head; and all the loose talk about gratitude 
and freedom added not a single drachm to the weight of 
the argument. The signal advantage of the American 
Republic over all other nations lay in its position, which 
enabled it, if only it could keep a cool head, to hold itself 
aloof from European broils. Distribution, conquest and 
annexation of territory mattered nothing to the United 
States, save in the continents of America. Alliances were 
to be avoided except in so far as they might serve to keep 
American soil free from the menace of European rivalries. 

To maintain such an attitude against the honest excite- 
ment of your fellow-countrymen is at no time an easy or a 
pleasant task. Washington lost his popularity. Hamilton 
became an object of execration. Jay was burned a hundred 
times in effigy. The remote approval of history is a poor 
substitute for the affectionate clamour of your fellow-towns- 
men when you emerge bowing gratefully upon a balcony. 
To practical fellows like Jefferson a preference for the 
former reward appeared a kind of idiotcy. The successful 
politician is ever something of a sentimentalist; an astute 
sharer in the joys, sorrows and emotions of the people, 
even in those which are least profound and permanent; 

1 Works, V. p. 406. 



THE DEMOCRATS 357 

and lie is not, therefore, to be damned as insincere. But the A.D. 
wise statesman must ever be prepared to accept loneliness ^^^ol ?! 
for a bride and to cultivate fortitude upon a rock. 

Here, as in all Hamilton's public acts, the dominant note 
is the wise and faithful stewardship of the estate. The 
stumbling-blocks of popular perversity, muddled thought 
and imaginary duties were what he set himself to remove. 
If only his countrymen could be made to realise their 
true place in the world of nations, their few simple and 
obvious interests as a people, if the rule of conduct in ex- 
ternal affairs could be but once practised with courage and 
consistency in the tender infancy of the Republic, and made 
to sustain itself in the teeth of popular clamour — could 
these things be achieved on one conspicuous occasion, he 
had the foresight to understand that it would take some 
man greatly his own superior in force to break away from 
the tradition that would thus have been created. In a demo- 
cracy the thing done successfully against the outcry of the 
people, when it comes in after times to be judged by its 
results and approved by the wisdom of men whose heads 
have in the meanwhile grown cool, is like timber in the 
wind-swept spaces, gnarled and twisted into a prodigious 
strength. 

The principle of aloofness, having been successfully up- 
held and extended by Washington and Hamilton during 
the fever of the French Revolution, came in later years, 
by a singular perversity, to be associated with the name of 
the least dignified, and one of the most active, of Hamilton's 
enemies. To any one who has read the scurrilous invective 
poured out on both men from 1793 to 1797 ; to any one who 
has realised the eagerness with which Jefferson, Monroe, 
and their followers endeavoured to destroy all confidence in 
the characters of the President and the Secretary of the 
Treasury, it must appear one of the strangest of historical 



358 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. ironies that a lineal descendant of tlie policy of Washington 

^I?^l}JVr. and Hamilton should now be cherished by posterity under 
^T. 36-40 . „ 

the name of the Monroe Doctrine. The compelling force of 

a precedent boldly established by brave men in times of 

difficulty is a truly marvellous phenomenon. The spectacle 

of Monroe, the defeated but undiscouraged assailant of 

Hamilton's private honour and public policy, roaring most 

nobly to all the ages out of the stolen skin of the ' Little 

Lion/ is possibly the crowning triumph of a great idea. 

The Monroe Doctrine is an unfortunate phrase, suggestive 
of a pedant, mildly obstinate, carrying a scroll of sheep- 
skin formulas under his arm. A doctrine, as we understand 
it, is a prim challenge to argument ; a thing open to doubt 
and controversy, about which endless logic may be chopped, 
hairs split, and tempers lost, until fashion finds another 
object. 

The Monroe Doctrine is, in fact, the very opposite of 
all this. It is not a challenge, but a very simple warning. 
Nothing less arguable was ever made, and among its many 
virtues this is not the least. Deceived by its title, eminent 
men, on various occasions, have assumed or denied it to 
be a part of international law. But it has no nearer kin- 
ship to that branch of human study than to astronomy or 
tactics. It is in no sense a lawyer's business, but only a 
statesman's. It amounts to a plain declaration that for 
certain objects, which are well understood, the United States 
are prepared to spend the substance and the lives of their 
citizens until they are victorious or ruined. If another 
nation chooses to dispute these pretensions it has a perfect 
right to do so. There is no legality in them that makes that 
power which refuses to conform a moral outcast. The 
sanction is not in the conscience of mankind, but in the 
strong arm of a formidable people. If a time should come 
when the United States are unable to enforce the observance, 



THE DEMOCRATS 359 

or are unwilling to incur the risk and inconvenience of an A.D. 
appeal to arms, they will call in vain to a general congress of ^^ gg^Q 
the world to support the Monroe Doctrine. 

The greatness of this idea lies in its simplicity. Instead 
of higgling and niggling like a small shopkeeper over con- 
tiguous house property, afraid to state his object plainly 
from a fear of abandoning the advantages of obscurity, 
delaying the accomplishment of his ambitions, destroying 
confidence, engendering mischief and suspicion at each suc- 
cessive step, one nation has had the sense and courage to 
declare its intentions clearly and to attach the penalty of 
war to their infringement. Instead of weakening its posi- 
tion by this procedure, it has enjoyed an immunity from 
attack that even its great resources and remote position are 
inadequate to explain. The frank method of a declaration, 
which is the rule of great business dealings, has so far at 
any rate proved itself superior to the elaborate duplicity 
and concealment that European diplomacy has inherited 
from the Middle Ages. 

In establishing this extraordinary method Hamilton had 
the chief share. The instinct of Washington was his main 
support, but the part played by the President was rather that 
of disciple than of master. The clear perception was Hamil- 
ton's. The initiative and the defence were also his. There is 
some sense in the Democratic sneer that the Secretary of the 
Treasury led Congress, cabinet and chief executive officer of 
the Republic by the nose. Nonsense begins when it is 
pretended that any of these three followed him blindly, 
from personal loyalty or interest, or in indolence. Men 
did not follow Hamilton blindly. He lacked this quality 
of greatness ; possibly he despised it. His appeal was not 
limited to the reason of mankind, but it was always 
through the reason that he made his approaches. In his 
writings there are many excellent phrases, but they are the 



1793-1797 
JEt. 36-40 



360 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. cap and plume of the argument, not the main matter of 
it. His power of reducing the ' forts of folly ' lay not in his 
phrases or eloquence, but in his exhaustive discussion of the 
theme. The progress of his argument was like that of an 
army which burns, consumes and devastates every particle 
of sustenance in the enemy's country, overcoming resistance 
by the destruction of supplies. 

The Declaration of Neutrality was the first position gained. 
It was a bold step considering the temper of the time and 
the fact that there was disunion, bordering close on treachery, 
even in the cabinet. In addition to the outcry it provoked, 
as a document deemed to be unsympathetic and unfriendly 
to France, there was the further awkward fact that it in- 
volved action. The whole procedure of the eloquent, 
smiling, fire-raising Genet was illegal. The minister pleni- 
potentiary of a foreign power had to be restrained, always a 
delicate and ticklish business ; but when a good half or more 
of the citizens, inspired in a subterranean fashion by their 
own Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, were shouting 
for him enthusiastically, it became a situation of extreme 
complexity. 

Hamilton's method of defending the policy on which 
Washington and he were united was characteristic of the 
man and of the nation of his paternal origin. He did pre- 
cisely what a good English solicitor will always forbid his 
client upon any consideration to undertake — he trusted to 
reason and wrote long letters. To trust to the luck of the law 
and put nothing upon paper that can be avoided is no doubt 
the safer rule for ordinary men. But Hamilton was not an 
ordinary man, and he entertained an almost fanatical belief 
in the efficacy of practical arguments, of reason as dis- 
tinguished from logic, for persuading an excited democracy 
to abandon the pursuit of folly. 

Nature had not endowed him with wit or humour, so that 



THE DEMOCRATS 861 

he escaped without danger the pitfalls of a mistimed vivacity A.D. 
that have swallowed up so many brilliant controversialists. ^^ gg.^Q 
His writings have a most dangerous quality, for it is all but 
impossible to read them without being dragged to his con- 
clusions. If Jefferson could have included them in an index 
expurgatorius, he would certainly have risked the imputa- 
tion of tyranny for the sake of the result. This being 
impossible, he laid his hand upon the very worst device 
that could have been contrived: he put up inferior men 
to answer them.^ The inferior men got terribly mauled and 
knocked about, and people with JefFersonian sympathies, 
reading, we may suppose, innocently and for the sake of 
the fun, gradually found themselves in the opposite camp. 

The letters of Pacificus ^ were aimed at a popular illusion. 
The plea of gratitude to France was analysed, in a spirit 
neither hostile nor cynical, but generous and practical ; and 
out of the discussion, as with Hamilton is invariably the 
case, out of the examination of the particular facts under 
observation, he arrives at general principles of rich wisdom 
and wide obligation. To say that he had a lawyer's mind 
misfht be misunderstood if the statement were made without 
qualification. No man was ever more free from the tyranny 
of legal pedantry or a slavish adherence to forms and 
formulas ; but he was urged on by his nature to that per- 
petual quest after the governing principle in every new 
situation and set of circumstances which is the mark of the 
greatest lawyers. 

Pacificus found an unexpected ally in Genet, who, having 
in the first instance tickled sentimental unreason with much 
success, ended by treading on its toes. Neutrality was estab- 
lished in a position unassailable by sympathy with France ; 

^ History, v. p. 340. 

2 Works, iv. pp. 460-482. See particularly numbers iv, , v. and vi. , which 
seem to reach the high-water mark of political controversy. 



362 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. but it remained to secure neutrality against attacks inspired 

^I?^~}JV^ by a blind hatred of Britain. 
JEii. 36-40 

It is probable that, from the point of view of the United 

States, Hamilton would have made a better treaty, but Jay 
succeeded in making a sufficiently good one. The differences 
were removed and substantial advantages were obtained by 
the Americans. Jay accordingly was burned in effigy, and 
the infamy of Washington and the Senate in confirming the 
agreement was denounced under Democratic inspiration in 
terms that had hardly been exceeded in regard to the 
treachery of Arnold. 

Hamilton, now no longer in office, came to the defence of 
the government, the treaty, and of Jay. Camillus is a 
tremendously long document, consisting of nearly forty 
letters that would have occupied not less than a hundred 
columns of the Times} The process of conquest by exhaus- 
tion is carried so far that one marvels at the heroic qualities 
of the generation that was wooed in such a fashion. Few 
people will read Camillus to-day from cover to cover. Those 
who achieve it, while not ceasing to marvel at the popular 
taste in 1795, will derive much comfort even from the dis- 
cussions of Vatel, Bynkershoeck, Puftendorf, Grotius and 
other classical writers upon the Law of Nations. For the 
casual reader, interested in the difficult problem of how 
nations, whose interest it is to be friends, may adjust their 
differences without loss of dignity, the seven letters which 
commence the series are still as full of life and meaning as 
on the day when they were written. Of all Hamilton's 
writings we should put them in the highest place. There 
is in them a noble spirit of vigorous wisdom. They have 
a practical quality which is not sordid, a sympathy and con- 
sideration for the feelings of the other nation which is far 

^ Works, V. p. 189 et seq. Eight of these letters were written by Rufus 
King. 



1793-1797 
Mt. 36-40 



THE DEMOCRATS 863 

removed from weakness. Even in his onslaught upon the A.D. 
factions and the mischief-makers he is magnanimous. His 
contempt is terrible, because it is entirely without malice. 
Looking beyond the persons of his opponents, he pours out a 
measureless scorn upon government by weak men and vague 
words; upon the policy of drift, which possesses neither 
the courage to foresee results nor the energy to prepare 
for them ; upon those people, arguing interminably to delay 
action, who grudged every sacrifice whether its object were 
peace or war, who denounced with the same cantankerous 
hostility all preparations as aggressive, and all concessions as 
cowardice. 

There are two documents of pre-eminent fame in the 
early history of the United States — the Declaration of 
Independence and Washington's Farewell Address. The 
former was written by Jefferson, while in his thirty-third 
year,^ to embody the ideas and aspirations of Congress on 
the eve of the struggle for independence. The latter was 
written by Hamilton twenty years later ^ to convey the 
counsels of the first President to the nation on his retire- 
ment from public life. The two papers invite a comparison 
at several points. 

To the cold reader of to-day, who owes no duty of 
gratitude or reverence in either case, the comparison is to 
the disadvantage of the earlier document. We are inclined 
to rate it lower than it deserves, because of the somewhat 
faded fashion of its rhetorical bedizenments. We lament its 
lack of restraint, and suspect unreality lurking under a 
wealth of phrases that have come to be somewhat dis- 
credited as currency. It occurs to us, looking back upon 
the event, that the occasion was one when the simplest Avords 
would have served best. We are affected by certain flourishes 
unpleasantly, as by things misplaced and somewhat gaudy. 

» Summer of 1776. 2 1796. ^t. 39. 



1793-1797 
Ml. 36-40 



364 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. We breathe an atmosphere of travesty and burlesque. The 
ready writer, from an artistic standpoint, is rarely the best 
spokesman when stern citizens are preparing to go out to 
battle for the idea of liberty. The proclamations of Generals 
Botha and Delarey have an accent of dignity which is lacking 
in the flowing smoothness of Dr. Leyds. 

If we are to view this Declaration fairly on its merits, we 
must put on one side both the enthusiasm with which it 
has been regarded ever since by the American nation, and 
that derisive contempt with which the brilliant reviewer 
is apt to welcome the appearance of a new poet. The 
enthusiastic judgment combines a natural gratitude to the 
man with the pride of a very remarkable achievement. We 
are stirred by it as we are apt to be stirred by the con- 
templation of a monument, good, bad, or indifferent, which 
has been erected on a famous battlefield. The derisive 
judgment is equally inadequate, for the cool test of reason 
cannot be applied to a purely dramatic incident. 

JeSerson was constitutionally incapable of writing for 
posterity. When he attempted it with the greatest care, as 
in his Anas and Autobiography, he made the most con- 
spicuous failure. The more he tried for it, the worse was 
the result, the more contrary to his desires and intentions. 
But to catch the emotions of the moment and express 
them in words that made men shout as they read them 
was his peculiar gift. Even if the Declaration of In- 
dependence lacks every quality of permanence, and remains 
a famous piece of writing merely because it is associated 
inseparably with a great event, that criticism does not affect 
its virtue for the purpose it was designed to accomplish. 
It has the essential quality of great oratory, for it blew 
upon the smouldering embers in the hearts of the men 
to whom it was addressed until they burst into flame. 
It proclaimed the justice of the cause, held up an ideal of 



1793-1797 
^T. 36-40 



THE DEMOCRATS 365 

conduct, inspired hope and courage; and these were the A.D. 
supreme needs of the moment. A still greater man might 
have achieved this, and at the same time something more. 
The Declaration is no mine of political wisdom, no model 
of literary excellence; but the thing it did was of far 
higher importance than the thing it has failed to do. 

The Farewell Address being less dramatic in its occasion 
afforded fewer opportunities to the spirit of oratory. It is 
the testament of a man who, having served his country for 
five-and-forty years in war and peace, felt that his work 
was done, his strength for contest spent, his rest well earned. 
There were no personal or party ends to serve. To a vain 
man there might have been a temptation to chronicle his 
services. A lover of applause might have yielded to the 
desire to part company with a universal benediction — a good 
word for every one, so that his enemies might unite with 
his friends in praise of the departing hero. These were the 
obvious snares. But Washington was not the man to fall 
into either trap ; and had there been a danger, he was saved 
from it by his choice of a clerk. 

The Farewell Address is a stern document. Duty is its 
keynote ; not complacency or smooth words. Most men who 
have read it will be inclined to name the Farewell Address 
as among the noblest public statements that men have made. 
About his own services Washington says little, except to 
plead, with every appearance of sincerity, his fallibility, and 
to justify his retirement, not on grounds of eminent success, 
but of prolonged labour. He utters three solemn warnings : — 
against any weakening of the Union; against the growth of 
party spirit ; and against foreign entanglements. As to the 
second his words have been unheeded; not from a lack of 
reverence in his countrymen, but from the nature of the 
case. The authors of the Farewell Address desired an 
excellence incompatible with the form of government that 



366 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. had been deliberately chosen. A Democracy that is not 
^ sfi 40 governed by parties, parties that are not affected by the 
spirit of faction, are things yet undiscovered. But for the 
rest they have been justified in their countrymen, whether 
we judge the result by the test of sacrifices, or by the test of 
success. 

To attempt a separation of Washington and Hamilton in 
the authorship of the Farewell Address would be a futile 
and invidious task. In their political aims no two men 
were ever more nearly at one. Privately, there would 
appear to have been a certain barrier of formality. The 
difference in age, the temperament of the President, the 
deliberate effort on the part of Hamilton to surround the 
highest office with respect and stateliness, are enough to 
explain it. But in public affairs the unanimity was a 
perfection that leaves us amazed. That Hamilton's extra- 
ordinary intellect may have influenced his chief is more 
than likely ; but in every serious emergency the instinct of 
the two men pointed out the same course. The special 
function of Hamilton was to set forth the reasons on which 
the policy was founded, and to discover the means for 
carrying it into execution. The spirit of the Address belongs 
equally to both. It was the message of Hamilton and 
Washington together to the people of the Republic. 

But what gives this statement a universal value, and 
places it permanently in the literature of the world, is the 
mind of Hamilton, and not the character of Washington. 
It is no disparagement to the fame of one who was a great 
soldier and a wise ruler to deny him a further reward to 
which he himself would never have laid a claim. Had 
Washington written his Farewell Address without assistance 
from any quarter, it is incredible that it would not have 
been a memorable document, full of noble counsel, high 
dignity and sincere patriotism ; but what makes its im- 



THE DEMOCRATS 367 

portance for us, who are not citizens of the United States A.D. 

and are concerned only indirectly in their wellbeingf, is 1793-1797 
„ 1 . , . * ^T. 36-40 

precisely that quest of the universal m the facts, the diffi- 
culties and the particular dangers of the hour, which is the 
inimitable distinction of the genius of Hamilton among all 
the men of his time. 

The principles of public credit, of the true relations of 
any country to its neighbours, of honour, of perpetual 
sacrifice as the condition of strength, and of union, above 
all things, as the foundation of the whole fabric, are 
stated and set forth with such intensity, that a French- 
man reading it will think of France, an Englishman of 
England. Under the excitement of his personal interest the 
occasion is forgotten, and the United States of America 
could be replaced by some legendary title — Utopia or No- 
man's Land — without impairing the significance. Such an 
achievement is the rare triumph of the man of letters, who 
may or may not be a soldier or a statesman in addition, but 
who in this case, beyond any doubt, was Hamilton and not 
Washington. 



BOOK V 

THE POLITICIANS 

A.D. 1795-1804 



2 A 



Let the long contention cease ! 
Geese are swans and swans are geese. 
Let them have it how they will I 
Thou art tired : lest he still. 

They outtalked thee, hissed thee, tore thee ? 
Better men fared thus before thee ; 
Fired their ringing shot and passed, 
Hotly charged and sank at last. 

Charge once more then and he dumb I 
Let the victors when they come, 
When the forts of Folly fall. 
Find thy body by the wall. 

Matthew Arnold. 



BOOK V 
THE POLITICIANS 

CHAPTER I 

The End of an Epoch 

Hamilton retired from Washington's cabinet on the last day a.d. 
of January 1795. He had been in office for upwards of five 1795-1797 

TT • J • r • 1 rr ,1. ^T. 38-40 

years. He remained in power lor six years longer, io tne 
end of Washington's term (March 1797) he was the chief 
counsellor and the strongest supporter of the President and 
his government. The letters of Camillus and the Farewell 
Address were only the most conspicuous of his many public 
labours ; and it is the fact that his private industry, of which 
we get a ghmpse in his voluminous correspondence, was of 
an even more arduous character. 

The confidence with which his great chief sought his 
assistance during this stormy period, the deference paid 
him by the newly constituted cabinet, his successors in 
office, the admiration and allegiance of the whole Federalist 
party, might have compensated for the bitterness and abuse 
of the Democrats had the question uppermost in his mind 
been the personal one. But this with him was never the 
case, not from virtue so much as from temperament. The 
permanence of the works of his hands was ever more 

871 



372 ALEXANDER HA.MILTON 

A.D. precious to him than his own prosperity and reputation. 
^I?^'}'^^! The growing power of the opposition seemed to him to be 
a menace against the institutions of the Repubhc. The 
faithfulness and good opinion of his friends, although grate- 
ful to him in a personal sense, did not provide an adequate 
security against the dangers which he dreaded. 

He still continued after Washington's retirement to be the 
most powerful influence in political affairs until the end of 
the presidency of John Adams. But during these four 
years the conditions and their issue were less fortunate. 
With the new head of the State he was united by their 
common hatred of anarchy ; but in their personal relations 
all was discord and intolerance. Hamilton, said Adams, 
speaking bitterly of his own term of office, was all the time 
" the commander-in-chief of the House of Representatives, 
' of the Senate, of the heads of Department, of General 
' Washington, and last, and least, if you will, of the President 
' of the United States ! " It cannot be a pleasant position for 
any man to preside over a cabinet which reposes its con- 
fidence, and takes its inspiration, if not actually its orders, 
from an outsider — from a lawyer in New York engaged, but 
unfortunately not absorbed, in the labours of an enormous 
practice. 

. The motives of Hamilton's resignation were mainly 
private. He had spent all his savings. The official salary 
of the Secretary of the Treasury was, even in those days, an 
impossible pittance for a man without private means. He 
was deeply in debt, not through an inability to manage his 
affairs, but because he had given his time and energies to 
his country instead of to the pursuit of his own fortune. 
No suspicion of miscalculation or incompetence attaches to 
him. Had rich admirers been willing to endow him, and 
had he been willing to accept their alms, it is probable, 
from his conduct in the matter of his actual savings, he 



THE POLITICIANS 373 

would have employed the funds shrewdly. The chance, a.d. 
however, did not come his way. Political admiration at the ^gg^^J 
end of the eighteenth century had not yet learned to write 
large cheques. He was in debt, and had no mind to die in 
debt. He was acutely conscious that his public work had 
entailed a sacrifice not merely of his own ease, but of the 
interests of his family. The last nine years of his life were 
devoted to the honourable but undramatic end of dis- 
charging his debts and providing for his children. 

On the political side the motive of his retirement is pro- 
bably clearer to the world to-day than it was to Hamilton 
himself at the time. He was the man of an epoch, and the 
epoch was ended. On the ground which the Revolution had 
cleared the plan of a nation had been marked out, the 
foundations had been trenched and laid, the fabric had 
begun to rise. The main work he had set himself with 
Washington to do was done. The States were independent. 
They were united. They were financially sound. They 
were started upon a wise and dignified course of policy with 
regard to other nations. They were at peace when all the 
European continent was plunged in war. 

For the permanency of human institutions two things are 
necessary : a clear idea consistent within itself, and a living 
and vigorous tradition. Thought alone is not enough to 
entitle a man to the fame of a constructive statesman. It 
must be converted into action. To him, therefore, who not 
only thinks, but proves the thought capable of serving his 
purpose, is the power present and to come. His institutions, 
like an estate, pass to future generations under a beneficent 
mortmain. 

Of Hamilton's main ideas only that concerned with com- 
mercial policy was left unachieved. Political conditions 
would have rendered it a long and most difficult task. His 
private circumstances made even an efibrt towards it impos- 



874 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. sible. Moreover, he foresaw clearly that if only the fabric of 

1795-1797 ^^Q Union held together, his plans for industries and manu- 
^T. 38-40 ,-,..,,, 1 1 1 1 

factures would inevitably be adopted, sooner or later, by 

his successors. For until they were carried into practice 

a blank would remain in the general scheme of policy, so 

obvious that it could not be overlooked. 

He may not have been fully conscious at the period of 
his retirement that he had been the chief factor in one 
of those rare, great works of statesmanship that stand out 
from the mass of merely useful accomplishment like a 
mountain island in mid-ocean. For although he had a 
soaring ambition, he lacked the power of standing back 
and resrardinsr his times and his own actions therein in 
a spirit of detachment. The golden, dramatic imagination 
which has been so rich a recompense to some great men 
and to many mountebanks, was wanting in his composition. 
He may not have foreseen, and in all likelihood did not 
endeavour to foresee, his place in history ; but as a true 
descendant of two shrewd and well-judging races, the 
Huguenot and the Lowland Scot, he did not nourish his 
fancy on illusions. He was fully aware at the age of forty, 
when most men are entering upon their careers, that the 
greatest work he could ever hope to do was done, and lay 
behind him. In comparison with what had been accom- 
plished, the present was a time of little problems and 
wearisome details, of party triumphs and personal ambitions. 
His energy continued, but the zest was gone out of public 
life. After having slain giants, only a philosopher could 
return contentedly to the herding of sheep. 

There is a tragical element in these last nine years 
quite apart from the circumstances of his death. He under- 
valued what had been done. He feared that the institu- 
tions he had been unable to strengthen according to his 
judgment, would fail to stand the stress of events. His 



1795-1797 
Ml. 38-40 



THE POLITICIANS 875 

public papers maintain a discreet and statesmanlike reserve a.d. 
upon this dangerous topic, but bis private correspondence 
and his recorded conversations leave us in no doubt as to 
his opinions. 

In addition to the original disintegrating force of State 
Rights, a fresh and, to his eyes, a terrible danger had arisen 
in the shape of Democracy. These two forces his great 
rival Thomas Jefferson had compacted into a party which 
was growing rapidly in popularity and power, and threatened 
very soon to seize upon the government. It must be ad- 
mitted by his strongest admirers that he misjudged these 
dangers, and overrated the destructive power of both forces. 
If Hamilton, who saw so far and so wide, did not see these 
things as men see them to-day, it is not after all very 
wonderful; for he was bound to judge both pleas as they 
were presented by their advocates, and to weigh to some 
extent the characters of their advocates. 

The case for State Rights was in the hands of the 
Democratic party. The chief argument was an appeal to 
mean motives and dangerous jealousies, which rallied to its 
support all those who hated the constitution. The true 
virtues of the State Rights doctrine were hidden as closely 
from Jefferson as from Hamilton. The zeal of the one, the 
opposition of the other, were equally grounded upon a mis- 
conception of its nature. It was the same with Democracy. 
The sturdiest upholder of the institution turns with disgust 
from the records of those years when blatancy and disordered 
emotions are its representatives. If we were called upon to 
judge democracy solely upon the manifestations of French 
and American opinion during the period of the Revolution, 
we should not hesitate any more than Hamilton did to 
condemn it utterly. 

The growing confidence of the people in Jefferson's inspira- 
tion seemed to Hamilton to be proof of his forebodings. 



376 ALEXANDEE HAMILTON 

A.D. Men have always been apt to take this view of any popular 
^T 38-40 i'^clination towards a political opponent. But after all, it 
is the tradition which drives, and the politician who has to 
draw the coach along. Hamilton, fearful for the safety of 
his institutions, did not take this comfortable view of the 
matter. The predilection for Jefferson showed a lack of 
power in the people to discriminate between leaders who 
saw into the realities of things, and those others who saw 
only the shadows that phrases cast upon the wall. From a 
long and bitter conflict he knew Jefferson to be neither wise 
nor brave. He knew him to be incapable of looking at the 
facts. He knew him to be entirely lacking in executive 
ability, and he assumed as a matter of course, though 
wrongly as things turned out, that the first need in the 
President of the United States was that he should be a 
man of action. 

But even allowing for so much of error in his calculations, 
it cannot be pretended that Hamilton's vision of the dangers 
to the Union which seemed to lie in State Rights was 
altogether an illusion, or anything resembling an illusion. 
More than half a century later one of the bloodiest wars in 
history, lasting over a period of four years, grimly justified 
his presage of disaster. All that can be urged against his 
judgment is that he thought the peril to be more imminent 
than was actually the case. But even this is doubtful. It 
is impossible to avoid the feeling, as we read the history of 
those sixty years, that it was a freak of fortune, good-luck 
or ill-luck, which postponed the struggle to the presidency 
of Lincoln. The outbreak might have occurred as naturally 
under Jefferson or Monroe, Jackson or Harrison. 

As regards Democracy, Hamilton must be judged to have 
been even more in the wrong ; for he believed anarchy 
to be its necessary issue. The spectacle of France had 
disturbed the compass of his mind, as it disturbed also 



THE POLITICIANS 377 

the judgments of all his great contemporaries; of Fox A.D. 
no less than of Burke, of Washington as much as Jefferson. ^^"^38.40 
To one set of thinkers there seemed to be a promise 
of the millennium, to the other a certainty of the inferno. 
From the tumults and massacres of Paris, Hamilton argued, 
without proper allowance either for race or tradition, and 
without a clear perception of the essential difference between 
the two cases. Democracy in France, where alone it had 
been indulged in its purity, had led to inconceivable political 
folly, to the destruction of order, to wholesale murder and 
finally to despotism. To his mind this seemed to be a 
natural and even an inevitable sequence. He did not 
penetrate the disguises in which the supreme needs and the 
passionate desires of the two peoples were enveloped. Had 
he so penetrated he must have distinguished between the 
two cases and endured less anxiety. 

It is of all political events the most improbable that a 
strong nation will allow its institutions, even in their green 
youth, to be overset by any merely imaginary grievance. A 
ferment may be caused by words and phrases that have no 
practical meaning, but with average good fortune things 
will settle before it comes to serious action. That a 
number of agitators and journals depicted Washington as 
a bloodthirsty tyrant and an oppressor of liberty did not 
constitute any real menace to the Union. That the citizens 
of New York and Philadelphia banqueted, and mangled pigs, 
and shouted French phrases, and wore tricolour ribbons, and 
sang the Marseillaise Hymn, did not prove them to be 
impregnated with the spirit of the September massacres. 
The whole manifestation was a mere fashion, and when we 
review it calmly at a distance, the most we feel inclined 
to say of anything having so little real importance is that 
it was an ugly fashion entirely unsuited to the wearers 
and their conditions. 



378 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. The obstruction to his plans explains much of Hamilton's 

I 7QK_i '7Q7 

^T 38-40 ^'^tiP'^^thy to Democracy, but under what other form of 
government a man gifted and circumstanced like himself 
might have been sure of faring better he would probably 
have been puzzled to explain. Certainly not under a 
despotism, or a limited monarchy, or under such a republic 
as he had desired to set up. But finding difficulties 
in his way at every fresh effort to improve the prosperity 
of his country, he laid the charge of placing them there 
at the door of a malicious Democracy, without consider- 
ing that all men at all times, and under every variety 
of political institution, have fared as he did, and few 
of them so fortunately, We feel with him in his chagrin, 
but we quarrel with his indictment. The far-sighted, swift- 
thinking reformer, the builder of states and maker of 
constitutions, may as well lay his account at starting with 
much mortification. That the people, the force without 
which all his efforts must fall to the ground, will not 
understand and cannot keep pace ; that on many occasions 
they prefer the catch-penny tags of his ill-wishers to his 
own well-reasoned advocacy ; that base words often soothe 
their vanity or allure their selfishness, while truth boldly 
spoken grates upon their ears and fills their hearts with 
resentment, — all these things are no good reason for a 
profound distrust. 

During the whole of this period Hamilton was over- 
wrought, worked almost to death, and assailed with the 
most malignant calumnies. His courage never flagged. 
His wisdom in great things remained as clear as ever. 
But he saw everything black; not only his enemies, but 
even the people and the future of the nation. It is to 
his credit that he should have kept the outward form of 
his faith as firmly as he did. With few exceptions, his 
public documents give no evidence of distrust. Their 



1795-1797 
^T. 38-40 



THE POLITICIANS 379 

appeal is founded always upon reason and directed by A.D 
high motives. Cynicism is entirely absent. But although 
we admire the fortitude of his conduct, we are conscious 
of the presence in him of a spirit that would have made 
future victory impossible. 

Making every allowance for the circumstances, we must 
judge him to have been of too impatient a temper ever to 
have held the position of a great party leader in a democracy 
settled to its round of humdrum business. His true place, 
and the place which he so gloriously filled, was at the begin- 
ning. His fit task, his joy and his triumph, were in dragging 
order out of chaos, while ordinary men stood about him 
dazed and confounded by the hugeness of an unexampled 
crisis. He lacked astuteness and natural cunning. He lacked 
also sympathy and tact. He treated men severely upon 
their merits, which is fatal, and failed conspicuously when he 
attempted to secure the adhesion of important mediocrities, 
who are at all times vain and usually self-interested. When 
a compliment would have served his purpose admirably, he 
gave a reason and left his audience cold. He failed in 
the management of the rank and file of his party, and he 
failed no less with popular opinion. He never allowed it to 
have its head; never waited till a favourable opportunity 
offered for guiding it as he wished it to go. In smaU things, 
as in great ones, if the people were in his judgment wrong, 
he fought against them. He could not, like Jefferson, stand 
aside until the storm had passed. This is magnificent but 
it is not the art of governing a Democracy. He was, in fact, 
a great statesman, but a poor politician under the con- 
ditions that had been imposed. In spite of all his defects 
he had qualities which, under the British system of parlia- 
mentary government, would probably have altered the face of 
affairs. But under the system of Cabinet responsibility which 
had been adopted in the United States, what he lacked was 



380 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. fatal and what he possessed was of little value when once 



1792-1797 
Mr. 35-40 



the first great struggle was concluded. 



CHAPTER II 

James Monroe 

Shortly before Christmas 1792 an incident occurred of 
which at the time only a vague rumour was bruited in 
political circles. Had all the five gentlemen concerned in it 
kept to their words, given as gentlemen (as four of them did), 
it is improbable the world would ever have known Hamilton 
in the full strength of his character. To the chief actor it 
was in all likelihood the severest trial of his life. It was 
squalid, sensational and undignified. The private life of the 
Secretary of the Treasury was thrown open, like the house 
of some notorious bankrupt, when the bills are up and the 
auctioneer rattles his hammer, to a crowd of vulgar gazers 
and curious gossips. It is clear that to Hamilton the mere 
fact that the world was to be admitted to an inspection of 
his personal affairs was odious and repugnant. The intru- 
sion was what chiefly mattered. That men busied them- 
selves in pronouncing moral verdicts, condemning vice and 
jeering at the predicament of the sinner, was doubtless an 
odious aggravation, but it was subordinate. Had the crowd 
pushed their way in to admire his private virtues and gloat 
over the spectacle of his domestic affections, it would have 
been almost as intolerable. For he had never traded, like 
other statesmen then and since, upon his private virtues. 
The Scots character at its best, both gentle and simple, 
abhors such invasions with an intensity that has its equal 
perhaps only among the Jews. He was a servant of the 
nation, and as regarded the performance of his public duties 
any charges, the most malevolent, the most trivial, or the 



THE POLITICIANS 381 

most absurd, he was bound to answer patiently and at A.D. 
length. It was a part of his duty. To have alleged his ^^^gg^.^J 
personal honour as a reason for not answering a political 
opponent would have struck him as admitting the world to 
a familiarity which his pride forbade. The world had no 
right to concern itself with him save as a steward ; and for 
every detail of his stewardship he was at all times fully 
prepared to answer. 

But this plan, whereby a man endeavours to keep his two 
lives apart — his private life in one watertight compartment, 
his public in another — has always been difficult in demo- 
cracies, even in the earliest democracies of whion we have 
records. It requires a vigilance, a correctness of behaviour, 
a perpetual concern and circumspection even about trifles — 
good as well as bad, wise as well as foolish — that is seldom 
found in conjunction with the exuberant temperament of 
genius. Moreover, it was easier to escape the personalities 
of Aristophanes, the penetrating curiosity of Athenian 
scandalmongers, than the rectitudinous inquisition that is 
enjoyed under the freedom of the press. In private life 
Hamilton was not always vigilant, not seldom incorrect, and 
with regard to precautions against assassins, of life or char- 
acter, he viewed them impatiently, as Csesar did, considering 
that immunity was not worth the purchase at such a price. 

Accordingly he did not, any more than Caesar, secure 
immunity; and the price he had afterwards to give for 
redemption would have staggered a poorer spirit into 
bankruptcy. For not only had he to pay dearly in derision, 
in offence to his pride, in the loss of the good opinion of 
many good men; but also in the distress and humiliation 
of a wife whom, in spite of his errant disposition, he loved 
and cared for, as more respectable characters occasionally 
do not, from the beginning of their courtship to the end of 
his days. 



882 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. In the summer of 1791 Hamilton had drifted into an 

92-1797 
/Et. 35-40 



1792 1797 imJ.ig^e Tiyitii a woman of the name of Reynolds, who pro- 



fessed to him that she had been deserted by her husband. 
The husband in due course, being a sort of stage husband, 
appeared upon the scene. At first he attempted the bully ; 
afterwards became lachrymose and pathetic; talked of 
his ruined happiness and home. Finally, on receipt of a 
thousand dollars, paid in two instalments, he was consoled ; 
and throughout the remainder of the first act played the 
part of a zealous and cheerful pandar. Letters passed 
between the three persons concerned, which Hamilton 
(vigilant in this particular) filed and docketed. The neces- 
sities of Reynolds, induced, as it is hardly necessary to state, 
by undeserved misfortunes, recurred at short intervals, and 
Hamilton parted with a considerable sum, in small amounts, 
in exchange for formal receipts. 

The second act began towards the end of 1792, when 
Hamilton's own department, the Treasury, in the ordinary 
routine of its public duty, and apparently without the 
cognisance of its chief, proceeded to the prosecution and 
conviction of Reynolds and a confederate called Clingman, 
for subornation of perjury in a case of fraud. Political 
influence was brought to bear on behalf of the felons ; but 
Hamilton refused to interfere, and they were ultimately 
released, upon terms which the officials of the Treasury, 
in whose jurisdiction the matter lay, considered to be regular 
and advantageous to the public service. When they came 
out of prison Clingman communicated with Muhlenberg, 
the Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
informing him that his friend and fellow-prisoner, Reynolds, 
possessed documents that would ' hang the Secretary to the 
Treasury ' ; that Hamilton had frequently supplied him 
(Reynolds) with money for the purpose of speculating in the 
funds on their joint behalf, their operations being based 



THE POLITICIANS 383 

upon Hamilton's internal knowledge. Muhlenberg hastened a.D. 

to share these iovful tidings with two members of his party 1792-1797 
J J ^ i" J ^T. 35-40 

— with Venables and Monroe, afterwards famous as the 

godfather, if not actually as the maker, of the 'doctrine.' 
These three highly respectable politicians proceeded to hold 
interviews with the two gaol-birds and Mrs. Reynolds, who 
now came upon the stage in her true colours. The game 
of blackmail was up. There might be advantages, pecuni- 
ary and otherwise, in a new policy : at any rate there were 
the pleasures of revenge. 

The three worthy congressmen eagerly studied the docu- 
ments offered for their inspection, and being carried away 
by excitement, did not stop to ponder over the improba- 
bilities. That a minister of finance, accustomed to think in 
millions, should have doled out, never more than five 
hundred, usually only thirty or forty dollars at a time, 
to accomplish his crooked ends, roused no suspicions. They 
gravely considered the propriety of going hot-foot to Presi- 
dent Washington with their mare's nest; but by good 
fortune for themselves and ill fortune for Hamilton, they 
prudently decided to ask, in the first place, for an explana- 
tion of the damning evidence. 

The first scene of act the third was laid at Hamilton's 
ofl&ce in the Treasury, where the three gentlemen were 
begged to be seated, and proceeded to open the matter of 
their visit. The event may be described in Hamilton's own 
words. "Muhlenberg introduced the subject by observing 

* to me that they had discovered a very improper connection 
' between me and a Mr. Reynolds ; extremely hurt by this 
' mode of introduction, I arrested the progress of the discourse 
' by giving way to very strong expressions of indignation. 
' The gentlemen explained, telling me in substance that I had 

* misapprehended them ; that they did not take the fact for 
' established ; that their meaning was to apprise me that, 



384 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. ' unsought by them, information had been given them of an 

^^^'oJVo ' improper pecuniary connection between Mr. Reynolds and 

' myself; that they had thought it their duty to pursue it, 

' and had become possessed of some documents of a sus- 

* picious complexion ; that they had contemplated laying the 
' matter before the President, but before they did this they 

* thought it right to apprise me of the affair, and to afford an 

* opportunity of explanation ; declaring at the same time that 
' their agency in the matter was influenced solely by a sense 

* of public duty and by no motive of personal ill-will. If my 

* memory be correct, the notes from me in a disguised hand 

* (i.e. to Reynolds) were now shown to me, and without a 
' moment's hesitation I acknowledged to be mine. 

'I replied that the affair was now put upon a different 
' footing — that I had always stood ready to meet fair inquiry 
' with frank communication — that it happened, in the present 
' instance, to be in my power by written documents to remove 

* all doubts as to the real nature of the business, and fully to 
' convince that nothing of the kind imputed to me did in fact 
' exist. The same evening at my house was by mutual 
' consent appointed for an explanation." ^ 

Hamilton engaged his friend Wolcott to be present at this 
interview. The letters and other documents were taken 
from their pigeonhole, and the reading of them commenced. 
" One or more of the gentlemen {i.e. Venables and Muhlenberg) 

* were struck with so much conviction, before I had gotten 
' through the communication, that they delicately urged me 
' to discontinue it as unnecessary. I insisted upon going 

* through the whole, and did so. The result was a full and 

* unequivocal acknowledgment on the part of the three 
' gentlemen of perfect satisfaction with the explanation, and 

* expressions of regret at the trouble and embarrassment 
' which had been occasioned to me. Mr. Muhlenberg and 

» Works, vii. pp. 398, 399. 



THE POLITICIANS 385 

* Mr. Venables, in particular, manifested a degree of sensibility A.D. 

* on the occasion. Mr. Monroe was more cold, but entirely 1792-1797 

•^ Mt. 35-40 

* explicit." ^ 

Following upon this, memoranda were made, letters were 
exchanged, documents were copied. No shred of doubt was 
permitted to remain by any of the persons concerned that 
Hamilton's statements were fully accepted by them, and 
entirely proved by the evidence which he had submitted to 
their examination. It was further agreed that all notes, copies 
and originals, should be retained by the gentlemen them- 
selves, and not allowed to come into the possession of the 
blackmailing trio, or of any others who might misuse them. 
The undertaking was carefully observed by all except 
Monroe. 

After the interview at Hamilton's house, Monroe "had 
' another interview with Clingman, who declared Hamilton's 

* explanation to be a fabrication, originally made up between 
' Hamilton and Reynolds to cover their real transactions ; 
' and all this rascally stuff Monroe embodied in still another 
' memorandum," ^ which, however, he does not appear to 
have communicated to either of his colleagues; certainly 
not to either Hamilton or Wolcott. He then consigned all 
the papers to ' a respectable character in Virginia,' in whose 
custody (if indeed he were anything but a pigeon-hole in 
Monroe's desk) they remained — until they were wanted. 

The fourth act took place after an interval of more than 
four years. The mine was laid in 1792 ; it was not 
exploded till 1797. Hamilton had left office, but was still 
the leader of the Federalist party. Monroe had been 
minister in Paris, and had conducted himself with so 
great a fatuity, that Washington was forced to recall him. 
He was an object of derision and attack to the Federalists. 
Hamilton's influence with the President and the public 

^ PTor^s, vii. pp. 399, 400. ^ Trori's (Senator Lodge's footnote), vii. p. 370. 

2 B 



386 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. had been used with his accustomed energy and frankness 
)2-1797 
^T. 35-40 



to bring about the recall of the scatter-brained diplo 



matist. The time therefore for firing the mine was clearly 
indicated by the finger of destiny. Monroe did not hesitate. 
' The respectable character in Virginia ' handed over the 
documents to one Callender, the editor of an annual publi- 
cation avowedly in the interest of the Democratic party, 
called the History of the United States. In the volume 
published early in 1797, which covered the events of the 
previous year, the charge of corruption was revived against 
Hamilton, and was based upon the subsequent memorandum 
of Monroe. There was a little bunghng. The editor did 
not profess to be 'influenced solely by a sense of public 
duty,' but naively pleaded the further justification that the 
Federalist party were assailing the reputation of the good 
and valuable man Monroe. 

The choice of the instrument of defamation is worthy 
of notice. Callender was a drunken and profligate rascal. 
His slanders against Washington were as copious and 
malignant as those against Hamilton himself Neverthe- 
less he was in the counsels and confidence of the Democratic 
party ; for the excellent reason that he did them vigorous 
service in bespattering their enemies with mud. He enjoyed 
the special protection of Jefferson, who befriended him in 
various ways and was not backward to aid him with money. 
This, it may be heartily admitted, he had fairly earned. 
When he was prosecuted for sedition in May 1800, we find 
Monroe still his upholder, denouncing the prosecution, and 
suggesting that the executive should employ counsel to 
defend him. But in June 1801, and for ever afterwards, he 
is a ' serpent,' and deserving of a serpent's doom. The ex- 
planation of this change in sentiment was that Callender, 
an artist in calumny, had in the meantime turned his 
attention to the private life of his former patron Jefferson, 



THE POLITICIANS 387 

where he had discovered materials for the exercise of his A.D. 

talents 1792-1797 

^^^^^^^- ^T. 35-40 

The fifth act was short, and sharp, and full of dramatic 

movement. Hamilton wrote at once to the three gentle- 
men — his opponents — asking them for an explanation. 
Muhlenberg and Yenables replied, clearly and definitely: 
first, that they never had had copies of the documents 
in their possession, and consequently had no responsibility 
for the publication, which they regretted and deplored as a 
breach of an honourable understanding ; secondly, that they 
had always adhered to the opinion expressed by them at the 
conclusion of the interview in December 1792, viz. — " that 
' they were perfectly satisfied with the explanation Hamilton 
' had then given, and that there was nothing in the transac- 
' tion which ought to affect his character as a public officer, 
' or lessen the public confidence in his integrity." ^ 

In a joint letter written with Muhlenberg, Monroe thinks 
" proper to observe that ... we had no agency in, or know- 
' ledge of, the publication of these papers, till they ap- 
' peared " ^ in Callender's volume — a statement which places 
too great a strain upon human credulity. That Monroe 
alone had the documents which Callender made use of; 
that Monroe alleged that he had entrusted them 'to a 
respectable character in Virginia,' whom he did not pro- 
duce; and that they turned up precisely when they were 
wanted in order to blacken the character of a man who 
was leading an attack on Monroe — all these things were 
sufficiently clear, and the world has never hesitated to draw 
the obvious conclusion. 

Monroe, whose writings are ever tuned to a bleating note, 
now entered into a separate correspondence with Hamilton. 
So far from taking the open line of his colleagues with 
regard to the original interview, he ambiguously hints 

1 Works, vii. pp. 400, 450. ^ j^^i^ yH p. 455. 



388 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. that he has always entertained suspicions, and impudently 
1792-1797 oroes on to state that he will preserve an open mind upon 

Mt. 35-40 * i r r 

Hamilton's guilt or innocence of the corruption alleged, 
until Hamilton has laid his explanation before the public, 
"Whether the imputations against you as to speculation 
* are well or ill founded," he proceeds sanctimoniously, 
"depends upon the facts and circumstances which appear 
' against you upon your defence." ^ 

It was always dangerous to provoke Hamilton to make a 
defence, for, as we have seen, he had the gift of the counter- 
stroke. He continued to conduct the correspondence for a 
few weeks longer ; accused Monroe of being ' actuated by 
motives towards me malignant and dishonourable';^ and 
informed him that he intended to publish the whole of the 
documents, along with the present correspondence and a 
full explanation. Monroe shuffled and blustered. If Hamil- 
ton wished to fight, he was ready to oblige him. Hamilton 
replied courteously that he had no intention of challenging 
Monroe, but if that gentleman should feel himself aggrieved 
by the publication of documents in which he was to be 
pilloried as ' malignant and dishonourable,' Hamilton would 
be delighted to name his friend. But Monroe explained 
that he had no such intention. 

This is the story. The accusation in Callender's publica- 
tion was corruption. It was alleged that Hamilton had 
entered into a conspiracy with Reynolds to speculate upon 
his knowledge of the government's intentions. The public 
was ignorant of all the rest. 

Three courses were open : to ignore the charge ; to deny 
it ; or to tell the whole story. The first was tantamount to 
an admission. The second could never have ended the 
matter. The third needed a steadiness of nerve that Monroe 
and his partner might be excused for believing to be beyond 

1 Works, vii. p. 466. ^ /jj^j. y^^ p. 473. 



THE POLITICIANS 389 

the reacli of human nature. It is clear they calculated upon A.D.^ 
the second, and relied upon an elaborate and protracted duel ^^^35.40 
of rejoinders and surrejoinders, rebutters and surrebutters, in 
which they would have enjoyed an infinite advantage, seeing 
that Hamilton would all the time have been fighting with 
one hand tied behind his back. He would never, so they 
may have argued, be man enough, or fool enough, to admit 
his connection with Mrs. Reynolds, and to publish the 
squalid documents that alone could clear his reputation. 
One cannot find fault with their conclusion, which was pro- 
bably based upon a careful self-analysis. But what might 
have been the rule for Monroe and Callender was not the 
rule for Hamilton. 

Hamilton elected to tell the whole story ; to publish every 
document in his possession, and to expound the situation, 
the motives of the parties, and the dangers to the com- 
munity and to public life arising out of such methods, in 
that vehement and copious manner which he was famed for 
pursuing at the bar. He 'exhausted ' the case. When he had 
made an end, there was nothing more to be said. The state- 
ment is without a reservation, and yet it is never familiar. 
He shirks nothing, nor seeks for any shelter against the 
opinion of the world. His sole aim is to set his honesty in 
discharge of his public duty beyond attack. A single 
departure from the strictest rule of simplicity, a single dis- 
ingenuous excuse or sentimental quaver, would have made 
the statement odious. Temptations to an eternal loss of 
dignity lay on every side, but he had only one concern: to 
clear his honour. No one has yet been found bold enough 
to challenge the completeness of the vindication.^ 

^ On the whole matter we are content with the terse verdict of Senator 
Lodge: "The character which suffers most in the business is that of 
' Monroe. On him rests a dark stain of dishonour, of slippery evasion and 
' of mean revenge, which has never been wiped out, and which apparently 
' can never be lightened or diminished." — Works (Senator Lodge's footnote), 
vii. p. 371. 



390 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

CHAPTER III 

John Adams 

A.D. The result of the election of 1796 was to make John Adams 

1797-1800 President of the United States. The FederaHsts thereby 
^T. 40-43 ^ . ■, ^ IT 

scored a success m the first party contest, but the narrow 

majority of three votes by which Jefferson, the Democratic 

candidate, was defeated made it apparent that his partisans 

were gaining ground. 

John Adams has been described by Franklin as " always 
' an honest man, often a wise one, but sometimes and in some 
' things absolutely out of his senses." ^ Anger was usually 
the cause of his madness, and while the fit lasted his activity 
was only equalled by his bhndness. Some characters, having 
been associated with great events, have a way of passing, by 
mere longevity, from the second rank, to which by nature 
they belong, into the first rank in the estimation of their 
fellow-citizens. They become popular institutions. The 
dramatic virtue of a date has done much to embalm 
Adams's memory and exalt his reputation. He died on 
the 4th of July 1826 — the anniversary of the Declaration 
of Independence — and, by an amazing coincidence, on the 
same day a few hours before him died Thomas Jefferson — 
both at a great age. 

Adams had a pleasant face — plump, self-satisfied, and 
honourable. In his sayings and writings there is a humor- 
ous, sardonic, pompous quality ; a dogmatism that suggests 
a man posing as stupider and more prejudiced than it was 
actually his nature to be. In the many quarrels and con- 
tests of his long life he showed always a very great pug- 
nacity, a very bad judgment and a very hot temper. He 

1 History, ii. p. 486. 



THE POLITICIANS 891 

was a strong personal force in tlie Revolution ; but when he A.D. 
had the chance of showing himself a statesman he came to \I^'^~!f ^2 

o ... ■^'^' 40-43 

disaster. Judged merely as a politician he was even worse 
than Hamilton himself 

As it takes two people to make a quarrel, so it takes two 
conflicting personalities to smash a party. Hamilton with- 
out Adams, or Adams without Hamilton, would in all likeli- 
hood have kept the Federalists together in a formidable 
minority. But Hamilton's contempt was excessive, and the 
jealousy of Adams was grotesque. A party is required by 
nature to be united. Disunited, it is a kind of disease in the 
body politic, good for nobody and nothing, not even for its 
opponents. A party with a single leader, even if he is a 
bad one, will do more good not only for itself but in the 
world, than one fighting under the standards of two leaders 
who cannot co-operate. The disastrous administration of 
Adams split the Federalists in two, and the party which had 
made the constitution and had set it to work passed gradu- 
ally and ignominiously to meaner and meaner things, and 
finally out of existence. 

John Adams's grievance against Hamilton was mainly a 
personal one. He had no quarrel with his politics, but he 
suspected him of an overweening ambition. He resented the 
deference paid to him by his own supporters and even by his 
own government, and he hated the superiority of his mind. 
At the first election of a President it was the desire of all 
men that Washington should be called to fill the post ; but 
according to the clumsy system of choice the candidate who 
received the second largest number of votes cast for the 
Presidency became Vice-President. Two candidates, there- 
fore, had to be nominated, and as it was necessary to secure 
Washington's election it was agreed, on Hamilton's sugges- 
tion, that while all voters should give their first vote to 
Washington, a certain number should throw away their 



392 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. second vote lest by an accident Adams might have been 

Z ".i^?o elected. It was a perfectly leo^itimate device in view of the 
iET. 40-43 r ; n 

inconvenience of the system, but Adams took it very much 
amiss. 

When it came to Adams himself being a candidate for the 
Presidency, Hamilton omitted to take the same precautions, 
and Adams's wrath was even greater. Our sympathies are 
with Adams, although logic is against him. If the device 
was unwarrantable to elect General Washington, it was 
equally so in his own case. But Hamilton's position was 
both unfair and unwise. For Adams was the party candi- 
date, and the duty of a party is to support its candidate with 
loyalty. Hamilton said frankly that he would have pre- 
ferred it had Thomas Pinckney, the second Federalist 
nominee (intended for the Vice-Presidency), secured the 
first position. To leave things in such a position of un- 
certainty was to reduce party organisation to an absurdity. 
It would hardly have been more unreasonable if, on the eve 
of battle, one of the armies was undecided which of two 
generals it would follow, and left the point to be settled by 
the issue of the contest.^ 

The result of this half-hearted co-operation was what 
might have been expected. Federalists who favoured Adams 
threw away their votes for Pinckney, admirers of Pinckney 
threw away their votes for Adams. Adams was elected by 
the narrow majority of three, while Pinckney was defeated 
by nine votes by Jefferson. It is an undignified episode, and 
shows very plainly that Hamilton had failed to grasp the 
rudimentary conditions of government by parties. Indeed, 
it is clear he hated parties as much as he loved ideas ; and 
the fact that he believed a Republic which rested upon 
popular suffrage could be conducted on any other system is 

1 Much, however, may be said for Hamilton's course of action, v. Morse's 
Hamilton, ii. pp. 224-27. 



THE POLITICIANS 393 

proof that he did not fully realise the nature of the institu- A.D. 
tions he had been the means of creatine. 1797-1800 

° ^T. 40-43 

A few months later a fresh disagreement arose between 
the crowned and the uncrowned leaders, and on this occasion 
the blame lies wholly at the door of the President. The 
affections and hatreds between nations stand, as Washington 
had warned his countrymen, upon no basis except pure 
fantasy. An ounce of real interest, a foolish insult, a single 
blundering act, is sufficient to banish the whole cloud- 
cuckoo-town of the sentimentalist like mist before a 
morning breeze. The same citizens who had with so great 
difficulty been preserved from a war with Britain as the 
allies of France in 1793, were with equal fervour clamouring 
in 1798 for a war with France as the allies of Britain. The 
Republic of the West had been affronted in the persons of 
their envoys, whom the Republic of the Seine had treated 
with contumely. 

The nation made ready for war. General Washington 
was called out of his retirement to become commander-in- 
chief. He made his own conditions : the first that he should 
not give his services until the army took the field; the 
second that Hamilton, Charles Pinckney and Knox should 
be immediately appointed as his generals. The order of 
nomination marked the respective rank. He made it clear 
that he meant to place upon Hamilton's shoulders the 
burden of chief command, and all the responsibilities of 
organisation, until hostilities had actually commenced. 
Adams assented; but when the commissions were made 
out and signed it was found that Knox had been placed 
before Hamilton. Washington protested and tendered his 
resignation. Before this awful threat even Adams in the 
mad-bull fit was reduced to submission. Hamilton's 
appointment was ungraciously confirmed after a public 
exhibition of ill-feeling that destroyed all hope of future 



394 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. concord between the leaders of the Federalist party. The 

'97-1800 
^T. 40-43 



1 7Q7— 1 ^f\0 

attempt to exclude Hamilton from the command of the 



army had earned the reprobation not only of Washington 
and all the leading Federalists, but also of the great majority 
of the party. It was the first of a series of great blunders 
which Adams committed during his term of office under 
the influence of uncontrollable rage. While it began the 
fatal split among his own supporters, it also shook the 
confidence of the country in his judgment. For, strange 
as it may appear, enemies as well as friends, Democrats as 
well as Federalists, desired that Hamilton should be ap- 
pointed. In a national emergency safety was the supreme 
object, and it was felt upon all sides that the chief power 
should be in the hands of the man who had given the 
clearest proofs of executive ability. 

Hamilton desired peace for his country. War with any 
nation was to be avoided if possible ; but he was not blind 
to certain advantages of a war with France, which might 
compensate in some measure for the evils and disturbance. 
No war with France could take place except at sea, and 
the British navy kept the ships of the Directory too well 
employed to give them much leisure for remote activity. 
On the other hand, Spain was the ally of France, so that 
war with one meant war with both. The Spaniards held 
Louisiana and the Floridas, and possessed inconvenient 
conflicting rights with regard to the navigation of the 
Mississippi. The object, therefore, of any war would neces- 
sarily be the acquisition of these territories and the settle- 
ment of these disputes for ever. The United States, given 
that war was inevitable, had much to gain by it and hardly 
anything to lose, providing they acted promptly and with a 
clear aim. 

It is probable that Hamilton also saw other advantages in 
a war, advantages in the matter of internal order and the 



THE POLITICIANS 395 

strengthening of the executive. But the idea that he A.D. 
desired it either from his hatred of France, or because he ^I,^^~!f ^2 

Mt. 40-43 

had ambitions of a Napoleonic career, is not to be entertained 
seriously. As to the first, not even Bismarck himself was 
less influenced by his personal antipathies in questions of 
foreign policy. As to the second, his whole history is a 
contradiction of it. No man whose object is personal glory 
will sacrifice his popularity to his opinions, and this was 
Hamilton's constant habit. At no great crisis of his life do 
we ever find him engaged in considering whether a certain 
course of action will or will not conduce to his personal 
aggrandisement. He belonged to the class of men with 
whom the accomplishment of their objects is the most 
powerful motive. In the pursuit of renown he hardly rose 
above the average of public characters, but his desire for 
achievement was a passion. 

In the end there was no war. It was possible to avoid it 
with dignity. Adams chose to give dignity away with the 
bargain. It is beyond doubt that he caught at peace 
in order to prevent Hamilton from obtaining credit. 
His action was too inconsistent and precipitate to be ex- 
plained on any other hypothesis. As at the beginning he 
had disregarded the calmer counsels of his cabinet in the 
heat of his indignation against France, so in the end he 
ignored them in scrambling helter-skelter for peace at any 
price. This was the second of the series of great blunders by 
which the ruin of the Federalist party was accomplished. 

Hamilton's discharge of military duties during this period 
of doubtful negotiations was marked by his usual inability 
to turn out flimsy work. His measures of organisation were 
effective for their immediate purpose, and possessed in 
addition the same quality of permanence that is the dis- 
tinction of his political achievements — the quality of the 
Roman road-makers who laid for the purposes of a single 



396 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1800 march a causeway that centuries could not destroy. Wher- 
^T. 43 g^gj, Hamilton had been at work his successors found their 
task reduced, a body of coherent principles, a consistent 
plan that was capable of service long after the object for 
which it had been undertaken had been attained or 
forgotten. 



CHAPTER IV 

The Victory of Jefferson 

It is not wonderful that a party rent by such internal dis- 
agreements was in a poor position to face a contest with its 
opponents. The attempt to exclude Hamilton from command 
of the army, and the disgraceful conduct of the negotiations 
with France, were followed shortly afterwards by a third 
blunder. Adams, seeing everything red, and unable to tolerate 
the respect entertained for Washington and Hamilton by 
M'Henry, Pickering, and Wolcott, dismissed these gentle- 
men from his Cabinet on the very eve of the Presidential 
election. Apart from schism, however, the Federalists had 
lost heavily in public esteem. The blunders of Adams were 
of a large variety and wide extent. His administration 
carried things with a very high hand against their opponents. 
Their Sedition and Alien Acts, passed by a Congress heated 
by hostility to France beyond the temperature at which wise 
legislation is likely to be distilled, gave to Jefferson, quietly 
waiting and watching, the opportunity he needed. 

These measures were oppressive, panic-stricken and unwise. 
They were contrary to the spirit of reasonable liberty, and 
not beyond suspicion of infringing the constitution. Jefferson 
seized upon the advantage with his instinctive sagacity. 
The ears of men were yearning for the old tunes, and he 
gave them loud and brazen in his best manner : State Rights 



THE POLITICIANS 397 

and the Riglits of Man; liberty, equality, and the rest of the A.D. isoo 
phrases, formulas, maxims and war-cries of the golden age ^^ 

of paper constitutions and philosophic revolutions. He 
blundered, say critics zealous for his reputation, with pos- 
terity. He went far beyond the mark, alienating and 
distressing good men who would otherwise have ranged 
themselves on his side. His object was to create an atmo- 
sphere favourable to his candidature, and it cannot be 
denied that he succeeded. His methods excite more ad- 
miration for his skill than respect for his frankness. With 
characteristic cowardice he concealed his authorship of the 
most incendiary of his electioneering addresses. The Ken- 
tucky Resolutions ^ were transmitted to the legislators who 
brought them forward upon the solemn assurance that his 
name should not be disclosed. The kernel of this violent 
document was a proposition which, if approved, would have 
been fatal to the Union. Each state, he announced, had an 
equal and inalienable right to judge for itself whether or 
not any act of the central government constituted an infrac- 
tion of the constitution. If a state arrived at the conclusion 
that the constitution had been infringed, nullification of the 
Act of Union was the proper remedy. Even for the persons 
to whom this draft was forwarded its purport appeared too 
formidable, and it was found necessary to water down 
certain expressions. The Kentucky Resolutions, according 
to one admiring biographer, were a wicked act of passion 
amounting to a precedent and authority for the War of 
Secession.^ But to judge in this fashion is to miss the 
real point of the matter. To the true Jefferson, the great 
planner of electoral victories, the skilful manceuvrer, the 
brilliant foreseer of popular opinion for twelve months 
ahead, what did it matter if a few wise and good men 
were alienated ? What did he know or care about Wars of 

1 Ford's Jefferson, vii. pp. 289-309. 2 Morse's Jefferson, p. 194. 



398 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1800 Secession ? Jefferson at his greatest is entirely imconcerned 
*^ with posterity and its opinion of him. The art in which he 
excelled was not the art of governing, but the art of sitting 
in the highest place of popular favour. As an artist he was 
inspired when he drew the Kentiichy Resolutions. Their 
wild extravagance gave to the extremists of his party pre- 
cisely what they wanted. The opportunity was one for a 
noisy orchestra. A subdued melody would have missed the 
mood, and, while it might possibly have earned the respect 
of future generations, would have awakened but little 
enthusiasm at the time, The man who chooses the right 
means to an end will always compel a certain degree of 
admiration. The aim of Jefferson was to be President of the 
United States at the election following, and the plan of his 
campaign was admirably calculated to serve this purpose. 

The election which fell at the end of 1800 was con- 
tested more keenly and upon clearer lines than its pre- 
decessor. Party organisation had advanced by great strides 
during the four years of John Adams's presidency. The 
campaign began in early spring, with the election of the 
state legislatures in whose hands lay the choice of the 
presidential electors. Pennsylvania was the first great 
Federalist defeat. Short of miracles, the result would be 
decided by the voting in New York state, where Hamilton, 
conscious of the great issues, was leading his party against 
a powerful Democratic combination. His defeat was the 
work of Aaron Burr. 

Burr was a consummate party organiser in a constituency 
compact and small enough to be brought into actual touch 
with his remarkable personality. By a truly marvellous 
exercise of tact he laid for the few necessary months the 
jealousies and discords of the Clinton and the Livingston 
groups, and united them in firm co-operation with his own. 
He devised a new weapon in party Avarfare, an elaborate 



THE POLITICIANS 399 

organisation of ward committees and canvassers, placing his A.D. 1800 
trust in machinery rather than in ideals. New conditions ^'^' ^^ 
make new tactics. The leader whose pride disdains to adapt 
the old drill-book to the facts before him is usually out- 
manoeuvred. Hamilton followed the plan which had so well 
served him in the past, — reason and argument, pamphlets 
and speeches, vigorous, convincing, dignified, and in the 
grand manner. Burr in his unconspicuous fashion worked 
quietly at his lists, interviewed multitudes of unimportant 
men, pleasing every one by his tactful compliments, his 
ready counsel, his unassuming courtesy and good manners. 
He was not fighting for any cause, but merely for victory. 
Opinions and convictions were never allowed to embarrass 
the contest or endanger its result. A negative was much 
safer. The overthrow of those evil-minded Federalists, 
hankering after monarchy, distrusting the people, tampering 
with the constitution, filling the air with their noisy dis- 
cords, was a stronger ' ticket ' than any positive propaganda. 
Burr's party was but newly healed of its wounds, and an 
outbreak of disunion was a constant menace. He viewed 
these conditions calmly as a wirepuller, without prejudice 
and without enthusiasm, and judged the highest wisdom to 
lie in keeping the minds of his supporters fixed upon the 
iniquity of their opponents, and not allowing them to stray 
into premature speculations upon the various uses to which 
a Democratic victory might be turned. 

The unfortunate Burr stands in American history like 
some figure of straw, at whose riddled reputation every 
aspirant for a virtuous renown lets off his pistol. He is a sort 
of universal cockshy for all good men ; a kind of scapegoat 
for democratic institutions. Doubtless he was a rascal who 
deserved all he got ; but he is less distinguished from other 
politicians by the pre-eminence of his rascality than by the 
attainment of his deserts. He was certainly a wirepuller, a 



400 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1800 successful practitioner of petty intrigue (if it be desired to 
^' call things by unpleasant names) ; but in our flight of indig- 
nation it may profitably be remembered that the methods of 
working an election which he employed, and which to a 
large extent he discovered, have been adopted by every 
country to which we allow the titles of free and enlightened. 
The fact is, obloquy has attached itself so tightly to 
the name of Burr, that it is customary to abuse him for 
everything he did during his long and variegated life. 
Among other things for which he has been attacked are the 
methods he employed during the New York election, and 
people who employ no other methods at the present time, 
in New York and elsewhere, shake their heads over him 
and call him knave. The sin would appear to lie in 
his originality, and the plagiarists may escape censure. 
His methods were hated and denounced by the defeated 
Federalists mainly because they were new, clever and suc- 
cessful. They were pronounced unworthy ; but seeing that 
they fitted the wants of the situation, and have continued 
to fit them from that day to this, the charge can only be 
supported upon the admission that Democracy itself is 
unworthy. 

The sum of his offence in this particular is that he 
applied a sound, businesslike organisation to the problem 
of a popular election. In principle, when closely examined, 
we cannot see that it is open to any grave moral objection. 
Only in some visionary republic will the citizens ever vote 
in full force without much management. Ideals alone will 
serve the purpose only on occasions of exceptional exalta- 
tion. As for his practice, there is probably much in it that 
may be reprehended ; much dirt and mire, bribery and pro- 
mises, sordid expectations and mean appeals to low motives, 
with drams and libations and other like influences which do 
not enter into our theory of a perfect State. But allowing 



THE POLITICIANS 401 

so much, it is but reasonable to look at tlie fashion of the a.d. isoo 
times. In the general drab of morality Burr's historical ^^•'*^ 
campaign attracts no remark. It is not even a darker 
shadow. What is remarkable about the event is that he 
had discovered a machinery for working the Democracy, 
and that Hamilton had not. 

The Federalist candidates were defeated, and with their 
defeat a Democrat President became almost a certainty. 
To Hamilton such a result appeared equivalent to the 
destruction of all his labours ; the overthrow of the constitu- 
tion, repudiation of the debt, a French alliance, and the 
reign of the philosophers. He made the double error of 
believing the windy threats of his opponents, and of under- 
rating the strength of his own work. He had a tendency 
to exaggerate the dangers to be apprehended from men 
who spoke loud and vaguely. Jefferson was in reality too 
indefinite, and Burr too shrewd a thinker, to threaten very 
seriously any existing institution. An arrest of progress 
was the main thing to be dreaded, but to Hamilton's imagi- 
nation nothing less than revolution and civil war seemed 
imminent. The real ballast of his singular character was the 
confidence and exuberance of youth. Middle age instead of 
ripening his judgment warped it. 

Foreseeing an enormous disaster, and considering that 
any measure was justifiable to avoid it, he committed the 
error of petitioning the Governor to call together the old 
legislature and give the choice of presidential electors to 
districts.! By this means, instead of a solid Democratic 
vote there would be something less formidable — a division, 
at all events; possibly a neutrality. For this suggestion, 
had it been made before and not after the election, there 
was much to be said. On a former occasion it had even 
been advocated by Burr himself ; but in the particular cir- 

1 Works, X. pp. 371-74. 

20 



402 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1800 cumstances it was a blunder of the first order, and the 
^T. 43 proposal was rightly rejected by Governor Jay. 

After the New York election a great party leader would 
have seen clearly that the only chance of defeating the 
Democrats lay in closing up the ranks. Absolute solidarity 
was the first essential. Accidents and dissensions among 
the enemy, of which signs were not altogether wanting, 
might conceivably have prevented disaster. But Hamilton 
was not a great party leader, and in the particular circum- 
stances his distrust of Adams ran away with him. It has 
been assumed, entirely contrary to the facts, that Hamilton, 
like the President, was actuated by personal pique. The 
assumption is a natural one, for there was a long account 
unsettled between them. The last item was an act of stupid 
insolence that undoubtedly estopped the President from all 
legitimate complaint and absolved Hamilton of all personal 
allegiance.^ It is quite conceivable that Adams's course of 
fatuous jealousy may have warped Hamilton's judgment of 
his character ; but it is also clear that his action during the 
elections was not due to any desire to wipe out old scores. 
Indeed, it may be said truly that on no single occasion 
during his public career did Hamilton ever allow his political 
course to be influenced by a spirit of revenge. The sequel 
to this very election is one of the most conspicuous examples 
of his restraint. The issue was not a question between 
individuals; and in all the United States no man realised 
this fact more clearly than Hamilton himself. It is therefore 
difficult to explain why he should have prepared a document, 
written in his usual cogent and convincing style, the main 
purpose of which was to expound the errors of John Adams, 
and to lay the blame of the dissensions in the Federalist 
party at his door. His reasoning and his array of facts were 
irresistible ; but they entirely quarrelled with the conclusion 

^ Lodge's Hamilton, pp. 230-31. 



THE POLITICIANS 403 

of his address, in which he advised that the Federalist party A.D. 1800 
should unite in support of Adams's candidature in spite of ' 
everything that had gone before. His first intention appears 
to have been to publish this manifesto broadcast ; but under 
pressure he reduced the scope of his original design, and 
the mischievous pamphlet was converted into a confidential 
communication to the leaders of the party in the various 
districts of the Union, It is possible that even this folly 
might have yielded to cooler counsels; but unfortunately, 
if we may believe tradition, Burr happened to be walking 
early one morning in the streets of New York when he met 
the printer's boy carrying the proofs to Hamilton's house. 
Possessing himself of a copy he proceeded to make the 
contents of it public, so that the author's original intention 
was fulfilled. 

The indiscretion was much greater than its actual effect. 
The voting, in spite of the blow to the Federalist party, 
appears to have been solid. Jefferson and Burr received 
an equality ; between Adams and Pinckney there was only 
a difference of one. 

Then followed a long period of alarm and intrigue. 
The biographer ^ of Burr represents him as having played the 
part of a calm and angelic personage, willing to abide by 
the choice of the people. Biographers of Jefferson, on the 
other hand, represent Burr as a dangerous and devilish 
character, ambitious of obtaining the presidency ' by foul 
means,' and the author of ' a gross betrayal.' 

The venue was changed to the House of Representatives, 
which had to determine which of the two should be Presi- 
dent. The choice was therefore in the hands of the routed 
and distempered Federalists. They believed Burr to be a 
knave, courteous, amusing, clever, ambitious, and corrupt ; 
but Jefferson they believed to be a successful hypocrite. 

^ Parton. 



404 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1800 Things having gone all wrong in the party sense they had 
JEt. 43 grown reckless, and were inclined, like any demoralised 
and discomfited mob, to let off their pieces in a desperate 
fashion. It was rather a question with them which of the 
two candidates they hated least than which would do least 
harm to the United States. Being entirely beaten and 
without hope of carrying their own man, they came down to 
purely social considerations. They knew Burr to have been 
a distinguished soldier, a very brave man, cynical, brilliant, 
affectionate, good-humoured, good-mannered, dignified, and 
most faithful to his personal friends — all these things, but 
a knave notwithstanding. When the issue was reduced to 
a question of comradeship they were inclined upon private 
and personal grounds to prefer the knave to the hypocrite. 
Their inclination was certainly against the interest of the 
state, and it is probable that each Federalist was in his 
heart fully aware of this fact; but he also knew that his 
opponents of the Democratic faction regarded the election 
of Jefferson as a matter of supreme importance, and malice 
urged him to defeat this aspiration. 

That Burr intrigued for Federalist support does not appear 
to be beyond doubt. Even had he done so the fact would 
hardly justify such grandiose phrases of abuse as 'foul means' 
and ' gross betrayal,' especially in view of the fact that Jeffer- 
son himself gave pledges to his opponents that he would not 
reverse the chief acts of their policy. The presumption is 
always against Burr, and therefore it is settled in history that 
he was open to an offer. While the Federalist party was 
swithering, the matter was settled by Hamilton. He hated 
Jefferson as a man and despised him as a statesman. He 
had no dislike to Burr as a man, but abhorred him as a 
politician. The idea of this cool, cynical and ambitious 
adventurer coming into a position where the beloved con- 
stitution would lie at his mercy was intolerable. Jefferson 



THE POLITICIANS 405 

was at least honest in private matters, and in affairs of state a.d. isoi 
he had ideals. He would be a weak ruler, but not a rascal. ^''- ■*■* 
Moreover, it was clear beyond any doubt that the Democrats 
were in a large majority, and that the choice of this party 
was in favour of Jefferson. To take advantage of a clumsy 
system of election in order to defeat the nomination of the 
victorious party appeared to Hamilton to be bad politics. 
In great matters, though not in little ones, he kept his head. 
Contrary to the irresponsible opinion of his party he urged 
the claims of Jefferson. All his great influence was exerted 
against Burr, and in the end, against the predilection of his 
own supporters, his great rival was chosen President of the 
United States. 

With the administration of Jefferson Hamilton had no 
relations and no influence. He continued to be the chief 
mind of the broken and dispirited Federahst party ; the 
most prominent figure, the most active and industrious 
inspirer, exercising great power by his private correspon- 
dence and personal influence. But he was no longer in any 
sense a director of the policy of his country. He lived long 
enough to be reassured as to the permanency of his own 
work, to be ashamed possibly of his misgivings, and to 
realise the enormous potency of a tradition. The Union 
stood. The financial policy which had been so bitterly re- 
viled was maintained. The foreign relations were dominated 
by the principles of the Farewell Address. The doctrine 
of the ' implied powers ' was stretched, the authority of the 
executive was magnified, even beyond his most daring 
anticipations, and with his full approval, by the purchase 
of Louisiana. It seemed as if Hamilton's opponents were 
hypnotised by his institutions. They might protest elo- 
quently, but they were nevertheless subdued. Escape became 
impossible. The tradition was everywhere victorious. 



406 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

CHAPTER V 

Aaron Burr 

A-l>. Aaron Burr became Vice-President of the United States in 
Mt. 44-47 March 1801, when, contrary to their inclinations, and under 
the influence of Hamilton, the Federalists permitted the 
will of their opponents to prevail, and Jefferson was elected 
to the highest office. The Vice-President is not an active 
force in government. He is not even a member of it; but a 
sort of Queen Bee kept in reserve in a cell in case the acting 
monarch should die or be killed. His position is one of 
honour and dignity, but of no executive importance. He 
presides over the Senate, and in earlier times was held to 
have a kind of reversionary interest in the Presidency. 

It was no post for an active and ambitious man up to the 
ears in debt, with many enemies and a dubious reputation. 
The President treated him with something more than 
coolness. Prior to the New York election Burr had been the 
recipient of letters from the great man distinguished by the 
warmth of their well-wishing. Jefferson had written taking 
' an opportunity of recalling myself to your memory, and of 
evidencing my esteem for you.' ^ But Burr the quiet organiser 
of victory in New York State, and Burr the rival for the 
Presidency, were two very different individuals. Burr had 
endangered his election, and had shared his popularity. 
By a man of a less jealous temperament than Jefferson 
these incidents might have been held sufficient to cancel 
all previous obligations. 

In January 1804, when the next Presidential election was 
within sight. Burr, who was certainly never found wanting 
either in courage or candour, sought an interview with 
Jefferson with the object of arriving at the President's true 

* Ford's Jefferson, vii. p. 145. 



1801-1804 
.Et. 44-47 



THE POLITICIANS 407 

disposition with regard to himself. There was a supposed A.D. 
intention on the part of the Virginia clique (Jefferson, 
Madison, and Monroe) to keep the reversion of the highest 
office in their own hands. Vice-President Adams had suc- 
ceeded to President Washington ; Vice-President Jefferson 
had succeeded to President Adams, but Vice-President Burr 
was not to be allowed to follow after President Jefferson. In 
New York State the Democratic party was split in two. 
The Clintonians, supported by the Livingston faction, had 
now become the bitter opponents of Burr, and had started 
a paper i.f a more than usually calumnious character to 
destroy mm. They were supposed, and not without some- 
thing to show for it, to draw encouragement from the 
President himself The Federalists, it is true, were some- 
what inclined to favour Burr; but more from hatred of 
Jefferson, the Clintons and the Livingstons, than from any 
love of Burr. Federalist affections were, however, little to 
be counted upon; for Hamilton had already shown that on 
any great issue he could overawe all personal sentiments, 
and as to Hamilton's opinion of Burr there existed no shadow 
of a doubt. 

In these circumstances Burr came to Jefferson to ask that 
he would put a stop to the 'use of his name to destroy 
him.' Burr professed himself willing to retire from the 
Presidential candidature in order to avoid a party schism, 
but was averse from taking this step unless it were accom- 
panied by some signal mark of favour ' which would declare 
to the world that he retired with Jefferson's confidence. 
The results of the interview were hardly encouraging. 
Jefferson appears from his own account^ to have spoken 
at great length, making nothing clear except that he was 
not disposed to take the step which Burr desired. We 
gather, although it does not appear precisely in so many 
* Ford's Jefferson, i. pp. 301-4. 



1801-1804 
Mt. 44-47 



408 ALEXANDER HAMILTON * 

A.D. words, that had Jefferson been willing to give a promise of 
office, Burr would have undertaken to withdraw from the 
coming contest, to leave the Virginian clique a clear field, 
and to use his influence in New York and the Northern 
States in favour of the official candidates. But this price 
Jefferson was not willing to pay ; nor had he much tempta- 
tion to purchase Burr's adherence, seeing that his own 
re-election was practically certain. 

Finding the President disinclined to grant him any terms. 
Burr thereupon played his own game boldly and at once. 
He proceeded to strengthen himself in the Northern States, 
and as a step in the campaign he stood for the Governor- 
ship of New York. For this he has been accused of disloyalty; 
but then it was his misfortune always to be so accused. It 
is difficult to say why he should have acted otherwise than 
he did. The official Democrats were no friends of his. They 
had ignored him upon all occasions, and had lent their names 
to damage his reputation with his own constituents. He 
was not a malicious man. His object was not to cause 
annoyance or embarrassment to his party, but merely to win 
their confidence by one of the most practical means known 
to the human race — to make himself so powerful that he 
could not be disregarded. The Clinton-Livingston factions 
do not appear to have had any illusions in favour of Jefferson, 
but they fought Burr heartily for the good and sufficient 
reason that they were jealous of his predominance. Con- 
sequently the issue was once more in the hands of his 
opponents the Federalists. Again the rank and file of this 
party was inclined in his favour. Again Hamilton put forth 
all his great influence with his adherents against one whom 
he considered to be a national danger. Again Burr was 
defeated, and the defeat, situated as he then was, in debt and 
distrusted by his leaders, meant nothing less than the end 
of his political ambitions 



THE POLITICIANS 409 

The catalogue of injuries that Burr had received at the A.D. 
hands of his great enemy was a long one. If it is true that ^^^'^^^1 
Washington took his estimate of Burr from his Secretary of 
the Treasury, then Hamilton had prevented his appointment 
to a foreign mission, and had again foiled his application for a 
high military post in the Adams administration. Hamilton's 
authority alone had prevented him from receiving the votes 
of the Federalists, and securing the Presidency of the United 
States over the head of Jefferson. Finally, Burr had been 
defeated by the same relentless adversary in his forlorn hope 
of the Governorship of New York, and the position of greatest 
power in the Northern States. Hamilton had denounced 
him in public utterances and private correspondence. The 
unguarded phrases of his letters had passed into the current 
vocabulary of the Federalist party. However admirable the 
result for the fortunes of the nation, this personal antagonism 
was a thing which could not be overlooked. At each fresh 
attempt towards the attainment of his ambition Burr found 
himself headed off by Hamilton. 

Hamilton and Burr were born within a year of one 
another. Both had served with distinction in the war. 
Both had won a high reputation for military organisation, for 
leadership of men, and for courage, not only of the spirits, 
but of the head. Both had served on General Washington's 
staff, although in Burr's case this association endured only 
for a few weeks. They had been called to the bar at the 
same time, and immediately and together they found them- 
selves famous as its leaders. Both were dandies, handsome, 
dashing and gallant. Both were eager and ambitious, well- 
read and well-mannered. Both were of the same slight 
build, and diminutive stature, and essential dignity. Burr 
had wit and humour, Hamilton gaiety and eloquence. Up 
to the last they met politely in court and in society, and 
dined at one another's houses. They were not separated by 



410 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

any personal dislike or constitutional antipathy, nor were they 
knit together by any natural attraction. Each was intelligent 
enough to take a pleasure in the conversation and good 
manners of the other. Their relations were not warm, but 
they were friendly and tinged with a certain respect. Both 
hated phrases, and had an eye for reality. The disposition 
of both was to be men of action, and both followed the law 
with much distinction, but mainly as a means to a living. 

In so much that was ahke in their personal qualities 
and in the circumstances of their lives, one great difference 
prevented a private intimacy or a political alliance. Hamil- 
ton, for all his combativeness, viewed politics as a religion, 
and never as a game. The ideas of the nation, the Union 
and the constitution, were sacred ideas, hardly to be spoken 
of lightly even in jest. He desired power, in order that he 
might strengthen the state. His energies were concentrated 
upon his ideas, and only to a small extent upon his career. 
He is a type of great rarity, a fighting politician who was 
also a disinterested statesman. 

To Burr this view of the matter was foolishness. When 
he believed men guilty of it, which he did but rarely, he 
spoke of them with a good-natured scorn. The only serious 
zest of public life was personal : to win the game, to prevail 
over arduous things, to prove oneself superior to fortune, 
and men's favour, and every adversary. His manners were 
amiable, his instincts predatory. What we have already 
spoken of as the religion of the hive was the mainspring of 
Hamilton's pohtics. Burr was a plunderer of the hive, stand- 
ing in the same relation to men as Atropos the Death's-head 
moth to bees. To Hamilton the welfare of the race, the 
eternity of the city, the divine obligation of the law, were as 
the Ark of the Covenant. He was a man of the world and 
he lived in rough times, but he kept this faith till Burr shot 
him in the heart at Weehawken. His strong nature was a 



THE POLITICIANS 411 

cave of passions of every sort and description over which 
this ideal ruled like a tyrant. It shook his whole being as 
men are shaken by avarice, hatred, or love ; as wild beasts 
are stirred by danger to their young. When a man is born 
in whom the instinct of self-preservation, as in a bee, is 
habitually and spontaneously dominated by the instinct of 
the safety of society, we are apt to regard him as an admir- 
able but startling departure from the normal type. If it 
were possible to conceive of a nation in which such a 
disposition was the rule with ordinary men, it is clear that 
at its pleasure it could conquer the earth. 

Burr also was much driven by his passions, but they were 
unusual only in their vigour, not in their direction. In a 
sense both men loved the hive, but Hamilton loved it 
because it contained bees. Burr because it contained honey. 

It is only fair to judge a man to some extent from his 
own point of view and by his own standards. If he passes 
this test with credit, it is something even to the world, and a 
great deal to himself. Like Hamilton, Burr was conscious 
of great abilities and of a great influence over men. Neither 
took the slothful servant for his pattern, but all the endow- 
ments which each possessed he put to the most daring use. 
But, unlike Hamilton, Burr viewed his laborious enterprise 
as being strictly bounded by the limits and conditions of his 
time. The future that should begin when his own life ended 
was nothing to him. It did not stir him even to curiosity, 
far less to labour, sacrifice, or enthusiasm. What moved 
Hamilton was something far greater than himself, some- 
thing which surrounded him on all sides, which had been 
before he was, which would be for centuries after he walked 
no longer among men. Hamilton beheld a vision. Burr saw 
no visions, and such men as did he accounted the victims 
of superstition. He saw only himself and some private 
persons whom he loved. 



412 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

Burr did not underrate his own qualities, and he feared 
nothing. As a ruler of men, as the head of a great nation, he 
would be best able to justify the gift of his talents and to 
make them yield the largest usufruct. But both men and 
the state were of subordinate importance, and although he 
probably considered, honestly enough, that his triumph 
would be a high advantage to both, it would not have altered 
his resolution had he judged the matter otherwise. Men and 
the state were the medium in which he worked. They were 
the lump of marble and he was the sculptor. The supreme 
end was not their happiness, but his own art. His clear 
objective, therefore, was the highest place, and his first duty 
was to arrive. 

We are familiar with the spectacle of the man who makes 
a cult of his own career. We who live in peaceful times, 
under fixed and powerful traditions, can regard this solemn 
devotion of a man to himself without anxiety ; with interest, 
amusement, or weariness, according to the gifts of each wor- 
shipper. Out of little men it produces prigs, out of great 
ones buccaneers. Burr was unfortunate in his conditions ; he 
might have had a chance in the British Parliament of those 
days, but he was too artificial a gamester for the circum- 
stances in which he found himself. He needed, as it were, 
the prop of highly civilised conventions for his success. His 
pirate nature was hardly exuberant and direct enough for the 
rough vigour of a new nation. The example of Napoleon 
was his misleading. Against the wild forces of the Revolu- 
tion Burr would have contended in vain with his fine 
manoeuvres and dehcate intrigue. His faith in himseK was 
serene and imperturbable, but it never amounted, as in the 
case of Buonaparte, to fanaticism, and that perhaps is the 
chief cause of his failure as a buccaneer. For in the supreme 
events it is not sufficient to be reasonably persuaded; the 
man who is to succeed must be unreasonably confident. 



THE POLITICIANS 413 

Burr's minor virtues astound us : liis industry, his self- 
discipline — upon Chesterfield maxims — his dignity unruffled 
by misfortune or success. He was never arrogant and never 
abased. Exile, poverty, starvation, deferred hopes and 
private sorrows, the neglect and contumely of his fellow- 
countrymen found him still the same — smiling, courteous, 
considerate for the feelings of those whom he met. He had 
also an extraordinary courage, daring to undertake, persistent 
in the carrying out, and patient under failure and adversity. 
His charm made him a conqueror in all societies, nor was it 
a thing cultivated merely for his own advantage (though, 
doubtless, he must have known its utility), but sprang spon- 
taneously from a sympathetic and affectionate nature, from 
an eager and ever youthful interest in thought and in men. 
He was wanting in enthusiasm in public life, but he was 
equally wanting in misanthropy. His enemies prevailed, 
he suffered great misfortunes ; but he never appears, like the 
good men Jefferson and Monroe, malicious and revengeful. 
He could lead men of all ranks — not, like Hamilton, only 
leaders. He was tolerant of foibles, was not impatient of 
interested motives, and did not exact homage to incon- 
venient ideals. He neither ' bored ' nor drove, avoided 
treading on men's toes, dealt quietly and courteously, and 
until the time was ripe appeared to be quite unambitious 
of any personal distinction. Possessing such qualities, the 
puzzle is that he should have failed so completely as he did. 

One reason of Burr's failure is that, for all his cleverness, 
he never arrived at seeing things together. He saw them 
singly, or in twos and threes, with an admirable perspicacity 
But his sight was dim and blurred when he tried to grasp in 
their rough proportions all the multitude of facts that 
compose a situation. He relied too much on the minor 
arguments. But beyond this, his nature, sympathetic to 
individual men, was senseless as regarded popular emotions. 



414 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

He lacked entirely the intuition of Jefferson for the moods of 
the constituency. It is true that, like Hamilton and unlike 
Jefferson, he saw real things and not the shadows of phrases ; 
but he saw them in his cool, analytic brain without per- 
spective. A beetle crossing the window-pane was larger than 
an elk a hundred yards away. 

Hamilton not only saw real things, but he saw them in 
their true proportions. His spirit was ever seeking for a 
harmony in them, for a law and a purpose. To Burr's clear 
but disconnected vision things were altogether purposeless 
and lawless. The only harmony to be sought for by the wise 
man was in his own career and not in externals. The levity 
of human creatures, their meanness, sentimentalism, timidity 
and distrust, all the veneer that covers patriotism, he under- 
stood, and no man better; but he entirely misjudged the 
strength of the fabric because he made no account of what 
is to be looked for underneath. Something, which is pos- 
sibly more of an instinct and less of a virtue than what we 
understand by patriotism, has to be reckoned with at its 
proper value when a man is meditating violence against the 
state. 

Hamilton also made the error of underrating this resist- 
ance. He saw that Burr despised the strength of the fabric, 
and would attempt to destroy it by a political revolution; 
that, failing at the first effort, he would not hesitate to 
plunge the country into civil war rather than abandon his 
project. Hamilton feared that society would not stand 
the strain of civil war. There is no doubt that there was 
in fact in Burr's mind a design for severing the Northern 
States from the Union should he have succeeded in carrying 
them in his favour against Jefferson and the Virginia clique. 
The attempt was rendered impracticable only by his defeat 
for the governorship of New York. A few years later (after 
Hamilton's death) we find him actually engaged in an 



THE POLITICIANS 415 

endeavour to detach the South-Western territories from 
their allegiance by force and arms, and to found a great 
empire and a Burr dynasty by the conquest of Mexico. His 
imagination soared to courts, and constitutions, and a mili- 
tary monarchy. His plans were complete and admirably 
suited for deahng with the opposition of those contingencies 
which he foresaw, and of such forces as he had carefully 
measured. But his foresight was at fault, and his calcula- 
tions were absurdly out of scale. All his tact and courage 
were insufficient to make even a respectable failure of this 
enterprise which inhabits the limbo of historical fiascos. 
Hamilton must therefore be judged right in his estimate of 
Burr's intentions. When he denounced him as a Catiline 
and a Napoleon, and prophesied that he would not hesitate 
to become a traitor to the constitution, he was not using 
words of vain exaggeration, as was thought even by many 
upon his own side. His error consisted in his failure to 
estimate the futility of such an effort. 

Another cause of Burr's non-success was the atmosphere 
of distrust which even from the beginning of his career 
enveloped his public reputation. Few men have had more 
loyal and devoted friends, and few, judged by their fidelity 
to private friendship, have deserved attachment better. But 
the distrust of people who were not his intimates followed 
him from the class-room to the grave. It is difficult to 
discover sufficient grounds for this opinion, but it is even 
more difficult to believe it to have been ill-founded. It 
resembles an instinct of the hive against an enemy of the 
hive. The grounds which are alleged leave always some- 
thing to seek. The rumours of pecuniary irregularity lack 
precision. They were never clearly proven, and sometimes 
they were disproven. The mere existence of debts does not 
constitute a man corrupt. The attacks of his opponents 
were party philippics, less violent, certainly, than the 



416 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

charges which Giles and Jefferson and Monroe directed 
against Hamilton, but of the same order. The malicious 
mendacity of his domestic enemies, the democratic cliques 
of New York, carries even less authority. And yet the fact 
remains that every one did distrust him, with the exception 
of his personal friends, not only as a loyal citizen, but also 
as an honest man. 

It is impossible, moreover, to resist the conclusion that 
Aaron Burr, with all his great and admirable qualities, was 
in fact a sham. Chesterfieldian maxims are not the best 
foundation for a real human character. His manner and his 
pose were magnificent. His attitude in the face of the world 
was sublime. But we have the feeling all the time that he 
was acting ; that in public affairs his eye was fixed upon the 
pit and the stalls, or, at any rate, upon the critics, rather than 
upon the object. He made no vulgar appeal to a mean 
audience. We feel, indeed, that often his sole audience — pit, 
stalls and critics — consisted of himself, and he was a severe 
judge. But it was acting all the same. It was self-conscious- 
ness and concern about the manner of doing, much more 
than about the thing to be done. The actual goal was 
always secondary. 

To be a great man of action — statesman or buccaneer — 
there must be a subordination of self-consciousness to the 
external aim ; a simple, artless, overwhelming passion for 
attainment. Burr is artistic and artificial ; in action always 
the dandy. His style is admirable. He has the most 
beautiful manners. He is neat and apt. None of his effort 
is wasted. But always in great attempts he fails with as 
much certainty and grace as a Stewart Pretender. It was 
so at the beginning and at the zenith of his fame ; and to 
his credit be it said, disappointment and sorrow, dishonour 
and neglect, found him still faultless at the end. The game 
which he believed himself to be playing he lost. The game 



THE POLITICIANS 417 

which lie really played he won. His true object was a kind 
of fantastic self-discipline, in which pursuit he attained the 
supremest excellence. 

His last years are a strange picture. He continues the rule 
of his early life — eats little, drinks less, works hard and 
makes love everlastingly. At the age of seventy-eight he 
marries a lady of beauty, spirit and fortune, and another lady 
breaks her heart at the event. Within a few months he 
is separated, coming under the suspicion of infidelity. 

Stories of his wit and pose are without end. 'Was 
Hamilton a gentleman ? ' inquired some foreigner with a 
notebook. The reply is fiUed with a quiet resentment : 
' Sir, / met him ! ' 

But there is always the actor: the actor with the 
severest standard, but still the actor. He is never content 
with the effect unless he himself, the hardest of the critics, 
is satisfied. No external applause will compensate. He 
was not a great man of action, but he enacted the part of a 
great man of action to admiration. 

Two things about him passed the bounds of acting — his 
generosity and his affection. He had at all times many 
creditors, and it cannot be said of him that he was depressed 
by the weight of his obligations. Strictly he was an immoral 
citizen, because he flouted the sanctity of contract and gave 
away upon an impulse what was already hypothecated to 
others. But at least he did not spend upon himself. The 
simplicity and industry of his life were exemplary. He 
gave because he could not resist appeals, because he could 
not help giving. And he was none of your cold givers, 
but gave always with sympathy; never the benefactor, 
but ever the comrade. His charity was of the heart, 
spontaneous, promiscuous and usually misdirected. It 
lacked organisation, and possibly did more harm than 
good. It was emotional and not deliberate, and upon all 

2d 



418 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

the principles of his friend Jeremy Bentham its method 
was deplorable. Still he lived frugally, and gave when he 
felt compassion, and that is something to set against the 
sanctity of contract and a queue of creditors. In his old 
age the habit amounted to a mania. He fancied himself rich 
and gave still more recklessly — a more amiable and a less 
common trait in septuagenarians than to fancy themselves 
poor and hoard. * 

It is no plea for a public character that he was loyal to 
his private friends and beloved by them, or that his family 
affections were strong and unselfish. In these respects 
there was something of a likeness between Hamilton and 
Burr. As a husband neither was distinguished by a rigid 
fidelity, but in affectionate devotion to their wives both 
men were conspicuous. In an age when respectful awe 
rather than intimacy and comradeship marked the relations 
between parents and children, both were altogether excep- 
tional. They were not only respected but adored. The 
correspondence between Burr and his daughter, his constant 
devotion to his little grandson, are filled with an intelligence 
and sympathy that explain the intensity with which his 
love was returned. 

Barr was in his last period, an industrious outcast in New 
York, when the boy died in the south. The ship which 
was bringing the broken-hearted mother to visit him never 
came into port. These were the real griefs of his long life, 
in comparison with which poverty, and defeat, and the dis- 
favour of men were insignificant. It is upon his conduct 
under these sorrows that we rate him highest. He altered 
nothing of his quiet courtesy, continuing to smile upon the 
world, continuing to treat mankind with friendliness, to 
enjoy their society, and the light and warmth of the sun and 
the rest of God's gifts to the utmost extent of which his 
ardent nature was capable ; and this not from an easy self 



THE POLITICIANS 419 

indulgence, but on his simple theory that he would have 
been ungrateful and a coward had he acted otherwise. 

Not only with his family and friends, but wheresoever he 
went, travelling sumptuously or living on crusts, this quiet 
little gentleman, with his eighteenth -century manner, 
radiates an affectionate atmosphere that even his wit, his 
self-command, his exquisite manners, cannot chill. Jeremy 
Bentliam is as much under his spell as the testy old man he 
meets in a mail-coach. English philosophers and statesmen, 
Scots lawyers and ministers, Swedish merchants, German 
princes, dukes of the empire, rough frontiersmen, clerks and 
shop-boys, soldiers and sailors, every variety of man, rich and 
poor, old and young, honest citizen or reckless outlaw, every 
casual acquaintance and simple wayfarer, are won with the 
same magic. They like him because they believe that he 
likes them and understands them, which there is little doubt 
he did. As for women and children, they followed him as if 
he had been the Pied Piper of Hamelin — the former not 
always to their own advantage. 

Lovers of Hamilton and of a settled order. Federalist par- 
tisans and outraged Democrats, have drawn the picture of 
Burr which is accepted in history books. It is only natural 
that the shadows have been overblackened. He was a bad 
citizen, no doubt, but he was a brave gentleman. His public 
career ended in blank failure, bitter derision and merited 
obloquy. Moralists are certainly in the right when they 
point to his vices as the cause, but the cynics would no less 
certainly be in the right if they pointed to his virtues as 
contributory. From a kind of intellectual coxcombry he 
elected to play a part in the world for which his nature was 
altogether unsuited, a part which demanded that he should 
have been stern, relentless, masterful and something of a 
fanatic. The possession of these qualities was denied to him. 
He could only put on their masks, and that was not enough. 



420 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

CHAPTER VI 

Duel and Death 

A.D. 1804 The immediate cause of tlie duel in which Hamilton lost 
his life was so trivial as not to merit examination — what 
somebody had written ^ that Hamilton had said to some- 
body else. The challenge was sent upon that verbal 
pretext, but as Hamilton well knew, the real occasion 
was an essential antagonism. When gentlemen of delicacy 
shot one another on account of a lady, it was usual 
to feign a disagreement about the claret or a difference 
over cards. It was a graceful fashion which kept logic, 
and upon rare occasions even gossip itself, from inter- 
meddling in the question. It would have savoured too 
much of the melodrama if Burr had sent his challenge 
on the ground of ' an essential antagonism.' We are inclined 
to agree with his biographer that, having regard to the 
conventions of the time, the two men were by circumstances 
foredoomed to fight. They had been pitted against one 
another, not on one occasion, but on many. The result 
had not been a drawn battle, but, with a single exception, 
a series of defeats. Hamilton had been the vigorous and 
successful aggressor; Burr, constantly within sight of 
victory, had been completely discomfited. Few gentlemen 
have ever sent a friend with a message upon more substan- 
tial provocation. 

It has been generously assumed that Burr challenged, 
because he was revengeful and a scoundrel. Much discus- 

^ Dr. Cooper, in an electioneering letter, had stated that Hamilton had 
described Burr as ' a dangerous man, and who ought not to be trusted ' ; and 
subsequently, ' I could detail to you a still more despicable opinion which 
General Hamilton has expressed of Mr. Burr.' (Morse's Hamilton, vol. ii. 
p. 356. For account of duel, etc., see also Parton's Burr.) 



THE POLITICIANS 421 

sion, however, has taken place and many words have been A.D. 1804 
wasted upon the question why Hamilton fought. He was '^'^' '*^ 
a Christian, enlightened and liberal, a hater and despiser 
of the institution of duelling. He was a man whose 
courage was beyond suspicion, whose eminence, services and 
family circumstances might well have justified a refusal. 
Why had he not the moral courage to decline the combat ? 
Much censure and some elaborate theories leave us to face 
the fact that he fought because duelling was an institution 
and because he was Hamilton. Had Jefferson found him- 
self placed in like circumstances he would undoubtedly 
have refused, and even by the standards of the day his 
action would have been considered natural and proper. 
For Jefferson belonged to the new school. He was a phil- 
anthropist and a philosopher. His position and influence 
with his party would have been enhanced rather than 
diminished by a refusal to engage. 

But with Hamilton it was altogether different. His 
whole scheme of politics and plan of life rested upon the 
old fashions. What was bad, foolish, or archaic he accepted 
with the rest in the fear that by eliminating anything the 
fabric might be loosened. The idea of his state was an 
aristocracy, and duelling was somewhat in the nature of 
a cockade. In his own case he attached little importance 
to the privilege, but he could not logically deny it to others. 
He had given the provocation, and it was not for him (so 
he may well have argued) to refuse his enemy satisfaction. 
The Federalists as a party shared his opinions. If he had 
suddenly taken up a humanitarian position when it was 
a case of avoiding a personal risk, he would undoubtedly 
have been sustained by many of his friends, but he would 
with equal certainty have lost caste with a large section 
of his followers. Had Hamilton found himself in Burr's 
position there is no doubt that he would not have sought a 



422 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1804 duel; but wlien it is a question of putting down duelling it 
^T. 47 jjiust be by the aggrieved party waiving his rights, not by 
the giver of offence pleading the privilege of his conscience. 

With Burr's conduct leading up to the duel, and during 
the period of four weeks that elapsed between the challenge 
and the meeting, imaginative animosity has been busy, as 
with all the principal events of his career. Federalist and 
anti-Burr journals hastened to allege after the event that 
he had employed the period advantageously by practising 
in cold blood at a tree in his garden. It is probable that 
he did nothing of the kind ; but if he had, he was not only 
well within his rights, but also well within established 
custom, which in this particular of the duello at all events 
is founded upon common-sense. It has also been stated that 
on the eve of the appointment, anticipating the possibility 
of his death, he did up, and arranged neatly and orderly 
in packets his large and compromising correspondence with 
women, leaving the collection, and the necessary clues, 
as a bequest to his daughter, with the cynical direction 
that if she made use of them discreetly she need never 
want. His daughter was well married, and in no danger 
of want. If we may judge her by her letters, she was of 
too noble a disposition to consider blackmail in the light 
of a possible alternative even to starvation ; and if we may 
judge Burr by his letters to her, much as he loved her, he 
would rather have seen her dead than stooping to such 
infamy. The truth was precisely the contrary, for he 
appears to have been at considerable pains to arrange for 
the destruction of his letters lest they should come into 
hands that would misuse or even dare to read them. These 
stories, unimportant in themselves, are only worthy of 
attention as showing the extent to which Burr's very ragged 
reputation has been converted into an unbelievable scare- 
crow by the inartistic zeal of his enemies. 



THE POLITICIANS 423 

When Hamilton accepted the challenge he asked for a A.D. 1804 
delay of several weeks in order to conclude the cases in ^" 
which he was engaged, and to settle his personal affairs. 
The latter obviously could not have required so long a 
period. They might easily have been dealt with in a few 
days, if not in a few hours. It is characteristic of Hamilton 
to have been concerned that the clients who had trusted 
him should not be deprived of his services until the settle- 
ment of their business ; but it is an unusual case to find a 
man coolly and cheerfully (for the accounts are very precise 
upon this point) attending to the affairs of other people 
during such a time of suspense. 

For the last nine years of his life Hamilton had devoted 
himself seriously to the practice of the law. He was the 
leader of the New York bar during the whole of this period, 
and although, had he abstained altogether from public work, 
he doubtless might have added considerably to his income, 
his earnings were substantial even if we judge them by 
modern standards, and very large indeed compared with the 
rewards of his own day. His first task on resuming prac- 
tice was to discharge the debts he had contracted while in 
office ; his second, to provide for his family. The salary of 
the Secretary of the Treasury was totally inadequate to the 
position, and as has already been stated, he was forced to 
live upon his savings while they lasted, and afterwards to 
contract serious liabilities. It seems certain that he had 
succeeded in clearing himself of many if not all of his old 
debts, and was engaged successfully in providing for his 
family when he met with his death. 

On an average calculation, he had reasonable expectations 
of at least twenty years of active professional life. There 
was no obligation to an excessive frugality. The charges 
of incompetence and misjudgment do not attach to 
Hamilton at any point. He was successful and industrious 



424 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1804 in his profession. Though generous, he was no spendthrift. 
^" His plan for the investment of his savings was judicious,^ 
and only an accident put him at a disadvantage. The 
man of business who so frames his budget as to provide 
for every contingency, whose aim is to shelter his property 
from every conceivable risk, will never 'make a spoon or 
spoil a horn.' He will never be overtaken by failure, 
and he will never achieve success. He will deserve blame, 
according to the Gospels. He will receive praise only 
from the writers of moral tales. Hamilton acted in this 
matter as it is worthy to act. He regarded the few main 
probabilities, he disregarded the thousand and one things 
that were only possible. The Caesarian maxim applies to 
worldly gear as well as to a man's life. There is a pre- 
cautionary price at which it is not worth while to possess it. 
Hamilton, it should be remembered, gave the best years 
of his life to his country, and took for his services less than 
a living wage. He lived before the days of party presenta- 
tions and teapots full of sovereigns. Millionaires were scarce 
in those times in the United States, and neither political 
enthusiasm nor personal gratitude had stirred the prosperous 
classes to write cheques in six figures for the endowment of 
their champions. Hamilton started upon his career as a 
penniless student. He gave much time and eflfort for 
nothing, or for an utterly inadequate stipend. He never 
enjoyed the recompense due to his military services ; for 
he resigned all his claims in order that he might be free 
to serve the army by advocating their cause in Congress. 
Neither from the Union nor from the State of New York 
did he ever receive any allowance of lands such as was 
made to officers of similar rank.^ No man had ever better 
excuse for dying penniless. 

In his will, made in anticipation of the duel, he estimates 

^ He bought land in the vicinity of New York. ^ Works, x. p. 479. 



THE POLITICIANS 425 

the chances of his dying insolvent. " Should it happen A.D. 1804 

' that there is not enough for the payment of my debts, I '^' ' 

' entreat my dear children, if they or any of them shall ever 

' be able, to make up the deficiency. I, without hesitation, 

' commit to their delicacy a wish which is dictated by my 

' own. Though conscious that I have too far sacrificed the 

' interests of my family to public avocations, and on this 

' account have the less claim to burthen my children, yet I 

' trust in their magnanimity to appreciate, as they ought, 

' this my request." ^ 

" On the fourth of July Hamilton and Burr met, for the 
' last time, at the convivial board. It was at the annual 
' banquet of the Society of the Cincinnati, of which Hamilton 
' was president and Burr a member. Hamilton was cheer- 
' ful, and at times merry. He was urged, as the feast wore 
' away, to sing the only song he ever sang or knew, the 
' famous old ballad of The Drum. It was thought afterward 
' that he was more reluctant than usual to comply with the 
' company's request ; but after some delay he said, ' Well, 
' you shall have it,' and sang it in his best manner, greatly 
' to the delight of the old soldiers by whom he was sur- 
' rounded. Burr, on the contrary, was reserved, mingled 
' little with the company, and held no intercourse with the 
' president. He was never a fluent man, and was generally, 
' in the society of men, more a listener than a talker. On 
' this occasion his silence was, therefore, the less remarked ; 
' yet it was remarked. It was observed, too, that he paid 
' no attention to Hamilton's conversation, nor, indeed, looked 
' toward him until he struck up his song, when Burr turned 
' toward him, and, leaning upon the table, looked at the 
' singer till the song was done. The difference in the 
* behaviour of the two men was doubtless owing partly to 

1 Works, X. pp. 481-82. 



426 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1804 ' their different positions at the banquet. Hamilton, as the 
' master of the feast, was in the eye of every guest, while 
' Burr could easily escape particular observation. The object 
' of both was, of course, to behave so as not to excite 
' inquiry." ^ It is an odd picture, and as it is drawn by Burr's 
biographer, who had the evidence of persons present to found 
upon, we may take it as authentic. 

The duel was fought on the 11th of July, under the 
heights of Weehawken, upon a grassy platform overlooking 
the Hudson River. Hamilton fell mortally wounded at the 
first fire. There has been much dispute as to his action. 
Burr and his second maintained that he fired at his 
opponent and missed. The generally accepted version is 
that, in accordance with his expressed intention,^ he did 
not fire at the word, but that his pistol went off as he was 
falHng. It is certain that he refused to have the hair-spring 
set. The matter is of little moment. If a moral stigma 
attaches to duelling under the conditions of that time, it 
attaches because the man consented to engage. That he 
held his fire, or let off his pistol in the air, is merely 
irrelevant chivalry. 

Hamilton died on the following day. The world mourned 
for him with a fervour that is remarkable considering its 
treatment of him in later years, and the speed with which it 
proceeded to forget him. It mourned ; and then, in order 
that the emotion might be complete, turned upon Burr and 
made a scapegoat. 

Hamilton came by his death as he had spent his life, in 
the service of his country. He did not die in a private 
quarrel. If he had fallen at Yorktown or been killed, as 
nearly came to pass, by the heavy labours of his office, he 
would not more certainly have sacrificed himself to the 
interests of the nation. In attacking Burr at every point 

^ Parton's Burr. ^ Works, x. p. 474. 



THE POLITICIANS 427 

he was not attacking a man whom he hated, but the most A.D. 1804 
formidable and conspicuous type of a class of men whose 
ambitions, if unchecked, must in his judgment have led to 
the ruin of the state. He took the whole circumstances of 
the case into account. He did not overlook the temper or 
underrate the courage of his opponent. He knew only too 
well the dangers of political controversy, for his eldest son, 
a mere boy, had already been killed in a similar quarrel. 
He was well aware that his unrelenting efforts to exclude 
Burr from public life were nearly certain in the end to 
provoke an appeal to arms, which from his own position and 
the views of the Federalist party and the people in general 
it would be impossible for him to decline. 

Hamilton, Jefferson and Eurr are three distinctive types 
of public men. Hamilton was a type of the statesman, 
Jefferson of the sophist, and Burr of the politician. Their 
enmity was fundamental, and in no sense peculiar to the 
special period in which they lived, or due to any accidents 
in their circumstances. The predominant motive of the 
politicians is ever their own advantage. In the case of 
Burr this was not only the predominant, but the single 
motive. His adventures and his fortunes, his great talents 
and his engaging personality, introduced an element of 
romance. His defects of character led to failure so complete 
and ludicrous that there is some temptation to misjudge the 
main issue, and to think of him as harmless merely because 
of his futility. But romance and futility were both acci- 
dents. His career was perfect in the simplicity of its aims. 
A man of coarser fibre and stronger will would have been a 
more dangerous enemy to the Union ; but no politician that 
has ever lived is a truer type of mischievous intention. 

Hamilton's public career was a long struggle against the 
politicians and the sophists. In the green youth of the 
republic the dangers to be apprehended from the latter were 



428 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

A.D. 1804 of more account than the attacks of the predatory classes. 
The early period was one of exaltation. Men were wrought 
up to a high pitch of emotion. The chief peril was lest they 
should be misled, not by their personal interests, but by 
an enthusiasm for shadows. Jefferson's loose and eloquent 
phrases about liberty, fraternity and the Rights of Man 
were more likely to wreck the Union, by stripping the 
government of its powers and by involving the nation in 
struggles which it was too weak to bear, than the plots and 
combinations of greedy adventurers. But as the tradition 
grew, as the Union hardened and became strong through the 
exercise of its functions, the sophists ceased to be a formid- 
able menace. Their intention, after all, was virtue, not 
mischief. They were great experts in the use of words, 
which often did not correspond to facts ; and, as they guided 
their own course of action as they would have guided the 
policy of the state — to a large extent by words — they were 
not likely to prevail against settled institutions and a 
vigilant opposition. 

By the date of the election of 1800 danger was to be 
apprehended from a different quarter. Clearheaded men 
who had no scruples about using the state for the purpose 
of their own advancement were much greater evils. The 
sophists, being to a large extent dupes of their own fancies 
and slaves of the passing moods of the people, might ulti- 
mately fall a prey to the intrigues of adventurers hampered 
by no concern for the national advantage. For the poli- 
ticians, if successful, would endeavour to use the sophists 
for their own ends. But when it was a choice between 
Jefferson and Burr for the Presidency, Hamilton took a 
practical view of the conditions and acted without hesitation, 
although he cannot have been blind to the possibility that 
the course he adopted might cost him his hfe. 



THE POLITICIANS 429 

CHAPTER VII 

The Failure of the Democrats 

Measured by years, Hamilton, like Pitt, his contemporary, 
died young, at the age of forty-seven. It is difficult to 
picture him as an old man, for the note of his character was 
youth. It was said of Pitt that ' he did not grow, he was 
cast.' At twenty-five he was as good as at forty-five. To 
a certain extent the same is true of Hamilton, with this 
difference — that he was cast in the mould of a young 
man, Pitt in that of an old one. The highest virtue of 
each was his courage ; but Hamilton's courage was eager 
and impetuous, while the courage of Pitt was remark- 
able chiefly for its extraordinary endurance. There is in 
all Hamilton's work — writings and speeches — the intense 
seriousness of youth. The qualities that made him a great 
statesman and a terrible combatant were force, lucidity and 
conviction. His confidence in himself and in his ideas is 
amazing, amounting almost to fanaticism. It is possible 
that the Union of the States would, in one way or another, 
have achieved itself had he been shot at Yorktown instead 
of Weehawken, for it was in the order of great events ; but 
the speculative historian would be puzzled to supply the 
deficiency or explain the method. 

If we seek for a complete presentment of the man in 
what he wrote and spoke we shall not find it. He treats 
his public ceremoniously and with reserve. An excessive 
gravity is the rule. Anger is the only passion which is 
permitted to appear; not a beam of humour or a flash of 
wit. The whole procedure is stately and tense. This also 
is in accordance with the nature of youth. 

Hamilton has left us no records of his private life 



430 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

from which we can construct a human being. His pen was 
a sacred weapon which, if it had to write of private affairs, 
dealt with them as if they had been state papers or a 
le^^al precis. The elaborate sprightliness of his correspon- 
dence with Gouverneur Morris and Laurens is intimidating. 
The picture of Hamilton is drawn from the accounts of 
others. This serious young statesman we gather to have 
been remarkable in private life chiefly for his high 
spirits, his good looks, his bright eyes, and his extra- 
ordinary vivacity. He loved the society of his fellow- 
creatures, and shone in it. He loved good wine and good 
company and beautiful things — even clothes and ruffles of 
fine lace. He despised slovens and people like Jefferson, 
who dressed ostentatiously in homespun. He belonged to 
the age of manners, and silk stockings, and handsome shoe- 
buckles. In Bagehot's excellent phrase, he was ' an enjoying 
English gentleman ' ; companionable and loyal, gay and 
sincere, always masterful and nearly always dignified. 

Hamilton would have appeared in all likelihood a more 
heroic figure in the annals of his country, his memory 
would have been brighter and more fortunate, his fame 
more splendid and universal, had his death chanced to 
coincide with the retirement of Washington instead of fall- 
ing some eight years later. For he would then have died 
at the very height of his achievement. Up to this time he 
had never known defeat. His ideas had prevailed even 
against the racing tide of popular emotion. He had won a 
victory not merely against his rivals, or over a party. He 
had fought with the people itself, and had held it till it 
yielded to his masterful intention. Men knew they had 
been beaten by him, and as wisdom in due course began to 
illuminate the confusion of their thoughts, they were satisfied 
with the issue. They did not love him, for he had treated 
them rudely, nor ever hesitated to speak his mind ; but they 



THE POLITICIANS 431 

feared his great strength, and his unerring sagacity filled 
them with respect. They felt towards him as one running 
upon a precipice feels towards a rough deliverer who, 
catching him by the throat, pitches him on to a heap 
of rubbish. The escaped victim is at once grateful and 
indignant; safe, but badly bruised. His dignity is rufiled, 
and he feels himself to have been a fool. In his heart, 
perhaps, he thinks that he might have been rescued from 
his folly with something more of tenderness, and considera- 
tion for his feelings. 

When the Farewell Address and the last of the letters of 
Camillus had been read, and being read had worked the 
revolution in the public mind which their authors intended, 
the fame of Hamilton was complete. It rested upon a basis 
of fact, not of opinion. He had arrived at authority and 
power without incurring popularity, and in a pure democracy 
it is impossible to conceive any triumph more overwhelming. 
Up to this time he had been concerned with great events, 
with the welfare of a nation, in which the exigencies of a 
party were barely considered. But the party which had 
grown up and formed itself around his ideas demanded 
consideration. It had been the instrument of his policy, 
and after the conclusion of the campaign, like an army 
which through its conquests has become superfluous, it em- 
barrassed him by its clamours to be exalted from the status 
of a means to that of an end. Nature had not fitted Hamil- 
ton for such a task, and his failure was no great marvel. 

The effect of contact with great events is comparable to 
the effect of contact with a great mind. Every man is 
conscious of an expansion and exhilaration of his spirit when 
he is thrown into relations, friendly or hostile, with some 
character beyond the common stature, who errs in the grand 
manner by overrating the virtues of his opponents, and over- 
taxing their strength; who joins issue boldly upon the 



432 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

principles of conduct and disdains to concern itself with the 
smaller motives. The reverse of this condition is when a 
magnanimous nature becomes entangled in controversy with 
mean minds about mean things, when his pursuit of lofty 
aims is tripped up by petty obstacles. In such a contest the 
chief danger lies in the distraction. Each file in the legion 
of mediocrity invites an easy and separate annihilation. 
Every knave deserves to be trounced. Every fallacy cries 
out for exposure. A great mind engaged with a multitude 
of small enemies must be overwhelmed by sheer weight of 
numbers when once it loses the weather- gage, and is forced 
to accept a contest on terms of their choosing. Up to the 
period of the Farewell Address Hamilton had kept the 
weather-gage, and in the compulsion of events had found 
a gale favourable to his battle. The struggle for inde- 
pendence, the foundation and defence of the Union, strained 
his nature to its highest pitch. But with the accomplish- 
ment of these objects there was a swift change in the 
conditions. Gradually national interests tended to become 
subordinate to those of parties, and party interests in turn 
to those of persons who discovered a business advantage to 
be gained by inhabiting, like hermit crabs, the derelict shells 
of political ideas. 

Hamilton feared lest the Constitution might not prove 
strong enough to stand against the results of this general 
deterioration. When we remember that the Constitution 
and the tradition which supported it were for the most part 
his own handiwork, it is easy to excuse his distrust. He 
regarded the Union with the tenderness and doubt of an 
anxious lover, who would seclude his mistress from the 
society of rakes ; confident in her good intentions, but 
dubious of her fortitude. In reality, neither Jefferson 
fatuously worshipping phrases, nor Burr with his busy 
intrigue, had even a far-off chance of playing the successful 



THE POLITICIANS 433 

Lovelace. The constitution was delicate indeed, but not 
frail. Neither Burr play-acting the part of Catiline, nor 
Jefferson dressed in the ribbons of popularity, was a danger 
worthy of consideration. The lassitude of the times was 
the result of easy circumstances, and any serious peril 
would have changed it to a fierce alertness. The state of 
popular opinion in those years may be compared to some 
strong beast dozing and blinking in the sun. 

It was not so much that the efforts of the Revolution 
had exhausted statesmanship, as that peace, prosperity 
and a sense of security induced men to rest comfortably 
upon what had been already done. It was more because they 
believed the constitution safe than for any other reason that 
they had ceased to take politics seriously. 

For those men who looked beyond party triumphs to the 
needs and dangers of the future. State Rights and slavery 
remained two menacing problems, of which there must be 
a final settlement before the Union could be secure from 
internal disaster. Two ways were possible to this end : the 
slow, constant and increasing pressure of a policy, or the 
sharp means of civil war. Wise men, who loved their country, 
prayed for the first, but their prayers were answered ad- 
versely by the gods. For a quarter of a century power was 
in the hands of statesmen who were lacking both in vision 
and courage, and without these qualities in government it is 
vain to look for strong and consistent effort towards any 
national aim. The successors of Washington and Hamilton 
were astute but timid. They kept an unremitting watch 
against rivals who might supplant them in the affections 
of the people, but they were negligent and feeble guards 
against the dangers which threatened the existence of the 
state. 

Jefferson, Madison and Monroe held office in succession, 
each for a double term, during the first quarter of the 

2 E 



434 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

nineteenth century. Few rulers in the history of modern 
democracy ever enjoyed office in greater security, had to face 
opponents so feeble and distracted, or were fixed with the duty 
of governing a people in an easier temper. Strong men, with 
such currents to aid them, would have made much progress ; 
but these had no aim in view. They relied upon the wisdom 
of the people to inspire as well as judge them. They regarded 
the people not merely as a tribunal but as an oracle. Great 
things will never come out of a democracy treated in this 
obsequious spirit by its governors. Statesmen have to submit 
themselves in the end humbly to the verdict of the man in 
the street, but to go to him for advice or for ideas is almost 
as futile as for a captain of a ship to consult his passengers 
upon problems of navigation. Jefferson's chief sin is that 
he substituted the ostentatious patronage of a democracy 
for the leadership of a people. 

These three Presidents denied most vehemently that any 
Federalist revered the Union more than they, or would 
have been capable of greater sacrifices had it been in 
jeopardy. They acknowledged, sorrowfully, that slavery 
was a great evil in society, and expressed desires to see 
it removed. But unfortunately their personal sympathies 
were warmly engaged for the doctrine of State Rights, 
which was the only internal enemy of the Union ; and the 
interests of their supporters, of their private friends and of 
their family traditions, were bound up with the institution 
of slavery. In Jefferson's philosophy of eighteenth century 
phrases State Rights were applauded ; slavery, on the con- 
trary, was utterly condemned. He has left it on record that 
he disapproved of slavery ; but, except in early days when 
it was convenient to denounce the institution in order to 
add a count to the indictment of George the Third,^ he was 
at considerable pains to conceal his opinions from his 
^ See Declaration of Independence. 



THE POLITICIANS 435 

countrymen,^ His private practice was in fantastic contrast 
to his beliefs. His public activities did not advance by- 
one hairsbreadth the sacred cause of liberty which he 
professed to have at heart. In his political career the 
humanitarian always walked behind the opportunist when 
the road was too narrow to admit of the two going arm 
in arm. 

It has been maintained that had the United States been 
compelled to face the difficulties of a European environment 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, they must 
have collapsed or fallen asunder. Except for the fortune 
of their isolated position, and the immeasurable resources 
which nature had given them, it is alleged that the}'- could 
not have made head against the intrigue and open attack 
of their enemies, and against the discontent and disorder 
that would thereby have been induced among their citizens. 
But two things have been left out of notice in this calcula- 
tion, and if the nation had lacked these two things, it must 
certainly have gone to pieces, despite the advantages of 
natural wealth and fortunate position. The first of these 
is the spirit of the people, upon which no crisis up to the 
present time has ever called in vain. The second is the 
great legacy of laws and traditions which it inherited from 
the first eight years of Federal government; the ideas of 
the sanctity of the Union, of national probity and of a 
dignified independence. The spirit of the nation is a great 
force, but it is one which cannot be always on the alert, 
and, while it sleeps, the part of noble institutions is to keep 
watch. 

The names of Washington and Hamilton, which we 
honour together, must be honoured in both; for even 

^ When Jefferson's Notes on Virginia, previously circulated in manuscript, 
were printed, he imposed conditions that all ' Strictures on Slavery ' should 
be omitted. History, iv. p. 453, also pp. 454 and 465. 



436 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

the spirit of a people is in large measure a tradition 
with an origin in the effort and suffering of its great 
men. Washington and Hamilton governed, and directed 
the policy of the United States when occasion required 
it against the opinions of the majority. They incurred 
much hatred in consequence, which even the memory 
of their services could not keep within bounds. But this 
bold and uncompromising disregard of opinion is more akin 
to the special genius of their country, and to the role 
which it has played in the affairs of the world, than the 
fine discernment, the smooth and pliant dexterity of Jef- 
ferson. A man who never disagrees with his countrymen, 
and who shrinks from unpopularity as the worst of all evils, 
can never have a share in moulding the traditions of a virile 
race, though for a time he may make its fashions. With- 
out paradox, we may truly say that Jefferson, in spite of all 
his triumphs, missed every opportunity. He takes rank 
among the men who succeeded only in success, but had 
nothing to show for it at the end, save only success. He 
maintained himself in office and floated gloriously upon a 
kind of vapour. He built no new defences for his country, 
and those which he received in custody he barely kept in 
repair. 

Every difficulty which could be postponed was left to a 
future generation. Every awkward question was adroitly 
shelved. He was an indulgent and courteous physician, 
who alleviated the symptoms and soothed the nerves, but 
lacked both the skill to understand the cause and the 
courage to treat the root of the disease. His legacy was a 
lexicon of phrases, a dramatic reputation of homespun 
equality, and a tangle for posterity to unwind. 

The making of the United States owes nothing to Jef- 
ferson except a few eccentric fashions, often ungraceful 
and sometimes absurd. The work of Washington and 



THE POLITICIANS 437 

Hamilton, after a long and dreary interval, passed into 
worthier hands. Sixty years after the duel at Weehawken 
the constitution was confirmed. What Hamilton had 
feared came to pass — a civil war; but what he had given 
his life for was as the result of it secured. The tremen- 
dous cost does not lie at his door. To lay so awful a 
charge against any man is perhaps beyond justice, but as 
we read of the complacent beatitude of Jefferson, full of 
years and adulation, our memory calls up a contrasting 
scene, in which the action is a great rebellion; in which 
orators of the South invoke not unfairly the protection of 
his name ; in which brave men go into battle with his 
phrases on their lips ; in which the aim of the whole Con- 
federate party, which does him honour, is to destroy the 
constitution and to break the Union. It is a common event 
that when a man is dead his name and authority are mis- 
used, his words misinterpreted ; but Jefferson has to answer 
a much graver charge than careless sympathy, or a mere 
verbal indiscretion. The Union which he professed to 
venerate was intrusted to his keeping, and fortune put it 
in his power to render it secure. He failed even to make 
the attempt. 

The state which Alexander Hamilton had planned and 
inaugurated Abraham Lincoln completed and confirmed. 
It is natural to contrast these two men, who in all super- 
ficial things were most unlike — in circumstances, manners, 
age, temper and appearance. But in the great matter 
that concerned each of them most nearly they were at 
one. In many of their qualities they were ahke. In both 
there was the same instinct for reality and contempt for 
phrases, the same clear judgment and swift decision. Their 
eyes saw ' far and wide,' and things appeared to them ever in 
a splendid and true proportion, rhythmical and harmonious, 
governed by great laws. In richness of nature they were 



438 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

equals, and equals also in integrity and courage. And in 
both there was the same rare and consummate mastery of 
the English tongue, begotten of great thoughts and a fiery 
sincerity, which not only increases an hundredfold the power 
of a man in his own day, but continues it as an intimate 
and living force among generations to whom otherwise he 
would have been but a remote actor or a great historical 
shadow. 



BOOK VI 
CONCLUSIOI^ 



On the most elaborate and correct detail of facts, the result seems to he 
that at no time has the wealth and power of Chxat Britain been so con- 
siderable as it is at this very perilous moment. We have a vast interest 
to preserve, and we possess great means of preserving it. But it is to be 
remembered that the artificer may be encumbered by his tools, and that 
resources may be among impediments. If wealth is the obedient and 
laborious slave of virtue and of publick honours, then wealth is in its 
place and has its use. But if this order is changed, and honoxir is to be 
sacrificed to the conservation of riches, riches, which have neither eyes nor 
hands, nor anything truly vital in them, cannot long survive the being of 
their vivifying powers, their legitimate masters, and their potent protectors. 
If we command our wealth we shall be rich and free. If our wealth 
commands us, we are poor indeed. — Burke. 



BOOK VI 

CONCLUSION 

CHAPTER I 

Some General Remarks 

An attempt has been made in the foregoing chapters to give 
a general view of the events which preceded and followed 
the formal Union of the States, to describe the two hostile 
tendencies of political thought during that epoch, and to 
make a rough estimate of the chief personal forces and 
antagonisms which were concerned in the result. The 
intention of the author, so far, has been to regard the career 
of Alexander Hamilton mainly in its relation to the fortunes 
of the United States of America, 

In the remaining pages the achievements of Hamilton will 
be considered, very briefly, under a different aspect. The 
quality of his statesmanship, the nature of that inarticulate 
desire for union on which he built, the strength and the 
obstinacy of those difficulties which he encountered at every 
turn, are subjects of universal interest. He is no local hero, 
but one whose work and greatness have a meaning for the 
whole world ; and for the British race at the present time 
they have a special and intimate concern. 

Among many things that appear to be widely different 
when we contrast the circumstances of America in the years 
preceding the convention of Philadelphia with those of our 

441 



442 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

own empire as it stands to-day, at least one thing is tlie 
same. In both cases we find the same widespread conscious- 
ness of an issue that must be faced before the world has 
grown much older, that cannot be put off indefinitely by 
dilatory prudence or sentimental make-believe. The conse- 
quences of this issue are so tremendous that even the most 
reckless partisan is willing at times to treat it with a grave 
attention. In both cases there is the same vague but im- 
patient yearning for some bold, constructive efforts towards 
a solution, and on the other hand the same clear and cogent 
arguments of destruction are brought to bear against every 
plan which the wit of man has yet been able to devise. 

Before proceeding to a consideration of these topics, the 
author desires to offer a few remarks upon the scope and 
intention of his work. It may reasonably be urged that 
reflections of such a character would have figured more 
suitably in a preface; but for various reasons which it is 
unnecessary to set forth, it has been judged better to reserve 
them to a later stage. 

The author is fully aware of his many disqualifications 
for the task which he has undertaken. It is not merely 
upon the literary side that he is ready to admit the in- 
adequacy of his equipment. Faults arising from this cause 
might have been easily pardoned. But he is conscious also 
of a deficiency in knowledge of American political conditions 
as they exist to-day. Without something more than book- 
learning the spirit and atmosphere of the United States at 
the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
century cannot be completely understood. A writer, ignorant 
of these things, lacking the freedom and confidence which an 
intimacy with American politics alone can give, is debarred 
from following Hamilton's great ideas into modern times. 
Although he is dimly aware that morals could be drawn. 



CONCLUSION 443 

principles established, and forecasts clinched, he is shut 
out from the attempt. The few references to later events 
are therefore of a general character, and are concerned only 
with facts too notorious for dispute. 

It may reasonably be asked why, if the author was con- 
scious of such hampering limitations, he had ever the 
temerity to undertake the task. His answer is that he 
undertook it because he was unable to discover any account 
of Hamilton's career which satisfied his curiosity. In making 
this statement he denies any intention to depreciate the 
many learned and diligent American authors who have dis- 
coursed upon the topic. He readily admits his debt to their 
industry, but at the same time he has to acknowledge that 
their efforts have not met his requirements. Their view of 
the man and his epoch is in every case too ' American.' It 
is natural that this should be the case, and it would be the 
height of absurdity to utter any complaint. But there is 
room for an estimate arrived at by a different method. To 
Englishmen the achievements of Hamilton may not mean 
precisely the same thing as they do to citizens of the United 
States, but, unless this essay has entirely missed its mark, 
it will hardly be contended that they mean anything less. 
Our kinsmen do not hesitate to claim a share in the heritage 
of our literature, and in fairness, therefore, we may claim 
some part and interest in their statesmen. The work of 
Hamilton's life was the solution of problems which we have 
not yet found any means to solve. That, for us, is the chief 
interest of his career. Admitting frankly and fully that 
what he achieved is no precedent to govern our actions, 
his example is inspiring. We may draw morals from his 
fortitude and find encouragement in his success. And here 
and there, as we read his words upon the events and 
difficulties of a bygone age, the darkness and perplexity 
of the situation in which we find ourselves is lit up with 



444 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

sudden, luminous flashes which pierce to the four comers 
of the canopy. 

It is probable that fault may also be found with the pro- 
portions of this essay. Complaint may be made that certain 
matters have been forced into an undue prominence, while 
others which ought to have been dealt with at length have 
been slurred over in a few paragraphs or sentences. The 
space devoted to an account of the war will be cited under 
the first head, and under the second the omission of any 
substantial discussion of the constitution. But having 
regard to the author's intention, the war was a matter of 
capital importance, the terms of the constitution were not. 
Consequently, although the attempt to describe the course 
of the dreary and protracted struggle for independence was 
surrounded with obvious dangers for one who has had no 
experience in military affairs, it was necessary to make it. 
The war is the key to the whole situation. If the hazards 
and difficulties which attended Washington's canjpaigns are 
not fully realised, those which attended the acceptance of a 
formal union and the making of a real one must be entirely 
missed. The disasters arising out of disunion were apparent 
from the very beginning of the contest with Britain. In a 
sense the two struggles — for independence and for union — 
originated at the same moment, were retarded by the same 
obstacles, and were achieved by the same spirit, and to a 
large extent by the same men. 

But the constitution occupies a different place. Its 
terms and provisions are matters of a subordinate interest. 
Had they been better suited than they were to the needs of 
the situation, the labours of the early administrations might 
have been less arduous, but the final result could hardly 
have proved very different. Or if the constitution had been 
a much less efficient instrument than it was in fact, the 
energy and courage of Washington and Hamilton would in 



CONCLUSION 445 

all likelihood have found some means of making it serve 
their purpose. The constitution has now been on trial for 
upwards of a century, and it can hardly be imagined that 
any reflective citizen of the United States would seriously 
propose it as a model for another nation which found itself 
faced by a similar emergency. Its weakness in certain 
directions has been constantly made clear, while in others 
its very strength seems to be a danger no less formidable. 
Its power for resistance to all reforms, sane or insane, is a 
lesson even more of what should be avoided than of what 
should be copied. The British constitution is a thing by itself, 
and stands outside comparison. But the Canadian constitu- 
tion is comparable, and as a model it is immensely superior. 
Its makers had profited by the experience of others. Its 
strength is strongest where the strain is greatest — at the 
heart. Sovereignty is firmly established. The majesty of 
the law is acknowledged without question from one end 
of the Dominion to the other. The characteristics of 
Canada are order and freedom. No man fears either that 
he will call in vain upon justice, or that the development of 
the estate will be hampered by a misplaced strength or an 
inelastic charter. The constitution of Canada was made in 
1867 — eighty years after the convention of Philadelphia — 
and the debt which it owes to the efforts and example of our 
kinsmen is immeasurable. 

It is not, therefore, the precise terms, or even the prin- 
ciples of the American constitution, which move our admira- 
tion; but the great facts that the Americans made a 
constitution sufficient for their purpose, that they set it to 
work, and in a few years built round it an upholding tradi- 
tion which has stood the fiercest trials. They had no 
precedents to guide them. Republican institutions were in 
discredit. Obstacles and difficulties existed upon every 
hand. And yet men had the wisdom to plan and the 



446 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

courage to succeed in their attempt. These are the matters 
to which it has been the object of this essay to call 
attention. 

This book is neither a history nor a biography, but 
merely an essay upon the character and achievements of a 
man who, in the author's opinion, was the chief figure in a 
series of striking events. It has been written, frankly, from 
the standpoint of Hamilton. The aim has been to make it 
an honest account; but the aim has not been to make it 
an impartial account. A staid, unbiased narration of the 
career of a great man of action, who lived in stirring times, 
and engaged in controversies of an exceptional fierceness, 
might have a certain value; but it would never give any 
true picture of the man or measure of his work. The value 
of this quality or of that effort cannot be slioAvn by sub- 
mitting it to the alien standard of some cold arbiter, but 
only in relation to the divine unity of the character of the 
man himself. The diatribe of an enemy is preferable, for it 
has at least a dramatic consistency and the merit of a 
caricature. Our endeavour, therefore, has been to show 
Hamilton as he saw himself, and to judge him as he would 
have judged himself. 

But it is not to be denied that there are disadvantages of 
a serious nature attaching to such a method. One of the 
best biographical essays that ever was written is Fronde's 
Julius Gcesar, but no man in search of a true, positive 
estimate of Cicero or Pompey would accept it as final. It 
is necessary to consider not only the limitations of space, 
but the mood of the reader. To hustle him about from 
pillar to post, to make him regard characters and events in 
one chapter from the standpoint of the statesman, in the 
next from that of the sophist, in the next again from that 
of the politician, would be to irritate and weary him into 



CONCLUSION 447 

an utter confusion. In accepting the dramatic necessities 
of the situation, we have to realise the impossibility of doing 
full justice to the rest of mankind. The friends of Hamilton 
are dwarfed and obscured by the central figure. His oppon- 
ents are less in shadow, but they appear under a negative 
aspect. They assume a great importance only when they 
offend. Our attention is concentrated upon their incon- 
venient angles, and with the best will in the world, it is 
impossible to construct a complete and positive likeness 
upon such evidence. And yet it is impossible to avoid this 
injustice. In considering any period of history from the 
standpoint of a great man of action, we are certain — con- 
temptuously certain — of the value of his enemies. We read 
what they have said, striving to give just attention, but their 
words have the hollow resonance of an echo. 

Indeed, in proportion as an opponent of the man, whose 
mood and standpoint we have accepted, has ideas of his 
own, it becomes harder to realise him positively and truly. 
It is much easier to deal generously with the fighting 
qualities of an enemy than with the motives which in- 
duced him to fight. It is much easier, therefore to draw 
a picture of Burr than of Jefferson ; for in the case of Burr 
it was only his personal ambition which entered into the 
conflict, while in the case of Jefferson it was not only his 
personal ambition, but probably to quite as great an extent 
his political ideas and sympathies. 

And there is this further consideration, that even im- 
partial history is apt to be unfair to the opposition, when 
the matter under discussion is a series of events upon which 
the world has already formed a favourable and final judg- 
ment. Between the founder of a state and the eccentric 
human creature, stuffed with an honest conceit, who de- 
noimces the great idea on some ground of particular injustice, 
there is not that tremendous moral gulf which the dramatic 



448 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

brush of history has painted. The good congressmen who 
formed the opinion that Washington was a poor soldier, who 
intrigued against him at the height of his difficulties, who 
stinted his supplies and obstructed his endeavours; the 
loyal opposition who were quite ready to deal with Pitt and 
Wellington as malefactors, and hailed any victory of the 
French with far greater joy than a feat of British arms, — 
all these were fairly honest people in their way, and not so 
very different, merely as human units, from their opponents. 
But history is mainly concerned with other things than 
the psychology of human units, and leaves the study of it to 
novelists and poets. If a man has chosen to play a part 
upon the larger stage, and by ill-luck or a natural propensity 
has chosen the wrong part, he is damned beyond redemption. 
History will not waste her time in finding an excuse for him 
merely because he was a good father, a faithful husband, or 
a punctual discharger of his debts. Development is a rough 
force, and if any man has obstructed it, he may not expect 
to be remembered kindly or with honour by posterity. 



CHAPTER II 

Whig or Tory ? 

Until the Federalist party was formed Hamilton described 
himself as a Whig ; and although, like Burke, he considered 
that the French Revolution could claim no affinity with his 
political faith, it is probable that he would have maintained 
himself to be a true Whig to the end of his days. 

Even in the flux of politics it is possible to attach a 
certain general meaning to the party labels. If, at the 
particular moment, there is often a confusion which obscures 
the underlying principles, at the end of each epoch things 



CONCLUSION 449 

settle down and become clearer. If the terms Wliig and 
Tory stand for any essential differences in human thought, 
if they are anything better than mere rosettes or favours, 
Hamilton was not a Whig, but a Tory. It must be 
added that he was a Tory of the type which great Tory 
statesmen have beheld in their dreams, but have rarely, if 
ever, attained to under the conditions of party government 
His achievements began before government by parties had 
got to work. Although the greater part of his public life 
was spent in a bitter contest, hand to hand, the system of 
faction was not fully accepted as an institution until his 
retirement. Whether he could have kept his political faith 
so consistently in later days is open to doubt. What is 
certain about his actual career is that his ideal never wore a 
mask or suffered any kind of compromise. 

The fact that Hamilton called himself a Whig does not 
count for much one way or the other. All men who engaged 
in the rebellion assumed the same title, partly for the 
reason that the Whig party in Britain was notoriously in 
sympathy with their demands, their methods and even with 
their arms ; but partly also from the belief that their own 
revolution was founded upon the ' glorious ' principles of 
1688. But when the war was ended, when the interest 
shifted from a struggle with external enemies to problems of 
a different order, when the chief questions which demanded 
consideration were those concerned with a settled and 
permanent foundation, the inadequacy of the Whig cockade 
became apparent. The Federalists and the Democrats might 
dispute about their rights in the political tradition, but it is 
clear that the latter had the juster claim. 

The names Whig and Tory are not used here with any 
partisan intention. The controversy is ancient, and the 
descriptions themselves are nearly obsolete. The former 
title, indeed, has almost turned into a term of general abuse. 

2 F 



450 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

It is not intended to claim the shelter of Hamilton's great 
authority for all the preposterous propaganda which at 
various times, under the pressure of opportunism or by the 
misfortune of blindness, have been temporarily associated 
with Toryism. But if we pierce to the core of those prin- 
ciples which have been devoutly held by the noblest spirits 
in the opposing parties, we must recognise an essential 
difference and antagonism. 

Hamilton's love for his country was always greater than 
his love for his countrymen. The emotional side of his 
nature was stirred by the idea of a nation, rather than by 
the interests or sufferings of the various masses or classes of 
which every nation is composed. He was humane, but he 
was never the philanthropist. At the sight of disorder and 
injustice he was not swept away by a passionate impatience, 
but viewed the nature of the evils with a relentless scrutiny. 
Against the doctrine that some alleviation must immediately 
be discovered, he was usually found in opposition. His 
enemies alleged, untruthfully, that his heart was incapable 
of a generous impulse. What they meant was that he was 
incapable of acting upon the spur of the moment under no 
guidance save that of his emotions. His aim was always a 
complete and permanent cure. He distrusted palliatives 
and temporary expedients. He would not put forward a 
remedy for any particular trouble until he had convinced 
himself that the means proposed would work in harmony 
with the general principles of his policy. 

Hamilton's idea of statesmanship was the faithful steward- 
ship of the estate. His duty was to guard the estate, and, 
at the same time, to develop its resources. He viewed man- 
kind and natural riches as material to be used, with the 
greatest possible energy and with the least possible waste, 
for the attainment of national independence, power and 
permanency. A means to this end was certainly the pros- 



CONCLUSION 451 

perity of the people, but the end itself was the existence of 
a nation. The emotional spring or motive of his endeavours 
was not a passionate love or pity for his fellow-creatures, but 
an overwhelming sense of duty towards his Creator, whose 
providence had appointed him to the stewardship. This 
attitude may justly be described as beneficent; but, beyond 
doubt, it is not the attitude of the philanthropist or of the 
eighteenth-century Whig. 

His foreign policy was dominated by the same principle. 
The nation had been given into his hands, and the task of 
keeping it secure was one sufficient for his powers. What 
happened to other nations was the care and concern of other 
stewards. He had private sympathies with France and 
Frenchmen, and to a considerably less extent with England 
and Englishmen ; but these feelings were never allowed to 
interfere with the performance of what he considered to be 
his duty as a steward. He judged that the task to which 
the Almighty had appointed him was, not to put the whole 
world right, but to keep his own country safe. The view of 
the philanthropist is widely different. During the ferment 
of the French Revolution the steadfast refusal of Hamilton 
to consider anything but the wellbeing of his own nation 
was freely judged to be inhuman. The Whig spirit con- 
demned him as a cold and selfish schemer. His enemies 
had abundant excuse for their attacks, since they believed 
sincerely that an opportunity had offered itself of changing 
the whole order of human institutions for the great advan- 
tage of the race. Hamilton profoundly disbelieved in this 
opinion, and held unmoved upon his course. 

The final test of Toryism, according to some critics, is the 
belief in Divine Right. " The divine right of kings," Disraeli 
wrote, "may have been a plea for feeble tyrants, but the 
* divine right of government is the keystone of human pro- 
*gress." Hamilton believed in the divine right of government 



452 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

with his whole heart. The right to enforce order and to 
compel men to live justly, he derived, not from the interests 
of the people, but from the ordinances of God. The forms 
of government without an upholding tradition were useless 
phrases. That the leaders of men should trim their sails to 
popularity was in his view a fatal abdication. Human society 
was something nobler than a mere convenience, a nation 
something greater than the sum of its subjects. One of the 
duties of the state was the wellbeing of its citizens, but the 
whole duty of every citizen was the wellbeing of the state. 

The reason of Hamilton's increasing honour is the endur- 
ance of his handiwork. The constitution, after more than a 
century of stress and rough weather, is stronger than it was 
at the beginning. The public credit is still based upon the 
foundations which he laid. Foreign relations continue to be 
governed by the principles which he sacrificed popularity to 
uphold. The growth of population and prosperity which he 
foresaw has come to pass. Men did not choose to follow the 
guidance of his sane and moderate maxims for the regula- 
tion of commerce, but at any rate they lived and did their 
work under the shelter of those institutions which he had 
the chief share in moulding. He prevailed upon his fellow- 
countrymen to make a trial of union, and b}^ the audacity of 
his procedure he filled a written charter with the spirit of 
life. He left things better than he found them ; firm insti- 
tutions to replace a quarrelsome anarchy; a wide co- 
operation instead of an insensate independence ; a proud 
nation and a noble tradition where there had been but an 
angry strife between ' thirteen jarring states.' If a states- 
man has achieved these things, his lovers may view with 
equanimity his failure in all meaner contests. 

Anything which has stood — a tradition of conduct or the 
fabric of an empire — compels our admiration w^ith little 



CONCLUSION 453 

regard for our personal interest or national pride. A true 
instinct of mankind insists on homage to those great spirits 
who have built enduring monuments. The mere permanence 
is proof of a certain magnanimity in the author. Our imagina- 
tion working backwards to the confusion of the particular 
time discovers in each case the same group of qualities — 
a true judgment, without which the work must have 
crumbled in a few seasons; fortitude which overcame the 
doubts of men and difficulties of the material; a grim 
patience that refused to abandon hope even in the blank 
spaces of dull stagnation and dreary vigilance. If an institu- 
tion has stood, we assume that it must in some way or 
another be harmonious with the divine purpose of the 
world, 

American union, order and good husbandry of the estate 
make so strong a vision, the memory of enmity and defeat 
is by comparison so faint a shadow, that no competition 
is possible between them. In our tribute, therefore, to 
Washington and Hamilton, nothing is kept back. And 
even in the case of Germany, which is more recent, our 
admiration for the great minister who, with so great odds 
against him, crowned his sovereign and his policy of union 
in the Hall of Mirrors is not hindered by any conflict of 
national aims. The reason is not difficult to find. These 
men, in their various ways, did the work which, when 
once it is done, the world readily acknowledges to be 
the greatest. They subdued the forces of disunion, and 
reduced the most jealous and reluctant interests to a 
serviceable harmony. 

Hamilton discovered, as others before and since have also 
discovered, that there are two opposite forces to be reckoned 
with when it is a question of drawing together a loose 
federation into a nation or an empire : the centrifugal and 
the centripetal, the forces of disunion and union. 



454 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

Local sympathies, as well as the interest of mediocrity, 
are strongly enlisted on the side of the former. They are 
in favour of flying apart, of the independence of sections, 
of devolution and separation. They pretend to be satisfied 
with some sentimental phrase as a bond of union. Antici- 
pating, in the case of any change, a future all in black, they 
grow impatient as their imaginations conjure up a picture 
of the apathy, ignorance and incompetence of a strong 
central government. Running through everything is a 
tendency on the part of individuals who are unhopeful 
or unambitious of distinction on the greater stage to cling 
to and magnify their offices under a number of smaller 
sovereignties. 

On the other hand, in the minds of the people at large, 
unconcerned with any thought of posts or privileges, when 
they judge the matter disinterestedly in a cool hour, the 
idea of union — the centripetal idea — is ever predominant. 
The instinct of civilisation, seeking security and justice, is 
towards co-operation. But it is a vague and inarticulate 
instinct, easy to overcome by sophistry, or by appeals to 
prejudice, vanity and discontent. The issue of the contest 
between these two forces is never a foregone conclusion. 
Among Americans, at the end of the eighteenth century, the 
centripetal was victorious. In the British empire, at the 
beginning of the twentieth, the result is still hanging on 
the balance. 



CHAPTER III 

Union and its DifficvXties 

In the United States, from the Declaration of Indepen- 
dence onwards for twelve years until the constitution was 
accepted, the sentiment in favour of union in the abstract 



CONCLUSION 455 

was practically universal. No man dared get up boldly and 
proclaim himself an advocate of disintegration. But disputes 
began so soon as it came to a definition of terms. The end 
was willed sincerely enough, but not the means to it. In 
popular debate every plan put forward was riddled with 
objections. The British people, at any rate, need have little 
difficulty in understanding such a situation, since for many 
years they have been living in a similar one. The ordinary 
man in a serious mood has no hesitation in preferring a firm 
union to an uncertain union or to disintegration. His view 
is that ours would be a better empire if it were a real 
empire ; if all its countries were bound inseparably together, 
sharing their burdens, aiming at a development of the whole, 
offering the swift opposition of a united government and 
coherent institutions to every threat of foreign aggression. 
He would be happier in his mind if he were certain that we 
were one people as much in times of peace, as at those rare 
moments of high emotion which are the result of danger, 
grief, or victory. Such is the natural mood of his mind. 
He is vague, but altogether sincere. It is not his business 
to think things out ; and the foundations of his belief are 
therefore easily unsettled by the first fluent person who, 
having put instinct contemptuously on one side, does his 
thinking on the squares of a draught-board. 

This universal, timid adhesion to the principle of union 
was the material out of which Washington and Hamilton 
sought to create a strong nation. The widespread distrust 
of all means calculated to secure this end was the force 
which had to be subdued. As in the case of Moses and 
Aaron, plagues came to their aid ; but the achievement of 
union grew each year more difficult owing to the continu- 
ance of disunion. Every inconvenience, distress and disaster 
was adroitly charged by the opponents of union, not, as 
they should have been, against the condition of impotence 



456 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

which prevailed, but against the folly, or arrogance, or 
selfishness, or fraud of each neighbour state. The spirit of 
criticism among the thirteen separate sovereignties was 
by this means fanned into prejudice, and prejudice into 
enmity. When any state for a moment seemed to be 
favourable to a closer union, its motives were immediately 
impugned. It was suggested that it sought a mean profit by 
diminishing the natural advantages of its rivals. New York, 
rejoicing in a harbour and a judicious tariff, bled its less 
fortunate neighbours at its leisure, resented as a matter 
of honour any alteration of so lucrative a system, and made 
its fiscal independence a condition in every scheme of union. 
Any suggestion to the contrary was resented as the gospel 
of spoliation. 

The case of New York was no exception. The whole 
atmosphere was charged with the imputation of mean 
motives, selfish interests and sordid considerations. Charges 
and counter-charges of narrowness, provincialism and a lack 
of generosity were freely bandied about. Certain states, it 
was alleged, had failed to make a fair contribution to the 
expenses of the war. Certain others would not bear their 
proper burden in the cost of government. Some were 
oblivious to the dangers of foreign aggression, and viewed 
with apathy the injuries which might thereby accrue to 
their fellow-members of the confederacy. Some, again, 
called out for treaties to secure* their commerce, but found 
their reasonable demands obstructed by states which had no 
interest in trade. 

The contemplation of our neighbours' shortcomings is not 
the likeliest road to union. Hamilton denounced the ten- 
dency. AVashington dealt with it in the grand manner, 
looking over its head and affecting to ignore it. To our 
own ears there is a curious familiarity in the phrases. 
Narrowness, provincialism, the shirking of burdens, an in- 



CONCLUSION 457 

difference to tlie wider issues, are trite enough accusations 
in our own morning newspapers. There is something start- 
hng in the echo of history describing a struggle which took 
place more than a century ago. 

Before we bandy reproaches of this kind it is well to 
realise that there are dangers in doing so. If the charges 
were entirely true, which they never are, it would be only a 
degree less criminal to put them forward. We may be sure 
that they will speedily beget counter-charges, and we may 
also be sure that there is another side to our own estimate 
of our own virtues. The average Briton is convinced that 
he understands his own character and is the victim of no 
illusions in regard to it. He sees himself in the looking- 
glass of his mind a free-handed, hot-tempered, magnanimous 
fellow ; businesslike, incorrigibly tenacious, and entirely free 
from pedantry, except with regard to the strict interpreta- 
tion of his own promises. He is, of course, aware that 
foreign nations affect at times to hold a different opinion ; 
but he believes them to be insincere, or charitably excuses 
them on the plea of envy, ignorance, or ill-temper. 

He is proud of his colonies, but in the ordinary way he 
does not read their newspapers. If he did, he would be 
shocked and surprised to find that not only the friends of 
disintegration, but honest, impatient persons who still cling 
to the idea of a united empire, regard his character under a 
different aspect. To a considerable section of the Australian 
people he is held up weekly as a hypocritical usurer, a 
grasping mortgagee, eternally preaching sermons about thrift 
and integrity with the object of securing the punctual pay- 
ment of interest which is due to him. Even his name 
suffers the indignity of an addition meant to be unflattering : 
he is not plain 'John Bull,' but 'John Bull-Cohen.' To 
many of his South African kinsmen he figured, before 
the war and possibly to some extent still, as a timid and 



458 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

vacillating professor, arguing ever in phrases and con- 
temptuously ignorant of the facts. In Canada there are 
many who consider him to be of weak intellect, capable of 
being ' bluffed ' into any sacrifice providing it is at the 
expense of his friends and not of himself. If John Bull 
were to go into retreat with a bundle of such criticisms, and 
were to study them patiently until he came to an under- 
standing of the element of truth there is in each unfavour- 
able picture, he might be less ready to endure the superior 
and often pharisaical commentaries with which certain news- 
papers and politicians in his own island are prone to improve 
every occasion. Finding his own motives misunderstood 
by the captious sections of colonial opinion, he might 
coolly consider if perchance the cause of the misunder- 
standing is not to be found in utterances which he has 
warmly applauded. Criticism which is not meant to im- 
prove a man, but to hurt his feelings and disturb his peace, 
rarely fails to attain its object. He is less likely to strive 
after self-improvement than to engage in recrimination, 
and once this dangerous game begins, the enemies of union, 
of whom there are many in these kingdoms and throughout 
the empire, have an easy task in feeding the flame with 
fresh fuel. 

The worst difficulties of Washington and Hamilton were 
of this class. In their case, however, matters were both 
more confused and more acute than in our own. There 
were thirteen critics and thirteen subjects for criticism, and 
no state was ignorant of the unflattering opinions held of it 
by its neighbours. It is not hard therefore to sympathise 
with the wrath of Washington and Hamilton against the 
mischief-makers. From a frequent contemplation of our 
own imperfections much good may ensue. From the 
vigorous analysis and setting forth of the imperfections of 
persons with whom we wish to make a solemn compact, 



CONCLUSION 459 

the method is without merit, and malice is ever on the 
watch to profit by the evil it creates. 

The maker of empire wisely and deliberately miscalcu- 
lates. He ignores and shuts out from view a thousand 
plausible arguments and undeniable facts, not because he is 
without reverence for truth, but because the arguments and 
facts are useless for his purpose and therefore irrelevant. 
The complaints of one state against another, even when 
they were just, Washington viewed as bad building material 
for the edifice he had it in his mind to construct, and 
having come to this judgment, he put them quietly aside 
as often as they came under his hand. 

Allowing the case of the United States to be no precedent 
for our guidance, it must not therefore be assumed that their 
difficulties were less formidable than our own. Indeed, in 
many matters of high importance the contrary was the 
fact. There is no such ill-feeling between the states which 
compose the British Empire to-day as that which existed 
between New York or Massachusetts and the respective 
neighbours of each. There is also a pride which is very 
serviceable; a pride not merely in the vague idea of an 
empire which covers all, but a more intimate, keen and 
particular pride which is taken in the achievements of 
each member of the empire by all the rest. Had Hamilton 
been equally fortunate in his conditions, there would have 
been less distinction in his achievement. It is no ex- 
aggeration to say that the hatred of state against state 
blazed out at various times between 1783 and 1788 with 
a fury which certainly was never surpassed by the popular 
feeling against Britain. War was actually threatened, and 
within an ace of being declared, between members of the 
confederacy; and not war merely for the sake of State 
Rights and to prevent the Union, but in order to avenge 
what were felt to be burning injuries. 



460 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

In the matter of remoteness from one another and from 
any common centre, the thirteen states were at an im- 
mense disadvantage as compared with ourselves. Whether 
we consider the time necessary for the transmission of news 
or for the conveyance of citizens from one point to another ; 
whether we calculate by the danger of the journey or by its 
relative cost, the conditions upon which Americans had the 
courage to undertake a union were miserably inferior to our 
own. We are inclined to think and talk as if telegraphy 
and railroads had been then invented, and tend unconsciously 
to compare the case of a new country to-day, where these 
means of development form part of any reasonable fore- 
cast, with that of America at the end of the eighteenth 
century, where they were not so much as dreamed of. 

In 1787 Boston was as far removed from Philadelphia 
merely in time as New York is to-day from London ; South 
Carolina as remote as Cape Town. Measured in certainty, 
comfort, or safety of travel, Boston and South Carolina were 
far further removed from the common centre. Relatively 
to the standard of wealth, the expense of such journeys 
was much greater. The remotest dependencies of Great 
Britain are more accessible to-day than were then the 
states to north and south along the Atlantic Coast, with- 
out reckoning the ironbound separation of the east from 
the settlements in the Mississippi valley. Bad roads, rivers 
without bridges or ferries, roving Indians, and democrats who 
combined principle with plunder in their warfare against 
men who dared to travel in their own coaches, created an 
isolation which it is difficult now even to imagine. 

But the great inferiority of the Union was in communica- 
tions. The thought or decision which within a day is now 
flashed to every main outpost of the British Empire Avould 
have taken weeks or months to penetrate into the chief 
cities of the union. A swift understanding between the 



CONCLUSION 461 

states was entirely out of the question. Simultaneous feel- 
ing or utterance could not exist. And yet, in spite of this 
tremendous disadvantage, Americans ventured boldly upon 
an experiment which has succeeded. The country which at 
the same moment of time is capable of being stirred by the 
same impulse throughout its length and breadth, is surely 
wanting in faith and resolution if it puts forward the plea of 
miles as an obstacle to union. 



CHAPTER IV 

Nationality and Enipire 

There is an essential difference between the problem which 
Hamilton set himself to solve and that which we have to 
consider at the present time. His aim was to make a nation : 
our aim is to make an empire. The word ' empire ' figures 
constantly in his writings, but the meaning which he 
attaches to it is merely that of a vast extent of territory. It 
is a synonym for a great nation in contrast with a small one. 
The force of nationality did not enter into his calculations, 
or if he considered it at all, his object was to nip the idea in 
the bud. The principle of separate nationality was the 
enemy of his poHcy, and he sought by every means in his 
power to destroy it. 

In our case any scheme of empire which should ignore 
the force of nationalities is predestined to ruin. But it 
was different with Hamilton. His aim was practicable, and 
in a great measure, though not altogether, he achieved it. 
He did not love the states. Their meanness and vanity, 
in his judgment, had completely overlaid their virtues. 
He was ruthless to their plea of separate sovereignty, and 
equally contemptuous of their sentiment for local tradi- 
tions. His one aim was strong government, for he had 



462 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

suffered much from a weak one. We view the problem 
with different eyes. Local tradition has a certain degree of 
sanctity. The principle of nationality is welcomed, not only 
because it is inevitable, but for the further reason that in 
the huge body of an empire it is the only means to preserve 
vitality. If we would we cannot put it on one side, and if we 
could no one but an academic architect in pasteboard would 
regard it in the light of an advantage. Nationality is a 
bugbear and a stumbling-block to the impatient reformer ; 
to the rhetorical man of feeling it is an end in itself; but to 
the statesman who has the skill to use it, it is possibly a 
way to the widest and the firmest union the world has ever 
known. 

The one thing which is harder to deal with in our own 
case than in that of the Americans is nationality. The 
long growth and establishment of the states, which must 
be parties to the intended union, are at the same time 
our hardest problem and our strongest hope. Between 
the Declaration of Indeioendence and the Convention of 
Philadelphia there was an interval of only twelve years: 
between the War of Independence and the present time 
a period of a century and a quarter has elapsed. Hamilton 
had to deal with saplings that could be pleached and 
trained. Our task is with older and tougher timber. If 
the British Colonies possess a less definite sovereignty than 
the thirteen states, they are much more certainly inde- 
pendent nations. Indifference, faint-heartedness and the 
obscure vision of our ministers, working in alliance with the 
estranging seas and the long lapse of time, have built up, 
during the nineteenth century, a proud and almost a 
ferocious self-reliance. 

The difficulty arising out of the maturity of the timber is 
the creation of the nineteenth century. That period of time, 
if we may personify it, was used to think and speak with 



CONCLUSION 463 

much complacency of its achievements in the matter of 
colonial policy. It was firmly persuaded that the main 
characteristics of this policy were a lofty wisdom and a 
serene generosity, and that the success of its administration 
was no less conspicuous than the virtue of its methods. 

The new century is like a young heir, confident that he 
can do better with the estate. Bringing a fresh mind to 
bear, he jumps to the conclusion that things have been 
wofully mismanaged and ill-developed, and kept back and 
under in a thousand ways. Filled with eager projects of 
improvement he is apt to be irreverent towards the ideas of 
his predecessor ; but it is better that he should be irreverent 
than a sluggard, content to let everything alone, loving his 
ease, and well satisfied with his income. It is less important 
that he should be respectful than that he should be bold ; 
and in a young heir the two qualities are seldom found 
together. 

It is difficult to withhold our sympathy from the impatient 
thinkers of the new school who demand contemptuously to 
have the wisdom of the colonial policy of Britain from 
Grey to Gladstone explained to them. The Radical party 
alone, during this period, appears to have been possessed 
firmly by any ideal — the ideal of Bright, which aimed at 
sending out strong sons into the world, encouraging them to 
be self-reliant, wishing them as soon as possible to become 
independent, and hoping sincerely they might turn out a 
credit to the family. 

But this, it is hardly necessary to say, was not the Whig 
ideal, if indeed the existence of an ideal is not inconsistent 
with the just conception of a modern Whig. The Whigs, who 
entertained a timid preference for union in the abstract, 
were terrified by the least murmur of discontent or threat 
of separation. In a manner at once lavish and ungracious, 
grudging yet hasty, they gave away concessions which, by 



464 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

impoverisliing sovereignty, made steadily for the disintegra- 
tion of the empire. They pretended to beUeve that these 
concessions, made under the unmistakable influence of their 
fears, would nevertheless stamp the magnanimity of British 
statesmen upon the minds of her colonists, and reap in the 
fulness of time a great harvest of gratitude. The empire 
was not then invented, but the tie of union could, in their 
opinion, only be maintained by sentiment. They were full 
of contempt for new institutions, and of distrust for old 
ones. 

The Tories, who never tired of heaping ridicule upon this 
strange jargon of empty phrases, who questioned its sincerity 
and loaded it with accusations of hypocrisy and cowardice, 
do not themselves cut a glorious, or even a very creditable, 
figure. If we may speak of them in their own harsh terms, 
they were no less open than the Whigs to the charge of 
cowardice ; while, if they may escape that of hypocrisy, it is 
only because the excuses and justifications offered for their 
acts and negligences were the mere mumblings of an old 
official ritual ; conventions which imposed on no man, for 
the reason that all meaning in them was dead. Their whole 
behaviour during this period is not unlike the inarticulate 
anger of a bullock driven to a market, which some instinct 
warns him may lead eventually to the slaughter-house. 

The real opposition was between the Radicals and the 
Tories. Between Bright and Lord Derby there was no 
agreement save in their common contempt for the windy 
pretensions of the Whigs. But Bright held the advantage 
and won, in the sense that he brought ojDinion over to his 
side, because he had an idea sufficiently noble to stir the 
hearts of men, when contrasted with a gospel that dared not 
make a positive appeal, but relied upon mere negation. 
The Radical aim is worthy of honour in comparison with 
the cheap criticisms which assailed it. It was misled by 



CONCLUSION 465 

the false light of a metaphor, and foundered on the rocks 
of ignorance. You cannot argue from family life to 
national affairs. Sturdy sons launched into the world, and 
thriving colonies encouraged to cut themselves adrift, make 
an alluring but a false analogy. To ignore the changes that 
were working round slowly among the kingdoms and 
republics of the world upon a well-beaten road of history ; 
to believe that the ambitions of men and races of men were 
moving speedily to extinction under the benign spell of 
commerce ; not to foresee that the dominant force in inter- 
national affairs was not the multiplication of peaceful 
Switzerlands and Hollands, but the consolidation of little 
states into great empires, may fairly be termed ignorance 
when the matter under consideration is the action of a great 
statesman, who more profoundly than any other affected the 
ideas of his fellow-countrymen for the quarter of a century 
which ended in 1880. 

It must be clearly understood, that when men now speak 
with complacency of British colonial policy during the nine- 
teenth century, it is precisely the action or inaction of the 
Whigs and the Tories that they are regarding. For the 
policy of Bright, which alone is worthy of praise, has been 
expressly disavowed. Every one shrinks away with horror 
from the idea of separation. There is something marvellous 
in the quiet and complete disappearance of this idea. It 
could not be killed by criticism; but it died immediately, 
unnoticed, almost without a struggle upon the appearance 
of the counter-idea. 

The action of the Whigs and the Tories — though it is a 
hard judgment — appears to us to merit all the abuse 
which they poured out so lavishly upon one another, which 
Radicals, confident in a making-tide, poured out upon both. 
The only puzzle is this new-fangled admiration for things 
which no one, not even the actors themselves, believed 

2a 



466 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

in while they lasted. At best their wisdom was but 
negative. It is wise to know what you yourself are unable 
to do ; but it is rash always to assume that the thing is 
therefore impossible. In this limited sense alone was 
British colonial policy at all worthy of praise. Being afraid, 
at least it had the wisdom not to try to appear brave, or to 
attempt the heroic in anything. 

As a result of the wisdom of Wliigs and Tories during the 
nineteenth century our self-governing colonies are indepen- 
dent nations in all but name ; or perhaps it would be more 
true to say, in all but their loyalty to the idea of a united 
empire, which is in no sense the work either of Whigs or 
Tories but of destiny. The situation is vastly more complex 
than that of the American States, and being more complex 
it demands a simpler solution. 



CHAPTER V 

Cotnmerce under Two Aspects 

Hamilton is remarkable among statesmen for the wide 
extent of his endeavours, and fortunate in having left 
behind him enough work — done, half done, and attempted 
— to make us certain of the vision which possessed his 
mind. A commercial system was an important part of his 
plan of national policy. 

He held no brief for manufactures, merchanting, or agri- 
culture. His aim was a balance, and his idea of the duty of 
the state was to regulate a just and proportionate develop- 
ment all along the line. He was no advocate of protection 
for the benefit of any trade or interest unless the advantage 
of the community as a whole appeared to him to be involved 
in such a course. If it be true that the tendency of modern 
American legislation has been to consider the prosperity 



CONCLUSION 467 

of certain classes as an end in itself, and to ignore the equal 
and concurrent development of other branches of industry, 
his name cannot be invoked. The goal of his policy was 
a nation supplying the whole of its own needs, which should 
be independent of foreign countries for its means of subsis- 
tence and even for its luxuries. The aim may be open to 
attack on various grounds ; but in view of the variety of soil 
and climate which is covered by the United States, it cannot 
be set aside on the ground that it was impracticable. Nor 
can it be argued against him that individual effort would 
have been adequate to the task, or that there was any hope 
of accomplishing it without the intervention of the state. 

Like Adam Smith, Hamilton was keenly alive to the advan- 
tage of the double bargain. Assuming that in any exchange 
both parties as a rule are benefited, he considered that it 
was an advantage to any country if both parties were 
citizens of that country. If a grower of wheat required a 
pair of boots, it was better if he bought them from an 
American cobbler than from a German, for then the profits 
on both transactions remained in the States. 

The wealth of a nation, according to his philosophy, 
could never be gauged merely by an addition of the private 
fortunes of its inhabitants. It was necessary to regard the 
manner in which their capital was employed and invested. 
From the statesman's point of view a man who had a million 
sterling fixed in foreign securities, of one kind or another, 
was a much less valuable asset in computing the wealth of 
the nation than one who was employing the same sum, or 
even an immensely smaller sum, in mills or farms in his 
own country. Even if the income of the former citizen 
were greater in amount, he was still immeasurably inferior in 
the imperial balance-sheet. The wealth of a community 
is to be reckoned mainly by the sums which are fixed within 
its own borders, giving employment to its own workers. 



468 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

The wealtli of individuals, in so far as it is placed abroad, 
is of little value except to the individual investor and to 
the fortunate country which he is assisting to develop. 
The manner of the investment is the all-important question 
for the statesman whose unit is the nation he is called upon 
to govern. The mere amount of it is irrelevant. To the 
economist, on the other hand, who regards the whole world 
as the unit, and not any single country, the manner is of 
subordinate interest ; the chief object is the amount. 

The belief that commerce between nations is a safeguard 
of peace has had a remarkable influence upon the policy of 
Britain. The proposition cannot stand historical scrutiny. 
Commerce has no more to do with peace than it has with 
war; or perhaps it would be juster to say that in its nature 
it has much to do with both. So long as the relations of 
two men or of two nations can be kept mainly to the inter- 
change of goods of one class against goods of another class, 
commerce is akin to peace, and is a strong influence in 
maintaining it between the two parties. But when this 
relation alters, and from being seller and buyer they become 
rival sellers, it is akin to war. The former of these cases, the 
peaceful relation of buyers and sellers, held good in the main 
when Britain first accepted free-trade as a practical rule of 
statesmanship. We supplied the world with manufactures, 
and received in return raw materials and food. The wealth 
of Britain was for the moment admirably served by the new 
arrangement. Ideas of national development were then 
unfashionable. Any imperial system, or plan of regulating 
commerce in order to promote political strength, seemed, 
in the warmth and effulgence of a sudden prosperity, to be 
a rude device of antiquated error and more savage times. 
The policy of Britain from the beginning of the sixteenth 
to the middle of the nineteenth century was suddenly and 
somewhat too hastily discovered to have been a colossal 



CONCLUSION 469 

error. No authority could save it from derision. No prac- 
tice, however successful, in Britain or elsewhere, was deemed 
worthy of respectful consideration. 

As years have rolled slowly by, the aspect of things has 
insensibly undergone a change. The growth of the imperial 
idea throughout the world, the consolidation of races, hitherto 
held loosely together by treaties or traditions, have become an 
articulate ambition. The utility of commerce as a means of 
binding together, strengthening and developing each separate 
empire against the world outside it, has gradually come to 
be accepted everywhere save in our own two islands. The 
other states which are united under the British crown have 
unanimously rejected our economic creed, and have used the 
force of commerce in order to make nations, since it had 
been despised and discarded for the purpose of making an 
empire. 

Concern for the maximum prosperity of mankind as a 
whole has ceased to colour with the faintest tinge the 
policies of nations. The ideal which for a brief time men 
entertained when the Crystal Palace was set up in Hyde 
Park, an ideal of national boundaries crumbling into ana- 
chronisms, of armies and fleets melting into legend, under 
the influence of a tepid fraternity and the interchange of 
commodities, is now everywhere abandoned. It is useless 
any longer to pretend that commerce with free-trade as her 
handmaiden can act as a peacemaker when confronted with 
a universal array of deliberate, vigilant and self-conscious 
systems. Trade, and all that appertains to it, is recognised 
by intelligent rulers to be the most powerful instrument of 
empire. It is restricted indeed, but most lovingly cherished. 
If it cannot make a full boast of freedom, at least it is pros- 
perous, and to such a degree that many people are in doubt 
whether under the economic as well as under the pohtical 
aspect there is not an advantage in restraints on liberty. 



470 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

In a comparatively short space of time a great change lias 
come over the appearance of international aifairs. Before 
the end of the nineteenth century the greater part of man- 
kind had returned to the views of earlier epochs. The 
peaceful tendency of commerce is now less triumphantly 
insisted upon. To foreign competition, rightly or wrongly, 
are attributed the phenomena of mills standing idle, and a 
large number of millions of our population on the verge, 
as it is alleged, of starvation. The explanation may con- 
ceivably be erroneous. Not foreign competition, but some 
accident or folly may be the true cause ; but the fact still 
remains as we have stated it, that commerce appears to the 
average Englishman of to-day to be less akin to peace than 
it did to his radiant ancestors in the sixties and seventies. 
Its accent is no longer friendship, and if it is not actually 
hostility, it has moved a long way in that direction. 

Owing to the growth of the imperial idea on the one hand, 
and to the rivalry of commerce on the other, the firmest 
rule of business among private men has risen into a great 
pohtical importance. The merchant or manufacturer cannot 
afford to buy in the cheapest market if the cheapest market 
happens to be the shop of a rival trader. He does not hesitate 
to put temptation on one side, and to buy at a dearer rate 
from some independent source, selling for the time being at 
the meagrest profit rather than strengthen the hands of a 
competitor. No trader is ignorant of the folly of increasing 
his rivals' output, enabling him thereby to cheapen still 
further the cost of his goods by swelling the scale of his 
operations. 

The practice of the individual merchant is not an infal- 
lible guide to the statesman who undertakes the regulation 
of commerce, but it is at least as valuable as the specula- 
tions of the student who proceeds upon the single motive of 
clear-sighted acquisitiveness. In the particular instance, 



CONCLUSION 471 

and granting, what it is impossible to deny, the existence of 
a strong and jealous national objective in other nations, the 
analogy of the trader appears to apply. Viewing the matter 
from the political standpoint, taking the nation, and not the 
world, as the unit whose strength and security it is the 
business of the statesman to consider, the trade relations of 
two independent countries stand upon an entirely different 
basis from those of allied states or of a mother country and 
her colonies. 

Trade relations between the states of the Union in 1787, 
between the German principalities before 1870, between the 
various dominions of the British crown to-day, were and are 
desirable without a single reservation. The danger of 
strengthening a rival does not enter into the consideration. 
The empire being the unit in each of these cases, the states, 
principalities and dominions have a common object — to 
increase the strength and prosperity of the whole. The 
policy of free intercourse is obviously sound. Its accom- 
plishment is by comparison more easy. Its results have a 
reasonable prospect of permanency. 

But in dealings with foreign nations, even if we ourselves 
are exempt from all jealousy and suspicion, and are content 
to treat the national object as a foolish fetish, the other 
party to the bargain is animated by a wholly different 
ambition. For while he is anxious to arrive at any arrange- 
ment which may assist the prosperity of his industrial 
classes, he has at the same time the second and predominant 
motive to increase the strength of his nation, relatively to 
the strength of other nations. The joint prosperity of the 
people of Great Britain and Canada may be fairly assumed 
to be the object of any wise statesman in either country; 
but the joint prosperity of Great Britain and Germany is 
not, as the world is now constituted, nearly so important a 
consideration as the relative superiority in riches and power 



472 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

of the one empire over the other. Each party is ea^er to 
conclude a favourable arrangement for commercial purposes, 
but will always keep an eye upon the political aim, and 
be jealous of strengthening the sinews of a rival, or of 
jeopardising his own empire as an independent, self-contained 
and self-sufficing unit. 

It would be no less absurd than unjust to hold the con- 
clusions of the classical economists up to a cheap scorn. 
Viewed in a proper relation to pubhc affairs, their labours 
have been of inestimable value. The quarrel, indeed, is rarely 
with the men themselves, but with their impatient and shallow 
misreaders who are unable to discriminate between the 
principles of a science and the maxims of an art, These 
disciples insist upon applying the cold conclusions of a study 
whose matter is the wealth of the world, as if they were 
practical rules for the government of each particular country. 
They judge action and test policies in the spirit of some 
nervous reader of a manual on chemistry who, having 
ascertained that arsenic is a poison, would therefore refuse 
to take it as a drug. 

In putting forward a plea for the respectful consideration 
of Hamilton's commercial policy, it is necessary to admit 
that he is in disagreement with the text-books. The 
national aim was everything in his philosophy. He had 
not lived long enough to see political economy uplifted into 
a religion. He took the science for what it was worth, 
grateful for what he could get out of it. Orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy in his day were terms of no meaning in this con- 
nection. When it served his purpose he made use of the 
science, but he would have viewed with astonishment any 
pretensions in it to dictate a course of political action. 

It has happened, rather unfortunately perhaps, that free- 
trade, which was a conclusion of the economists, has come 
to be a question between political parties. What is apt to 



CONCLUSION 473 

be forgotten is that the doctrine of laisser faire, or the 
devil-talce-the-hindmost, was equally an article of their 
faith in the days of orthodoxy's greatest splendour and 
authority. Political economy was as confident with regard 
to free-contract as with regard to free-trade. Socialists have 
made inroads upon the former doctrine, and no political 
partisan, however respectful to the early writers, is pre- 
pared to take up the position of Cobden in this matter. 
State regulation, which he denounced and deplored, is 
become the rule. The fanatics for free-trade have now to 
bend the knee to the Baal of factory acts and land purchase. 
Is the one contention truer than the other? From the 
principles of the classical economists it is certain that the 
one ensues as inevitably as the other. Logically the one 
is impossible without the support of the other. And for the 
purpose of governing a people to their best advantage the 
one is as unimportant as the other. Both are doomed to 
be overridden by a wise opportunism which, finding itself 
face to face with a hotchpotch of human affairs, has to make 
the best way it can out of the difficulty. 



CHAPTER VI 

Sovereignty 

Sovereignty is an essential condition of union. The 
authority of the Continental Congress during and after the 
War of Independence was not sovereignty. This body had 
a great nominal dignity. The roll of its functions was 
sonorous and imposing; but there was no reality, for it 
lacked the power to enforce its decrees. Compliance depended 
upon the pleasure of the separate states. Although charged 
with the conduct of the war, it could levy no taxes. 



474 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

Although congress was entitled to make treaties, the states 
could refuse to carry out the terms; nor had they any 
scruples in exercising their power. Congress could raise 
foreign loans so long as foreign creditors misunderstood the 
situation, but was without the means of discharging the 
debt or collecting the interest. At every turn it was checked 
and humiliated, till in the end it became a pure farce. Its 
attitude towards the states was that of a man, hat in hand, 
recommending, advising, imploring, and usually, after the 
war had ended, speaking to deaf ears. Without sovereignty, 
union is merely a figure of speech. The union of hearts, the 
tie of kinship, a common sentiment, were put forward, then 
as now, as something more potent than any formal bond. 
These were the phrases of diffidence, dreading a new 
departure, or of malice, veiled under a thin civility. From 
the statesman's point of view they were merely words. So 
far aB they corresponded with any genuine belief, they were 
but the raw materials of union, and not union itself; a 
quarry, not a house. 

In this important matter of sovereignty we are some- 
what further on the Avay than the Americans in 1787. 
Our aspiration towards the essential is acknowledged by 
our affection for the person and office of the King, and to a 
certain extent by the dignified pre-eminence of the British 
Cabinet. Popular opinion throughout the empire is not 
outraged by the idea of monarchy, or even by the thought 
of a strong central power. But the case with which 
Hamilton had to deal was very different. Not merely 
kingship, but any force in government was classed without 
discrimination under the head of tyranny. Tyranny was 
even alleged to be a danger inherent in all central power, 
whether the functions were exercised by one or many; 
whether the one or many took by inheritance, or were chosen 
by the broadest democratic suffrage ; whether the sovereign 



CONCLUSION 475 

authority were elected for life or for a single year. This 
dread of tyranny was the great fixed idea of the times, 
and the chief difficulty of the Federalist party was how to 
overcome it. At every turn we meet with the blind and 
disheartening argument that mere strength in government 
is identical with tyranny. Not only on the hustings, but in 
the speeches and letters of serious men, the question is 
constantly raised why the states, having but recently con- 
cluded a long and ruinous war to get rid of a foreign tyrant, 
should create and set up a domestic one in its stead. It is 
argued, with a dreary iteration, that the powers which the 
British Parliament sought to exercise would be no less 
odious and intolerable if exercised by a parliament elected 
by American citizens. 

When, however, we come to inquire closely into this 
matter of sovereignty, we are amazed to find how strong a 
likeness there is between the States of America before the 
Union and the British Empire at the present day. The 
difference lies in the dispositions of the two peoples, not 
in their political circumstances. In spite of our aspiration 
towards sovereignty (so strong and universal as almost to 
amount to a belief that somewhere in the empire a clear 
sovereignty does actually exist), in spite also of the fact that 
we are haunted by no fixed idea which confounds strong 
government with tyranny, we are victims of the same disease. 
There is no sovereignty. Everything hangs on sentiment, 
influence and management. In the Three Kingdoms 
sovereignty so far has not been impaired ; but outside 
these islands it is a very different matter. The theory of 
the empire seems hardly to have moved a step forward 
since the War of Independence. Now, as then, the King 
accepts the advice of the Prime Minister of Great Britain 
and Ireland. The Prime Ministers of his other dominions 
have no direct access to his confidence, and he is pre- 



476 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

eluded froni acting upon tlieir direction unless with the 
approval of the British Cabinet. Under the guidance of 
a dignified committee which meets in DoAvning Street, he 
conducts the whole foreign policy of the empire, declares 
war, or makes peace, or signs treaties whereof the con- 
sequences may affect the remotest regions of his realm. 
Under the same guidance he assents to or rejects the 
legislation of the self-governing colonies, approves the acts 
of the Indian Viceroy, and the measures devised by his 
Colonial Minister for the good government of the crown 
colonies and territories. 

The theory, indeed, of sovereignty is complete and 
without a flaw, but it is also startling if we view it from a 
democratic standpoint. The imperial sovereignty which is 
exercised in the name of the King actually resides in the 
British Prime Minister, a gentleman who holds his office 
at the pleasure of the majority of the British House of 
Commons. Therefore, in the ultimate appeal, a majority 
of British voters is the supreme power in the empire. One 
democracy — for the time being the most numerous — holds 
a sovereignty, not merely over those portions of the King's 
dominions where, as in the case of India, the form of govern- 
ment is frankly autocratic, but over other democracies whom 
we think of and who think of themselves as self-governing. 

It has been the subject of much discussion whether or 
not a democracy is capable of exercising the functions of a 
despot over subject races, and the matter is not yet at rest 
even with the example of India before our eyes. But what 
has never been questioned since the War of Independence is 
that a democracy pretending to a sovereignty over other 
democracies is either a phantom or the most intolerable 
of all oppressions. 

In regard to the foreign affairs of the empire, sovereignty 
appears to best advantage. But even here, when carefully 



CONCLUSION 477 

examined, its tenure is precarious, its warrant, in reason if 
not at law, is dubious. The true meaning of tlie situation 
is no less painful than it is plain. The most powerful 
member of a loose confederacy is content to defend her 
fellow-members from foreign attack for so long as they 
are willing to acquiesce in her policy. Those whom she 
so protects are on their part content to acquiesce in her 
policy, to risk a considerable danger, to forgo their share in 
an honourable authority, for the solitary advantage of the 
evasion of a pecuniary burden, if we believe the mischief- 
makers, or from a loyal confidence in the imperial intention, 
if we believe our own instincts. But what is clear equally to 
the optimist and the cynic is that the other states will cease 
to acquiesce at the moment when our foreign policy has the 
appearance of being in serious conflict with their interests or 
their honour. The equilibrium is so unstable that no argu- 
ment upon tradition can persuade us it has any of the 
elements of safety. Even with fine Aveather it is only a 
miracle that maintains it, and under rain or storm there 
must be a shifting of the balance that can have no issue but 
disintegration. 

Leaving foreign affairs upon one side, we are equally dis- 
mayed by the lack of any efficient check, not merely upon 
colonial legislation, but also upon purely British legislation. 
This want may imperil the very existence of the union if 
there is no power equal to the task of restraint or co- 
ordination; no courage equal to the exercise of such 
power; no judgment capable of directing the courage. 
And such is unfortunately the case. On British legislation 
there is not even a formal veto, while the veto upon 
colonial legislation is scrupulously preserved only because 
it is hardly ever exercised. Even if a colony desired to 
institute polygamy or slavery, or to practise repudiation, 
it would be a matter of the utmost delicacy to defeat its 



478 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

intention. For the exercise of the only veto which exists 
is, in plain words, the tyranny of one parliament over 
another — of one democracy over another. . 

The theory of the British constitution is, as it stands, 
clearly intolerable, except in disuse. The powers which are 
imagined to exist in it would never stand the strain of being 
put in force. The exercise of the legal right of veto would 
provoke greater and more just resentment than if the matter 
lay in the sole discretion of the King. The consequences 
being so obvious, we have declined upon a timid make- 
believe, and for the sake of peace and goodwill have laid 
sovereignty upon the shelf, regardless of the fact that 
sovereignty is the very essence of union. 

If the government of Great Britain and Ireland, which 
we term somewhat grandiosely the Imperial Parliament, 
desires anything to be done which requires colonial co- 
operation, it must go like the old Continental Congress, 
hat in hand, arguing, persuading, cajoling and entreating. 
By a fine tradition it has the full dignity of sovereignty ; but 
in reality it is as impotent as the Continental Congress, and 
only less ridiculous because it has learned from experience 
the timid wisdom not to court rebuffs. 

Our real reliance is upon the sentimental quality of each 
great emergency to produce a dramatic co operation. But 
it is wise to remember that in a dramatic impulse, though 
there is elan, there is not and cannot be much staying- 
power. The tie of affection or kinship is the raw material 
of union, not union itself. 'Influence' said Washington, 
' is not government.' A power which we refuse to influence 
we shall hardly grant to sentiment. The union we com- 
placently acknowledge is a mere shadow — not a political 
fact, but a poetical fancy. It has the health of an invalid 
who is free from pain so long as he will lie still in one 
position. Such is its present frailty, that in a protracted 



CONCLUSION 479 

struggle of varying fortune, it must almost inevitably fall 
asunder. 

The hope and strength of our great empire are in popular 
government, but the hope will be disappointed and the 
strength will fail if the need of a true sovereignty be over- 
looked. Sovereignty can never be secure while it rests 
upon a confusion of legal formulas and brittle sympathies ; 
but only when it has been founded boldly upon the free and 
deliberate choice of the citizens of the empire. 



CHAPTER VII 

TJie Duties of Empire 

Many ways have been tried to the millennium, but experi- 
ence has shown that no short cut leads there. There was 
the way of Rousseau, obliterating boundaries and distinctions 
by an appeal direct to the heart of humanity ; a great aim, 
that failed because it ignored the things which are Caesar's. 
There was the way in more recent times of what has been 
called the Manchester School, among whose teachers John 
Bright was incomparably the noblest spirit. As we look 
back upon the period between 1850 and 1880, we are con- 
scious of his moral force gradually increasing year by year, 
until finally, having converted not only the rank and file, 
but the leaders themselves, it came to dominate the policy 
of the whole Liberal party. The cause of his supremacy 
does not lie in any argument, but in a quiet dogmatism 
and the intense faith of a lofty and disinterested character. 
Almost alone among statesmen he had the courage to be a 
visionary. He sought peace in a world of many independent 
states, small or moderate in size, and he viewed commerce 
in rose-colour as a bond of amity. This way has also failed, 
partly for the reason that commerce is not any nearer kins- 



480 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

man of peace than it is of war ; partly also because, despite 
his sympathies with the North in the war of Secession, 
Bright was blind to the centripetal instinct, and negligent 
of the eternal ambition of great races. 

Rousseau saw a short path across a few green fields. 
Bright's road was somewhat longer, but it was well beaten 
highway and easy travelling. We have followed it now for 
two generations with a virtuous fortitude, but if we pause 
to look around us at the landmarks of the region, their 
appearance and position are disconcerting. Either they 
have shifted or else we ourselves have wandered circuit- 
ously ; for the goal is more remote than when we started 
upon our journey. 

Another way to the millennium has advocates who at 
least are not open to the reproach of coming to us with their 
hands full of alluring promises that are to be immediately 
fulfilled. Their goal is so far off that it can hardly enter 
into the calculations of any practical man who chooses the 
road. Only visionaries are confident that the peace of the 
world can be attained as the result of a balance among a few 
gigantic empires. But following the analogy of commerce, 
there is much to be said for their aspiration. Negotiation 
is always swifter, adjustment easier and less damaging, 
when the principals are few and groat, than when arrange- 
ments have to be concluded between a multitude of small 
and jealous men. All the personal obstacles to a good 
settlement are much reduced. The main issues become 
clearer, and interest asserts a greater influence than umbrage. 
It is therefore not impossible to believe that if there were 
only a few great empires in the world, a permanent peace 
might more easily be attained by the methods of wise and 
reasonable concession, than in the present welter of the 
competing interests and fantastic pride of innumerable dis- 
proportioned principalities. 



CONCLUSION 481 

It has been already stated that the union of the American 
States is not put forward as a model for the union of the 
British empire. Pericles' advice to the Athenians may well 
be borne in mind. " Our state does not enter enviously into 
' a comparison with the laws and systems of others. We do 
' not imitate them ; but rather we provide them with an 
' example." If there be a boast in these sentences, it is 
desirable to remember that there is also a warning. We. 
who have the right to speak no less proudly, have need to 
beware of the same danger. As the American States found 
their own way to union; as the German States followed 
an entirely different road and arrived at the same goal 
- — so must we look at the facts of our own case and be- 
ware of landmarks that are apt to mislead the traveller by 
a treacherous resemblance. The real usefulness of these m- 
stances is less in showing precedents that are safe to follow, 
than in disclosing to us the true nature of union, which is 
sovereignty, and its inexorable condition, which is sacrifice. 

Any political arrangement in which powers are withheld, 
or granted upon terms, or are subject to revision at the will 
of any member of the confederacy, is not a real union, but 
only an alliance. It is lacking both in stability and per- 
manence ; for the assent of the parties to the contract may 
at any moment be withdrawn. The test of union is the 
utter sovereignty of the central government, which must be 
free and able to act directly upon, and to touch, without the 
favour of any intermediary, the humblest of its citizens in 
the remotest corner of its dominions. Its subjects are not 
states but people ; and according to the tradition of our 
race, this power can only be secure and beyond question if 
the government be the choice of the whole people. Judged 
by this test, the British empire at the present time is not a 
political fact, but only a phrase, an influence, or a sentiment. 
As in the case of the states before the Convention of 

2h 



482 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

Philadelphia, there are in our case abundant materials out 
of which union may be built ; but the same materials, unless 
they are used with courage and intelligence to this end, may 
as readily be turned to the opposite purpose, and out of 
the very virtues of our people a fatal independence may 
be irrevocably assured. 

In the matter of sacrifice there is equally no escape. 
There is no way round. The separate states must be ready 
to incur it no less than individual men. Legislatures must 
be prepared to part with some of their authority, statesmen 
with much of their consequence, the people themselves, for 
the moment at any rate, with things which are dear to 
them. The aim and hope of this sacrifice is an immeasur- 
ably greater benefit at some later time. It may happen, as 
in the case of the American Union, that the advantage will 
be gained by our own generation ; but for a proud nation 
this is of little moment if our children shall have reason 
to acknowledge that their fathers were good citizens. But 
sacrifice, whether of blood, or labour, or dignity, or riches, 
is the price of a secure union, and it is impossible to escape 
the payment. America and Germany have paid it, and there 
is no discordant voice among us in acknowledging their 
virtue. Japan also has paid it with a splendour of con- 
tempt for the present, and of hope in the future, that proves 
youth to be a quality which the oldest nation may renew. 
Britain has already paid much on account; but in order 
that what we inherit from our fathers may be secured to 
our children, we are bound to fix our eyes, not upon our 
private advantage, not even upon the immediate prosperity 
of any particular state, but upon the ultimate strength and 
happiness of the whole Union of the Empire. 

It is well to grasp clearly the conditions of union and to 
consider, before we make the attempt, what are the main 



CONCLUSION 483 

difficulties to be surmounted. But having made our survey, 
having coolly appraised all the risks and hardships, it is not 
open to us to make a choice. The right of decision, whether 
we shall remain where we are or go forward on a bold 
adventure, is not in our hands. We are confronted, not by 
alternatives of policy, but by a plain, inexorable duty. We 
may choose indeed, but not as a merchant chooses between 
courses which promise a greater or a less gain. Our case is 
that of a brigade which, receiving orders to assault and 
capture a position, has a choice only between obedience and 
dishonour. 

With us, as with Hamilton, the single principle which 
rules over everything is the faithful stewardship of the estate. 
The plea of prudence will not avail us if we dig in the ground 
and hide away the talent. While we may readily grant that 
no task of a like difficulty has ever yet called upon any 
nation to undertake it, we may also consider that a 
successful achievement would leave the works of every age 
far behind it. The knowledge that so great a thing has 
never yet been done in the history of the world is in itself a 
reason to the British race for cheerfully attempting it. 

When we contemplate the nature of the opportunity 
' in all its dimensions of length, breadth, height, and depth,' 
we tremble at the possibility that it should be missed. The 
mere numbers of our own people, scattered throughout the 
empire at the present time, are no measure of our respon- 
sibility. The duty of stewardship looks further ahead, at 
a population that may be, at homesteads that are not yet 
built, fields that are still unbroken. Few men would wish 
to shirk the burden of our inheritance, but the confusion 
is apt to overwhelm our understandings and misguide our 
efforts. We allow ourselves perhaps to be too much oppressed 
by the maxim that charity begins at home. We are dis- 
couraged when we contemplate the base and huddled poverty 



484 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

of our great cities, and arc too ready to turn with impatience 
upon a teacher who reminds us sternly that this hideous 
problem is only a part of the cares of empire. It is not the 
mere weight or number of the burdens that renders them 
intolerable, but quite as often faults of balance and adjust- 
ment. It is easy to pass from pity to despair at the sight 
of black squalor and hungry discontent if we insist upon 
regarding these alone. But if the mind's eye be allowed to 
range 'far and wide' over the field of duty we shall see 
things in a truer proportion, and may discover that a double 
load is easier to carry than a single one. If we are responsible 
for all the misery which is packed in our great towns, we 
are no less responsible for those wide, unpeopled tracts where 
fresh winds blow. If England is full of cities where life is 
sorrowful, where clothing, food and shelter — even air and 
the light of the sun — are hard to come by, it may be worth 
a thought whether the true remedy is not to be found in 
the acceptance of the whole imperial burden, in the de- 
velopment of an inheritance where men and women of our 
race can live and children be born to them, where the soil 
is rich with the promise of plenty, and the climate stern 
enough to keep the vigour of our manhood. 

But even if the remedy for social disorders were not to 
be found in the performance of the imperial duty, that duty 
remains unaltered. As we sit quietly at home reading the 
names of places on Mercator's Projection, it is natural to be 
proud of our ancestors who served under Burleigh or the 
Pitts. The results of their indomitable efforts lie around us 
on every side. In the west there is a great Dominion, in 
the south a great Commonwealth, in the east a great Empire. 
From Table Mountain to the delta of the Nile there is a 
chain of states, territories, protectorates, and spheres stretch- 
ing out on either hand from the Indian Ocean to the 
Atlantic. There are islands all the world over, some as 



CONCLUSION 485 

large as European states, and strong places in every sea 
and on every coast. Our obligation to the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries is not cancelled or diminished because 
the nineteenth, wearied by a struggle that was nearly 
fatal, fell asleep, and awoke again to find itself in a hum 
of material prosperity which it mistook during fifty years 
for the millennium. We are still burdened with the honour 
of the stewardship. The nature of our duty has changed, 
but the duty itself is plain. The estate is of such vast 
extent that it is hard to think of a boundary which it would 
be desirable to set farther out, or of a corner that needs to 
be rounded off. The period of acquisition may be said to 
have ended. The new task is to make a worthy use. 

The question which now presses for an answer is — what 
can we make of all this ? Can we make more if we stand 
fast by the ideal of John Bright ; if each part goes its own 
way, thinking merely of its own immediate advantage, doing 
only the duty which lies nearest to its hand, keeping a kind 
heart and a smiling face for all men, but for its kinsmen no 
more than for strangers ? Can we still approve the ideal of 
sturdy sons whose destiny is independence ? 

This solution has been deliberately rejected, not because it 
is too arduous, but rather because it is too easy. It does not 
cover the whole field of duty. It misses the special meaning 
of an opportunity which has offered itself to us alone among 
all nations whose history has been preserved. During the 
past thirty years a new light has been thrown upon our 
affairs. The whole view has changed. Political duties 
appear in a different proportion. Independence, bustling 
and shouldering its way along, is no longer accepted as the 
worthiest aim for each separate member of the union. The 
idea of a joint stewardship is gradually imposing itself upon 
every earnest mind. The goal is a wide co-operation whose 
consequences are fervently believed to be an unexampled 



486 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

order, prosperity and strength. As the thoughts of the 
people have become clearer, statesmen have grown less 
diffident, and not in one state or in one party, but in every 
state and in all parties, there is a stir and murmur of life. 
The desire for union is suddenly discovered to be deeply 
implanted in our hearts. Men are prepared for sacrifices, if 
only the leaders would understand, and will hardly be satisfied 
that their object has been attained unless they are called 
upon for sacrifices. Confidence in the old policy of dis- 
integration is utterly destroyed. Nor will people believe 
that the new policy of union is to be achieved without an 
effort. They are suspicious of advice which assures them 
that true safety is to be found by drifting with the easiest 
currents. Their minds are fully possessed by the greatness 
of the endeavour, and they have judged rightly that the 
difficulties which attend it must be in proportion. A pro- 
blem of this magnitude, in their opinion, cannot be solved 
without guidance of the forces. The industrious cupidity 
of distracted individuals, the energies, ambitions and rivalries 
of particular states can never carry them to their goal. 

The final question with us, as with Hamilton, is how 
we may convert a voluntary league of states, terminable 
upon a breath, into a firm union. It is useless to regret 
what has been done or left undone during the past century ; 
but it is not altogether profitless to consider in what position 
we might have found ourselves to-day had British policy 
during that period proceeded on the centripetal instead of 
on the centrifugal principle. 

Few will be found to deny that the empire in such case 
might already have become a strong political fact; that 
we might have retained within our own boundaries a vast 
population which is now lost to us; that the resources of 
our rapidly accumulating wealth, instead of being lent out 
to strangers, might have been employed in the development 



CONCLUSION 487 

of our own estate, benefiting us not merely in usury, but in 
the use. For the currents of investment, no less than those 
of emigration, are capable of being controlled and diverted 
by an intelligent policy, pursuing a steady and consistent aim. 

So much is granted by many who will grant no more. 
True, they say, we might have had a stronger empire, but we 
should have attained it by the sacrifice of what is of still 
higher value. The whole might have gained much, but the 
parts would have lost more. The spirit of freedom and 
self-reliance would have been discouraged. The growth of 
material prosperity might have been arrested. 

Granting the sincerity of this doctrine, it is hard to under- 
stand how it comes to be held. If we accept it we are 
compelled also to believe that the malcontents of New York 
were in the right, and that their own state, and probably 
the remaining twelve as well, would have thriven better in 
disunion than bound together. So far as the plea may be 
tested by arithmetic, it resolves itself into an absurdity; 
while if we judge it by our sentiments, or by those instincts 
under whose guidance we go about our daily business, we 
have to do violence, in accepting it, to every principle upon 
which we are wont to act in our private affairs. It is no less 
opposed to all the lessons of individual experience than to 
those of political history. 

" But," it will be said, "in the eagerness of your argument 
' the principle of nationality has been overlooked. The 
' American Union succeeded because it made a single nation. 
' If British Union is to succeed we also must make a single 
' nation. An empire which admitted nationality would be 
' no true union, and an empire which crushed nationality 
' would be intolerable." An empire, according to this theory, 
is either a ruthless tyranny or an empty abstraction. 

Those timid minds who dread the extinction of the 
national spirit, while they maintain it to be incompatible 



488 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

with a firm union, are apt to ignore the facts which lie 
nearest to them. The union of Scotland with England has 
lasted for three centuries if we count from the accession of 
King James the Sixth ; for two centuries if we reckon from 
the Act of Union. Yet Scotland retains, as England also 
retains, every characteristic of a proud and self-reliant 
nation. The national life of Scotland is the growth of a 
thousand years. For more than ten centuries Scots kings 
have ruled and Scots pride has remained unbroken. If 
we were in search of a type to illustrate the meaning 
of the word ' nation,' we should turn to Scotland. Her 
nationality is no abstraction, but a tingling reality; a 
living organism, and not a mere legend of the poets. 
She has all the stern virtues of a nation and all the fan- 
tastic punctilios. The love and fidelity of her children, 
scattered in the four quarters of the world, are proofs 
which stand fast against the scorner. Her valour, her 
arrogance, her belief in her own destiny have not been 
quenched by the free citizenship of a wider empire. Her 
traditions have suffered no wound or injury in a loyal co- 
operation. With the example of Scotland before us it is 
wise to have confidence. The meaning of Empire to a free 
people is not a stunting and overshadowing growth, but a 
proud and willing subordination. Its aim is the security of 
a great inheritance, and while it will augment the resources 
and the power of every member of the union, it will also 
touch each separate state and private citizen with a firmer 
courage and a finer dignity. 



APPENDIX I 

James Hamilton, the father of Alexander Hamilton, was the 
fourth of eight sons of Alexander Hamilton of Grange, in Ayr- 
shire, hy Elizabeth, eldest daughter of Sir Robert Pollock of that 
Ilk. Alexander Hamilton of Grange was in direct descent from 
Walter de Hamilton, the second son of Sir David de Hamilton, 
Dominus de Cadyow, the common ancestor of the elder branches 
of this famous house, head of the family, and a person of great 
consideration during the reign of King David ii. (He is mentioned 
as one of the Magnates Scotise at a meeting of the Estates held at 
Scone, 27th March 1371.) The Hamiltons of Cambuskeith received 
their first grant from King Robert ill., inter 1390 et 1406. To 
Cambuskeith were added the lands of Grange, as appears from a 
charter dated 7th May 1588. Arms : gules, a lion rampant argent, 
betwixt three cinquefoils ermine. Crest : an oak-tree proper. 
Motto: "Viridis et fructifera." — Memoirs of the House of Hamilton, 
John Anderson, 1825, pp. 254-257. 



APPENDIX II 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 

Event. 

Seven Years' War begins, 

[Jan. 11] Alexander Hamilton born 

Fall of French power in Canada ((Quebec taken). 

Accession of George iii. 

Fall of French power in India. 

Resignation of Pitt the elder. 

Lord Bute's ministry. 

Seven Years' War ends (Treaty of Paris). 

American Stamp Act passed — resistance of the 

colonies. 
Lord Rockingham's ministry. 
Stamp Act repealed — Chatham's ministry. 
American imports taxed. 
Duke of Grafton's ministry. 
A. H. apprenticed to Nicholas Cruger. 
Boston occupied by British troops. 
1770 13 Lord North's ministry. 

American import duties removed except on tea. 



Date. 


Age of 
Hamilton, 


1756 




1757 




1758 


1 


1759 


2 


1760 


3 


1761 


4 


1762 


5 


1763 


6 


1764 


7 


1765 


8 


1766 


9 


1767 


10 


1768 


11 


1769 


12 



1771 


14 


1772 


15 


1773 


16 



[Oct.] A. H. arrives in New York. 

[Autumn] A. H. enters at King's College 

(Columbia). 
[Dec] Boston Tea Riots. 
1774 17 [July] A. H. speaks at Meeting in the Fields. 
Continental Congress meets at Philadelphia. 

490 



APPENDIX 491 

Date, n^^^u^ Event. 

Hamilton, 

1774 17 [Dec] A. H. pamphlet, 'Full Vindication.' 

Repressive measures passed against American 
colonies. 

1775 18 [Feb.] A. H. pamphlet, 'The Farmer Refuted.' 

[April] Skirmish of Lexington. 

Americans besiege Boston. 

[June] Battle of Bunker Hill. 

Washington appointed Commander-in-chief. 

A. H. pamphlet, 'Remarks on the Quebec Bill.' 

A. H. joins 'Hearts of Oak' Volunteers. 

[Dec] Failure of American attack on Quebec. 

1776 19 British evacuate Boston. 

[March] A. H. appointed captain of New York 

company of artillery. 
[July 4] Declaration of Independence. 
[Aug.] Washington defeated at Brooklyn. 
[Dec] Washington victorious at Trenton and 

Princeton. 
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. 

1777 20 [March] A. H. appointed A.D.O. and Military 

Secretary to Commander-in-chief with rank of 

Lieutenant-Colonel. 
[Sept.] Washington defeated at the Brandy wine 

and [Oct.] Germantown. 
[Oct.] Burgoyne surrenders to Gates at Saratoga. 
Conway Cabal begins. 

1778 21 Americans enter into alliance with France and 

Spain. 
[May] Death of Chatham. 

1779 22 Siege of Gibraltar begins. 

[Sept.] French and American attack on Savannah 
repulsed. 

1780 23 [May] British capture Charleston. 

A. H.'s first memorandum to Morris on establish- 
ment of National Bank. 
[July] French reinforcements arrive. 
[Sept.] Americans defeated at Camden. 
Treachery of Benedict Arnold. 
[Dec] A. H. marries Miss Betsy Schuyler. 



492 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

Date, jr^^^f Event. 

Hamilton. 

1781 24 A. H.'s second memorandum to Morris on estab- 

lishment of National Bank. 
A. H. resigns Military Secretaryship. 

Second French fleet sails for America. 
Dissensions in American army. 
A. H. begins ' The Continentalist.' 
[Oct.] Surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. 
A. H. captures 1st Redoubt, 

1782 25 A. H. appointed receiver of Continental Taxes 

for New York State. 
A. H. elected to Congress. 
A. H. called to the Bar. 
Victories of Rodney. 

1783 26 [Jan.] Preliminaries of Peace arranged. 

[Dec] Pitt the younger's ministry. 

1784 27 Americans begin to violate terms of the Treaty of 

Peace. 

1785 28 Conference on waterways at Mount Vernon. 

Paper money. 

Civil war (Shays's Rebellion). 

1786 29 Convention of Annapolis. 

A. H. represents New York at Convention. 

1787 30 Convention of Philadelphia. 

1788 31 Convention of New York state at Poughkeepsie. 

Ratification of constitution by majority of states. 

1789 32 Washington elected President. 

[May] Opening of States-General. 

[July] Fall of the Bastille. 

[Sept.] A. H. Secretary of the Treasury. 

[Dec] Jefterson appointed Secretary of State. 

1790 33 A. H. reports on Public Credit. 

A. H.'s Financial Policy accepted. 

Burke's ' Reflections on the French Revolution.' 

1791 34 A. H.'s plan for National Bank accepted. 

[June] The flight to Varcnnes. 
British Minister (Hammond) arrives in U.S. 
American Minister (Pinckney) arrives in England. 
Jefferson's and Madison's opposition to A. H. 



APPENDIX 493 

Date, jj^^^'n^ Event. 

JJaiinlton. 

1792 35 Washington re-elected President. 

The French Republic proclaimed. 
[April] France declares war on Austria. 
[Sept.] Battle of Valmy. 
[Nov.] Battle of Jemappes. 

1793 36 [Jan.] Execution of Louis xvi. 

France declares war on Britain and Holland. 
Washington issues 'Declaration of Neutrality.' 
A. H. writes letters of ' Pacificus.' 
Genet (Minister of France) arrives at Charleston. 
Genet attacks Washington's administration. 
[Dec. 31] Jefferson resigns, 

1794 37 Jay goes to Britain to negotiate treaty. 

[July] Eobespierre beheaded. 
Whisky Eebellion. 

1795 38 A. H. resigns Secretaryship of the Treasury. 

Jay's Treaty with Great Britain. 
[Oct.] Napoleon fires on Paris mob. 
[Nov.] The Directory. 
179G 39 Napoleon's campaign in Italy. 

A. H. writes letters of 'Camillus.' 

A. H. drafts Washington's ' Farewell Address.' 

1797 40 John Adams elected President. 

[Feb.] Battle of Cape St. Vincent. 
[Oct.] Battle of Camperdown. 

1798 41 U.S. prepare for war against France. 

Washington nominated Commander-in-chief. 
A. H. second in command. 
[Aug.] Battle of the Nile. 

1799 42 Napoleon First Consul. 

[Dec] Death of Washington. 

1800 43 Presidential Election Tie. 

[June] Battle of Marengo. 
American Treaty with France. 

1801 44 Jefferson becomes President and Aaron Burr 

Vice-President. 
Pitt resigns. 

1802 45 [March] Treaty of Amiens. 



494 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 

Date. H^^liltl. E^-^- 

1803 46 U.S. purchase Louisiana from France. 

[May] Britain declares war on France. 

1804 47 [May] Napoleon Emperor. 

[July 11] A. H. killed in a duel with Aaron Burr. 
Pitt's second ministry. 



INDEX 



Abraham, Heights of, 37. 
Adams, John, 101. 

Hamilton's attack on, 402 et seq. 
Inauguration as President, 350. 
Influence of Hamilton over his cabi- 
net, 372. 
Presidency of, 390-6. 
Adams, Samuel, 27, 101. 
Aide -de- Camp, Hamilton appointed, 

69. 
Alien Act, 396. 
Allen, Ethan, captures Crown Point and 

Ticonderoga, 31. 
A7nericanus, letters of, 351. 
Ames, Fisher — 

Description of Washington's inaug- 
uration as President, 183. 
Laments condition of Public Credit, 
215. 
Annapolis — 

Convention of, 141-3. 
Hamilton's address to Convention 
of, 142. 
Aristocratic element in the Constitution, 

Hamilton's anxiety to secure, 161. 
Army, American — 
Disbanded, 68. 
Sedition on account of non-payment, 

66-7. 
Starved and mutinous, 59. 
Arnold, Benedict, 101. 

Captures Crown Point and Ticon- 
deroga, 31. 
In British service invades Virginia, 

60. 
Invades Canada, 37. 
Treachery of, 59. 
Artillery Company of New York — Hamil- 
ton appointed to command, 68. 
Asia, H.M.S., fires on Hamilton's volun- 
teer corps, 31. 



Assumption of State Debts — Hamilton's 
plan rejected and afterwards carried, 
223. 

Attacks on Hamilton's integrity, 277 et 
seq. , 291 et seq. 

Bank, National — Hamilton's plan adop- 
ted, 225 et seq. 
Bar of New York — Hamilton admitted 

to, 113. 
Barras, Admiral de, 61. 
Bentham, Jeremy, 418. 
Boston — 

Evacuation of, by Sir William Howe, 

39. 
Hamilton visits, 18. 
Siege of, 36. 
Tea riots, 19. 
Brandywine, battle of, 47. 
Bright, John — 

Colonial idea, 485. 

Influence on the Liberal party, 

479. 
Opposition to Whigs and Tories, 
464-5. 
Britain — 

Hamilton's desire for good relations 

with, 311. 
Hamilton urges preparations for war 

against, 342. 
Oppressive shipping regulations, 

341-2. 
Treaty with, 341-50. 
British Agent accredited to United States, 

227. 
British Constitution — Hamilton's admira- 
tion for, 155. 
Brooklyn, battle of, 41. 

Hamilton's conduct at, 69. 
Burr, Aaron — 

Challenges Hamilton, 420. 
496 



496 



ALEXANDER HAMILTON 



Burr, Aaron — continued. 
Character of, 406 et seq. 
Conduct before duel witli Hamilton, 

422. 
Great party organiser, 393 et seq. 
Opposed by Jefferson and Democrats, 

406-7. 
Receives equal votes with Jefferson 
for Presidency, 403. 
Bunker Hill, battle of, 31. 
Biirgoyne, General — 

Moves from Canada on New York, 

45. 
Surrenders at Saratoga, 48, 49. 
Burke, Edmund, 26. 

Callender— newspaper editor, 386 et 

seq. 
Cainden, battle of, 59. 
Camillus letters of, 351 et seq. 
Canadian War — its legacy of ill-feeling 

between Britain and Colonists, 25. 
Carleton, Colonel — holds Quebec, 37. 
Carrington, Colonel— Hamilton's letter 

to, 286 et seq. 
Charleston — 

Evacxiation of, 64. 

Siege and capture of, by Sir Henry 
Clinton, 57, 58. 
Cincinnati, society of— Hamilton and 

Burr meet at dinner, 425-6. 
Clingman, 382 et seq. 
Clinton, Governor — 

At Convention of Poughkeepsie, 

176-9. 
Opposes fulfilment of terms of Peace, 
118, 119, 120. 
Clinton, Sir Henry, 45, 46. 

Plan for kidnapping, 74, 75. 

Siege and capture of Charleston, 57, 

58. 
Supersedes Sir William Howe, 51. 
Too weak to move to assistance of 
Burgoyne, 48. 
Commercial policy of Britain towards 
the states after Treaty of Peace, 127-31. 
Commercial policy of United States- 
Hamilton's Eeport on, 228-48. 
Commercial Treaties — difficulty of ob- 
taining, 134. 
Conciliatory Bills, 51. 
Confederation and perpetual union — 
articles of, 99. 



Army, neglect of, and lack of fair 

dealing with, 38, 45, 57, 66, 112. 
Attack on, by Dr. SeaVnuy ; defence 

of, by Hamilton, '28. 
Conduct of the war by, 96-110. 
Convention of Annapolis, indigna- 
tion with, 143. 
Election of New York delegates to, 

28. 
Hamilton elected to, 125, 
Hamilton's prominent part in, 125, 

126. 
Impotency of, after peace, 125. 
Philadelphia being threatened, re- 
moves to Baltimore, 42. 
Want of power and ability in, 55. 
Congresses following Union— their dura- 
tion, 200 n. 
Contijientalist, The, pamphlet on need of 

Union, 89-95. 
Convention of New York at Pough- 
keepsie, 176-9. 
Convention of Philadcliihia, account of, 

147-65. 
Conway Cabal, 103. 
Cornwallis, Lord — 

Battle of Monmouth Court-House, 

52. 
Defeats Greene at Guilford Court- 
House, and retreats to Wilming 
ton, 60. 
Left in command in south, 58. 
Meets Arnold at Petersburg, and 
sends him back to New York, 
61. 
Pursues Washington across New 

Jersey, 42, 43. 
Surrender at Yorktown, 61-4. 
Credit, the public — 

Hamilton's first report on, 216. 
Hamilton's policy, account of, 215- 
28. 
Crown Point falls into hands of rebels, 

31. 
Cniger, Nicholas, effects of Hamilton's 
apprenticeship to, 16, 17, 33. 



Debt— 

Divisions of the public, 216. 
The domestic — Hamilton's proposak 
for, 217 et seq. 



INDEX 



497 



Debt — continued. 

The foreign — Hamilton's proposals 
accepted, 217. 
Democratic Party, origin of, 270 et seq. 
Ditficulties of Union (1787), 460. 
Disraeli, 451. 
Divine Right, 451. 

Dorchester Heights occupied by Wash- 
ington, 39. 
Duane, Hamilton's letter to, 87-9. 
Duel of Hamilton with Burr, 420-8. 
Dumouriez, General, 324. 

Election Tie, 403. 
Empire, the duties of, 479-88. 
Esprit des Lois, I', 173-4. 
Estaing, Admiral d', 50. 

Repulse of, at Savannah, 56. 

Returns to West Indies, 54. 

Retires a second time to West 
Indies, 56. 

Sails for France, 56. 

Sails to New York and Rhode 
Island, 53. 
Eutaw Springs, battle of, 62. 

Farewell Address, Washington issues, 

349, 351 et seq. 
Farmer Refuted, The, pamphlet by 

Hamilton, 29. 
Faucette, Rachel, mother of Alexander 

Hamilton, 15. 
Federalist Party, its beginning, 191. 
Federalist, The, 165-76. 
Federalists favour Burr's election to 

Presidency, 404. 
Fort Wasliington, Hamilton volunteers 

to retake, 69. 
France- 
Advantages of war with, 394-5. 
Alliance with (1778), 50. 
Danger of war with (1798), 393. 
Franklin, Benjamin, 27, 39. 

Description of John Adams, 390. 
Gates and French parties wish to 
nominate for Presidency, 185. 
Fraunces' Tavern, Washington says fare- 
well to his officers at, 34. 
French Revolution — 

Influence on American politics, 303- 

41. 
Popular feeling in United States in 
favour of, 315 et seq. 



Freneau starts the National Gazette, 277. 

Frontier posts, retention of, by Britain, 
127. 

Full Vindication, pamphlet by Hamil- 
ton, 29. 

Gage, General, holds Boston, 86. 
Gallatin — 

Becomes eminent in Congress, 349. 
Connection with Whisky Rebellion, 
344. 
Gates, General Horatio, 103. 

Adherents wish Franklin to be 
President instead of Washington, 
185. 
Captures Burgoyne at Saratoga, 48. 
Defeated at Camden, 59. 
Hamilton sent to seek reinforce- 
ments from, 71-3. 
Intrigues to destroy army's attach- 
ment to Washington, 67. 
Strong party in favour of, against 

Washington, 71. 
Superseded by General Greene, 60, 
Genet, Citizen — 

Arrives in America, 332. 
Character of, 336-41. 
George iii., King — 

Influence upon Rebellion, 27. 
Sense of duty, 58. 
Germaine, Lord George, 45, 46. 
Germantown, battle of, 48. 
Gibraltar, destruction of attacking 

batteries, 68. 
Giles of Virginia, character of, 292-5. 
Grasse, Admiral de, sails from Brest, 60. 
Graves, Admiral, 62. 
Greene, General, 101. 

Guilford Court-House, defeated at, 

60. 
Hobkirk Hill defeat at, 60. 
Takes command in the south, 60. 
Guilford Court-House, battle of, 60. 

Halifax, Sir William Howe retires to, 39. 

Hamilton, James, father of Alexander 
Hamilton, 15. 

Hamilton's plan at Convention of Phila- 
delphia, 153. 

Harlem, HamiltoE's earthworks at, 69. 

Harrison, General, 70. 

Hearts of Oak volunteer corps, Hamilton 
joins, 31. 



2i 



498 



ALEXANDER HAMILTON 



Helvetius, letters of, 351. 

Henry, Patrick, 27. 

Heth, Colonel, letter to Hamilton, 299. 

Hobkirk Hill, battle of, 60. 

Holland, loan successfully floated in, 

227. 
Holt's Journal, Hamilton writes for 

29. 
Hood, Admiral, 62. 
Horatius, letters of, 3.51. 
House of Lords, Hamilton's admiration 

for, 1.57. 
Howe, Admiral Lord — 

Defence of New York, 53. 
Moves against French fleet, 54. 
Transports army across bay to New 

York, 53. 
Withdraws resignation on hearing of 
approach of French in superior 
strength, 51. 
Howe, Sir William — 

Drives Washington from his positions 
at White Plains; captures Ameri- 
can forts, 42. 
New York, attack on, 40. 
Pliiladelphia, moves on, 47. 
Succeeds General Gage, 39. 
Hudson River — importance of waterway, 
39. 

Implied Powers— Hamilton's doctrine 
of, 225 et seq. 

Independence, Declaration of, 41 ; com- 
parison with Washington's Farewell 
Address, 363 et seq. 

Independence — the object of Hamilton's 
threefold policy, 194-6. 

Independence, War of — its period, 33. 

Jay, John— 

Hamilton's letter to, on difficulties of 
Union, 125. 

Helps Hamilton to write the Feder- 
alist, 168. 

Nominated to negotiate treaty with 
Britain, 344. 

Policy with regard to navigation of 
Mississippi, 140. 

Refuses Hamilton's suggestion for 
altering method of New York 
election, 402. 

Success of mission to Britain. 348. 



Jeff'erson, Thomas — 

Anas, allegations in, that Hamil- 
ton's measures were grounded in 
corruption, 281. 

Antipathy to Britain, 313. 

Assists Freneau to start the National 
Gazette, 277. 

Attacks Hamilton through Washing- 
ton, 289. 

Attitude to Slavery and State 
Rights, 433-7. 

Burr, opposition to ; refuses him any 
post, 407. 

Character of, 251 et seq. 

Declaration of Independence written 
by, 40. 

Doubts about ratification of Con- 
stitution, 178. 

Execution of Louis xvi., opinion as 
to, 327. 

Hamilton's attack on, 290-1. 

Influence upon Rebellion, 27. 

Kentucky Resolutions drafted by, 
397. 

National Bank, opposition to, 225. 

Receives equal votes with Burr for 
Presidency, 403. 

Secretary of State, appointment as, 
213. 

Shrewdness in dealing with men, 
258-9. 

September massacres, opinion as to, 
326. 

Tour in France, 317-18. 

With Madison founds the Demo- 
cratic party, 273. 

IvENTUcKY Resolutions, 397-8. 
King's College — 

Hamilton entered at, 19. 
Hamilton protects the Principal, 32. 
Knox, Dr. — a Presbyterian minister, early 

friend of Hamilton, 18. 
Knox, General, appointed Minister of 
War, 212. 

Lafayette, Marquis of, 77, 315, 323. 
Commands light corps in the south, 

61. 
Hamilton's letter to, on French 

Revolution, 319. 
Washington's letter to, on sea-power, 

35. 



INDEX 



499 



Ledyarrl, 121. 
Lee, General, 52. 
Lexington, skirmish of, 31, 34. 
Lincoln, Abraham, 376. 

Confirms Hamilton's work, 437. 
Louis XVI., King, 49. 
Louisiana, purchase of, 405. 
Loyalists, oppressive acts in relation to, 
after peace, 119-20. 



Machiavelli, 173-4. 

M'Henry, Secretary of War under 

John Adams, 396. 
Madison, James — 

Accuses Hamilton of dishonesty, 

285. 
Advises Washington to appoint 

Jefferson Secretary of State, 213. 
Character of, 219 et seq. 
Conversion of, by Hamilton, alleged, 

149. 
Commercial war with Britain, anxious 

for, 311. 
Declaration of Neutrality denounced 

by, 339. 
Favours modified repudiation, 218- 

19. 
Helps Hamilton to write the Feder- 
alist, 168. 
Laments condition of public credit, 

21.5. 
National Bank, opposition to, 225. 
Preparation for war against Britain, 

opposition to, 343. 
Slavery and State Rights, opposition 

to, 433-7. 
Warning to Hamilton of intended 

attacks on constitution, 273. 
With Jefferson founds the Demo- 
cratic party, 273. 
Manufactures, Hamilton's report on, 

228-48. 
Marriage of Hamilton with Miss Betsy 

Schuyler, 75. 
Meeting in the Fields, Hamilton's speech 

at, 27, 28. 
Military Secretaryship — 

Hamilton appointed to, 69. 
Hamilton resigns, 76-78. 
Mississippi, navigation of, 140. 
Monmouth Court -House, battle of, 
52. 



Monroe Doctrine, 358-9. 
Monroe, James — 

Connection with the Reynolds 

scandal, 380-9. 
Declaration of Neutrality denounced 

by, 339. 
Ratification of Constitution opposed 

by at Virginia Convention, 178. 
Recalled from Paris for incompe- 
tency, 385. 
Slavery and State Rights, attitude 
towards, 433-7. 
Montesquieu, 173-4. 
Montgomery invades Canada, 37. 
Montreal, surrender of, 37. 
Morris, Robert, 105, 133. 
Financial Minister, 84. 
Hamilton's first memorandum to, 

85. 
Hamilton's second memorandum to. 
86. 
Morristown, Washington's winter quar- 
ters, 44. 
Mount Vernon, conference at, 138. 
Muhlenberg, F. A., Speaker of House of 
Representatives, 382 et seq. 



Narragansett Bat, Lord Howe appears 
ofi-, 54. 

Nationality, 461-6. 

Neutrality, Declaration of, 330-2. 

Nevis, island of, birthplace of Hamilton, 
16. 

New Jersey Plan at Convention of Phila- 
delphia, 151. 

North, Lord, 26, 40. 



Pacificus, letters of, 335, 351 et seq. 

Paper money, 135-7. 

Issued by Congress, 100. 

Parties in the United States, origin and 
growth of, 270-85. 

Patterson introduces New Jersey Plan, 
151. 

Peace with Britain, preliminary articles 
of signed, 68. 

Phocion, letters from, 115. 

Pickering, member of John Adams's 
cabinet, 396. 

Pinckney, Thomas, elected Vice-Presi- 
dent, 392. 



500 



ALEXANDER HAMILTON 



Pitt, the j'ounger — 

Commercial policy, 127-9. 
Comparison with Hamilton, 429. 
French Revolution interferes with 
his policy, 304-5. 
Poughkeepsie, Convention of New York 

at, 176-9. 
Princeton — 

Washington captures, 43. 
Washington retires to, 42. 
Princeton College, Hamilton applies for 

admission to, 18. 
Principe, II, 173-4. 
Publius, a pamphlet against peculation, 

84. 
Putnam, General— Hamilton requires to 
send reinforcements to Washington, 
72, 73. 

Quebec, American attack on, repulsed by 
Carleton, 37. 

Quebec Bill- 
Effect on Canadian feeling, 31. 
Pamphlet by Hamilton, 29. 



Randolph, Edmund— 

Applies to French ambassador for 

money, 346. 
Attorney-General, appointment as, 

212. 
Introduces Virginia Plan, 150. 
Opposed to measures for suppres- 
sion of Whisky Rebellion, 346. 
Raritan, crossing of, Hamilton's conduct 

at, 69. 
Rawdon, Lord, defeats Greene at Hob- 
kirk Hill, 60. 
Receiver of taxes for New York state, 

Hamilton's appointment to, 113. 
Repudiation, 217-18. 

Advocated by Monroe, 343, 
Resignation of office, Hamilton's motives 

for, 372-3. 
Revolutionary epoch, 254. 
Reynolds scandal, 380-9. 
Rivington's Press, Hamilton's attempt to 

prevent destruction of, 32. 
Rochambeau, Count de, 35, 61. 

Arrives with fleet at Rhode Island, 
59. 
Rockingham, Marquis of, 26. 



Rodney, Admiral, 62. 

Arrives at New York, 59. 

Defeats de Grasse, 68. 
Rousseau, 115-6. 

Ideal of, 479-80. 



St. Croix, island of, Hamilton appren- 
ticed in, 16. 
St. John, surrender of, 37. 
Saratoga — 

Burgoyne surrenders at, 48, 49. 
Military and political consequences 
of surrender of, 49. 
Savannah — 

Capture of, by the British, 54. 
Evacuation of, 64. 

French and American attack on, 
repulsed, 56. 
Schuyler, General, 113. 

Hamilton's letter to, on resignation 

of Military Secretaryship, 77. 
Strategy before Saratoga, 75. 
Schuyler, Miss Betsy — Hamilton's mar- 
riage with, 75. 
Scotland the type of a nation within an 

empire, 488. 
Seabury, Dr. — pamphlet. West Chester 

Farmer, 28. 
Secession, War of, 189-90. 
Secretary of Treasury — 

Appointment of Hamilton, 199. 
Hamilton's friends averse to his 

accepting the post, 206. 
Inadequate salary of office, 207. 
Resignation of office by Hamilton, 
300. 
Sedition Act, 396. 
Shays's Rebellion, 137. 
Shipping, American — British regulations 

with object of crippling, 131. 
Smith, Adam — Wealth of Nations; in- 
fluence on Hamilton's report on manu- 
factures, 229. 
Smith, Melancthon, at Convention of 

Poughkeepsie, 178. 
Sovereignty the condition of Union, 

473-9. 
Speaker, the, Hamilton's letter to, 

298. 
Speculation (1791), 227. 
Stevens, Edward, Hamilton's letter to, 
16. 



INDEX 



501 



Sullivan, General — 

Abandonment of operations in 

Rliode Island on withdrawal of 

French fleet, 54. 
Endeavours to drive British out of 

Newport, 53, 54. 

Talleyrand — opinion of Hamilton, 6, 

319. 
Tariff war between the various states, 

135. 
Ternay, Chevalier de, 35. 

Arrives with fleet at Rhode Island, 59. 
Textbook on law by Hamilton, 122. 
Ticonderoga — 

Burgoyne retakes, 48. 
Falls into hands of rebels, 31. 
Tories — 

American, their reasons against re- 
bellion, 23. 
Hamilton a Tory statesman, 448- 

54. 
Persecution of, after Treaty of Peace, 

124. 
Policy of, in Britain in nineteenth 
century, 464. 
Treaty of Paris, 138. 
Treaty of Peace— breaches of, by the 

states, 116-23. 
Trenton, Washington storms, 43. 
Trespass Act, 120. 

Troup, Robert— early friend of Hamil- 
ton's, 19. 

Union, resolutions in favour of, drafted 
by Hamilton, 126. 

Valley Forge— 

Hamilton engaged with Committee 

of Congress at, 73, 74. 
Washington's winter quarters, 50. 
Venables, a Democratic politician, 383 et 

seq. 
Virginia Plan at Convention of Philadel- 
phia, 150. 

War of Independence— 
First year of, 36-8. 
Second year of, 39-44. 
Third year of, 44-50. 
Fourth year of, 50-4. 
Fifth year of, 54-6. 
Sixth year of, 56-9. 



War of Independence— con<twMetf. 
Seventh year of, 60-5. 
Eighth year of, 65-6. 
Ninth year of, 66-8. 
Washington — 

Attacks on, for signing treaty with 

Britain, 348. 
Attitude of Congress towards army, 

Hamilton's letter on, 112. 
Burning of New York advocated on 

military grounds, 42. 
Cabinet Government, mistaken con- 
ception of, 202-5. 
Campaigns, brilliant autumn cam- 
paign (1776), 44. 
Effect on Hamilton's character, 33. 
Censure of General Lee by, 53. 
Centrifugal and centripetal tenden- 
cies, Hamilton's letter on, 107-8. 
Charges that Hamilton exercised 

undue influence over, 73. 
Circular letter to Governors of 

states, 108. 
Clemency in spite of Congress, 56. 
Commander - in - Chief, appointment 

as 31, 393. 
Concealing departure from Clinton, 

marches south, 62. 
Conference at Mount Vemon, 138. 
Convention of Philadelphia, presides 

at, 147. 
Democratic press, denunciation by, 

349. 
Desires that Hamilton should under- 
take mission to Britain, 343-4. 
Dictatorship, suggestions of, 66. 
Difficulties in making army eflScient, 

37, 38. 
Discusses with Rochambeau whether 
to attack Clinton in New York or 
Cornwallis in the south, 61. 
Dread of 'habit of trade' with 

Spain, 139. 
Dream of development of western 

lands, 138. 
Efforts to keep army in being after 

Yorktown, 65. 
Elected President, 183. 
Farewell Address, issue of, 349. 
Federalist policy, sends Hamilton 

list of objections to, 289. 
Genet's attack on, 340. 
Holds New York, 41. 



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